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From the late eighteenth century to the First World War, in slightly more than a 
century, the Ligurian maritime community of Camogli, located thirty kilometres 
far from Genoa, underwent enormous transformations. Either provoked by global 
processes or local events, these transformations were inherently related to the 
irreplaceable relationship of its inhabitants with the sea.  
The sea, the global and the local are the primary elements of this doctoral thesis, 
which grounds upon the adoption of a maritime perspective to analyse the 
dialectic between the global and local dimensions – an approach stimulated by 
recent historiography. In the last years, historians have been increasingly attracted 
by global questions and, in force of that, many historical disciplines tried to 
readjust to the contemporary debate. The so-called “global turn” invested and 
transformed the pre-existent fields and created whole new ones. Even the roots of 
transnational studies and the success of comparative approaches might be 
reconducted to the need of historians to investigate global issues to understand 
the present.  
Within this theoretical framework, the opportunity for maritime historians to 
assume a leading role in the field of historical studies is clear, and the discussion 
was embraced – now a decade ago – in the pivotal volume Maritime History as 
Global History edited by Maria Fusaro and Amelia Polonia1. The dialogue between 
maritime and global history could not be more natural, as the two disciplines 
converge on the same prerequisites, grounded on geographic mobility and wide-
ranged entanglements2. In the age of global matters, maritime history can 
definitively offer its contribution.  
 
1 M. Fusaro and A. Polonia (eds.), Maritime history as global history, St. John’s Newfoundland: 
IMEHA, *4&4. The same topic is addressed in: P. Manning, “Global History and Maritime History”, 
International Journal of Maritime History, No. *.: &, *4&+, pp. &-**.  
2 Frank Broeze, in a pioneering article of &515, had provided a sort of manifesto for maritime 
history. See: F. Broeze, “From the periphery to the mainstream: the challenge of Australia’s 
Maritime History”, The Great Circle, No. &&:&, &515, pp. &-&+. See, also: G. Harlaftis and C. Vassallo, 
“Maritime History since Braudel”, in Idem (eds.), New Directions in Mediterranean Maritime 
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The success of “globalism” in historical studies, however, raised several 
methodological concerns about the actual feasibility to do practical archival 
research on global themes. As a response to these concerns, arose the discipline of  
“micro-global history”, which aimed to individuate and implement micro-
historical methodologies to investigate global questions3. Accordingly, the studies 
on phenomena and subjects which can be reconducted to the local scale but show 
global entanglements occupied a central position within the most recent 
publications and research directions4. Small-scale maritime communities possess 
all the requirements to be contextualised within the micro-global methodological 
framework. Firstly, as communities, they are framed within the local scale and, 
therefore, can be researched with the tools of micro-historical analysis. Secondly, 
they have the potential for global investigations because of the outward projection 
deriving from the practice of maritime activities. In other words, maritime 
communities can be the exemplar subjects for micro-global approaches, since they 
are spatially limited and, at the same time, framed within broader networks.  
The transition from sail to steam in navigation, a real watershed in nineteenth-
century maritime history, represents the primary global question to which the 
present doctoral thesis aims to provide a further understanding. Inscribed within 
the broader process labelled as “transport revolution”, the application of steam 
technology to navigation transformed the life and activities of seafarers, disrupted 
centuries-old maritime traditions and promoted the emergence of new 
protagonists. Furthermore, the effects of the transition spread outside the 
maritime sector and raised further transformations in other human activities. 
 
History, St. John’s Newfoundland, IMEHA, *44/, pp. &-*4; G. Harlaftis, “Storia marittima e storia 
dei porti”, Memoria e ricerca, No. &&, *44*.  
3 F. Trivellato, “Is there a future for Italian Micro-history in the age of Global History?”, California 
Italian Studies, No. *:&, *4&&; C. De Vito, “Verso una microstoria trans-locale (micro-spatial history)”, 
Quaderni Storici, No. &.4: +, *4&., pp. 1&.-1++. See also, the debate published in a recent volume of 
Past and Present: J.P. Ghobrial, “Introduction: Seeing the World like a Micro-Historian”, Past and 
Present, No. */*: &/, *4&5, pp. &-**; J. De Vries, “Playing with Scales: The Global and the Micro, the 
Macro and the Nano”, Past and Present, No. */*: &/, *4&5, pp. *+-+$; G. Levi, “Frail Frontiers”, Past 
and Present, No. */*: &/, *4&5, pp. +)-/5. 
4 Take into account the creation of the “global commodities” and “global lives” research axis, as 
the most recurrent implementation of micro-global methodologies. See, F. Trivellato, “Is there a 
future for Italian Micro-history in the age of Global History?”.  
 V 
Technological advance revolutionised the mobility of objects and human beings: 
steamships became «agents of globalisation» – by reformulating the famous 
definition of Armstrong and Williams5.  
The adoption of seafaring communities to investigate the effects of the 
transition from sail to steam, therefore, could not be more natural. British, 
Northern-American and Scandinavian maritime historians gave their contribution 
to the development of these studies6; instead, the Mediterranean environment and 
seafaring communities lying at its shores were rarely contemplated within these 
designs. The ERC project SeaLiT (Seafaring Lives in Transition. Mediterranean 
maritime labour and shipping during globalisation, >?@As->CDAs), coordinated by 
Apostolos Delis, within which the present doctoral thesis is framed, aims to fill this 
gap. The project identified the Mediterranean seafaring communities as the core 
objects of analysis to investigate the transition under a comparative perspective. 
Thus, the case-study of Camogli will be compared with other Mediterranean 
communities, including Galaxidi, La Ciotat and Barceloneta. Their consistency and 
differences with the case of Camogli will be of crucial significance for the 
advancement of the current knowledge on this field of studies.  
The historical evolution of Camogli in the nineteenth century had all the 
requirements to be selected for this purpose. In the late eighteenth century, it was 
a fishing village, whose inhabitants engaged to coastal fishing and cabotage. Then, 
it underwent an unprecedented escalation of shipping which culminated into the 
"UD^s: at that time, its fleet counted more than three hundred vessels engaging to 
oceanic tramp shipping. Then, it entered into a steady decline: its fleet was 
 
5 J. Armstrong and D.M. Williams, “The Steamship as an agent of modernisation”, International 
Journal of Maritime History, &5, No. &, *44), &/.-&$4.  
6 A short selection: J. Armstrong and D.M. Williams, The impact of technological change. The 
early steamship in Britain, St. John’s Newfoundland: IMEHA, *4&&; L.R. Fischer and G.E. Panting 
(eds.), Change and adaptation in maritime history. The North-Atlantic fleets in the nineteenth 
century, St. John’s Newfoundland: IMEHA, &51/; Y. Kaukiainen, Sailing into twilight. Finnish 
Shipping in the Age of Transport Revolution, $>D2-$M$#, Helsinki: SHS, &55/; L.U. Scholl and M.L. 
Hikkanen (eds.), Sail and steam. Selected maritime writings of Yrjo Kaukiainen, St. John’s 
Newfoundland: IMEHA, *44/; D.J. Starkey and G. Harlaftis (eds.), Global markets: the 
internationalization of the sea transport industries since $>L2, St. John’s Newfoundland: IMEHA, 
&551. See, also the historiographical account of Gelina Harlaftis about the publications of the 
International Journal of Maritime History: G. Harlaftis, “Merchant shipping in the International 
Journal of Maritime History”, International Journal of Maritime History, No. *$: &, pp. &+5-&/).  
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marginalised to low profitable market sectors, and the financial resources of the 
community were progressively drained. Meanwhile, the shipping world was 
invested by new technologies, which disrupted the previous dynamics and power 
relationships. The integration within the international shipping market, which 
Camogli had acquired throughout its rise, also determined its decline.  
Scholarly historians paid scarce attention to the nineteenth-century evolution 
of Camogli. Conversely, several local historians devoted their energies to the 
identification of the local sailing fleet and the collection of “great stories of great 
individuals” to reconstruct a mythological history of the Ligurian community 
within the “golden age of sail”7.  
On the national scale, Paolo Frascani was the first to call for the adoption of a 
maritime perspective to investigate the nineteenth-century Italian history: his 
collective volume A vela e a vapore contains several contributions crossing various 
themes (fishing, cabotage, high-seas shipping, the Italian maritime institutions, 
maritime education) and regional areas (more represented the South, less the 
Ligurian and the Adriatic maritime regions)8. However, even the pioneering 
contribution of Marco Doria about the Ligurian sailing fleet in the nineteenth 
century was primarily based on secondary sources9.  
Camogli can claim to be the hometown of Gio. Bono Ferrari, one of the most 
representative figures of the Italian non-academic maritime literature. Born in 
"UU#, Ferrari dedicated the years of his maturity to the collection of oral 
testimonies and old newspapers about the history of Camogli and the nearby 
communities. More than “history”, Ferrari gathered several “stories”: the amount 
of information is enormous, but the news is presented unsystematically – even 
randomly – and with no references to historical sources other than non-specified 
 
7 The most complete attempt in this sense can be found in: P. Schiaffino (ed.), I mille bianchi 
velieri della città di Camogli, Genova: Nuova Editrice Genovese, *445.  
8 P. Frascani (ed.), A vela e a vapore. Economie, culture e istituzioni del mare nell’Italia 
dell’Ottocento, Roma: Donzelli, *44&.  
9 M. Doria, “La marina mercantile a vela in Liguria dalla metà dell’Ottocento alla prima guerra 
mondiale”, in P. Frascani (ed.), A vela e a vapore, pp. 1+-&4).  
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eye-witnesses10. Nevertheless, Gio. Bono Ferrari is still the primary reference for 
the Ligurian nineteenth-century maritime history, a fact bearing witness of the 
unhealthy conditions of its historiography11.  
Compared to the status and accomplishments of the international maritime 
studies, the primary distinction emerges about sources and their utilisation. In this 
case, maritime-related sources such as crew lists, logbooks and career registers 
have been long implemented into the methodology and resources of international 
scholars. Conversely, apart from a pioneering article of Paolo Frascani12, who 
underlined the outstanding potential of logbooks to develop maritime research on 
nineteenth-century Italy, there are no comparable studies. 
Instead, the present doctoral thesis will mostly draw on this set of sources, in 
compliance with their availability. The crew lists, kept – in the State Archives of 
Genoa – between "U#U and "U'', will be essential to investigate Camogli’s maritime 
labour and routes. The logbooks, kept between "UU^ and "V"%, are crucial to 
examine the declining phase of Camogli, across various perspectives. The career 
rolls, covering the "U%$-"V"% period, will represent a fundamental tool to analyse 
the career paths and other critical features of maritime labour.    
The structure of the thesis will reflect the adoption of a double perspective. 
Firstly, the fleet and the shipping business of Camogli will be taken into account 
to outline the integration of the Ligurian community within the international 
shipping market, from the late eighteenth century to the First World War. 
Secondly, it will deal with shipowners, maritime labourers and migrants, thus 
transferring the focus from the ship to the individuals.  
 
10 G.B. Ferrari, La città dei mille bianchi velieri: Camogli, Genova: Tipografia Nazionale, &5+.; 
Idem, Capitani di mare e bastimenti di Liguria del secolo XIX, Rapallo: Arti Grafiche Tigullio, &5+5.  
11 About the conditions of the Italian maritime historiography about the nineteenth century, see, 
particularly, the contribution of Maria Elisabetta Tonizzi in: M. D’Angelo and M.E. Tonizzi, “Recent 
maritime historiography in Italy”, in G. Harlaftis, C. Vassallo (eds.), New Directions in 
Mediterranean Maritime History, pp. ..-1*. See also: M.E. Tonizzi, “Lavoro e lavoratori del mare 
nell’età della globalizzazione”, Contemporanea, No. &*: /, pp. $5&-)4&, where she neatly declares: 
«Nel caso specifico dell’Italia, per la tarda età della navigazione a vela, bisogna ancora, con qualche 
eccezione, ricorrere alle descrizioni dei “classici” della letteratura marinaresca».  
12 P. Frascani, “Tra la bussola e il negozio: uomini, rotte e traffici nei giornali di bordo delle navi 
a vela dell’144”, Società e storia, &44, *44+, pp. /1)-.&4.  
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In the first part, the adoption of a multi-scale analysis led to the identification 
of three different historical phases which correspond to the first three chapters.  
The first chapter (late "Uth century – "U$^) addresses the conditions of Camogli 
before the nineteenth century and contextualises its shipping activities within the 
Ligurian geo-historical framework. The examination of two distinct models of 
Ligurian seafaring communities will be fundamental to outline the characteristics 
of the late eighteenth century maritime activities of Camogli, based on fishing and 
cabotage. Firstly, the main features of Camogli’s coastal and high-seas fishing will 
be taken into account. Secondly, after a general overview of Camogli’s cabotage 
routes, the traffic of charcoal from Tuscany to Genoa will be treated more in 
details.    
The second chapter ("U$^-"UD^) deals with the establishment of Camogli’s 
shipping into the Black Sea. From the first contacts to the consolidation, this 
chapter will outline the pivotal role of the Black Sea grain trade to determine the 
evolution of the community and its specialisation into shipping. In the first section, 
the growth of the fleet, by numbers and tonnage, will be addressed. Then, the 
second and third sections will provide a geo-historical background of the Black Sea 
trade. The fourth will present its merchant networks, with a focus on Greeks and 
Italians for their relationships with Camogli. The analysis of Camogli’s 
participation to the Black Sea trade covers the fifth and sixth sections: import and 
export trade from and to the Black Sea will be taken into account, through the 
examination of inbound and outbound cargoes and the analysis of loading ports. 
The seventh section is dedicated to the readjustment of the business to the 
Crimean War ("U&$-"U&'). Finally, the last section analyses the transfer of the 
discharging ports from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic.  
The third chapter ("UD^-"V"%) outlines the global phase of Camogli’s shipping, 
marked by rapid growth, in the beginning, – following the readjustment to the 
establishment of steam navigation into the Black Sea grain trade – and, then, 
steady decline, in response to the increase of steam competitiveness on longer 
routes. The first section provides a general and technical framework about the 
transition from sail to steam within the broader nineteenth-century transport 
revolution. The second section analyses the numbers and characteristics of 
 "$ 
Camogli’s fleet to outline the readjustment to oceanic shipping and its resilience 
until the First World War. The integration to oceanic routes and the specialisation 
of Camogli to oceanic tramp shipping are examined in the third and fourth 
sections: the former outlines the rising phase ("UD^-"UU^), the latter its steady 
decline ("UU^-"V"%), which took the form of a gradual marginalisation of sailing 
shipping to the market periphery.  
The second part of the thesis, on the contrary, examines the history of Camogli 
from a different perspective. Besides ships and shipping, the second part analyses 
the nineteenth-century transformations from the side of the members of the 
community. Thus, it takes into account shipownership, maritime labour and 
migration.  
The fourth chapter deals with Camogli’s shipowners and aims to delineate the 
mechanisms of local shipownership and its transformation over time. The first 
section reconstructs the trajectories of some selected shipping families to highlight 
the persistence of familiar and communitarian structures to shape shipping 
business in Camogli. The forms of shared-ownership, the tools implemented to 
minimise entrepreneurial risks and the development of mutualistic institutions 
constitute the primary objects of investigation of the second section. The third 
section deviates from shipping business and addresses the political, social and 
cultural involvement of shipowners in the development of the community. Finally, 
the fourth section takes into account the "UU^-"V"% period aiming to outline the 
entanglements between the global and local scales to determine the crisis of the 
community.  
The fifth chapter investigates maritime labour. It postulates the existence of an 
endogenous maritime labour market where demands and supplies of sea labourers 
remain within the borders of the community. Then, it analyses the transformations 
observed in the essential elements of maritime labour: the transition from share to 
salary, the proletarianization of labour, the professionalisation of captains and the 
consequences of technological transition. Finally, the career paths will be 
investigated in their last sections, with a specific focus on the rates of 
abandonment and the professional destinations of seafarers after the exit from 
Camogli’s endogenous maritime labour market.  
 "% 
The sixth and last chapter will deal with the labour migration and diaspora of 
Camogli. The first section will provide an analysis of desertion and emigration 
patterns to observe the practical ways of leaving the community and to analyse the 
geographical and professional destinations. The second section will deal with 
Camogli’s labour migration to the European foreign fleets; the third section will 
analyse more extensively labour migration and entrepreneurship in Latin America, 
particularly in Peru and Argentina. The last section will elaborate on the case-study 
of Tristan da Cunha where a small migrant community of Camogli was created in 









PART I   
THE MARITIME COMMUNITY “OUTSIDE”:  
SHIPPING AND ROUTES  
 "' 




The integration of Camogli in the international shipping business took place in the 
"U$^s when its ships and seafarers got involved in the Black Sea grain trade. 
Nonetheless, before directly addressing its evolution in that phase, this chapter 
aims to contextualise the first steps of Camogli as a maritime community in the 
geo-historical framework to which it belonged, the multifaceted scenario of the 
two Ligurian rivieras. The history of Liguria in the late eighteenth century is 
addressed to illustrate the socio-economic environment in which Camogli asserted 
itself as a leading shipping centre. In order to do so, the chapter highlights the local 
maritime activities, from fishing to long-cabotage to identify the distinguishing 
traits which concurred to the future success of the community.  
The first section will analyse the size of the fleet (number of ships and tonnage) 
and the types of ships. This analysis will illustrate the character of shipping activity 
of Camogli and the market orientation (trade routes, commodities) along with the 
perspectives and the structural limits. 
The following sections will examine the evolution of the communities and ports 
in the two sides of the Ligurian coast, namely the western and eastern rivieras. The 
western area had developed tighter connections with Southern Italy, a decisive 
factor to secure its participation to the long-range Tyrrhenian cabotage routes. On 
the other hand, the eastern communities specialised in fishing and short-range 
cabotage. Then, their parallel experiences are depicted in the light of the 
Tyrrhenian maritime system concept, in order to present the networks of 
interregional relationships systematically. 
Finally, the maritime activities of Camogli are directly taken into account, under 
the distinction between fishing and cabotage. Specific attention is paid to the 
transport of charcoal from Maremma (in Tuscany), which engaged the seafaring 
population of Camogli in a long-standing trade lasting up to the end of the 
nineteenth century.  
 "D 
8.8. The Camogli merchant fleet 
 
The data are drawn from the records of the arrivals at the port of Genoa, which 
the Maritime Health Authority of the Republic collected13: these records provide 
information about ships, captains, routes and cargoes. Nonetheless, the elements 
to identify the vessels are limited to the name and type, with no reference to the 
tonnage or serial numbers. Therefore, absolute certainty about the identity of the 
ship is not obtainable. The data are related to the arrivals in port, or ships’ voyages, 
without enabling to distinguish one ship from another. Name and type are the sole 
details provided, but they are of little help to the identification because, still in this 
period, most of the ships carried identical religious names, deeply connected with 
local devotion14.  
Nevertheless, the scarcity of details and information does not inhibit from 
illustrating in the most veritable way the main features of the fleet of Camogli, as 
well as its presumable relevance in the Ligurian maritime framework15.  
 
13 ASGe, Ufficio di sanità, /++-/+/; /$1-/$5; &$1)-&$11-&$15.  
14 A valuable analysis concerning the evolution of the names of Ligurian ships between the &1th 
and the &5th centuries can be found in L. Gatti, Un raggio di convenienza: navi mercantili, costruttori 
e proprietari in Liguria nella prima metà dell’Ottocento, Genova: Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 
*441, pp. 1$-5*.   
15 A statistical comparison between Camogli and its broader regional area is hindered by some 
methodological issues detected in the previous literature. Most of the studies about the late &1th 
century port movement of Genoa had been built on a specific source, the «Avvisi», a periodical 
publication providing general information about maritime business, including the list of the ships 
entering the port of Genoa. On these premises, Luigi Bulferetti and Claudio Costantini, in their 
pivotal work about the economic history of Genoa between the &1th and &5th centuries, adopted the 
«Avvisi» as their main statistical source to display the port movement. However, if compared to the 
sources of the Ufficio di sanità, which was the deputed institution to record all the information 
about in and out port movements, these data seem to be incomplete or, at least, rather deficient. 
For example, in the year &)1., the health records list &)5 navicello entering in the port of Genoa (all 
of them carrying the Genoese flag and manned by Camogli captains). In the data collected in the 
«Avvisi», on the contrary, among the records of all the arrivals in the port of Genoa, only ./ navicello 
are found (with a broader statistical sample). Likewise, the last data recorded in the «Avvisi» (&)5+) 
display a total of &**5 arrivals of ships carrying the Genoese flag. In a different source, drawn up in 
&14/, at the end of a protracted period of crisis, distinguished by the consistent loss of ships 
experienced by the Genoese fleet, the total number of the Genoese ships (not the arrivals in port) 
amounted to &//+. These and other incongruences imposed the choice not to rely on «Avvisi» 
statistics and on the related literature in order to make comparisons between the situation of 
Camogli (drawn up by the health records) and the broader region. See: L. Bulferetti and C. 
Costantini, Industria e commercio in Liguria, pp. &)$-&)).  
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Therefore, with the purpose to reconstruct the fleet of Camogli to the most 
verisimilar figure, we had to develop an estimation approach based on the number 
of voyages which a single ship carried out in a year. In doing so, we made a 
distinction according to the vessel type (navicello, pinco, tartana, etc.) and counted 
the occurrences in which ship name and captains coincided. Lacking further data, 
we assumed that, if a captain conducted a ship with the same name throughout a 
year, also the ship was the same. Then, we collected all the voyages referring to the 
same ship and, in order to obtain the yearly average, we divided the result by the 
number of captain-ship couples. Finally, we took the number of voyages, and we 
rounded it for the yearly average in order to have the estimated number of ships16.  
 
Year Bombarda17 Brick Feluca Leudo Navicello Pinco Polacca Sciabecco Tartana Total 
E*  E* % E* % E* % E*  % E*  % E*  % E*  % E*  % E*  % 
<=>?             "# <@% $% A?% "% <A%             >B 
<=@? " <% $ C%     && <@% '( CD% &) B?% & B%     ( A% <<D 
<>E?         $ "(% ' <C% "$ ?B% & =%     " D% & =% B@ 
Table &-&. Estimated number of Camogli-owned ships by type. Source: ASGe, Ufficio di sanità, /++-
/+/; /$1-/$5; &$1)-&$11-&$15. 
 
 
16 A sample of the estimate procedure adopted. In the year &)5., among the type of ship navicello 
we found the following results: Giuseppe Ansaldo – N.S. del Carmine ()); Giuseppe Avegno – N.S. 
della Mercede ()); Giuseppe Croce – N.S. del Rosario (+); Niccolò Denegri – N.S. del Rosario (/), etc. 
All the couple collected, we made the average (/,41 voyages each year) which was finally the divisor 
of the total voyages recorded for the navicello in the &)5. (&5+), in order to obtain the final result of 
/).  
17 The nautical terminology turned out to be one of the most challenging issues in the writing of 
the present chapter. Indeed, whereas in the following period most of the ship typologies tend to 
converge towards international standards, in the late eighteenth century the difference between 
Mediterranean and Atlantic ship-building is still as sharp as for the course of the entire early 
modern age. Therefore, several terms lack of an appropriate translation in English: in all of the cases 
where an English correspondence cannot be found, the decision was to keep the original term. This, 
therefore, is the case of most of the typologies displayed in table, apart from the sole brigantino 
which, for its northern origin (since it is not to be confused with its Mediterranean early-modern 
counterpart), has been translated in “brick”. Most of the following information provided for 
Mediterranean traditional ship-typologies are drawn from S. Bellabarba and E. Guerreri, Vele 
italiane della costa occidentale dal Medioevo al Novecento, Milano: Hoepli, *44*. Further 
information, more from a maritime than a purely nautical perspective, and enriched with reference 
to archival sources, can be found in L. Gatti, Un raggio di convenienza, pp. +1-1$.   
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Notwithstanding all the possible statistical inaccuracies, which might derive from 
the proposed estimate, from the table emerges a neat predominance of the 
navicello, followed by pinco and leudo.  
The origins of navicello are rooted in a different maritime tradition than the 
Ligurian one: in its first days, this type of vessel was employed in the fluvial 
navigation along the course of the river Arno, in Tuscany18. It was destined to the 
transport of marble from the mining regions towards the sea or Florence (via Arno 
river). The presence of navicello in the Tyrrhenian waters is documented from the 
first decades of the "Dth century19. Besides marbles, this vessel was rapidly 
associated with additional local commodities, such as timber and charcoal, which 
initially complemented marble cargoes but then became bulk cargoes on their 
own20. The transport of timber and charcoal, indeed, corresponded to the use of 
navicello by the shipowners of Camogli21. From a technical point of view, whereas 
the sophisticated system of sails and rigging is well-known22, there is no explicit 
reference concerning the dimensions and the tonnage of this type of ship. The 
average tonnage varied from $^ to D^ tons, but in some cases can be found navicelli 
of more than "^^ tons23. The progressive specialisation of Camogli into the 
charcoal trade with Maremma led to the widespread diffusion of this ship type.  
Instead, the successful establishment of pinco in the merchant fleet of Genoa is 
related to a different history. The Mediterranean pinco is a type of vessel with 
 
18 S. Bellabarba and E. Guerreri, Vele italiane, pp. &.1-&$+.  
19 Idem, p. &.1. The author mentions an episode of &$4+, when some navicelli were warned by 
the authorities not to take the sea-route, but to sail instead along the canals linking Pisa with 
Livorno.  
20 L. Gatti, Un raggio di convenienza, p. $).  
21 See the paragraph &.$ “A long-lasting route: the trade of Tuscan charcoal”.   
22 S. Bellabarba and E. Guerreri, Vele italiane, pp. &.1-&$+.  
23 Idem, p. &.1; L. Gatti, Un raggio di convenienza, pp. &*+-&)$. Most of the navicello found 
recorded by the author range from +4 to )4 tons. There are, however, some exceptions, as in the 
case of the navicello “Il Magnanimo”, measuring &+4,41 tons, which was built in &1*) in Varazze for 
the Camogli ship-owner Gaetano Schiaffino. Another case is the “N.S. del Carmine” (&4&,/4 tons) 
built in &1+4 for the Camogli ship-owner Michele Bertolotto. These and other cases can be also 
found in: P. Berti, Il traffico camogliese del carbone vegetale: un contributo alla storia marittima di 
Camogli, in Figari G.B.R. (ed.), Camogli da borgo a città. Notizie storiche e spunti di ricerca, pp. +&.-
+*1. 
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Spanish origins24. It is established as one of the most efficient vessels in the 
Tyrrhenian trade during the second half of the eighteenth century when its 
diffusion displays an impressive growth. Before the late "DD^s is presence is almost 
negligible; then, between "DDU and "DV$, the pinco covers up to "U% of the total 
ships registered at the port of Genoa25. The pinco constituted the core of the long-
distance Genoese fleet owing to its relatively big tonnage: the dimensions varied 
from &^ to #^^ tons, even though the vast majority of them averaged between "^^ 
and "&^ tons26. It was a flat bottomed vessel with a narrow stern; it had three masts, 
and its main technical distinguishing trait was the double rigging since it usually 
had both the square and the lateen rigs installed on the main-mast27.  
The leudo or liuto has a longer tradition and historical continuity than pinco, 
since this nomenclature dates back to the Middle Ages, in the Catalan area 
("#^V)28. Over the centuries, it passed through several transformations and found 
a stable and recognisable structure only in the nineteenth century. Mainly 
employed in the Tyrrhenian cabotage, especially in the connections between 
Sardinia and Genoa, the leudo was commonly used to transport foodstuffs, such as 
wine, oil, carobs, tuna and wheat29. Their average tonnage was around $^ tons, and 
it had one mast with lateen rigs and the bowsprit30.  
Finally, of secondary importance to describe the main features of Camogli’s 
merchant fleet, we find: a) the bombarda, a two-masted large coaster, ketch-rigged, 
of '^-U^ tons in average, which experienced a discrete fortune in the first half of 
the nineteenth century31; b) the brick, a two-mast ship of more considerable 
 
24 S. Bellabarba and E. Guerreri, Vele italiane, pp. &)*-&)$.  
25 Idem, p. &).. The statistics is found in L. Bulferetti and C. Costantini, Industria e commercio 
in Liguria, pp. &$*-&$+, and it is drawn by the authors from the Avvisi.  
26 Ibidem. 
27 Idem, pp. &)+-&)/.  
28 Idem, p. &+$.  
29 Among the arrivals of Camogli-owned ships, the leudo accounts for $. cases: although half of 
them reflects the outstanding importance of charcoal and timber trade, on the other hand the cargo 
list shows a great diversification, including lobsters, roe, carobs, wheat, oil, tobacco, tuna and wine. 
ASGe, Ufficio di sanità, /++-/+/; /$1-/$5; &$1)-&$11-&$15.  
30 S. Bellabarba and E. Guerreri, Vele italiane, p. &+).  
31 Idem, pp. ./-... 
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dimensions, which later became the central unit of the fleet of Camogli, and 
especially its evolutions of brick-schooner and barque32; c) the feluca, a two-
masted boat with lateen sails, usually employed in cabotage33;  d) the tartana, a 
three-masted vessel whose capacity stretched between D& and "$^ tons, employed 
in different context according to its dimensions34.  
 
8.=. The Tyrrhenian maritime system 
 
Leaving aside the role of Genoa, whose political and economic power is dominant 
in the region, in the late eighteenth century the Ligurian area was crawling with 
several seafaring places which had developed for centuries community-centred 
maritime traditions, occasionally tied with international shipping and in most of 
the cases marked by multi-activity. The Ligurian ships were scattered all around 
the Mediterranean shores, and the captains engaged in all sorts of seaborne 
business35.  
Therefore, it is possible to reconsider the role of the Ligurian merchant fleets 
within the Mediterranean trade networks. The widespread notion of “northern 
invasion”36, a legacy of Braudel’s interpretation of the Mediterranean world, might 
 
32 For its fundamental role in the following periods of the history of Camogli, this ship type will 
be more extensively described in the following chapters.  
33 S. Bellabarba and E. Guerreri, Vele italiane, pp. 5*-5); C. De Negri, Le feluche dei liguri, Genova: 
Tip. A. Porcile, &5$$.  
34 S. Bellabarba and E. Guerreri, Vele italiane, pp. ***-**5; L. Gatti, Un raggio di convenienza, 
pp. $/-$..  
35 Among the most recent works about the maritime activities in which the coastal communities 
engaged see: L. Lo Basso, Gente di bordo: la vita quotidiana dei marittimi genovesi nel XVIII secolo, 
Roma: Carocci, *4&$; Id., Capitani, corsari e armatori. I mestieri e le culture del mare dalla tratta 
degli schiavi a Garibaldi, Novi Ligure: Città del Silenzio, *4&&; A. Carassale and L. Lo Basso, Sanremo, 
giardino di limoni: produzione e commercio degli agrumi all’estremo Ponente ligure (secoli XII-XIX), 
Roma: Carocci, *441.  
36 The first definition of the “Northern Invasion” concept is in F. Braudel, The Mediterranean and 
the Mediterranean world in the age of Philip II, trans. S. Reynolds, New York: Harper and Row, &5)*, 
pp. $&.-$/*. See also M. Greene, “Beyond the Northern Invasion: the Mediterranean in the 
Seventeenth Century”, Past and Present, No. &)/, *44*, pp. /*-)&. See also the latest: M. Fusaro, C. 
Heywood and M.S. Omri (eds.), Trade and cultural exchange in the Early Modern Mediterranean. 
Braudel’s maritime legacy, London: Tauris Academic Studies, *4&4 and in particular the essays of 
Maria Fusaro and Colin Heywood: M. Fusaro, “After Braudel: a Reassessment of Mediterranean 
History between the Northern Invasion and the Caravane Maritime”, pp. &-**; C. Heywood, “The 
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not be questionable. However, as Katerina Galani pointed out in her book about 
the British shipping at the end of the eighteenth century37, the English vessels 
engaging to the intra-Mediterranean trade were mostly concerned into linking the 
Central Mediterranean area (which in her definition overlaps with the Tyrrhenian 
region of this chapter) with North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean38. The 
internal connections were left to the local merchant fleets, which participated in 
the general movement with vessels of minor dimensions. The functional role 
played by the “Mediterraneans” invites to propose new interpretations aimed to 
acknowledge the existence of a Tyrrhenian maritime system, self-sufficient but 
conditioned to interregional networks.  
The idea of a Tyrrhenian maritime system – a model to organise trade routes 
and maritime activities in a given area, which is divided into multiple units to form 
the entire structure – has found a lavish reception in Italian historiography. More 
generally, the adoption and definition of systemic approaches to maritime studies 
have been recently revived by Amèlia Polonia’s reconsideration of port systems in 
a functionalist model39. Accordingly, Italian historians now conceive the 
Tyrrhenian region as an organic area, where distinct political entities (from Sicily 
up to the French region of Marseille) and transnational subjects gave life to 
 
English in the Mediterranean, &$44-&$+4: a Post-Braudelian Perspective on the «Northern 
Invasion»”, pp. *+-//.  
37 K. Galani, British Shipping in the Mediterranean during the Napoleonic Wars. The Untold Story 
of a Successful Adaptation, Leiden: Brill’s Studies in Maritime History, *4&).  
38 Idem, p. &41. The author draws on the British trade at the port of Livorno from &))4 to &1&.: 
in reconstructing the routes through the sanitary records of the Tuscan port, Katerina Galani 
illustrates how .5 percent of the British vessels calling at Livorno engaged in intra-Mediterranean 
trade. However, only a limited portion of the ships were actually coming from the Central 
Mediterranean (&*%), whereas North Africa (/4%) and the Eastern Mediterranean (+.%) 
represented the overwhelming majority areas of the ports of departure.  
39 See A. Polonia, “The Northwestern Portuguese Seaport System in the Early Modern Age” in B. 
Tapio, L. R. Fischer and E. Tonizzi, (eds.), Making Global and Local Connections: Historical 
Perspectives on Ports, Research in Maritime History series (No. +.), Newfoundland: International 
Journal of Maritime History, *441, pp.&&+-&+$ and Id., “European seaports in the early modern age: 
concepts, methodology and models of analysis”, Cahiers de la Méditerranée, No. 14, *4&4, pp. &)-
+5. Also, see: R. Lee and R. Lawton, Port development and the demographic dynamics of European 
urbanization, in Id. (eds.), Population and society in Western European Port-Cities, c. $DL2-$M7M, 
Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, *44*, pp. &-+$.   
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communications and networks through sea activities40. Some preliminary 
approaches can be found in Paolo Calcagno41, for what concerns the stable linkages 
between Tuscany, Liguria and Provence. Annastella Carrino and Biagio Salvemini 
adopted the same approach42: through the observation of the more enduring 
routes linking together the agricultural regions of the Kingdom of Naples with the 
seaport of Marseille, they developed a three-level Tyrrhenian system. Its main 
elements were: a) a port-to-port northward trade in foodstuff and agricultural 
supplies from Naples, Messina and Palermo to Marseille and Genoa43; b) periphery-
to-port cabotage linking the productive areas of the countryside with the main 
regional seaports; c) a port-to-periphery/port transit and redistribution trade of 
cereals, colonial genres, spices and every sort of goods arriving in international 
scale ports– mainly Livorno.  
Far from constituting enclosed systems on their own, every level was entangled 
with the others. For example, the second axis (b) was instrumental in delivering 
agricultural products to the seaports, from which they were destined to 
international exports (a). Cabotage played a central role, particularly in the Italian 
south: it was fundamental to compensate the region infrastructural limits in terms 
of land communications. Accordingly, the Neapolitan and Sicilian marines 
developed large fleets of small-tonnage vessels. Local production was steered 
toward the main regional seaports, primarily Naples, which was the leading 
collecting centre of the Kingdom, followed by far from Messina44. Therefore, the 
 
40 The main reference goes to the collective volume edited by B. Salvemini (ed.), Lo spazio 
tirrenico nella “grande trasformazione”. Merci, uomini e istituzioni nel Settecento e nel primo 
Ottocento, Bari: Edipuglia, *445. The same approach is more directly addressed in A. Carrino and 
B. Salvemini, “Come si costruisce uno spazio mercantile: il Tirreno nel Settecento”, Studi Storici, 
No. .+, *4&*, pp. /)-)+.  
41 P. Calcagno, “Uno dei «Tirreni» di Braudel: scambi commerciali nell’area marittima ligure-
provenzale tra XVII e XVIII secolo”, Mediterranea Ricerche Storiche, No. ++, *4&.. 
42 A. Carrino and B. Salvemini, “Come si costruisce uno spazio mercantile”, p. /5.  
43 The crucial distinction between port-cities and the countryside landing-places lacking of 
harbor infrastructures is directly addressed in A. Carrino and B. Salvemini, “Porti di campagna, 
porti di città. Traffici e insediamenti del Regno di Napoli visti da Marsiglia (&)&4-&1/$)”, Quaderni 
storici, No. &, *44$, pp. *45-*./.  
44 Compare with the data shown in A. Carrino and B. Salvemini, “Porti di campagna, porti di 
città”, pp. **/-**$.  
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northward trade in staples and low-value merchandises encouraged the 
establishment of a chained structure where coastal trade was necessary. More 
importantly, while being international, this kind of trade involved endogenous (to 
the system) actors, as the Kingdom of Naples embodied the supplier, the “Genoese” 
the carriers and the industrial region of Marseille, the primary consumer. Most of 
the Italian research about the Tyrrhenian economic world and the maritime 
exchanges in the late eighteenth century had devoted a great spark of attention to 
this specific trade axis, emphasising the role of Ligurian maritime actors to the 
system’s subsistence45.  
The last level (c) concerned to some extent the international trade – of which 
the Tyrrhenian constitutes a transit unit – accomplished by foreign carriers who 
held a large proportion of the Levant trade to the Western Mediterranean and the 
Central and Atlantic Europe. The growth of Livorno’s maritime movement is 
emblematic to outline its evolution. Since the institution of the freeport status of 
the Tuscan city ("'D'), many English and Dutch vessels called to Livorno and filled 
the harbour warehouses with colonial genres and cereals. Thus, on account on the 
favourable tax regime granted by the Tuscan authorities, Livorno became an 
international emporium and the primary destination for the Mediterranean transit 
trade: hence, the city developed into a fundamental collecting centre for the 
regional economy and, as a result, attracted several ships aiming to continue the 
westward trade flow of colonial goods and to redistribute these commodities in the 




45 Despite the activities of “Genoese” presence and networks in the Mediterranean maritime 
trade in the nineteenth century have never been systematically collected in a singular monograph, 
there is abundance of articles and essays which represent indispensable tools to deal with this 
subject: L. Lo Basso, “Tra Santo Stefano e l’Europa”; A. Carassale and L. Lo Basso, Sanremo, giardino 
di limoni; P. Calcagno, “Uno dei «Tirreni» di Braudel: scambi commerciali nell’area marittima 
ligure-provenzale tra XVII e XVIII secolo”, Mediterranea Ricerche Storiche, No. ++, *4&.;  A. Carrino, 
“Fra nazioni e piccole patrie. «Padroni» e mercanti liguri sulle rotte tirreniche del secondo 
settecento”, Società e storia, No. &+&, *4&&.  
46 The port activities of Livorno are clearly underlined in: J.P. Filippini, Il porto di Livorno e la 
Toscana ($D1D-$>$#), Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, &551.  
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Map. &.&. Genoa and its rivieras (focus on Camogli area).  
Within this framework, the people of Liguria specialised in the trade and 
transport of foreign goods and moved them from port to port within and beyond 
the Tyrrhenian maritime system. The “Genoese”, as this miscellaneous group was 
commonly and erroneously labelled47, held a relevant proportion of the Tyrrhenian 
trade, especially in the southern Italian markets where, relying upon centuries of 
favourable relationships between the Republic of Genoa and the Spanish 
monarchy, they had developed a long-lasting presence. However, there is a 
distinction between the two areas of the region: the Western riviera was more 
integrated within the Mediterranean economy than its counterpart, which instead 
was specialised on fishing and short-range cabotage.  
 
47 A. Carrino, “Fra nazioni e piccole patrie”, p. +).  
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For instance, to the former group belong the communities of Santo Stefano48, 
Laigueglia49 and Sanremo50. Here, the local shipowning elites joined the ranks of 
merchants and commercial entrepreneurs rather than limiting their range of 
interests to shipping. Their trajectories are in line with the majority of 
Mediterranean and European businessmen, to which shipownership was an 
ancillary activity to engage in commerce and trade. In most cases, the unique 
geographical environment of the western communities of Liguria allowed the 
inhabitants to cultivate the ground and to produce specific agricultural 
commodities (olives, fruit and later flowers). On the other side of the region, 
cultivation was limited to subsistence horticulture, with little or none market 
integration. For the western elites, the passage from shipowners to traders was 
facilitated by the presence of marketable commodities in their territory. The 
studies developed on their commercial correspondence outline that they were able 
to integrate within international trade networks, which even transcended the 
Mediterranean borders to reach Central and Northern Europe51. These “Genoese” 
expanded their range of interests through the commercialisation of domestic 
products, as observed in the case of Sanremo, whose citruses and lemons found 
profitable marketplaces in Northern Europe52.  
If it were the case for most of the western maritime communities of Liguria – to 
carry out trade with northern Europe, to actively participate into the northbound 
commerce from southern Italy to Genoa and Marseille, and to handle the 
redistribution of colonial merchandises from Livorno to the Mediterranean –the 
eastern part of the region would display an utterly different scenario. Sparse along 
the coast, the Eastern riviera hosted a multitude of villages and poorly populated 
 
48 L. Lo Basso, “Tra Santo Stefano e l’Europa. Le attività commerciali di Giovanni Battista Filippi 
attraverso la documentazione privata (&)$*-&))&)”, Intermelion, No. &+, *44), pp. 1+-&45. 
49 A. Carrino, “Fra nazioni e piccole patrie. «Padroni» e mercanti liguri sulle rotte tirreniche del 
secondo settecento”, Società e storia, No. &+&, *4&&. 
50 A. Carassale and L. Lo Basso, Sanremo, giardino di limoni: produzione e commercio degli agrumi 
all’estremo Ponente ligure (secoli XII-XIX), Roma: Carocci, *441. 
51 L. Lo Basso, “Tra Santo Stefano e l’Europa”, p. 1.. The author has found +1 different places, 
among which there were Marseille, Livorno, Naples, Bordeaux, Antwerp, Amsterdam, London, 
Hamburg, Copenhagen, Havre, Nantes and other lesser centres.  
52 A. Carassale and L. Lo Basso, Sanremo, giardino di limoni.  
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centres whose maritime activities and economic subsistence depended on coastal 
and deep-sea fishing and short-range cabotage. The social composition of these 
communities was strikingly dissimilar to that of their western counterparts. There 
was no space for the merchant elites which elsewhere had a great significance and 
played a central role in the community economic activities.  
In this regard, their economic and social evolution seems to be in line with the 
historiographical assumption concerning the inverse relation existing between 
fishing and commerce in terms of diffusion and practice: in the Mediterranean, 
when a maritime community was able to develop a solid commercial structure, it 
rarely went back to fishing53. This pattern is recurrent in the Mediterranean – 
despite the alleged coexistence of sea economies (fishing, cabotage, trade) and land 
economy (agriculture and manufactures) – and was prompted by the fact that 
fishing, especially in the Tyrrhenian Sea, was scarcely cost-effective and did not 
represent a relatively profitable economic option. In comparison with the 
Northern seas, the Tyrrhenian waters had a scarcity of fishery resources, more 
various but less abundant. Indeed, this environmental factor led to contrasting 
results in the two maritime worlds: in the Northern European region (England, the 
Netherlands and Scandinavia) deep-sea fishing grew as a critical activity in the 
local economies whereas Mediterranean fishing remained subordinate or, when 
central, its relevance originated more by the absence of alternatives than due to 
real profitability. The importance of fishing in the northern countries led, for 
instance, to gradual modernisation and the introduction of technological (ships) 
and organisational (labour division and in the forms of food preservation) 
improvements which, on the contrary, could have hardly occurred in the 
Mediterranean marines54. In the light of the organisational models to structure a 
 
53 See in this case the tables proposed in A. Zanini, “Un difficile equilibrio. Stato, pescatori e 
comunità in Liguria tra Sei e Settecento”, in S. Cavaciocchi, Ricchezza del mare, ricchezza dal mare. 
Sec. XIII-XVIII. Atti della “Trentasettesima settimana di studi” $$-$L aprile !22L (Istituto 
Internazionale di Storia Economica “F. Datini”, Prato. Serie *, Atti delle settimane di studio e altri 
convegni +)), Firenze: Le Monnier, *44$, pp. &&4&-&&4*. For instance, see the cases of the Levant 
communities of Quinto, Nervi, Bogliasco and Monterosso, Vernazza and Corniglia, whose figure of 
fishermen out of the total of the maritime workers range between .&,. % and 54,* %.  
54 The comparative evolution of Mediterranean and Northern European fishing had recently 
attracted and stimulated international literature. The abovementioned conference papers of the 
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fishing enterprise, those of «company ownership» and «family ownership55» – 
marked by a fundamental distinction about the existing relationship between 
capital and labour (divided in the former, combined in the latter) – Mediterranean 
fishing fell under the second category. The ownership was usually collective, 
according to family relationships but also, on a broader perspective, with the 
participation of the entire community. Then, this collective form of ownership – 
adopted also in long-range cabotage and deep-sea navigation56 – overlapped with 
collective forms of remuneration of the single maritime enterprise. Sailors were 
recruited for single voyages, and the revenues were divided among the 
participants, according to the “share” system.  
Fishing, short-range cabotage, collective endeavours and “share” system: these 
are the features which shaped the economic evolution of most of the maritime 
communities lying eastward Genoa. Still, in the eighteenth century, Camogli 
reflects and seems to possess all of those characteristics.  
 
8.C. Camogli: a fishing centre 
 
In the analysis of the maritime activities sustaining the economy of Camogli up 
to the mid-"Vth century, a clear pattern of continuity is found between this sailor 
town and other similar realities scattered along the Ligurian riviera. In this phase, 
 
+)th conference of Datini Institute of Prato represent a pivotal work to deal with this subject: S. 
Cavaciocchi, Ricchezza del mare, ricchezza dal mare. Sec. XIII-XVIII. Atti della “Trentasettesima 
settimana di studi” $$-$L aprile !22L (Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica “F. Datini”, Prato. 
Serie *, Atti delle settimane di studio e altri convegni +)), Firenze: Le Monnier, *44$. A 
authoritative review and critical contextualisation of the conference proceedings and activities can 
be found in A. Clemente, “La ricchezza del mare in margine alla XXXVII settimana di studi 
dell’Istituto Datini”, Storia economica, No. 1, *44., pp. *&.-*+.. The Mediterranean fishing 
practices and communities are also at the center of M.L. De Nicolò, Microcosmi mediterranei. Le 
comunità dei pescatori nell’età moderna, Bologna: CLUEB, *44/.  
55 This distinction is clearly outlined in A. Clemente, “La ricchezza del mare”, pp. *&)-*&1. Such 
distinction roots into the North-Atlantic historical debate, where fishing constituted a much more 
significant activity in terms of finance and business. A comparative analysis can be found in: D. 
Vickers, “Comparing fisheries”, International Journal of Maritime History, No. &, &55., pp. &51-**/.  
56 Since the Middle Age, several credit and insuring tools have been created to sustain the 
collective endeavour to carry out shipping business. Some of them, as the cambio marittimo or 
colonna survived up to the end of the &5th century. See: G. Salvioli, L’assicurazione e il cambio 
marittimo nella storia del diritto italiano, Bologna: Zanichelli, &11/.   
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preliminary to the outstanding achievements of the following period, the history 
of Camogli does not seem to possess any extraordinary trait. The framework of 
activities proposed concerning the eastern communities of the region fits perfectly 
in the specific experience of Camogli, as fishing and Tyrrhenian cabotage played 
the most remarkable part. First, due to its deep-rooted fishing tradition, both 
coastal and deep-sea. Secondly, in the wake of its active participation to the 
Tyrrhenian maritime system: the people of Camogli disregarded long-range 
cabotage but, at the same time, developed some long-lasting connections with 
regional areas targeting specific merchandise, charcoal, whose transport 
constituted an extraordinary long-lasting activity up to the First World War.  
The first documented sector of activity pertained coastal fishing, in close 
contact with the village settlement due to the positioning of a tuna fishery located 
in the waters of Punta Chiappa, in the nearby area of the Portofino Promontory. 
The sources attested its effectiveness in "'^$57: however, its actual instalment 
might be even dated back to the sixteenth century. Far from being as productive 
as the most renowned tuna fisheries of Sicilia and Sardinia, the Camogli’s one was 
labelled as tonnarella, a trap designed to capture fishes of smaller dimensions (than 
tuna). The limited range of action of the tonnarella found reasons in the lack of 
fishing resources which is characteristic of the Ligurian and Tyrrhenian seas58. 
Despite the long period of activity, from April to September, this kind of fishing 
was not very demanding in terms of labour, both for the limited size of the whole 
structure and because it engaged no more than three small boats altogether. Part 
of the fish was distributed among the population and the rest was commercialised. 
Then, to underline the collective effort, some of the income was in the end 
consigned to the municipality to sustain communal expenses. Indeed, since 
Camogli lacked industrial facilities to process the tuna for external consumption, 
 
57 R. Cattaneo Vietti and S. Bava, La tonnarella e la pesca tradizionale a Camogli, Recco: Le Mani, 
*445; B. Minoletti, Della pesca a Portofino e della tonnarella di Camogli alla fine del secolo XIX ed 
oggi, Genova: La Marina Italiana, &5/&; A. Mariotti, “La tonnarella di Camogli e la pesca nel Golfo 
Paradiso tra ottocento e novecento”, in G. Doneddu and A. Fiori (ed.), La pesca in Italia tra età 
moderna e contemporanea. Produzione, mercato, consumo, Sassari: EDES, *44+, pp. $+-)$. 
58 A. Mariotti, “La tonnarella di Camogli”, pp. $.-)&; A. Clemente, “La ricchezza del mare in 
margine alla XXXVII settimana di studi dell’Istituto Datini”, pp. *&)-**5.  
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most of the catch was delivered to the Genoa fishing market. Meanwhile, the 
production and the periodical maintenance and repairing of nets employed part of 
the residing population, especially the sailors’ wives who could participate 
somehow to the economic activities of the village59.  
Due to its nature, this kind of fishing was not very demanding as daily 
commitment and continuous work; as a result, it was usually complemented by a 
more varied range of deep-sea fishing. For instance, the case of the Cooperativa 
degli zeri, which Gio. Bono Ferrari accounted to be one of the first experiences of a 
fishing cooperative60, seems to have involved a more considerable amount of ships 
and people of Camogli (the number of nearly one hundred provided by local 
historiography might be questionable and it is not verified elsewhere) from the 
"DU^s up to "U"^. Its foundation and development are tightly connected with the 
occasional but abundant presence of zeri, a species of small anchovies, in the 
waters surrounding Camogli. The massive output collected in these circumstances 
pushed the community to commercialise the catch. This feature led to the creation 
of a cooperative intended to handle the entire productive chain – through salting 
and frying processes – from the nets to the market. According to Ferrari, most of 
the output was sold on account of the personal entrepreneurship of the consul (the 
ruling authority of the cooperative) “Zanebum” Cichero, who was able to place its 
product on several markets of the Tyrrhenian (Civitavecchia, Gaeta, Messina and 
Palermo), where he had established substantial networks overtime61. From "U"^ 
onwards, this species of anchovies almost vanished, putting an end to the profits 
of the cooperative. Soon, the local fishermen found new employment in the more 
renowned – and celebrated – fishing for anchovies in the waters of the Gorgona 
Island.  
 
59 A. Mariotti, “La tonnarella di Camogli”, pp. $)-$1. 
60 G. B. Ferrari, La città dei mille bianchi velieri, pp. )/-)$. As usual in the local literature about 
Camogli, Gio. Bono Ferrari represents the unique authority to account for the history of this 
Cooperativa degli zeri, which is further mentioned by other authors with the mere reference to 
Ferrari.  
61 Idem, p. )..  
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This experience is remarkable for its volume and for the continuity recorded 
over time62. Despite Ferrari positions its beginning in the aftermath of the 
Cooperativa degli zeri’s affair, and indeed it is undoubtedly attested through the 
course of the nineteenth century, other authors, relying on archival sources, can 
date it back to a preceding period63. The fishing in Gorgona was practised on a 
seasonal basis, starting in May and lasting up until the first days of September. On 
a yearly average of "&^-#^^ ships, the community experienced this endeavour 
collectively, with massive participation of youngsters (aged V and "^) who had the 
opportunity to spend in a relatively safe environment their first period at sea. As 
the expedition to Gorgona was a collaborative practice, it held a deep significance 
for the life of the community. For instance, it was thoroughly correlated to mass 
ceremonies which were celebrated both at the beginning and the end of the fishing 
period, in religious festivals like the one of San Prospero, in September. The 
impression of a communal rite is masterfully sketched in Gio. Bono Ferrari’s 
account. He records:  
The departure of the ships of Camogli to Gorgona followed a 
specific event, every year. In May every captain, master and sailor 
used to go to the Mass, named the “Mass of Gorgona”. […] When 
all the ships were gathered in the harbour, the bells rang in 
celebration and the Priest, escorted by the praying crowd, brought 
the Case of Saint Prospero to the Castle. From the highest point, 
in order to let the people see, he raised the case and slowly blessed 
the crowd, spelling three words: oh San Prospero preserve the 
men, the boats and the nets!64 
 
62 The fishing for anchovies at Gorgona Island is central in the local historiography of Camogli. 
Exhaustive accounts can be found in: G.B. Ferrari, Camogli: la città dei mille bianchi velieri, pp. )$-
14; A. Mariotti, “La tonnarella di Camogli”, pp. )&-)+.  
63 A. Mariotti, “La tonnarelli di Camogli”, p. )*. 
64 G.B. Ferrari, Camogli: la città dei mille bianchi velieri, p. )). Personal translation of the Italian 
original: «La partenza della flottiglia camogliese per la Gorgona seguiva ogni anno un avvenimento. 
Un buon giorno di maggio tutti i Padroni, i Capi barca ed i marinai si recavano in chiesa alla Messa 
chiamata della Gorgona. […] Quando tutta la interminabile flottiglia era ben schierata sul golfo, 
dalla Bardiciocca alle case di Rissuolo, le campane suonavano a festa e il Prete accompagnato dalla 
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During the season the ships went to Livorno to sell the fish and, in the end, only a 
small proportion of the catch was destined to Camogli – for San Prospero’s 
celebrations – once the fishing was over. The adventure to Gorgona was carried 
out on small boats, batelli and gondole in the sources, weighing no more than %-& 
tons65.  The fleet was relatively recent since the ships recorded aged averagely '-D 
years. These boats were manned by a master (patrone) with three, maximum four 
people, without considering the occasional presence of an equal number of men as 
“reinforcement personnel” (uomini di rinforzo)66.  
Although the Gorgona has been usually conceived as a training opportunity for 
the youngest members of the community, the average age shows partially different 
results. Masters were usually in their late thirties (average $U), while the crew 
members aged in average $',U years, with extremes of V and 'V. On the one hand, 
masters’ figure can find an explanation in the requirements of experience and skills 
to handle ships in the open sea; on the other hand, it is possible to observe a 
dichotomy in the composition of the crews, crowded of elders and youngsters and 
with limited participation of men in their most productive working age67. This 
polarisation is not uncommon in late eighteenth century seafaring communities68: 
the coexistence of older and younger elements onboard responded to both social 
and educational purposes. The presence of seasoned seamen reflects the inner 
characteristics of short-distance voyages which allowed more mature personnel to 
continue their maritime careers in a less demanding working environment. On the 
other hand, the combination of elders and youngster fits totally with the 
 
folla orante portava la teca di San Prospero in Castello. Dal punto più alto, acciocché i partenti ben 
vedessero, egli alzava solennemente la teca del Santo e con gesto lento benediceva, pronunciando 
le tre parole sempre tramandate: San Prospero proteggi gli uomini, le barche e le reti».  
65 The data are extracted from the records of &) ships involved in this activity in &1+&. They are 
found in ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, &1+&, n. */+$-*/$+.   
66 This is, for instance, the case of the batello “San Fortunato”, which in a first phase hosts two 
men of reinforcement, whereas in a second phase it has three. ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, &1+&, n. 
*//*. This occurs in other two instances, in the voyages of two gondole: ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, 
&1+&, n. *//) and *//1.  
67 In percentage, out of the total members of the crews (.&), /.% were in the age interval of 5-
*5, /+% were /4-$5 while only the remaining &*% were in the group of +4-+5 years old.  
68 See the case-study of Scarborough, in C.R. Foy, “Sewing a Safety Net: Scarborough’s Maritime 
Community, &)/)-&)$.”, International Journal of Maritime History, No. */, *4&*, pp. &-*1.  
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conception of seafaring as a traditional activity within which knowledge and 
expertise were handed down through the generations. Given the scarcity of sources 
to examine this specific activity, the interesting data representing the age 
distribution of the crew members might lead to arguing the relatively decreasing 
importance for Camogli of its fishing sector, at least for the year "U$" when, as we 
will discuss in the next paragraphs, the attention of Camogli begins to direct 
towards most profitable activities.  
 
8.E. Camogli in the Tyrrhenian maritime system 
 
Indeed, leaving aside fishing, an activity that, despite its role in the evolution of 
the community, is out of the intended borders of the research, we might argue a 
durable coexistence of fishing with coastal shipping and short-range cabotage, as 
the activities of the merchant fleet, albeit still composed by rather small vessels, 
seem to demonstrate.  
However, before tackling the involvement of Camogli in the Tyrrhenian 
maritime system, we must briefly deal with the political context, which between 
the late eighteenth century and the beginning of the next century is too dense of 
transforming events. Liguria passed through various political transformations, 
from being an independent oligarchic Republic until "DVD up to be subjected under 
the Savoy dynasty after the Vienna Congress, without mentioning the countless 
administrative resettlements occurred under Napoleon’s rule. The outbreak of war 
disrupted the international scenario, involving the whole continent and affecting 
the shipping activities in the Mediterranean, which were severely damaged by the 
Anglo-French rivalry at sea. The merchant trajectories of the Camogli-owned 
ships, therefore, cannot be addressed without taking into account the political 
dimension and the war events impacting on the Mediterranean maritime 
framework. On the other hand, whilst admitting the centrality of political 
mutations in determining trade routes, this paragraph embraces politics only to a 
marginal extent, to frame Camogli into a broader system where the critical focus 
is posed on long durée elements (economic and social) rather than on conjunctures 
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(political). Whenever politics is taken into consideration, the reference is made in 
the light of the explicit key of interpretation to address the community structural 
limits and potentialities to profit from troubled contexts – a trademark of the 
Camogli historical evolution also throughout the nineteenth century.  
The data are drawn from the archival collection of the maritime health authority 
of Genoa69. To exploit sanitary registrations in dealing with shipping movement in 
ports is relatively common and widespread in the literature. In the absence of 
records collecting the arrivals and departures in ports with statistical purposes 
(more common in the following period), the political authorities main interests to 
keep an eye on the port movements were sanitary and fiscal concerns. Whereas 
the taxation controls were aimed at the goods either entering or being temporarily 
deposited into the port warehouses, on the other hand, the maritime healthcare 
was concerned with the cargo and vessel material conditions (nautical data), the 
medical status of the captain and the crew (seagoing personnel data) and the route 
and the specific ports of call visited by the ship (shipping and trade data). This 
enormous mass of information is extremely precious to maritime historians, as it 
allows to collect vast datasets and to carry out quantitative approaches. In the 
impossibility of delineating in details the overall evolution of Camogli’s shipping 
from the late eighteenth century to the Congress of Vienna, due to the 
overwhelming amount of vessels recorded, we decided to select three different 
periods, starting from "DU& with a time interval of ten years. The results obtained 
seem to fulfil the initial requirements, as, throughout the period under analysis, 
structural trends emerge along with conjunctural processes, the latter occasionally 
determining the establishment of new routes or in other cases affecting the final 
figure in a much more decisive way.  
 
69 The “Ufficio di Sanità” of the port of Genoa has produced an extensive documentation from 
the &$th century up to its dismission as a result of the Italian unification (&1$&). For the purposes of 
our analysis, we mainly used the records of the arriving vessels at Genoa which, with regard the two 
period under our interest (the latest decade of the Republic of Genoa and the period under the 
Savoy sovereignty), is divided in three different collections: with regard to the period &)1.-&)5., the 
arrival records can be found in ASGe, Ufficio di Sanità, Manuali e Notulari, *41-/1+; for the &14., 
they have been kept in ASGe, Ufficio di Sanità, Arrivi di capitani e padroni, &$1*-&$5/; for the latest 
phase, under Savoy administration, they are found in ASGe, Ufficio di Sanità, Arrivi di bastimenti 
dall’estero, ..+-$&..   
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For methodological purposes, the ports were grouped on a geographical basis 
and concerning port systems and traffic flows, notwithstanding the political 
borders. The port of Livorno deserves a different treatment: despite its location 
within the Tuscan area, it was considered as a distinct unit to underline its different 
role within Camogli’s shipping system. Indeed, the traffics linking Livorno, and the 
Tuscan area with Liguria differed under several regards, particularly when 
concerning merchandises.  
 
 
Figure &-& Camogli-owned ships arriving at Genoa distinguished by regional area. &)1.; &)5.; &14.. 
Source: ASGe, Ufficio di sanità, /++-/+/; /$1-/$5; &$1)-&$11-&$15.  
 
The figure reflects rather clearly the trend of cabotage routes and traffics 
handled by the fleet of Camogli. The records show the existence of a stable 
connection with the nearby Tuscan area and particularly with the region of 
Maremma, whose relative geographical proximity with the Ligurian eastern 
communities contributed to the establishment of long-lasting relationships. From 
the eighteenth century onwards, Maremma continuously supplied with charcoal 
and timber the Republic of Genoa and, in the aftermath of the Vienna Congress, 
to the Kingdom of Sardinia. The relevance of the statistical measure of charcoal 
trade within the whole shipping of Camogli – and within the strategies of its 






Tuscan area Livorno Sardinia and Corsica Southern Italy
Western
Mediterranean
1785 170 3 6 19 17
1795 198 43 9 11 70
1805 48 3 3
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captains and shipowners – leads to devoting more space to this subject in order to 
carry out proper analyses. Meanwhile, the other routes might be taken into 
account, especially as these activities are keen to provide an insight about the 
ability of Camogli maritime actors to enter into, and to benefit from, different 
typologies of trade. In this regard, the distribution of the ports of departure, among 
which it is worth outlining the recurrent presence of Livorno and Marseille, the 
sporadic records concerning the Iberic coast and the intermittent participation in 
the traffics with the southern Italian area might outline a more composite scenario, 
where short and long-distance hauls overlapped and coexisted according to 
convenience and trade opportunities70.  
The first remark involves the rate of arrivals to the port of Genoa from Livorno 
in "DV& ("$%), which strikes against the figures of "DU& and "U^&, when Livorno is 
negligible in terms of relative frequency (respectively ",$% and &,&%). The reasons 
for such contrast lie into exogenous factors. The conflicts waged by Napoleon 
against the British fleet in the Mediterranean granted a comparative advantage to 
Livorno, which established itself as one of the main entrepôts for grain trade. 
Livorno absorbed a high percentage of the seaborne trade of Marseille, becoming 
the principal port of transit (and deposit) of the Mediterranean, especially for what 
concerned wheat and cereals71. From the data drawn from the number of Camogli-
owned ships to Livorno in this specific year, the favourable conjuncture of the 
Tuscan city constituted an extremely profitable opportunity for the Genoese fleet. 
Among the cargo typologies registered emerges a neat preference for cereals and 
leguminous plants, which constituted the V&,$% of the total. Wheat was loaded as 
 
70 The ports of departures were grouped as such: Western Mediterranean (Agde, Barcelona, 
Ceuta, Ibiza, Marseille, Nice, Toulon, Villefranche-sur-Mer); Southern Italy (Castellammare, 
Girgenti, Licata, Majori, Mazzara, Mazzarelli, Modica, Napoli, Palermo, Pozzallo, Termini and 
Terracina).  
71 The most authoritative reference concerning the evolution of the port of Livorno in the early 
modern period until the Restauration is: J.P. Filippini, Il porto di Livorno e la Toscana ($D1D-$>$#), 
Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, &551. For the importance acquired by the Tuscan port in the 
Napoleonic period, see also: S. Marzagalli, “Le boulevards de la fraude”. Le négoce maritime et le 
Blocus continental, $>2D-$>$7. Bordeaux, Hambourg, Livourne, Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses 
Universitaire du Septentrion, &555; Id., I negozianti delle città portuali in età napoleonica: Amburgo, 
Bordeaux e Livorno di fronte al blocco continentale, $>2D-$>$7, PhD dissertation, European 
University Institute, &55+. Also, see the chapter about the British presence in Livorno during the 
Napoleonic wars in K. Galani, British shipping in the Mediterranean, pp. 15-&&$.  
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the main cargo in %U,U% of the instances72. Colonial genres, usually transported 
over British vessels from the Atlantic and the Levant, are absent, despite they have 
been a crucial export from the port of Livorno throughout the eighteenth century,. 
There are a few exceptions when high-value commodities are combined as a 
complement of the leading merchandise (usually wheat). In this regard, we can 
find cotton in eight instances and spices like pepper and saffron in four cases73.  
The absence of records concerning the arrival of colonial genres – which instead 
were common in the overall trade linking Livorno with Genoa – in the other years 
surveyed, together with the restrict number of ships departing from the Tuscan 
city in "DU& and "U^&, poses the question about the exceptionality of the results 
found in correspondence to the year "DV&. Arguably, Camogli-owned ships simply 
met Livorno’s conjunctural high demands for maritime transport. In "DVD, the first 
French occupation of the city disrupted the trade, which revived at the edge of the 
century to last only a few years before the imposition of the continental blockade. 
The absence of vessels recorded in "U^& holds a more profound significance to the 
general trend of the Tuscan port, especially concerning the British arrivals, whose 
presence was instrumental to the redistribution trade in which the Camogli-owned 
ships engaged74. Nevertheless, the picture plotted for "DV& is still valuable about 
the conditions and the potentialities of Camogli’s fleet, which might have 
accounted for more or less $"-$$ ships – at least a pair of identifications are 
uncertain75 – to this route. It implied, also, the presence of a mature merchant 
 
72 This is the table listing the cargoes loaded at Livorno in &)5. by Camogli-owned ships: 
fodder canvas chick peas fava beans wheat corn olive oil barley 
+ & * $ *& + & $ 
 
73 See, for instance, the case of the pinco “Nostra Signora del Carmine” (patrone Prospero 
Schiaffino), which arrives at Genoa on $th March &)5. with a cargo of wheat, soap, cotton and 
saffron: ASGe, Ufficio di Sanità, /$1.  
74 The decline of British shipping in the port of Livorno is clearly observable in the analysis of 
Katerina Galani: K. Galani, British shippin in the Mediterranean, p. &4+ (figure /.*b). 
75 In two cases, the Marine Health Authority official does not provide any name for the ship, one 
of the two main distinguishing information to identify a ship together with the family name of its 
master.  
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awareness of trade conjunctures and international flows of goods, a fundamental 
skill for the future sake of the community. Finally, this fortuitous occurrence might 
represent the first involvement of Camogli in the international wheat trade, an 
activity which later – under similar circumstances – played a critical role in the 
maritime community success within the international shipping business.  
Apart from the particular case of Livorno in "DV&, and the already mentioned 
trade of Tuscan charcoal which will be the subject of the next paragraph, the 
general trend of Camogli-owned ships in the late eighteenth century displays some 
occasional relationships with western Mediterranean ports, like Barcelona, Ceuta, 
Agde, Toulon and especially Marseille, together with sporadic arrivals from 
southern Italy, in particular Sicily.  
As far as the western Mediterranean is concerned, almost one-third of the ships 
("U of &&) arrived at Genoa on ballast, presumably in their return haul. Although 
the archival sources lack of further insights about the traffics to this vast area, 
presumably the transport of Tuscan charcoal touched Marseille as well. This 
hypothesis leads to the idea that some ships from Marseille were just returning to 
resume the trade from Genoa. Besides, the existing literature suggests the 
involvement of a few families from Camogli in alum trade between Naples and 
Palermo and the Iberian and French coasts76. Within this area, the data bear 
witness of a large predominance of Marseille, detaining the D',$% of the total 
arrivals from the Western Mediterranean: from the French port, the vessels of 
Camogli imported to Genoa a various spectrum of commodities, ranging from 
colonial genres such as coffee, tobacco, sugar, cotton and indigo to local 
production like hats, draperies, soap and wine.  
In analogy with the abovementioned trade axis linking the Republic of Genoa 
with the Kingdom of Naples, the ships which were directed to Southern Italy 
usually returned with general cargoes in foodstuff. The relatively modest number 
of vessels pursuing this route ("& percent of the total movement, leaving out the 
southernmost charcoal loading ports) sets the role of Camogli in the commercial 
 
76 G.B. Figari and S. Bagnato Bonucelli, La marina mercantile camogliese dalla guerra di Crimea 
all’Inchiesta Parlamentare Boselli: $>LL-$>>!, Genova: Tolozzi, &51+, p. ..  
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relationships with Southern Italy in a liminal position if compared to that of other 
communities. Nevertheless, it might be worth noting the existence in this period 
of a quite recurrent route to trade carobs – almost one-third of the general 
merchandises arriving from this region. Indeed, the trade in carobs is, to a lesser 
extent than Tuscan charcoal, a durable activity in which Camogli-owned ships 
engaged. Interestingly, the comparison with the sources collected concerning the 
late "U&^s period illustrates a shift in the geographical distribution of this kind of 
traffic: the role of Sicily gradually decreased, and the routes extended to the 
Eastern Mediterranean, where captains were able to contract more profitable 
freights in Crete and Cyprus. Indeed, out of %& ships with a carobs cargo between 
"U&U-"U'#, "V were loaded in Crete and other % in Cyprus77. The continuity of the 
traffic is remarkable and, perhaps, deserving of further analysis. The fact that a 
limited group of ships travelled more than once along the same route might 
suggest the existence of a certain degree of specialisation and leads to posing 
questions about whether existed or not further interests throughout the supply 
chain of this particular commodity. The late eighteenth century sources do not 
provide this kind of information: on the other hand, the mid-nineteenth century 
ones might give us more insights. The same merchant, Giuseppe Denegri, 
purchased most of the carob cargoes78. Although this family name is attested 
amongst the historical households of Camogli, he was born elsewhere, in 
Sampierdarena: nevertheless, Denegri maintained firm and continuous contacts 
with the leading figures of Camogli’s shipping. For instance, in "U&%, he purchased 
in society with Angelo Olivari "U shares (in a #% share system) of the brick 
“Annibale” ("%V tons.) from different owners79. Two years later, he was found as 
 
77 ASGe, Ufficio di Sanità, Arrivi di bastimenti dall’estero, .54-$&+. Among the Cretan ports is 
observed a quite consistent preference for Rethymno (&*) and Heraklion ()). In Cyprus, carobs were 
loaded in Larnaca. Then, among the remaining arrivals it is worth noting the persistence of the 
market of Pozzallo (Sicily), which appears in other && instances.  
78 ASGe, Ufficio di Sanità, Arrivi di bastimenti dall’estero, .54-$&+. Giuseppe Denegri is the main 
buyer in *) instances out of /..  
79 ASGe, Notai II Sezione, Notaio Gio. Batta Degregori, &)*, n. /&. In this purchasing contract he 
is recognized by the notary as «Denegri Giuseppe fu Bartolomeo, mediatore in noleggi e sicurtà, 
native del Comune di San Pier d’Arena mandamento di Rivarolo, Provincia di Genova, ed in Genova 
domiciliato e dimorante».  
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commercial correspondent of the Rocca family, merchants of Ligurian origin 
dealing with long-ranged international trade with North Africa and the Levant, 
and that in the late "Uth century had established the leading unit of their company 
in Marseille80. His commercial activities and his wide-ranging networks might have 
probably facilitated and stimulated Camogli’s persistence in this traffic, even when, 
from the "U&^s onwards, the Camogli maritime elites had already abandoned most 
of their traditional habits, and redirected their investments to the construction of 
bigger ships with to insert into more lucrative traffics.  
 
8.F. A long-lasting route: the trade of Tuscan charcoal 
 
Since the late eighteenth century, the most relevant trade practised by the ships of 
Camogli seems to be the transport of charcoal and timber from the Maremma 
Tuscan region to Genoa (and elsewhere in the Mediterranean, e.g. Marseille). The 
first mention of this kind of traffic ascends to Gio. Bono Ferrari’s works, who 
pointed out the remarkable rate of arrivals to Genoa from Maremma and provided 
some necessary information about the maritime actors and the ships involved, as 
well as a few details about the typology of merchandises which were traded along 
this route81. Lacking more exhaustive news, Ferrari erroneously dated the first 
occurrences of this activity to the mid-nineteenth century when, in effect, the 
people of Camogli still sailed along the route as much as they began to frequent 
the Black Sea to transport the Russian wheat to the Mediterranean and England. 
However, as the thoroughly conducted archival research of Pietro Berti has pointed 
out, the presence of ships from Camogli in this trade is more long-dated and 
 
80 About the Rocca family there is the recent work of Annastella Carrino: A. Carrino, Passioni e 
interessi di una famiglia-impresa. I Rocca di Marsiglia nel Mediterraneo dell’Ottocento, Roma: Viella, 
*4&1. The commercial correspondence of the Rocca family is kept in the archives of the Chamber 
of Commerce of Marseille. The letter of Giuseppe De Negri can be found in: ACCIMP, Fonds Rocca, 
Maison Rocca-Correspondance passive, L &5/&//&4&, Giuseppe De Negri &1.$-&1.$.  
81 G.B. Ferrari, Capitani di mare e bastimenti di Liguria del secolo XIX, Rapallo: Arti Grafiche 
Tigullio, &5+5, pp. /)&-/)+.  
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effectively might be ascended at least to the preceding century, at some stage 
between the "D$^s and the "DD^s82. 
Nevertheless, the purpose of Berti’s work was to outline a trend in order to 
stimulate further research on this subject: indeed, rather than attempting to 
reconstruct the entire statistical figure of Camogli’s involvement in the Tuscan 
charcoal trade, the author chose to focus on a few familiar nucleuses to show the 
effective continuity observed in this trade overtime. Despite the significant 
number of ships recorded in the article, the data bear witness of a much more 
consistent presence – from a quantitative perspective – than what is shown in 
Berti’s study. For instance, whereas he reports respectively $, # and D ships dealing 
with charcoal in the years "DU&, "DV& and "U^&, the registrations of the Marine 
Health Authority of Genoa provide us with a much more remarkable picture, with 
"$%, "'" and %' Camogli-owned ships recorded for having transported charcoal 
from Maremma to Genoa. Furthermore, charcoal was not the unique kind of good 
with which the people of Camogli dealt in the same area, due to the conspicuous 
numbers of timber cargoes, which made the total figure increase to "D%, "UU and %D 
respectively.  
During the late-eighteenth century period, in the measured intervals, the share 
of this traffic on the whole amount of Camogli-owned ships sailing along other 
routes is impressive:  
 
Year Total arrivals 
registered 
Charcoal and timber 
trade 
% 
"()$ &"> "(' (>,$% 
"(>$ %%@ ")) $#,>% 
")@$ $$ '( )$,$% 
 
82 P. Berti, Il traffico camogliese del carbone vegetale: un contributo alla storia marittima di 
Camogli, in Figari G.B.R. (ed.), Camogli da borgo a città. Notizie storiche e spunti di ricerca, pp. +&.-
+*1. 
 %# 
Table &.* - Relative number of ships coming from Camogli out of the total arrivals. Source: ASGe, 
Ufficio di sanità, /++-/+/; /$1-/$5; &$1)-&$11-&$15. 
 
First, it is possible to point out the similar figure observed in "DU& and "DV& 
concerning the number of ships doing the route of Maremma. This trend might 
suggest the substantial inelasticity of Ligurian demands for charcoal and timber 
within a decade, despite the relative percentages. Likewise, in "DV& the trade with 
Livorno absorbed another "$% of the traffics, thus resulting in a total picture of 
almost D^%.  
The relevance of coastal coal transport in the history of Camogli might resemble 
those of the multitude of British maritime communities which specialised in collier 
trade before committing to deep-sea shipping83. The opportunity to rely on a stable 
and unrelenting trade might have played a role in the evolution from occasional to 
professional sailors, engaged steadily throughout the year in the shipping business. 
Meanwhile, steadiness could have nurtured the expansion of the merchant fleet, 
as the statistical relevance of navicelli among the ships of Camogli seems to 
indicate.  
Following the inner features of the Mediterranean cabotage, the short-distance 
route covered by the vessels linking Genoa with the Maremma allowed captains 
and masters to sail throughout the whole year, even in winter, despite the seasonal 
interruptions which were needed in long-distance hauls which would necessarily 
involve deep-sea navigation stretches. This advantage, however, was not 
statistically relevant, since of "UU ships engaging in the trade during the whole 
"DV&, as few as ## challenged the odds of adverse weather over the winter months84.  
The figure for "U^&, instead, demonstrates a rather remarkable resilience of the 
route within the economic depression, when all the trade were limited by the 
 
83 See R. Davis, The rise of the English shipping industry in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, Research in Maritime History series (No. /1), Newfoundland: International Maritime 
Economic History Association, *4&*. An interesting comparison can be sketched with the maritime 
community of Scarborough: C.R. Foy, “Sewing a Safety Net: Scarborough’s Maritime Community”, 
pp. &-&&.  
84 ASGe, Ufficio di sanità, Manuali e notulari, /$1-/$5. In particular the arrivals of Camogli-
owned vessel from Maremma to Genoa in the months of January and February and from October 
to December are as follows: January (&), February (+), October ()), November (+), December ()).  
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international crisis owing mainly to the continental blockade and, therefore, 
marked by the absence of the British commerce which was vital to the 
Mediterranean maritime activities. The conditions of the Ligurian trade were even 
worse: in "U^%, the inclusion into the Imperial administration had deteriorated the 
already precarious position of Genoa within the international stage. Bulferetti and 
Costantini, in their pivotal work, have already underlined how the concomitant 
actions of the continental blockade and the inclusion in the Empire had inflicted 
a decisive blow to the Ligurian city85. After the steady growth observed until "DVD, 
the volume of traffics had remained stable up to "U^$; then, beginning with the 
following year, Genoa was rapidly cut off from the international trade, as the 
minimal participation of big ships in the total movement seems to confirm86. 
Genoa became a destination of short-distance voyages, and its fleet strictly 
restrained to cabotage. In the same regard, it is worth noting the fact that the 
Genoese fleet had been unceasingly diminished since Napoleon’s Egypt expedition 
in "DVU, in the context which the newly acquired territories of Liguria offered a 
consistent participation87. The campaign of Egypt directly concerned the fleet of 
Camogli, since several ships (#') joined Napoleon’s expedition, and only a few of 
them ($ out of #') returned safely88.  
The interests of Ligurian ship-owners had been damaged by British privateering 
in the Mediterranean waters, which disrupted the maritime activities of the region. 
 
85 L. Bulferetti and C. Costantini, Industria e commercio in Liguria nell’età del Risorgimento: $122-
$>D$, Milano: Giuffrè, &5$).  
86 See the two tables in L. Bulferetti and C. Costantini, Industria e commercio in Liguria, pp. *$1-
*$5. These tables clearly express the decrease of the percentage of big ships (over &.4 t.) arriving at 
Genoa between &)5) (*),5%) and &14/ (+,+%).   
87 The exploitation of the Ligurian marine for the Egypt expedition is mentioned in most of the 
general literature about the late &1th century history of Genoa: L. Bulferetti and C. Costantini, 
Industria e commercio in Liguria, pp. *)*-*)+. A more detailed focus on the naval involvement is 
found in: V. Ilari and P. Crociani, Le marine italiane di Napoleone:  le marine ligure, toscana e 
romana, $1M1-$>$#, Milano: Società Italiana di Storia Militare, *4&/.  
88 The number of ships of Camogli within the total amount is questionable. In Ferrari’s books 
the ships are *$, but, as usual for the local historian, there is no mention of his sources: G.B. Ferrari, 
Capitani di mare, p. +++. In the papers of the French administration of Genoa there are mentions of 
bureaucratic procedures to refund the shipowners who had lost their ships in the campaign, but 
through these sources is impossible to reconstruct the whole figure: see, A. Pellegrini, “Napoleone 
e il porto di Camogli”, in G.B.R. Figari (ed.), Camogli da borgo a città, p. &+$ and ASGe, Prefettura 
francese, b. .)+.  
 %% 
As a result of all these factors, the total number of Camogli-owned ships engaging 
in business in "U^& might not be a surprise. Nonetheless, the increased importance 
of charcoal trade in the broader perspective find reasons in the relative proximity 
of Maremma, and therefore in the limited length of the route. The short distance 
coastal navigation and the deployment of small ships allowed the Camogli-owned 
vessels to continue in their trade to a certain extent, despite the presence of British 
privateers in the Tyrrhenian waters. Through the year, out of %D voyages, only three 
captains reported some dealings with privateers, and all of them were involved in 
a single attack89. In order to prevent privateers’ aggressions and to conduct safer 
navigation, most of the vessels probably sailed in convoys. In several cases, the 
sources display concomitant arrivals from the same place of departure. On the Vth 
March "U^&, three Camogli-owned ships arrived at Genoa and two of them – 
captained respectively by Biagio and Gio. Batta Mortola – came from Castagneto 
(the latter one coming from the nearby area of Portiglione)90. The same individuals 
arrived together on ##nd September, from Follonica91. Family ties might have also 
connected Lorenzo and Andrea Senno who, on the "Vth July, arrived at Genoa from 
Portiglione92. Nevertheless, convoys were not restricted to the members of the 
same family: for instance, on the abovementioned ##nd September, six ships are 
recorded, coming respectively from Castiglione della Pescaia (Geronimo Mortola 
and Biagio Schiaffino), Follonica (Biagio e Gio. Batta Mortola), Portiglione 
(Antonio Boggiano) and Torre Civette (Bartolomeo Mortola)93.  
 
 
89 This is the case of the navicello “Gesù, Giuseppe e Maria” (patrone Bartolomeo Mortola) and 
of the filuca “La Misericordia”, (patrone Filippo Bertolotto), who reported to having be attacked in 
the waters of Castagneto (one of the main place of charging of charcoal) by English corsairs on the 
&)th September &14.. In the first case, the sight of the privateers approaching led the sailors to 
abandon the ship, leaving only the captain to deal with the corsairs. Both of the ships were not 
attacked for the cargoes which they were transporting, but only to take foodstuff and water 
(«diverse bagatelle e alcune provviste»). Then, the second vessel attacked had to share its own sailor 
with Bartolomeo Mortola who was evidently in need of people to man the ship to Genoa. ASGe, 
Ufficio di Sanità, Arrivi di capitani e padroni, &$11.  
90 ASGe, Idem, &$1).  
91 ASGe, Idem, &$15.  
92 ASGe, Idem, &$11. 
93 ASGe, Idem, &$15.  
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Map &.* – The ports of Tuscan charcoal. 
 
The presentation of a singular example of ship engaging in this trade might lead 
to valuable results, especially with the purpose to reconstruct the rate of 
productivity to engage in the charcoal route, under the lens of both owners and 
sailors. For instance, taking into account the navigation of the navicello “N.S. del 
Rosario” led by the patrone Andrea Simonetti through the course of the year "DV&, 
it is possible to observe that seven out of eight arrivals of this vessel at Genoa are 
related to the trade of Tuscan charcoal, evidence suggesting the rate of 
specialisation of the ships involved in this traffic. Furthermore, the occurrence of 
seven hauls in a single year might lead to arguing a similar rate of sailings between 
Maremma and Genoa, thus allowing to propose some hypothesis about the real 
dimensions of the fleet of Camogli (at least of the part which engaged in charcoal 
trade)94.   
 




Table &.+ – The voyages of the navicello “N.S. del Rosario”, patrone Andrea Simonetti, during the 
year &)5. – January to December. Source: ASGe, Ufficio di Sanità, Manuali e notulari, /$1-/$5. 
 
The analysis of the trade geography might lead to interesting results, at least 
concerning the practical procedures to load the cargo, and to obtain few 
indications about the ships types and the numbers of the tonnage deployed. The 
location and identification of the #% places of charging recorded in the sources led 
to the detection of three sites which were, already in the late eighteenth century, 
somehow inhabited and only two of them (Castiglione della Pescaia and 
Civitavecchia) had actual ports (being the third the village of San Vincenzo)95. On 
the contrary, the majority of these sites was placed in depopulated areas: the 
loading occurred next to military outposts located before the beach – with long 
stretches of marshlands at the back. Charcoal, which was locally produced through 
the burning of timber according to traditional procedures, was then transported 
to the sea by the members of the agricultural communities populating the 
hinterland. In the absence of ports, and due to the peculiar hydrographical 
characteristics of the area, dominated by shallow waters, charcoal and timber had 
to be loaded on small lighters and then, finally, on the ship which was anchored 
offshore.  
In the late "U&^s, the geographical distribution of the place of loading frames a 
somewhat different picture, with only ' locations registered and the overwhelming 
 
95 See D. Barsanti, Castiglione della Pescaia. Storia di una comunità dal XVI al XIX secolo, Firenze: 
Sansoni, &51/.  
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role of Talamone, covering the '%% of the departures96. Also, the number of ships 
changed significantly, from the averagely "D^ figure for the late eighteenth century 
to the %#,' yearly average in the last decade before the Italian unification (and the 
subsequent loss of information about this trade). However, as a result of the 
improvements in Camogli’s shipping business, leading to new and more significant 
constructions, the tonnage devoted to this traffic every year might not have 
decreased too much, despite the relevant fall in the number of vessels. The sources 
fail in providing reliable information about the average tonnages of the vessels 
employed by Camogli in this trade.  
Finally, a further interesting feature to observe in the charcoal trade in 
opposition to the other routes sailed by Camogli-owned ships comes out from the 
analysis of the average age of the captains involved. These data are available only 
to what concerns the "U&^s phase, but this kind of analysis provides nonetheless 
fruitful results. In the case of charcoal, the age of captains is much higher than the 
average for the same period: indeed, whereas the average age of the Camogli 
captains was $',&, those going back and forth to Maremma were %D,# years old. 
This remarkable difference might imply the relatively traditional nature of the 
traffic, as well as its declining position within the broader commercial framework, 
much more focused on longer and more challenging routes, those of the Black Sea 




In the course of the late eighteenth century, the evolution of Camogli’s maritime 
activities seems to be in line with the paradigm of the Ligurian communities, 
especially of those lying east of Genoa. From the coasts to the deep-sea, fishing 
remained a key source of economic subsistence to the community. In parallel, the 
community developed its merchant fleet to profit from both some long-lasting 
 
96 The locations reported in the documents are Castiglione della Pescaia, Follonica, Longone, 
Pozzallo, San Vincenzo e Talamone. ASGe, Ufficio di sanità, Arrivi di bastimenti dall’estero, .54-
$&+.  
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routes as well as conjunctural shipping opportunities. The coexistence of the two 
aspects represented respectively by the massive involvement in the Tuscan 
charcoal and the critical readjustment of the routes to exploit the advantageous 
status of Livorno in the Revolutionary period, reveals a discrete capability to shift 
from one type of navigation to another. The range of activities remained restricted 
to the local level, as the outliers from the Northern Tyrrhenian area seems to be 
somewhat sporadic and exceptional, and seldom substantial to the general 
framework of Camogli’s shipping.  
The coexistence of fishing, coal trade and the capability to exploit the 
opportunities deriving from trade conjunctures (a sort of tramp shipping), 
constitute the distinguishing traits of the first phase of activities of Camogli. 
Despite the later outstanding success of the community to insert into the 
international shipping business might not be directedly connected to these 
premises, since the late "Uth century Camogli demonstrates to possess a solid 
maritime tradition, based on vast supplies of skilled sea labourers and a discrete 
availability of tonnage. Indeed, only a minimum portion of the pre-existing fleet 
survived to the following phase, due to the different purposes it served. 
Nonetheless, the strength of the maritime tradition and the expertise of local sea 
workers might have played a role in future accomplishments. 
  
 %V 





The decades between "U$^ and "UD^ represent a phase of profound changes in 
the economic and social conditions of the maritime community of Camogli, which 
dramatically transformed it due to the outstanding growth of its shipping industry. 
Such evolution, in less than forty years, led a traditional seafaring community to 
achieve a dominant position within the Italian and world shipping. In the heart of 
this momentous evolution lies the direct participation in the leading maritime 
business of the period, the Black Sea grain trade, which produced hundreds of 
thousands tons of cereals transported yearly from the Southern Russian and 
Danube port-cities to the Mediterranean and Western Europe. The geographical 
range of Camogli’s shipping extended to new horizons, passing from the local to 
the international dimension, thus preparing the ground for further oceanic 
expansion characterising the last stage of its maritime activities. In the history of 
Camogli, the Black Sea phase is the cornerstone of all the further developments, as 
the consistent revenues collected with this traffic were continuously reinvested in 
the shipping sector, especially in the direction of the enlargement of the fleet.  
In this chapter, the Black Sea trade and the rise of Camogli’s shipping will be 
taken into account altogether, since the features and peculiarities of the former 
played a crucial role in shaping the evolution of the latter. The first section 
examines, from a quantitative and qualitative point of view, the transformations 
that occurred in the fleet of Camogli, the main economic asset – together with 
human capital, which will be directly addressed in the second part of the thesis – 
of the maritime community.  
The second and third sections will provide, instead, an historical and 
geographical contextualization of the main characteristics of the Black Sea trade, 
its formation, the earlier development, and the geographical framework, which has 
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been divided into three areas: the region of Odessa, the ports of the Azov Sea and 
the ports of Danube.  
In the fourth section, the most important commercial networks established in 
the Black Sea are taken into account, focusing on the Greek and Italian trade 
houses, due to the relative importance of their business to the maritime activities 
of Camogli. The analysis also aims to investigate and to determine the role of each 
of the two groups in shaping the characteristics of the business model of the 
maritime community.  
Then, the fifth and the sixth sections target the transport trade of Camogli in 
relation to both imports and exports to and from the Black Sea directly. Apart from 
the quantitative assessment of Camogli’s presence and participation in the 
economic activities of the area, one of the purposes is to contextualize Camogli 
within the broader framework of the Italian shipping business in the region.  
The seventh section, instead, opens a parenthesis about the reconversion of 
Camogli’s shipping during the period of the Crimean War ("U&%-"U&'). This 
interlude is fundamental to depict, on one side, the dependency of Camogli from 
the Black Sea framework and the difficulties to readjust into other markets. On the 
other side, the adjustment to warfare economy is an indication of the capability of 
Camogli’s ship-owners to develop rapid and reliable responses to conjunctural 
crisis, a crucial quality to endure in the shipping business.  
Finally, the eighth and last section addresses the last component of the Black 
Sea trade, namely the presence of Camogli ships in the ports of discharge. In this 
case, the gradual geographical transfer from the Mediterranean to the British Isles 
acquired greater significance in light of the development of a complementary 
trade, that of British coal to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. This trade 
transformed the nature of the maritime activities of Camogli by reducing the 
dependency of its economy from the grain trade and by introducing its captains to 
new markets, which opened the way to Camogli’s following establishment along 
the Atlantic and oceanic routes.  
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=.8. The Camogli merchant fleet 
 
Compared with the previous period, during the second historical phase, more data 
are available about Camogli’s fleet. Voyage and arrival records can be combined 
with crew lists, data about the shipbuilding industry in Liguria and, from "U&$ 
onwards, with the lists of the ships enrolled in the local mutual insurance company 
(Mutua Assicurazione Marittima La Camogliese)97. Altogether, the sources provide 
us information about tonnage, type of ship, place and date of construction (Gatti’s 
database also adds details about ship-builders) without mentioning all the data 
about ownership, the object of more extensive analysis in the fifth chapter.  
To propose an evaluation of the fleet of Camogli, two different perspectives are 
adopted: the first is related to the fleet’s average tonnage over time; the second to 
new constructions. The observation of the evolution of the fleet allows us to 
contextualise Camogli’s operational capacity within the international framework 
of the Black Sea trade. The information about new constructions, instead, is 
intended to highlight the historical peaks of investments in shipbuilding, aimed to 
enlarge the fleet and to conform its technology to the demands of the international 
market.  
The main corpus of data is available from crew lists from the Genoa State 
Archives, which allowed us to draw an almost complete survey of Camogli’s 
operating fleet in the Black Sea in the "U&$-"U'& period. Nonetheless, as far as 
possible, they have been integrated and compared with other sources.   
The first level of analysis concerns the growth of the average tonnage overtime. 
Paired with the progressive specialisation into brigantine, brigs and barks, these 
 
97 The following sources constitute the archival corpus in the analysis of the evolution of the 
fleet of Camogli: ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, from &1*5 to &1$.; ASGe, Ufficio di sanità, Arrivi di 
bastimenti dall’estero, .54-$&+; Civico Museo Marinaro “Gio. Bono Ferrari” (CMMC from now on), 
Assicurazioni varie; L. Gatti, Un raggio di convenienza, Appendice & – Le navi costruite (&1*$-+4 e 
&1+1-&1.*), pp. &*+-&)$. For a comparative perspective, see: A. Delis, “Mediterranean Wooden 
Shipbuilding in the nineteenth century: Production, Productivity and Ship Types in Comparative 




data offer a clear picture of the Camogli’s fleet upgrade from coastal trade vessels 
to long-distance navigation ones.  
 
 
Figure *.& – Average tonnage of Camogli merchant fleet (&1*1-&1$.). Source: ASGe, Ruoli di 
equipaggio, from &1*1 to &1$.; ASGe, Ufficio di sanità, Arrivi di bastimenti dall’estero, .54-$&+98.  
Figure #." illustrates the constant growth in the average tonnage between "U#U 
("#" tons) and "U'& (#VD tons.). The increase is even remarkable as far as the "U&$-
"U'& period is concerned (from "&U to almost $^^): this evolution is indicative of 
the profound correlation between Camogli’s participation in the Black Sea trade 
and the expansion of its merchant fleet. From a methodological point of view, the 
decision to show average tonnage rather than total tonnage is ascribed to the lack 
of homogeneity between the two chronologic sub-series under consideration, the 
periods "U#U-"U%^ and "U&$-"U'&. This specific information, instead, is found in 
the "U&$ list of the ships enrolled into the local Mutua (Mutual Insurance 
Association)– the first of the kind –, which constitutes a fundamental source to 
reconstruct the whole fleet of Camogli99. In "U&$, it was composed of "%$ vessels, 
 
98 The health records of Genoa’s port authorities have been paired to the crew lists information 
only for the years between &1.1 and &1$*.  



















































for a total of #&.^$U tons (average "D&,^V). Most of the ships fall under the "&^-#^^ 
tonnage class (Figure #.#).  
 
 
Figure *.* – The fleet of Camogli by tonnage range in &1.+. Source: CMMC, Assicurazioni varie.  
 
Unfortunately, in its first edition, the Mutua list does not provide further 
information concerning the fleet age and qualitative features: place and date of 
construction and ship type are not mentioned100. However, since an evaluation of 
the categorization by types might offer a more precise depiction of the nature of 
the fleet, we resorted to crew lists.  
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Table *.& – Percentage of ship types of Camogli’s fleet active in commerce (&1*1-&1$.)101. Source: 
ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio,   
According to Table #.", the traditionally high rate of diversification in ship types 
(see chapter ".#) was replaced by the specialization into three different types, 
brigantines, brigs and barks, suitable to long-distance navigation. Between "U#U 
and "U$&, sciabecco ($,#$%), navicello (U,^'%) and pinco ("",#V%) are still found102;  
the frequent recurrence of ketches (#^,VD%), then, might be interpreted as the first 
transition from coastal to the Mediterranean and Black Sea trade. Indeed, some of 
them sailed along these routes in the early stages of Camogli’s presence. The 
disappearance of traditional types of vessels coincided with the boom of 
brigantines, brigs and barks103. These three types shared some technical features, 
in particular concerning the hull. However, they were distinguished by rigging and 
masts: brigantines (brick goletta or brick schooners in the sources), had two masts. 
The foremast square-rigged, while the second mast was equipped with fore-and-
aft sails104. Brigs (brigantino in Italian) had two masts, both of them square-rigged, 
although usually, the mainmast carried a small fore-and-aft sail in order to improve 
manoeuvrability105. Barques (brigantino a palo) were bigger and had three masts: 
the first two were armed with square sails and the aftermost with fore-and-aft sails.  
Furthermore, these three ship types, all employed in the Black Sea trade, had 
considerable differences in tonnage. Brigantines were the smallest, measuring 
 
101 To translate the nautical terminology, in particular for what concerned the ship types, we 
chose the official translation proposed by the Registro Navale Italiano. Brigantines and brigs are 
found also in all the numbers of the Lloyd’s register to identify the respective kind of ships. Barks, 
instead, are also commonly found as barques.  
102 All of these ship types are grouped in the class “Other” in the Graphic +. For a description of 
these ship types see, Chapter &.*.  
103 A comparable transition is shown by A. Delis in the Greek-owned merchant fleet: A. Delis, 
“From Lateen to Square Rig: The Evolution of the Greek-Owned merchant fleet and its ships in the 
eitghteenth and nineteenth centuries”, The Mariner’s Mirror, No. &44: &, *4&/, pp. //-.1.  
104 S. Bellabarba and E. Guerreri, Vele italiane, pp. )*-)). 
105 Idem, pp. $/-)&.  
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around """,# tons (Gatti106) or "#D,' (crew lists of Camogli107). Brigs spanned 
between "DU,# (Gatti) and #^%,D tons (crew lists). Finally, barks (or barques) 
averaged to $'&," tons (crew list)108.  
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Table *.* – Ship types of Camogli built between &1*$-&1$.. Source: ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio; L. 
Gatti, Un raggio di convenienza, Appendice & – Le navi costruite (&1*$-+4 e &1+1-&1.*), pp. &*+-&)$.  
Differently from the previous one, Table #.# focuses on ship-building statistics 
in order to emphasize the transition from coastal to long-distance navigation ships. 
The data available in Gatti also fills some of the gaps of the crew lists. Still, in the 
"U$^s, some ship-owners opted for the construction of small-sized vessels, suitable 
for cabotage. The incidence of these ship types within the operating fleet of 
Camogli (Table #."), therefore, was not outdated; instead, small cabotage still 
represented a reliable and profitable market niche to the point of encouraging new 
constructions. Notwithstanding the impressive reduction of ship-buildings within 
this category, still, some ship-owners invested in coastal vessels until the early 
"U&^s. Then, as Camogli’s vessels had strengthened their position in the Black Sea 
trade, the maritime activities of the community specialized, even more, leaving 
few, if any space at all, to investments in other sectors.  
 
 
106 L. Gatti, Un raggio di convenienza, Appendice & – Le navi costruite (&1*$-+4 e &1+1-&1.*), pp. 
&*+-&)$. 
107 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, from &1*1 to &1$..  
108 The statistics are drawn from the crew lists of Camogli ships (ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, from 
&1*1 to &1$.) and from L. Gatti, Un raggio di convenienza, Appendice & – Le navi costruite (&1*$-+4 
e &1+1-&1.*), pp. &*+-&)$. Barks lack in Gatti’s statistics is due to the absence of barks among the 
ship-buildings reported. Indeed, also the crew lists show that no barks of Camogli was built in 
Liguria before &1.$, thus confirming the data of Gatti.  
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Figure *.+ – Comparison between yearly ship constructions and average tonnage of Camogli ship-
buildings. Source: ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, from &1*5 to &1$.; L. Gatti, Un raggio di convenienza, 
Appendice & – Le navi costruite (&1*$-+4 e &1+1-&1.*), pp. &*+-&)$; CMMC, Assicurazioni varie.  
In Figure #.$, a further level of analysis emerges from the combination of the yearly 
number of constructions and the average tonnage of the newly-built ships. In so 
doing, the results lead us to an estimation of the total tonnage constructed within 
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Figure *./ – Estimation of total tonnage built by Camogli ship-owners. Source: ASGe, Ruoli di 
equipaggio, from &1*5 to &1$.; L. Gatti, Un raggio di convenienza, Appendice & – Le navi costruite 
(&1*$-+4 e &1+1-&1.*), pp. &*+-&)$; CMMC, Assicurazioni varie. 
After the opening of the Black Sea waters to the Sardinian flag ("U#&), Camogli’s 
ship-owners made efforts to renew their fleet to respond to the increasing demands 
of sea transport connected with the booming Russian grain trade. Gradually, the 
constructions specialized in medium-sized brigs (between "&^ and #^^ tons.) 
which represented the most typical and recurrent ship type up until the late "U&^s. 
Hence, after the Crimean War, the shipping capital in the hands of local ship-
owners rose to new levels: more ships were ordered in the shipyards, and the 
tonnage growth represented one of the main accomplishments of the period. The 
average tonnage of the new vessels increased from "UV tons to around #D^ tons; 
most of them were barks, suited for both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, in 
line with the geographical expansion of Camogli’s shipping activities.  
In conclusion, Table #.$ invites us to propose some considerations about the 
shipyards and the place of constructions of the fleet of Camogli.  
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Table *.+. Place of construction of the ships of Camogli divided by area. Source: ASGe, Ruoli di 
equipaggio, from &1*5 to &1$..   
All of the ships belonging to Camogli’s fleet during this period were built in 
Ligurian shipyards. The geographical subdivision in Table #.$ is only partially in 
accordance with the "Vth-century maritime districts, attributed to the four main 
cities of the region, Genoa, Savona, La Spezia and Imperia. Instead, due to the 
absence of shipyards from the district of Imperia, we chose to divide the region of 
Genoa into two sub-divisions, referring to each side of the city. As shown in Table 
#.$, the absolute majority of the ships were constructed in Varazze (&U,%%), the 
Ligurian leading centre for ship-building, whose primacy rooted in the early 
modern period109. Then, at a very long distance, followed Prà, Sestri Ponente, 
Savona and Recco; the formers are located in the western part of Genoa and 
possessed a long tradition of seasonal and improvised shipyards on the beach. 
Nevertheless, during the last quarter of the century, Sestri Ponente was 
modernized, provided with infrastructures apt to industrial ship-building. Hence, 
it became a leading shipbuilding centre; a role still played so far. Savona had more 
or less the same fate, as in the late "Vth century it was industrialized and readjusted 
for iron shipbuilding110. Recco, finally, had the closest shipyards to Camogli; based 
on seasonal activities along the beach, it never became a permanent site for ship-
building as Sestri Ponente or Savona.   
 
=.=. Historical background 
 
The process of integration of the Black Sea into the international scene 
represents a long-told narrative in which foreign politics, military struggles and 
 
109 L. Gatti, Navi e cantieri della Repubblica di Genova, sec. $D-$>, Genova: Brigati, &555; Idem, Un 
raggio di convenienza, pp. 5+-&45 and Appendice + – Repertorio di costruttori.  
110 G. Doria, Investimenti e sviluppo economico a Genova alla vigilia della Prima Guerra Mondiale, 
pp. *)+-+4+.  
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the increase of the provisioning demands of Western Europe form a composite 
scenario. 
During the early modern period, the access to the Black Sea was firmly detained 
by the Ottoman Empire, and its navigation was subordinated to the obtainment of 
special privileges granted by the Porte. The commercial policies of the Ottomans 
responded to provisioning criteria, and the Black Sea represented the foremost 
region of production for strategic goods, such as grain, cattle and slaves. The 
merchants allowed to carry out trade in the area were provided with specific 
permission to be admitted in the Straits’ customhouses: after the loading of the 
cargo in the Black Sea, the ships were mandatorily destined to Constantinople, as 
the needs of the Porte hold the priority over international trade. Such trade 
connected the Ottoman capital with the commercial emporia scattered either 
along the northern coasts of Anatolia or the Bulgarian shores. Merchants and 
seafarers were usually settled in either of the three extremes of the traffic 
(Constantinople, northern Anatolia or Bulgaria). Therefore, the picture of a closed 
sea sailed by Greek and Turkish subjects under the Ottoman flag was the most 
veritable to describe the "Uth-century trade conditions of the Black Sea111. These 
conditions, however, lasted untilS"DD%, when the Treaty of Kuçuk Kainargé forced 
the Ottoman authorities to accept Russian flagged ships to navigate through the 
Straits and to participate in the Black Sea trade. The end of the Russo-Turkish War 
of "D'U-"DD% and the accomplishment of the free entrance of Russian vessels into 
the Black Sea represented an astounding breakthrough in the history of the region 
because it led the way to further transformations, being acknowledged as the first 
step of integration of the area into the world economy. From this moment onward, 
to pursue the long-desired economic exploitation of the northern shores of the 
Black Sea, the Russian Empire launched a massive campaign of colonization 
through the foundation of commercial emporia in the most strategic places of the 
region. After Taganrog ("D'V), positioned at the mouth of the river Don, in the 
 
111 C. Ardeleanu, “The discovery of the Black Sea by the Western World: The Opening of the 
Euxine to International Trade and Shipping (&))/-&)5*)”, New Europe College, Stefan Odobleja 
Program Yearbook !2$!-!2$7, *4&/, pp. *&-/$; Idem, “The opening and development of the Black 
sea for international trade and shipping (&))/-&1.+), Euxeinos, No. &/, *4&/, pp. +4-.*.  
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Azov sea, soon followed Kerch ("DD%) and Mariupol’ ("DDU) in the same area. Then, 
in the aftermath of the "DU$ Russian annexation of Crimea, Theodosia was built in 
the historical site of medieval Caffa, followed by the port of Sevastopol, designed 
to become the basis of the naval fleet. The foundation of Odessa in "DV%, however, 
represents the most remarkable action pursued by the Russian authorities to 
enhance the commercial activities of the region. Odessa was provided with 
countless privileges and fiscal concession, which stimulated its rapid demographic 
and economic growth112. In particular, most of the efforts aimed to facilitate the 
settlement of commercial and maritime operators, mostly of Greek origin, to 
compensate for the absence of merchants and seafarers of Russian descents113. The 
establishment of Greek merchant houses along the northern shores of the Black 
Sea proved to be crucial to the commercial growth of the area; along with seafaring 
expertise and ships’ ownership, the Greeks contributed to increase and expand the 
trade through their long-standing merchant networks in the most important 
European port-cities114.  
Meanwhile, the opening of the Black Sea to international commerce attracted 
the interest of the Mediterranean and Western countries, which rapidly sought to 
sign agreements with the Russian Empire in order to participate in the trade. 
 
112 The most recent historiography about Odessa is embodied by the following works: E. Sifneos, 
Imperial Odessa: people, spaces and identities, Leiden: Brill, *4&1; P. Herlihy, Odessa recollected: the 
Port and the People, Boston: Academic Studies Press, *4&1.  
113 R.P. Bartlett, Human Capital. The settlement of foreigners in Russia $1D!-$>2#, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, &5)5.  
114 The historiographical production about the role of the Greeks in the Black sea area is vast and 
dense. See: G. Harlaftis, The role of the Greeks in the Black sea trade, $>72-$M22, in L.R. Fischer and 
H.W. Nordvik (eds.), Shipping and trade, $1L2-$ML2: Essays in International Maritime Economic 
History, Pontefract: Lofthouse, &554, pp. $+-5$; Id, A History of Greek-owned Shipping: the making 
of an international tramp fleet, $>72 to present day, London: Routledge, &55$; E. Sifneos and G. 
Harlaftis, Entrepreneurship at the Russian frontier of international trade. The Greek merchant 
community of Taganrog in the Sea of Azov, $1>2s-$>72s, in V.N. Zakharov, G. Harlaftis and O. 
Katsiardi-Hering (eds.), Merchant colonies in the early modern period, London: Pickering & Chatto, 
*o&*, pp. &.)-&)5; V. Kardasis, Diaspora merchants in the Black Sea. The Greeks in Southern Russia, 
$11L-$>D$, Lanham: Lexington Books, *44&; G. Harlaftis, “From diaspora traders to shipping tycoons: 
the Vagliano Bros”, The Business History Review, No. 1&, *44), pp. *+)-*$1; P. Herlihy, “Greek 
Merchants in Odessa in the Nineteenth Century”, Harvard Ukranian Studies, No. +, &5)5, pp. +55-
/*4; E. Sifneos, “Greek Family Firms in the Azov Sea Region, &1.4-&5&)”, The Business History 
Review, No. 1), *4&+, pp. *)5-+41; J. A. Mazis, The Greeks of Odessa: diaspora leadership in late 
Imperial Russia, New York: Columbia University Press, *44/; O. Shliakhov, “Greeks in the Russian 
Empire and their role in the development of trade and shipping in the Black and Azov Seas”, The 
Historical Review/La revue historique, No. &4, *4&+, pp. *..-*$/.  
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Austria, having a direct interest toward the Black Sea, stipulated a commercial 
agreement in "DU%; in "DUD, both France and the Kingdom of the Naples signed 
commercial treaties to gain all the advantages and customs exceptions granted by 
Russia to friendly nations115. As a result, a Neapolitan consul was appointed in 
Kherson, the same city where some French merchants had established their 
commercial houses since the "DU^s116. During the French Revolution and the 
Napoleonic Wars, the conflict between the Ottomans and the French led to new 
concession to their allies, Russia and the United Kingdom, which in "U^$ achieved 
for the first time the right to cross the Straits for its merchant marine117. In the same 
year, U"& ships loaded with Russian wheat delivered their cargoes to European 
ports: in historiographical accounts, "U^$ represents the first occurrence of 
massive arrivals of grain from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean118. 
After the Congress of Vienna, the situation slowly changed and witnessed a 
gradual increase of the European trade in the Black Sea. In "U"V, Odessa was 
granted with the free port status, a factor that enhanced its already advantageous 
position into grain exports. Then, the outbreak of the Greek Independence War 
and the reopening of the hostilities between Russia and the Ottomans in "U#U-"U#V 
led to a new phase of closure of the Black Sea navigation, lasting until the sign of 
the Treaty of Adrianople in "U#V. After that, the exponential increase of foreign 
 
115 The first diplomatic and commercial encounters between Neapolitan subjects and Russia have 
stimulated various studies: M. Mafrici, Le relazioni diplomatiche e commerciali tra il Regno di Napoli 
e l’Impero Russo, in R. Sabbatini and P. Volpini, Annali di storia militare. Sulla diplomazia in età 
moderna. Politica, economia, religione, Milano: Franco Angeli, *4&&, pp. *&5-*+5; M. D’Angelo, Tra 
Messina e “li mari neri”, in L.M. Migliorini and M. Mafrici, Mediterraneo e/è Mar Nero. Due mari tra 
età moderna e contemporanea, Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, *4&*, pp. 5&-&+1; O. Fedenko, 
“The activity of the Italian merchants in Odessa during the nineteenth century”, Danubius, No. +/, 
*4&$, pp. +&-/*; H.R. Gomez, “Migrazioni italiane in Crimea e Nuova Russia: tracce, fonti e contesti”, 
Eurasiatica, No. 1, *4&), pp. &&)-&//.  
116 C. Ardeleanu, “The opening and development of the Black sea for international trade and 
shipping (&))/-&1.+), p. +..  
117 Idem, p. +).  
118 A. de Saint-Joseph, Essai historique sur le commerce et la navigation de la Mer-Noire, Paris: H. 
Agasse, &14., pp. *4/-*4); T. Dandolo, Sulle cause dell’avvilimento delle nostre granaglie e sulle 
industrie agrarie riparatrici dei danni che ne derivano, Milano: Giambattista Sonzogno, &1*4, pp. .-
). Most of the ships (..*) departed from Odessa, followed by Taganrog (*&4); among the ships, the 
Austrian (/*&) and Russian (+*5) flags outnumbered all the others. With regard to the port of 
destination, the scheme is more various, with the pre-eminence of Trieste (&1$), Messina (&//), 
Cephalonia (&4+), Genoa ()*) and Livorno (.)).  
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ships arriving at the Black Sea ports to load cereals finally enacted the inclusion of 
the Black Sea into the global economy119.  
Concerning the specific case of the participation of Sardinian, and later Italian, 
subjects in the Black Sea trade, within which Camogli’s maritime activities are 
included, we observe a relatively late establishment in the area. The Republic of 
Genoa, in its latest years, never sought to stipulate agreements with the Russian 
Empire in order to engage in the Black Sea trade; Ligurian main interests aimed at 
the Tyrrhenian and the Western Mediterranean. Nonetheless, some private 
entrepreneurs and merchants settled either in the newly founded Odessa or in the 
first commercial emporia of Crimea and Azov. Scattered information, for instance, 
can be found about the activities of individuals such as Raffaele Scassi120, or about 
merchant families such as the Garibaldi, Lagorio or Durante121, the first settlers of 
Ligurian origins in the region. In the same period, between "U^^ and "U"$, the 
number of Italians enrolled in the first guild of Odessa ascended from " to U 
members122. However, before the Congress of Vienna and the annexation of Liguria 
to the Kingdom of Sardinia, the number of ships of ‘Genoese’ origin is hardly 
relevant. Conversely, from "U"' onwards, the port of Genoa witnessed a constant 
increase of Ligurian ships arriving with cargoes of cereals from Odessa and the 
other ports of the region.  
On the other hand, despite few preliminary contacts – of diplomatic purpose – 
had taken place in the last decades of the eighteenth century, the Kingdom of 
 
119 A. Papadopoulou, “Foreign merchant business and the integration of the Black and Azov Seas 
of the Russian Empire into the First global economy”, Business history, *4&5, pp. &-*).  
120 H.R. Gomez, “Migrazioni italiane in Crimea e Nuova Russia: tracce, fonti e contesti”, pp. &+/-
&+$. Raffaele Scassi settled in Theodosia some time before the &1&+, when he already hold some 
influence in the city. Then, in the early &1*4s, he moved to Kerch, where he was appointed Port 
Governor and had strong connections with other Sardinian merchant families. Some of his 
correspondence (&+ letters) with his brother living in Genoa has been published in V. Vitale, Onofrio 
Scassi e la vita genovese del suo tempo ($1D>-$>7DM). Con appendice su Raffaele Scassi, Genova: 
Società Ligure di Storia Patria, &5+*, pp. ++.-+$..  
121 H.R. Gomez, “Migrazioni italiane in Crimea e Nuova Russia: tracce, fonti e contesti”, pp. &+/-
&+1. Members of both the Garibaldi and Lagorio families covered the role of consular 
representatives of pre-unitarian Italian states (the Kingdom of Sardinia and the Kingdom of Two 
Sicilies) in Kerch and Theodosia.  
122 O. Fedenko, “The activity of the Italian merchants in Odessa during the nineteenth century”, 
p. &&. Among the names reported by the author, only Giacomo Tassara can be surely recognized for 
his Ligurian origins.  
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Sardinia, lacking a maritime policy up until "U"&, never developed commercial 
relationships with Russia before that date123. The annexation of Liguria, however, 
altered the economic policies of the Savoy State: despite the initial imposition of a 
customs barrier between Liguria and Piedmont (lasting until "U"U) which was 
detrimental to the business of Genoese ship-owners, the subsequent introduction 
of flag privileges ("U#%) and the sign of the Treaty with the Porte ("U#&) paved the 
way for national shipping to participating to the Black Sea trade124. Flag privileges 
damaged the long-standing tradition of Genoa within transit trade, whose bulk 
volume moved to Livorno. Instead, shipowners highly appreciated these measures: 
indeed, the share of Sardinian ships handling the wheat trade boosted, passing 
from $^% in "U#% to V#,&% in "U$^125. The second institutional factor to play a 
significant role in the facilitation for Ligurian ships to access the Black Sea was the 
stipulation of a treaty –with the Ottoman authorities. Negotiations began in "U#$ 
and lasted until "U#&, through which the Sardinian vessels obtained free entrance 
to the Black Sea together with some fiscal advantages to trade in Ottoman Black 
Sea ports126.  This treaty led to immediate results: the presence of the Sardinian flag 
 
123 See, F. Bacino (ed.), La legazione e i consolati del regno di Sardegna in Russia ($1>7-$>D$), Roma: 
Tipografia riservata del Ministero Affari Esteri, &5.*, pp. 5-*4.  
124 The entry customs of cereals were &/+ less if the cargo was carried on board of national ships. 
Es. in &1*., the custom was L. 5/quintal under foreign flag and L. $/quintal under national flag. 
Source: E. Maragliano, La politica economica e il commercio marittimo sardo dal $>$L al $>7L, 
Genova: Quaderni dell’Associazione Ligure di Archeologia e Storia Navale, &5.), p. &*; M. Cevasco, 
Statistique de la ville de Genes. Tome II, Genova: Ferrando, &1/4, pp. +)/-+)..  
125 E. Maragliano, La politica economica e il commercio marittimo sardo dal $>$L al $>7L, p. &+. Flag 
privileges and differential duties were harshly opposed by the Genoese merchant elites, together 
with the progressive dependence from wheat imports over the total movement of the port of Genoa. 
To frame the protectionist economic policies of the Kingdom of Sardinia within the general context 
of the pre-unitarian Italian states, see: V.D. Flore, L’industria dei trasporti marittimi in Italia. Dagli 
inizi del XVI secolo al $>D2, Roma: Bollettino Informazioni Marittime, &5$$, pp. &..-+4.; A. La 
Macchia, “Aspetti dell’economia marittima genovese nei primi decenni della Restaurazione”, in R. 
Battaglia, S. Bottari and A. La Macchia, Porti e traffici nel Mediterraneo. Tre saggi di storia economica 
marittima ($DML-$>D$), Milano: Franco Angeli, *4&1, pp. 5-/1.  
126 Idem, pp. *4-*&; E. Guglielmino, Genova dal $>$# al $>#M. Gli sviluppi economici e l’opinione 
pubblica, Genova: Regia Deputazione di Storia Patria per la Liguria, &5+1, p. /.. The integral version 
of the Treaty can be found in Raccolta dei regi editti, manifesti ed altre provvidenze de’ magistrati ed 
uffizi, No. *+, Torino: Davico e Picco, &1*., pp. +&-+1. The sign of the Treaty constituted an 
international concern, as we might infer by the decisive role played by the British plenipotentiary 
Lord Strangford, who had the duty to enforce the principle of free passage through the Straits in 
order to appease the relationships between the Porte and the Russian Empire.  
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in Odessa increased from &D ("U#&) to ""' ("U#') and #$D ("U#D)127. Then, apart from 
a two year stop of the traffics owing to the Russo-Turkish War of "U#U–"U#V, the 
figure recovered to the pre-war levels again in "U$^ (##&)128.  
Finally, since the early "U$^s Sardinian maritime actors were well-established in 
the Black Sea trade. Within this framework, the action of Camogli seafarers, 
captains and ship-owners found profitable terrain to flourish and to rise through 
the ranks of international shipping.  
 
=.?. Geography and navigation in the Black sea 
 
The quantitative and qualitative analysis of the participation of Camogli ships 
in the Black Sea trade in total and within the Sardinian fleet is among the main 
objectives of the present chapter. In the following pages, the main characteristics 
of the Black Sea grain trade and the participation of Camogli in this crucial 
phenomenon will be outlined, from geographical, commercial and maritime 
perspectives. 
Since its opening, the Black Sea grain trade concentrated in three different 
geographical areas: the ports of the northern shore, dominated by the presence of 
Odessa; the Azov Sea ports, mainly Taganrog, Mariupol and Berdyansk and the 
ports of the Danube, where Galatz and Braila had a prominent role in grain exports. 
From the period of its foundation – at least up until the end of the Crimean War 
–, Odessa represented the main port for both export and import trade in Southern 
Russia. The city of Odessa benefitted from the Imperial government unique 
benefits to facilitate and support its commercial activities through fiscal 
facilitations (the free port status in the period between "U"V and "U&D) and 
infrastructural investments. Built in the original site of the Turkish fortress of 
Hadji-Bey, Odessa was ideally positioned nearby the mouths of the rivers Dnepr, 
Dniester and Bug. Soon after its foundation, the city was rapidly provided with a 
spacious harbour (with quays), a customs house and a large quarantine station. 
 
127 E. Maragliano, La politica economica e il commercio marittimo sardo dal $>$L al $>7L, p. */.  
128 Ibidem.  
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The inland waterways system was fundamental to the growth of Odessa: the three 
rivers granted direct connections with the grain-producing regions of Podolia and 
Volynia, from which the cereals were delivered through the utilisation of barges 
floating downstream to the coast. 
Moreover, fluvial navigation was paralleled by land transports operating 
through wheeled wagons. Water and land communications coexisted and, more 
accurately, were complementary according to the unique geographical features of 
the area129. Therefore, Odessa was the leading destination of cereals from the most 
productive areas of Ukraine and Southern Russia (with the sole exception of the 
Don region, whose products were delivered to the Azov Sea ports); then, 
favourable fiscal conditions, modern and spacious ports infrastructures and the 
growth of foreign merchant communities led it to prosper and dominate the Black 
Sea trade for a long time.  
The Azov Sea ports, instead, were very different, especially on what concerns 
their geographical environment. The navigation in the Azov Sea was dominated by 
unpredictable currents, fog, harsh weather conditions and shallow waters130. The 
access to the main ports, positioned on the northern shores of the sea, constituted 
a great challenge for captains and vessels. The opening of the port of Kerch, located 
at the entrance of the Azov, in "U#"131, was fundamental to guarantee a safe harbour 
 
129 P. Herlihy, Odessa recollected, pp. *+*-*++; V. Kardasis, Diaspora merchants in the Black Sea, 
pp. $+-)1. Both the authors underlines the existence of an integrated system of transport for grain 
from the interior to the coast. Up until the construction of railroads (from late &1$4s), riverine 
barges coexisted with the chumaky, carts or wagons pulled by oxen. The usage of one or the other 
was dictated by geographical reasons: in the northernmost regions, where rivers presented the most 
impeding obstacles to navigation (Podolia), land transport was usually preferred over barges which, 
instead, were more profitable along the southernmost course of the rivers (Bessarabia). Also, E. 
Sifneos, Imperial Odessa, Appendixes, Table &4 Number of carts carrying grain to Odessa, $>72, p. 
*/).  
130 See, in particular, the recent publication of Apostolos Delis: A. Delis, “Navigating perilous 
waters: routes and hazards of the voyages to Black Sea in the &5th century”, in M.C. Chatziioannou 
and A. Delis (eds), Linkages of the Black Sea with the West. Navigation, Trade and Immigration, 
Rethymnon: Black Sea History Working Papers, *4*4, pp. &-++. See, also: V. Kardasis, Diaspora 
merchants in the Black Sea, pp. /-). 
131 Interestingly, in his correspondence, the Genoese merchant Domenico Scassi entitles to his 
personal entrepreneurship the opening of the port of Kerch (of which the Scassi was appointed as 
first port-governor). He was also responsible for the earlier investments to provide the port with 
the needed infrastructures. See: V. Vitale, Onofrio Scassi e la vita genovese del suo tempo ($1D>-
$>7DM), pp. +$4-+$&, Letter XII, .th May &1**.  
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and to provide some essential services. The port was furnished with a quarantine 
station, where all the vessels aiming to enter into the Azov must stop, denounce 
their cargo and deliver all the needed information to Russian officials. 
Furthermore, due to the shallowness of the straits, several ships recurred to the 
enlightening practise: in order to sail through safely, the captains had to discharge 
part of the cargo at the entrance and then to receive it back at the opposite end of 
the passage. These expensive and time-wasting manoeuvres, however, represented 
one of the main economic activities of the local population132.  
Although, the obstacles to sail in the Azov Sea were not limited to the Straits 
passage: for an average of "#' days in a year (more than four months), icing 
impeded navigation133. Free navigation was usually inaugurated in late March-
beginning of April and lasted until late November: nevertheless, sudden icing was 
a possible risk, and consular or private correspondence is filled with cases of ships 
being entrapped within the Azov or, otherwise, stuck in the harbours for the whole 
winter134.  
Finally, shallow waters impeded the vessels’ entrance to the ports: the short 
water depth in the proximity of the coast prevented most ships from getting 
ashore. To this regard, apart from the environmental constraints, the captains bore 
their guilt: in order to clear as fast as possible the operations, they used to throw 
their ballast out of the ship, directly into the sea. Thus, they worsened the already 
troublesome conditions of the seabed135. However, not all the ports were affected 
by shallowness to the same extent: in more than one circumstance, Berdyansk was 
 
132 Sulla città di Kertch. Cenni di G.B. Giovannetti ex vice-console toscano ($>#> e $>#M) in Orano, 
in Bollettino consolare, Torino: Paravia, &1$5, pp. /.)-/.5.  
133 These data have been calculated on the basis of the information about the yearly opening and 
the closure of navigation in the Azov sea in the &1$4-$5 decade. See, V. Kardasis, Diaspora 
merchants in the Black Sea, p. ).  
134 See, for instance the data about the vessels which were forced to spend the winter in Mariupol 
and Taganrog: Stato della navigazione nei porti di Taganrog e Marianopoli. Rapporto del Regio 
console cav. Avv. G. Rossi, in Bollettino consolare, Torino: Paravia, &1$5, pp. /$/-/$1.  
135 In order to prevent this behavior and to punish the perpetrators, the Empire issued some laws 
requiring double inspections to the ballast quantities both in Kerch and in the ports of arrival. The 
lawbreakers might incur in fees from &44 to +44 roubles or even the confiscation of the ship and 
up to $ months of detention. See, AMAE, Affari esteri, 15., Odessa, Giuseppe Rossi – Regio Delegato 
Consolare d’Italia a Taganrog, Gennaio &1$*.  
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praised for presenting fewer hindrances (the ships were able to moor at $ miles 
maximum from the quay), whereas in Taganrog and Mariupol vessels might have 
to stop up to "&-#^ miles136.  
The grain deposits of the three cities were supplied from the fertile hinterlands. 
In this regard, Taganrog held a comparative advantage due to its relative proximity 
to the mouth of the river Don which provided a fundamental waterway connection 
with the internal regions where a network of canals put into communication the 
Don and Volga regions with Rostov-on-Don and Taganrog. Berdyansk and 
Mariupol, on the other hand, relied mostly on their respective countryside, despite 
some railway projects to improve the connections with the Dnepr river are 
repeatedly mentioned in the sources137.  
Furthermore, the Danube port system presents some similar characteristics to 
the Azov Sea. Located along the western shores of the Black Sea, the Danube 
embodied the third main area of grain deposit and exports to Western Europe. In 
this regard, the Wallachian and Moldavian cities of Braila and Galatz represented 
the most important ports for trade volume. Both of them, however, were in the 
interior, along the course of the Danube River: instead, the access to the river itself, 
through the three mouths of Kilia, Sulina and St. George was controlled by the 
Russian Empire from the Treaty of Adrianople ("U#V) onwards. According to the 
existing literature, in order to limit the economic growth of the principalities which 
was challenging the prosperity of Odessa, the Russian authorities decided to build 
a quarantine station at the mouth of Sulina, in "U$&, where all the ships entering 
and clearing the Danube were obliged to stop and denounce cargoes and 
navigation details to local officials138. The environmental conditions of the Danube, 
however, were slightly different from those of the Azov Sea; therefore, soon in 
 
136 AST, Consolati nazionali, Odessa, $, *$ Novembre &1.*.  
137 In this regard, the Italian consul in Berdyansk emphasizes the potential commercial growth 
of the city if put in direct connection with Alexandrovska (nowadays Zaporizzja) on the eastern 
shore of the river Dnestr. AMAE, Affari esteri, 15., Odessa, Cenni Statistici sul commercio di 
Berdianska ordinati a questa Regia Delegazione Consolare, Novembre &1$&.  
138 See, A. Emilciuc, “The Trade of Galati and Braila in the Reports of Russian Officials from 
Sulina Quarantine Station (&1+$-&1.+)”, in C. Ardeleanu and A. Lyberatos (eds.), Port cities of the 
Western Black sea coast and the Danube, pp. $+-5/.  
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Sulina lighters and tugboats companies were developed to assist or even substitute 
the ships arriving at the mouths heading to either Galatz or Braila. River cabotage 
became highly profitable, and even some Sardinians and Italians tried to invest in 
this activity139.  
Beside the Danube system, however, throughout the mid-"Vth century, Galatz 
and Braila entered in competition with Constanta and the Bulgarian ports of 
Burgas and Varna, southward to the entrance of the Danube. Whereas Constanta 
developed later (from the early "UU^s)140, the ports of Burgas141 and Varna142 
competed with the Principalities in the period of our analysis, and experienced 
exceptional growth in concomitance with the outbreak of the Crimean War, and 
to the related warfare economy. 
 
=.C. Merchant communities and commercial networks 
  
The absence of a structured Russian mercantile tradition in the area, and the 
early settlement of foreign merchant communities, attracted by the late "Uth 
century imperial policies, were crucial to shaping the Black Sea trade. These 
ethnical and national groups carried out the overwhelming majority of imports and 
exports and, through their networks, contributed to include the Black Sea into a 
broader interregional economy, including the Mediterranean and Northern 
Europe, up to the global scale. The influence of each group and the business 
models implemented changed over time, depending on conjunctural and 
 
139 The Italian consul in Galatz reports about the existence of the lightens company Fratelli 
Corsanego, in &1$1. See: Agricultura, industria e commercio della Moldavia; rapporto del nobile avv. 
Bernardo Lambertenghi Regio vice console a Galatz, in Bollettino consolare, Torino: Paravia, &1$1, 
pp. &*)-&*1.  
140 D. Kontogeorgis, “«International» and «National» Ports. The Competition between the Ports 
of Braila / Galati and Constanta during the Period &1)1-&5&/”, in C. Ardeleanu and A. Lyberatos 
(eds.), Port cities of the Western Black sea coast and the Danube, pp. 5.-&*5.  
141 D. Christov, “The Rise of a Port. Socio-economic development of Burgas in the &5th c.”, in C. 
Ardeleanu and A. Lyberatos (eds.), Port cities of the Western Black sea coast and the Danube, pp. 
&))-*&+. 
142 I. Roussev, “The Black Sea Port-City in the Road of Modernization. The First Modern 
Attempts in Varna during the &1/4s-&1)4s”, in C. Ardeleanu and A. Lyberatos (eds.), Port cities of 
the Western Black sea coast and the Danube, pp. *&/-**+.  
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structural transformations which altered both the regional and the world 
economies. In different periods, and different ways, Greeks, Jews, Italians, British, 
Germans and French played their role in the history of the Black Sea trade. On the 
long-term perspective, the Greeks and the Jews might have probably exercised the 
most substantial influence143. Historically, both groups were already circulating in 
the area during the Ottoman period, before the Russian conquest: upon these 
premises, they demonstrated similar capacities to capitalize their long-lasting 
presence with respect to the latecomers. Such a feature, for instance, was evident 
concerning the commercial relationships and networks with the hinterland and 
the production sites144. Then, another common feature might be found in the 
geographical width of their commercial operations: both Greeks and Jews disposed 
of long-standing networks in the critical places of the Mediterranean and Northern 
Europe, which were vital to trade along far-reaching routes and to optimise the 
information flows. On the other side, the western communities – a cluster 
comprehending the English, French, Austrians, Sardinians and Neapolitans – 
established their presence differently. First, the relationship with their native 
countries might be considered as a crucial distinguishing trait. Unlike the Greeks 
or the Jews, who settled in the region through private entrepreneurship, the 
westerners sought assistance in or even followed, their home political institutions 
before starting any sort of business. Therefore, most of the westerners retained 
stable and pervasive affiliations to their home countries, both from political and 
commercial perspectives, a development which was precluded to Greeks and Jews. 
These features led to some implications in terms of the pattern of business 
adopted: such sort of dependency from national business implied some 
restrictions, such as in the development of less widespread commercial networks, 
which seldom went beyond their respective home markets.  
 
143 A. Papadopoulou, “Foreign merchant business”, pp. &-*). With regard to the Jewish 
community of Odessa: P. Herlihy, Odessa recollected, pp. &5$-*41; E. Sifneos, “The Dark Side of the 
Moon: rivalry and riots for shelter and occupation between the Greek and the Jewish populations 
in multi-ethnic nineteenth-century Odessa”, Historical Review/La revue historique, No. +, *44$, pp. 
&15-*4/.  
144 Some historians also address the mistrust of Western merchants towards the producers in 
order to add further explanations of Greek and Jewish superiority against Europeans in the 
hinterland. See. V. Kardassis, Diaspora merchants in the Black sea, p. 1*.  
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The analysis which follows, however, will address two specific groups, the 
Sardinians and the Greeks. The selection will be motivated by their more direct 
relevance to the maritime activities of Camogli. 
 
".$.%. THE GREEK NETWORKS  
 
In the mid-"Vth century, the Greeks handled the majority of the Black Sea trade. 
This feature is even more evident when exports and imports are merged (the 
European countries were less competitive in the latter). To analyse the Greek 
influence in Southern Russia throughout the nineteenth century, the current 
historiography proposes a distinction between Chiot and Ionian phases, according 
to the existence of different ethnic commercial networks, also distinguished by the 
adoption of different business models and with regard to different geographical 
areas in the Black Sea region145.  
The Chiot phase ("U$^s-"U'^s) corresponds to the predominance of merchant 
families from the island of Chios, or somehow related to them. The Ralli 
represented the most influential family, followed by Rodocanachis, Schilizzi, 
Scaramanga, Negroponte and Sevastopulo146. The base of their operations was 
usually Odessa, where the head branch of their firms was founded. Their networks 
were based on ethnicity and kinship and were ruled by severe reputation 
mechanisms; the structure of their companies outreached the Black Sea, though it 
regarded the English financial and maritime centres, and some intermediate ports 
in between, such as Marseille, Livorno and Trieste likewise147. Rather than strictly 
specialize in the grain trade, the Chiot network opted for high degrees of 
diversification, engaging in different trade commodities, though still maintaining 
consistent investments towards shipping. Their commercial strategy was based on 
the control over both the production and consumption markets, being the Russian 
 
145 G. Harlaftis, A history of Greek-owned shipping, pp. +1-&4$.  
146 Ibidem; about Ralli and Radocanachi see also, P. Herlihy, “Greek Merchants in Odessa in the 
Nineteenth Century”, pp. /4)-/&$. 
147 G. Harlaftis, A history of Greek-owned shipping, pp. +5-/4.  
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countryside and England the extremes of the system148. Then, some families 
belonging to the network engaged directly in shipping, under Greek or foreign flag, 
depending on the opportunities: indeed, whereas most of the trade between the 
Black Sea and Marseille was carried out on Greek vessels, the grain destined to the 
English ports was usually loaded on Greek-owned ships flying the British flag.  
In the "U'^s, the Chiot predominance over the Black sea trade gave way to the 
rise of another Greek network, based on Ionian families. The reasons behind this 
transition lied in multiple factors, most of them concerning the end of the Crimean 
War and the following modernization of Russian economy and society (for 
instance, the abolition of serfdom in "U'"). The wave of renovation sought by the 
political authorities of the country affected the economic and social structure of 
Southern Russia dramatically: large estates based on serf labour were replaced by 
small land-ownership, and the Jews proved to be more able than the Greeks to 
adapt to the new conditions149. Modern transport communications, as railways, 
were built, in concomitance with the modernization of Azov and Caucasus ports 
infrastructures; moreover, Odessa lost its free port status in "U&D150. All of these 
transformations contributed to the redirection of most of the grain trade to the 
Azov Sea. There, in Taganrog, was based perhaps the most influential Ionian trade 
and shipping company, the one of Vagliano151.  
The Ionian phase ("UD^s-"V^^s) is such due to the role of numerous Greek 
families, most of them coming from Cephalonia or Ithaca, which were based 
mostly in the Danube and Azov areas. The reorientation of trade must have 
undoubtedly contributed to their rise: Braila, Galatz on one side and Taganrog, 
 
148 Idem, pp. .)-)4.   
149 P. Herlihy, Odessa recollected, pp. &/5-&.4; E. Sifneos, Imperial Odessa, pp. &*4-&*&; A. 
Papadopoulou, “Foreign merchant business”, pp. &1-*4. Among the main features of the Jewish 
business organization, most of the authors mention their capability to operate on a smaller scale 
than Greeks. Indeed, several Jews were members of the second guild (see infra).  
150 E. Sifneos, Imperial Odessa, p. *$ and Appendixes, Figure *-.. Relying on the analysis of 
imports and exports of the port of Odessa overtime, the author shows how the end of the freeport 
status in &1.) had  minimal impact over the trade movement of the Russian port-city. On the 
contrary, the effects of the Crimean War (&1./) and the Russo-Turkish War of &1)) are emphasized, 
due to the fact that in those periods more drastic variations of trade are observed.  
151 G. Harlaftis, “From Diaspora Traders to Shipping Tycoons: The Vagliano Bros”, The Business 
History Review, No. 1&, *44), pp. *+)-*$1.   
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Berdyansk and Mariupol on the other substituted Odessa rapidly in its leading role 
to grain exports. In its organisational structure, most of the features of the Ionian 
network were inherited by the Chiot predecessor, such as kinship and community-
based relationships; however, the most distinguishing trait concerned the existing 
balance between shipping and trade. If in the Chiot network shipping was 
instrumental in trading, in the Ionian phase seems rather the opposite. Several 
protagonists of the Ionian networks were of maritime origins: the case of Vagliano 
is emblematic, as the first successful member of the family left Cephalonia as a 
seaman and then, once settled in Taganrog, started a career as sailing fleet ship-
owner. Later, while involved in grain trade shortly after the Crimean War, the 
Vagliano bros firm raised the largest Greek-owned fleet, developing interests into 
maritime credit, banking and insurances as well.  
 
".$.". THE SARDINIAN NETWORKS 
 
Differently from the Greeks, the Sardinian commercial networks of the Black 
Sea have seldom been at the centre of specific studies152. The existing literature, 
indeed, has rarely been able to outline the patterns of business or to single out the 
distinguishing features of the Sardinian presence in Southern Russia. Moreover, it 
failed even to reconstruct individual or “firm” histories. Therefore, even though an 
extensive presentation might exceed the specific objectives of this chapter, the 
present paragraph will attempt to illustrate some of the main features as well as to 
outline few specific trajectories in order to draw a veritable picture of Sardinian 
business in the Black Sea.   
Lacking any bibliographical reference to deal with the massive amount of 
existing archival sources, we attempt here to put into effect the models developed 
for other communities, especially to the Greeks, and to verify their validity to the 
Sardinian case. For instance, in the process of formation of the merchant class in 
 
152 In order to reconstruct the Italian presence in the Black sea area, some work has already been 
done on Russian sources: O. Fedenko, “The activity of the Italian merchants in Odessa during the 
nineteenth century”, pp. +&-/*; H.R. Gomez, “Migrazioni italiane in Crimea e Nuova Russia: tracce, 
fonti e contesti”, pp. &&)-&//.  
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Odessa and the Azov port cities, historians have underlined the role of the 
interconnections between trade and consular delegation153. About the Greeks, the 
case of John Ralli is emblematic to this purpose154; however, the evolution of the 
Sardinian case reflects even more pervasive and systematic overlaps between the 
two figures, especially in the Azov port-cities.  
 
 




Berdyansk Vice-consul Sardinia Merchant 
Tubino 
Giuseppe 
Berdyansk Vice-consul Sardinia Tubino firm 
Tubino 
Lorenzo 
Berdyansk Vice-consul Sardinia Tubino firm 
Chichizola 
Pietro 
Kertch Vice-consul Sardinia 










Mariupol Vice-consul Sardinia Merchant 
Pignone 
Giuseppe 







Mariupol Vice-consul Sardinia 





153 E. Sifneos, Imperial Odessa, pp. )*-).. In particular, Sifneos includes diplomacy among the 
three patterns of successful business employed by merchants to establish in the Black sea, following 
the example of Henry Yeames.  




Odessa Aspiring consul 
Sardinia 
Gerbolini & Simoni 
firm 
Rocca Fratelli Odessa Merchant Rocca firm 
Rossi L. Odessa Merchant Rossi firm 
Tubino 
Domenico 
Odessa Merchant Tubino firm 
Rocca 
Pellegro 






Taganrog Vice-consul Sardinia Rossi firm 
Rossi 
Domenico 
Taganrog Vice-consul Sardinia Rossi firm 
Rossi 
Giuseppe 
Taganrog Vice-consul Sardinia Rossi firm 
Table *./ – List of consular representatives of Genoese origins in the Black Sea. Source: AST, 
Consolati nazionali, Odessa, $; AMAE, Politica, 14, Odessa; ASN, Segreteria e ministero di stato 
degli affari esteri, *5&$-*5&1 and Id., )&+1-)&/*; ACCM, Rocca frères.  
 
With the unique exception of the seat of Odessa to which, for its relevance155, 
only professional diplomats were appointed, the Sardinian consular 
representatives were always personally involved in the trade. For being a consul, 
merchants could benefit from various economic privileges, such as tax exemptions 
and the collection of the consular fees. They could increase their prestige by having 
access to confidential information relating to commercial agreements and 
representing their merchant community before the local authorities. In the Azov 
Sea, the model of merchant-consul resisted to the bureaucratic modernization 
process to appoint professional diplomats, state-salaried and trained to occupy an 
 
155 In Odessa, the Sardinian government put a &st rank consul, under whose control were 
positioned all the vice-consulate seats of the Black sea and Azov. The consul of Odessa was always 
a professional diplomat and he did not have a direct connection with the local society. He was not 
permanently resident in Odessa: instead, he usually stayed for a period between . to &4 years. See: 
F. Bacino (ed.), La legazione e i consolati del regno di Sardegna in Russia ($1>7-$>D$), Roma: 
Tipografia riservata del Ministero Affari Esteri, &5.*.  
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official position156. Indeed, with the partial exception of the Crimean War period 
("U&$-&')157, the consular profession was highly appreciated, and most sought by 
resident merchants. This is evident in the occasion of consular resignations when 
local merchants petitioned to the central consul in Odessa to advance their 
candidacies158. In doing so, each aspiring vice-consul needed to demonstrate his 
trade expertise and to attest the support of the local community. In the case of 
Pietro Schiaffino (whose case is even more relevant for his origin from Camogli), 
vice-consul in Mariupol, the availability of the corpus of bureaucratic papers for 
his appointment at the service of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies led us to 
understand the procedure. In "U%$, Luigi Accame, a Sardinian merchant, decided 
to move to Taganrog, leaving his seat vacant. Soon, Pietro Schiaffino, not a 
Neapolitan subject too, advanced his candidacy relying on the support of the local 
merchant elites. Although in the supporting letter Schiaffino’s «perfect integrity», 
«fair-minded qualities» and «Christian conduct» were praised159, the consul of 
Odessa did not omit his trade expertise: Pietro Schiaffino was «the local director 
of the famous trade house Enrico Rossi & Co.»160. Furthermore, the subscriptions 
reveal the existence of a composite scenario in which all the Italian native speakers, 
notwithstanding their origins, were deeply interrelated161.  
The personal trajectory of Pietro Schiaffino is worth more attention due to its 
uniqueness within the paradigm of Camogli’s pattern of business. Pietro Schiaffino 
 
156 F. De Goey, Consuls and the institution of Global Capitalism, $1>7-$>$#, New York: Routledge, 
*4&$.  
157 The effects of the Crimean War, such as the cease of the grain exports and the stagnation of 
trade led the local vice-consuls to abandon their posts to develop further trade in other regions. 
See, for instance, the case of both Pietro Schiaffino or Domenico Rossi who, in &1.., asked for a 
leave of absence due to the «actual cessation of navigation in those ports, and the disappearance of 
any kind of business there». AST, Consolati nazionali, Odessa, $.  
158 See the contrast between Sebastiano Lanfranco and Gio. Batta Chiozza for the seat of 
Mariupol, or between Pellegro Rocca and Giuseppe Rossi in Taganrog. AMAE, Politica, 14, Odessa.  
159 ASN, Segreteria e ministero di stato agli affari esteri, Odessa, *5&$, +&st December &1/+.  
160 Ibidem, &/th May &1//.  
161 Among the subscribers we find Gustavo Gerbolini, of Ligurian descent; Giovanni and Luca 
Mimbelli, perhaps merchants of Venetian origins, whose relative Stefano, in &1$4, figures as Tuscan 
consul in Mariupol; finally, G. Drascovich, Austrian consul in Mariupol, and repeatedly appointed 
as regent of the Neapolitan seat in the frequent leaves of Schiaffino. AMAE, Politica, 14, Odessa; 
ASN, Segreteria e ministero di stato agli affari esteri, Odessa, *5&$. For Gustavo Gerbolini, see infra.  
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was born in Gibraltar in "U""162: his father, born in Camogli, had moved to the 
British protectorate in "U^#, in the attempt to install a commercial presence along 
the route towards the Atlantic. Pietro had a brother, Giuseppe, a captain, and two 
sisters. Since the early "U%^s, Pietro Schiaffino settled in Mariupol as director of 
the local branch of the Rossi firm. As said, in "U%% he was appointed vice-consul of 
the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies; in "U&^, he reached the same position for the 
Kingdom of Sardinia. His unique origins and his father commercial background 
might have determined his professional career: Pietro was one of the few subjects 
from Camogli who engaged in trade rather than shipping. However, the absence 
of private correspondence prevents us from proving any direct relationship 
between Schiaffino and Camogli’s captains, his strategic presence in the port city 
of Mariupol might have constituted a fundamental contact for the subjects of 
Camogli, especially if considering the importance of reputation, trust and kinship 
in the formation of long-standing businesses.   
To single out some of the most influential and wealthiest Sardinian firms, we 
resorted to consular information and to Russian sources, crucial to frame the 
activities of Genoese companies within a broader context. According to the 
Imperial regulations, each merchant had to subscribe to a guild in order to engage 
in trade. The Russian guild system was structured in three categories, scaled 
according to the amount of declared capital. The first guild was for merchants 
dealing with wholesale and international trade without limits on annual 
transactions; the members of the second guild, instead, had limits for both 
domestic and international trade; in the third category, there were merchants 
engaged in retail and the range of their activities was restricted to the Empire163. 
The requirement of enlistment to guilds was also related to citizenship: apart from 
 
162 The data about his origins and his family are available in the &1+/ Gibraltar census of 
inhabitants, online and free searchable at: http://www.nationalarchives.gi/gna/&1+/.aspx.  
163 E. Sifneos and G. Harlaftis, “Entrepreneurship at the Russian frontier of international trade”, 
p. &$1.  
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the first rank, which remained accessible to foreigners, the membership of the 
lower guilds was gradually restricted to Russian citizens164.  
The following list is drawn from Sifneos’ reconstruction of the first-guild 
merchants published in the "U&V Odessa Vestnik newspaper165. The top positions 
were occupied by Greek and Jews merchants, as Efrussi, Ralli, Raffalovich, 
Radocanachi or Scaramanga. Then, five Sardinian firms are listed, three in the first 
fifteen.  
 






>D Rocca Carlo* &&.U"" ".#DV.&V% ".$$&.%^& 
>V Dall'Orso     
Cesare 
Augusto 
%U.'U% "."$%.^#D "."U#.D"" 
>W Rossi Luigi $.#%& "."%D.^"^ "."&^.#&& 
DD Tubino 
Domenico 
V$.$$V 'UU.UVV DU#.#$U 
D? Porro 
Giacomo 
%".#U& %D".#"& &"#.&^^ 
Table *.. – List of the top Genoese merchants in the first guild of Odessa in &1.5. Source: E. Sifneos, 
Imperial Odessa, Appendix. Table &*. *Of Genoese origin, based in Marseille 
The presentation of all the inner characteristics of the Sardinian presence in the 
Black Sea area might be well beyond the objectives of the present research. 
Therefore, unable to unravel this history in all its facets, we chose to focus on a 
critical feature, the relationship existing between shipping and commerce. This 
 
164 The correspondence of the Sardinian consul reports that the closing of the third guild 
(retailers and artisans) to foreigners was announced by the end of the &1./, or more probably in 
the &1... The law may have not been effective in the following years, since Herlihy date this decree 
to &1.1: P. Herlihy, Odessa recollected, pp. &/4-&/&. In both of these circumstances, however, the 
closure of the third guild to foreigners arouse complaints and demonstrations among the local 
European communities. Herlihy reports the case of French merchants; the Sardinian consul 
mentioned all the Sardinian subject who protested: . jewelries, & hotel, a pasta factory and * 
retailers. AST, Consolati nazionali, Odessa, $, &4th December &1./.  
165 E. Sifneos, Imperial Odessa, Appendixes. Table &*.  
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choice, indeed, might allow us to outline the evolution of some specific firms in 
relationship with Camogli’s unique evolution as a purely seafaring community.    
The organizational structure of the Sardinian firms entangled a few similarities 
with their Greek analogues. As merchants and businessmen forged throughout the 
early modern period, the Genoese group acknowledged the importance to operate 
through commercial networks based on kinship166: therefore, they bring to life 
various family firms167. The first group of merchants to settle in the region founded 
their main branches in Odessa, as in Rocca and Gerbolini. Later, as the Azov Sea 
ports entered into competition with Odessa, those companies expanded to this 
region; meanwhile, other merchants proceeded directly to the Azov, in order to 
maintain close control over local operations (Tubino in Berdyansk and Rossi in 
Taganrog).  
The most striking difference between Greeks and Sardinians lied in the variety 
of trade typologies practised. As mentioned before, the Greeks retained their 
outstanding shares of exports and imports altogether; instead, the Genoese firms 
engaged little or none at all into import trade. The underlying reasons for such 
discrepancy were linked with the structure of the Sardinian trade as a whole. The 
port of Genoa had little to offer to Russia in terms of export: the interior was poorly 
industrialized, and few were the products which could be exported, with the partial 
exception of silk, highly demanded in the United Kingdom168. Moreover, the 
Genoese merchant lacked connections in the production sites of the most 
appreciated goods in Russia, apart from Sicily, where the few imported 
 
166 In this regard, we must mention the pioneering work of Giorgio Doria: G. Doria, Conoscenza 
del mercato e sistema informativo: il know-how dei mercanti-finanzieri genovesi nel secolo $D. e $1., 
Bologna: Il Mulino, &51$. More recently: C. Marsilio, C.A. Nogal and L. Lo Basso, “La rete finanziaria 
della famiglia Spinola: Spagna, Genova e le fiere di cambio (&$&4-&$.$)”, Quaderni storici, No. &*/, 
*44), pp. 5)-&&4; L. Lo Basso, “Diaspora e armamento nelle strategie economiche dei genovesi nella 
seconda metà del XVII secolo: una storia globale”, Studi storici, No. &, *4&., pp. &+)-&.$.  
167 E. Sifneos, “Greek Family Firms in the Azov Sea Region, &1.4-&5&)”, Business history review, 
No. 1), *4&+, pp. *)5-+41.  
168 E. Guglielmino, Genova dal $>$# al $>#M. Gli sviluppi economici e l’opinione pubblica, pp. &**-
&*+; M. Cevasco, Statistique de la ville de Genes. Tome II, pp. &*-&+; V.D. Flore, L’industria dei trasporti 
marittimi in Italia. Dagli inizi del XVI secolo al $>D2, pp. *&)-**&.  
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merchandises came from169. The absence of reciprocity in the Sardinian sea-borne 
trade with the Black Sea influenced the organization of shipping business. The 
unidirectionality of trade, complicated a profitable integration between commerce 
and shipping. On the one hand, the Sardinian merchants were able to charter most 
of the national fleet from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, relying on their high 
share of exports. On the other hand, they could hardly provide return (from Genoa 
to the Black Sea) cargoes to the captains, forcing them to sail on ballast for one-
half of the route. 
For merchant companies, chartering national vessel on the market was more 
convenient than owning a fleet. There was a sort of externalisation of the transport 
phase to leave the management of entrepreneurial risks (covering the on ballast 
route from Genoa to the Black Sea) to shipowners. However, merchants and firms 
operating in the Black Sea port-cities adopted a wide array of solutions. The 
analysis will lead us to outline two different models to balance shipping and trade 
in the Sardinian Black Sea trade.  
The first might be labelled as a ‘high investment’ model, in which trade and 
shipping coexisted and complemented each other. In the early period, it 
represented the prevalent organizational structure of the Sardinian business in the 
area. The reasons lied in concomitance of factors: high diversification of the 
investments and low specialization had been characterizing the Genoese business 
at least since the "'th century. In "U&#, in his description of the national commercial 
activities in Odessa, the local Sardinian consul wrote:  
The Sardinian merchants in Odessa have twelve firms. They work 
both on commission and their own. Since most of them own ships 
(or possess interests in ships), they trade on heavy loads and send 
them to Genoa, unless Livorno and Marseille offer better 
opportunities. It is rare for the ships owned or co-owned by the 
 
169 Nonetheless, even long after the Italian unification (and the inclusion of Southern Italy) the 
trade balance between Italy and Russia did not change its trend. In &1)), for instance, the Italian 
consul in Odessa denounces losses for more than & million roubles annually deriving from the unfair 
distribution between imports and exports. See, S. Castiglia, Rapporto quadrimestrale. $° 
Quadrimestre $>11, in Bollettino consolare, Torino: Paravia, &1)), p. $*+.  
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merchants to be chartered by others, due to the fact that, on 
favourable circumstances, with high freight rates, they prefer to 
load them for their own profit; with low freight rates, apart from 
the difficulties to find freights to foreign ports, they prefer to load 
them anyway, hoping to meet favourable selling conditions in 
Genoa or in the abovementioned ports.170  
The Dall’Orso firm might offer an exact sample of this business model. The 
establishment of their business in the region had some traits in common with the 
members of the Ionian network, such as Vagliano. For instance, the Dall’Orso 
family had a maritime background: Chiavari, their hometown, was a small-sized 
port in the eastern riviera of Liguria, with similar characteristics to Camogli. The 
long-standing tradition of the place within the Mediterranean cabotage played a 
central part in the formation of the firm. Nevertheless, concerning Dall’Orso first 
steps into the Black Sea trade little or none is known so far, apart from few sparse 
notions collected about the protagonists and their activities.  
The company name was Dall’Orso Fratelli (Bros.), but more individuals can be 
associated with the firm. Francesco appeared in Genoa in "U&&: surprisingly, he 
chartered ship of Camogli directed to either Mariupol or Berdyansk to load 
wheat171. A few decades later, in "UU^, Giacomo and Gio. Batta subscribed into the 
Italian Society for Mutual Aid in Odessa, information demonstrating the longevity 
of their business172. However, the most influential members were Giacomo, Cesare 
and Giuseppe, merchants and ship-owners. Giacomo was the first enrolling in a 
Russian guild (first guild – Odessa): in "U&#, he handled import and export trade 
 
170 AST, Consolati nazionali, Odessa, Lettera del console di Odessa a Torino, ) aprile &1.+. 
Translation from the original Italian: «I negozianti sardi stabiliti in Odessa vi hanno dodici case di 
commercio. Essi lavorano in commissione e fanno anche molto per conto proprio. Essendo i sardi 
per la maggior parte possessori di bastimenti o esclusivamente o per interesse parziale, speculano 
per proprio conto sui carichi gravi e ciò che inviano per lo più a Genova, salvo che gli scali di Livorno 
e Marsiglia presentino maggiore vantaggio. Raramente avviene che i bastimenti di proprietà 
d’armatori o cointeressati negozianti siano ceduti a nolo, giacché in favorevoli circostanze granarie, 
e per conseguenza con noli alti, preferiscono di speculare caricandoli; ed in epoca di calma degli 
affari, e perciò di bassi noli, oltreché allora rari sono gli impieghi per i porti esteri, preferiscono 
anche fare il carico sulla speranza di favorevole sfogo sia a Genova che negli scali sovracitati».  
171 AST, Consolati nazionali, Costantinopoli, +*.  
172 AMAE, Politica, 14, Odessa.  
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for over D^.^^^ roubles173. After that, he strengthened his business up to ascend to 
achieve an important position among the export merchants of Odessa174. 
Presumably, Cesare was his successor: he is found in Odessa, Berdyansk and Galatz 
as a resident first-guild merchant and local representative of Ligurian maritime 
insurance companies (including Camogli’s Mutua)175. On the other hand, Giuseppe 
Dall’Orso had engaged in shipping: in the "U'^s, around '-D vessels were registered 
under his name, and he possessed co-interests in another dozen ships, all of them 
sailing the Black Sea176. The deep interdependence between shipping and trade, in 
the absence of specific studies, finds a partial confirmation from the data corpus 
of the Semaphore de Marseille. The economic fortunes of the firm peaked in the 
period between the late "U'^s and the "UD^s: in "UD^, the Dall’Orso chartered %D 
vessels from various ports in the Black Sea to Marseille177. The $'% of these ships 
were owned by Giuseppe Dall’Orso or his relatives178.  
Direct investments in shipping, as occurred in the case of Dall’Orso, are found 
in other instances. The Rocca house, for example, possessed a small fleet179; 
nevertheless, their approach is relatively diversified180. From the company 
 
173 See the data processed from Obzor vneshnii torgovlii Rossii, &1.*. In &1.*, Cesare Dall’Orso 
ranked &44th out of the first guild merchants of the Southern ports of Russia; his business amounted 
to &/.)1. roubles in imports and .5.11$ in exports.  
174 Idem, &1.+-&1.$. In &1.+-./, Cesare increased rapidly his affairs volume, reaching the 
impressive amount of +$&.)). roubles (matching imports and exports). Then, in &1.$, despite an 
evident setback because of the Crimean conflict, he still moved more than *44.444 roubles.  
175 CMCC, Assicurazioni varie.  
176 P. Schiaffino, Le «carrette» degli armatori genovesi, Genova: Nuova editrice genovese, &55$, 
pp. 54-5+.  
177 Data processed from Semaphore de Marseille, &1+.-&1).. 
178 Lacking of any information concerning ship-ownership in the Semaphore data, we confronted 
name and tonnage with the list of ships owned by the Dall’Orso firm in the same period, found in 
P. Schiaffino, Le «carrette» degli armatori genovesi, pp. 54-5&.  
179 Most of the archival material concerning the correspondence between the Rocca firm and 
their captains can be found in ACCM, Maison Rocca frères-correspondance passive, Lettres des 
capitaines de navires marchandes, L-&5/&//4$$-4$5. Furthermore, it is possible to consult the 
commercial correspondence between the different branches of the firm, where the different 
systems are vividly outlined. In their correspondence the difference between owned-ships and the 
others is made clear through the usage of the possessive adjective «nostra» (ours). 
180 About the renowned Rocca merchant firm, their business and their family history, there is a 
recently published monograph, based on archival material kept in Marseille. See: A. Carrino, 
Passioni e interessi di una famiglia-impresa. I Rocca di Marsiglia nel mediterraneo dell’Ottocento, 
Roma: Viella, *4&1.  
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correspondence, their ownership over a few vessels, as the ships  Francesco181, cap. 
Graffione, and Moderazione182, captain Giuseppe Craviotto seems to be clear. The 
second ship, for instance, is mentioned to be anchored in Odessa for weeks in the 
expectation of cargo; this incident triggers an evaluation about the efficiency of the 
system and recalls the concerns – raised by the consul – about the disproportionate 
relationship between shipping and trade in the Sardinian business. However, 
Rocca’s ships rarely engaged in the Black sea trade: instead, they were more likely 
employed in regular connections with Algeria, to honour the firm’s commercial 
agreements and relationships with the French merchant elites in Marseille183. 
Therefore, a high percentage of their trade must have been carried out by ships 
owned by others.  
Furthermore, from Rocca’s correspondence, we can assume the existence of an 
intermediate model, based on privileged relationships between captains and 
merchants, in accordance to the merchant-captain partnerships theorized by 
Sifneos to illustrate Greek and Western European entrepreneurship in the Black 
Sea184. These connections were established on trust and on the same reputation 
mechanisms which had been ruling trade since the Middle Age. For language 
familiarity and geographical proximity, the Rocca choices usually fell on Sardinian 
captains185. At the end of every voyage, comments addressing the captain’s 
behaviour and trustworthiness were shared between the company branches. When 
incidents occurred, ending up in the loss or deterioration of part of the cargo, the 
relationships were unilaterally closed186. On the other hand, once gained the 
 
181 ACCM, Maison Rocca fréres-correspondance passive, Correspondance de Fratelli Rocca 
(Odessa) à Rocca Frères (Marseille), L-&5/&//4*/.  
182 Idem, L-&5/&//4*+.  
183 Idem, L-&5/&//4** and Algiers, L-&5/&//&&+. Most of the traffics with North Africa were still 
concerning the grain trade, especially from Algiers and Oran.  
184 E. Sifneos, Imperial Odessa, pp. )+-)/.  
185 Part of the correspondence kept in the ACCM, Maison Rocca fréres, Lettres des capitaines de 
navires marchandes, is related to this category as well. 
186 A few of these incidents involved some captains from Camogli. The first is the case of captain 
Diego Schiaffino, ship Chiara, which was chartered in Messina, in &1/1, with a cargo of citruses to 
Odessa. In the Russian city, however, the cargo arrived completely deteriorated; an incident for 
which, after long inquiries, the responsible was not clearly individuated and, therefore, the 
economic loss went all on the Rocca’s side. Another experience is that of captain Ferrari, of the ship 
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company trust, captains could put to profit their privileged relationships, by the 
inclusion of their kinship under these favourable conditions: this is the case, for 
instance, of the captain of Stella del Mare, Giacomo Razeto from Camogli, who 
recommended to Rocca firm his brother, captain on Annetta, unable to find cargo 
in the Black Sea due to weather hazards187. The actual economic advantages of 
these partnerships were not clear: most likely, merchant and carriers split the 
profits of both the cargo selling and the freights. However, the unavailability of 
commercial and personal correspondence concerning other Sardinian firms 
operating in the Black Sea trade prevented us from going any further in the analysis 
of this issue. Arguably, there were several other cases, as witnessed with the 
establishment of ethnic networks as the Greeks. 
Finally, the main alternative to ship-ownership was a “low investment” model 
in which merchants disregarded or were limitedly involved in shipping. The cargo 
was loaded in the holds of “tramp ships” available in the loading ports. The profits 
concerning the cargo, the earnings deriving from price differentials in the 
purchasing and selling markets all fell into the hands of the traders, whereas the 
income of the ship was based on freights. The significant volume of affairs and the 
relative profitability for both parties involved led to the high supply of sea 
transport in the Black Sea port-cities, matched by high demand: the fluctuations 
of the two, animated the freight rates market. Despite the consul observations, or 
probably due to later developments following the Crimean War, some leading 
Sardinian firms (Rossi and Tubino) preferred to charter ships rather than to own 
them directly. Undoubtedly, both companies owned some shares on a few vessels; 
however, there is no clear evidence of high investments in shipping to the same 
extent of those of Dall’Orso, in which the link between trade and shipping was 
inherently structural. On the contrary, Rossi and Tubino, for instance, are 
repeatedly found as the most recurrent charterers of Camogli ships, a perfect 
example of a “tramp fleet” among the Sardinians.       
 
Margherita, who, on the contrary was held responsible for the rotting of a cargo of hides loaded in 
Taganrog and carried to Marseille in &1.*. ACCM, Maison Rocca fréres-correspondance passive, 
Odessa, L-&5/&//4** and L-&5/&//4*+.  
187 ACCM, Maison Rocca frères-correspondance passive, Lettres des capitaines de navires 
marchandes, L-&5/&//4$5.  
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Besides, both in surplus period or in extreme needs, the Dall’Orso or the Rocca 
exploited the opportunity to charter captains outside their networks. The 
correspondence of the latter can provide us fascinating insights on their practices: 
in their opinion, priority was given to the Sardinian and the other “Italian” flags; 
then followed the northerners and, as the last resource, the Greeks. This judgement 
raises some cultural issues: Greek captains could accept lower freights. However, a 
constant prejudice towards the Greeks played a role in influencing the merchants’ 
perspectives. In the Rocca’s words, the Greeks were unaccountable and «less 
known in the Mediterranean ports»188.  
 
".$.). CAMOGLI AND THE BLACK SEA COMMERCIAL NETWORKS 
 
The introduction about the commercial networks in the Black Sea area provides 
a framework for the following analysis. The present section aims to reconstruct the 
various relationships established between the people of Camogli and the local 
merchant networks. The analysis is drawn upon the data collected from the 




Italian Greek Other 
Odessa '",&^% "#,$&% #',"&% 
Berdyansk &',D^% $#,^%% "",#&% 
Mariupol '^,$^% #U,#^% "",&^% 
Taganrog &D,D^% $^,DD% "",&%% 
Galatz &&,"D% $",^$% "$,U^% 
Braila &U,U#% $&,$^% &,UU% 
 
 
188 ACCM, Maison Rocca fréres-correspondance passive, Odessa, L-&5/&//4**. «Preferiamo la 
bandiera bremese o svedese o altra neutrale alla greca, essendo quest'ultima nazione di poca fede 
e capace di rubare l'intero carico nelle attuali circostanze e poi tutti i capitani greci in nessun porto 
non sono affatto conosciuti, per cui non vogliamo aver da fare con simile gente» 
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Table *.$ - Merchants chartering Camogli ships to Genoa and Marseille divided by nationality in 
Odessa, the Azov Sea and the Danube. Source: ASGe, Ufficio di sanità, Arrivi di bastimenti 
dall’estero, registers from .54 to $&+; Semaphore de Marseille, &1+.-&1).. 
The traffics of Odessa, in comparison with Azov and Danube ports, present 
unique features: there, a more significant part of Camogli ships was chartered by 
Sardinian (to Genoa) or French (to Marseille) subjects. More specifically, the 
houses Casareto, Rocca and Dall’Orso handled most of the Sardinian trade to those 
destinations, whereas Savine et fils managed most of the expeditions to Marseille. 
On the other hand, and differently from the trend of the Azov and Danube regions, 
the share of the Greeks of Camogli’s trade from Odessa is of secondary importance, 
with minor involvement of Rodocanachi and Spartalis. The peculiarity of this trend 
is to be in opposition with the Greek predominance within Odessa’s export trade: 
indeed, Greek historians have extensively studied the contribution of the major 
Greek houses over Odessa’s trade. Their role was determinant and, in the period 
"U$$-"U'^, it counted for almost half of the exports value189. Moreover, the 
diminished importance of Greek partners from the port of Odessa implied further 
consequences about the destinations and to the structuring of the trade. Indeed, 
in the framework of Camogli’s activities, Odessa represented a fundamental 
market to the Mediterranean, whereas, Camogli’s vessels seldom left Odessa 
toward English destinations – where Greek houses handled most of the trade and 
the Sardinians run little or none business190.  
In Berdyansk, Mariupol and Taganrog, instead, the trend was different. First of 
all, the percentage of the third category – neither Italians nor Greek – falls to ""% 
average. Then, looking inside the two groups, we observe some difference in the 
partner merchants. In Berdyansk, the importance of the firms Tubino and Porro & 
Pertica is praised both in consular reports, where their commercial leading 
position is underlined and in additional sources (such as the Rocca’s private 
 
189 V. Kardassis, Diaspora merchants in the Black sea, pp. &/)-&... Tables from ).& to )./.&. 
According to these tables, /+% of the export trade value was handled by Greeks. Moreover, from 
his evidences the author illustrates how .&% of the total (export and import) business of Odessa 
(&1++-&1$4) was detained by the three greater houses Rodocanachi, Ralli and Pappoudov ($*% if 
adding Zarifi and Mavros).  
190 See, paragraph &.1 ‘Destination ports’.  
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correspondence)191. Concerning the Greeks, instead, most of the charterers of 
Camogli’s vessels were Ambanopoulo, Cuppa and Vagliano192. In Mariupol, instead, 
the trade was in the hands of the Sardinian houses Rossi (whose local agent was 
Pietro Schiaffino, until "U&U) Gerbolini and Rocca (through their agent Giuseppe 
Pignone193), whereas, for the Greeks, Scaramanga and Spartalis seemed to be the 
most influential194.  
About the commercial firm of Gustavo Gerbolini, later Gerbolini & Simoni, there 
are a few more details about their trade activities and their contacts with the people 
of Camogli. Established in Mariupol in "U$', the founder started by operating on 
commission195. In the following years, however, Gerbolini became one of the most 
influential merchants of the Sardinian community; he was also a personal 
acquaintance of Pietro Schiaffino, the resident Sardinian vice-consul196. In "U&^, by 
handling commercial operations for more than '^^.^^^ roubles, Gerbolini & 
Simoni grew into the wealthiest Sardinian firm in the Black sea197. To increment 
his income, Gerbolini obtained a long-term provisioning contract with the 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, a safe and continuous source of revenues which was 
decisive to the firm economic growth198.  
Finally, Taganrog emerged as the port where the relationships between 
Camogli’s captains and Greek merchants were more solid – although Table #.' 
shows results in line with other ports. The combination of the arrival information 
 
191 See: AST, Consolati nazionali, Odessa, $; ACCM, Maison Rocca frères – correspondance 
passive, Correspondance de Fratelli Rocca (Odessa) à Rocca Frères (Marseille), L-&5/&//4*/. 
192 Semaphore de Marseille, &1+.-&1).. 
193 ACCM, Maison Rocca frères – correspondance passive, Correspondance de Fratelli Rocca 
(Odessa) à Rocca Frères (Marseille), L-&5/&//4**.  
194 Semaphore de Marseille, &1+.-&1)..  
195 See, ACCM, Maison Rocca frères – correspondance passive, Gustave Gerbolini (Marianopoli), 
L-&5/&//&4*. At the moment of my archival research, the passive correspondence from Mariupol 
was erroneously kept within the correspondence from the Italian states (perhaps due to the 
existence of a Marianopoli in Sicily).  
196 See the support provided by Gustavo Gerbolini to Pietro Schiaffino in the moment of his 
election to vice-consul for the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies: ASN, Segreteria e ministero di stato agli 
affari esteri, Odessa, *5&$.  
197 Obzor vneshnii torgovlii Rossii, &1.4.  
198 ASN, Segreteria e ministero di stato agli affari esteri, Odessa, )&/4.  
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in Genoa and Marseille and the sparse notions emerging from consular and private 
correspondence suggests a different picture indeed, with particular regard to the 
role of English ports, for which we lack the merchant information. For instance, 
Rocca’s report of all the ships leaving Taganrog to either the Mediterranean or 
England in June "U&V, illustrates some fundamental features of the trade. From it, 
we could individuate "U ships hoisting the Sardinian flag and, half of them might 
be identified as Camogli’s vessels ("^^% reliable identification is impossible due to 
the absence of other means of identification apart from the name of the ship).  
 




Adelfide* British ports #$DV rye Taganrog Scaramanga 
Cara British ports "DU" rye Taganrog Rodocanachi 
Francesco* British ports #V^D wheat Taganrog Ralli 
Leone British ports $"&% oat Taganrog Several 
Luigi* British ports $U&V oat Taganrog Rodocanachi 
Maria British ports $$%& wheat Taganrog Ralli 
Moderazione* British ports #%&D linseed Taganrog Rodocanachi 
Oriente* British ports $$UV oat Taganrog Several 
Regina British ports #&^^ wheat Taganrog Micrulacchi 
Rimbalto British ports $%^& wheat Taganrog Ralli 
Siccino British ports #U#$ rye Taganrog Scaramanga 
Solone* British ports "$D# oat Taganrog Ralli 
Teresa British ports #$VU linseed Taganrog Rodocanachi 
Thalia British ports $D&& barley Taganrog Ralli 
Tigre* British ports "'^^ wheat Taganrog Ralli 
Arbace* Mediterranean #'"& oat Taganrog Micrulacchi 





$%"# oat Taganrog Lauder 
Table *.) - List of the Sardinian ships leaving Taganrog in June &1.5. *presumable Camogli-owned 
ships. Source: ACCM, Maison Rocca fréres-correspondance passive, Correspondance de Fratelli 
Rocca (Odessa) à Rocca Frères (Marseille), L-&5/&//4*/.  
According to Table #.D, the overwhelming majority of traders were of Greek 
origin. The Ralli chartered ' Sardinian ships ($ of Camogli); then, followed 
Rodocanachi with % (#); finally Scaramanga and Micrulacchi, with # (") vessels 
each. Most of the ships were sent to the British ports, "& (D) out of "U.  
Finally, the scarcity of similar sources about the Danube area limits our capacity 
to deal with the context of Galatz and Braila as much as their counterparts. From 
Genoa and Marseille arrivals, the Greek houses Argenti & Sechiari, Melas, Spartalis 
and Zariffi seem to participate extensively to Camogli’s presence in the mentioned 
ports. Besides, for what concern the Sardinian traders, most of the cargoes were 
purchased on the mediation of Andrea Danovaro, of Genoese origins200. However, 
the main Sardinian commercial house settled in the Danube region had been that 
of Pedemonte Brothers201. Founded in "U$" by Filippo, Antonio and Francesco, the 
company was very active in the "U%^s. From "U%D onwards, it entered in crisis, from 
which it never recovered. His troubled business passed through bankruptcies, 
unpaid debts, company renaming throughout the "U&^s; Francesco Pedemonte 
had indebted with both Sardinians and local subjects (an Italian banker, Marco 
Thal or even the Moldavian prince Gregori Stourdza202). In the late "U&^s and 
"U'^s, however, when Camogli’s presence in the Danube ports grew consistent, 
 
199 Although the brig Idea was chartered to the Mediterranean, from its crew list it emerged that 
this vessel delivered its cargo in Newcastle. ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &/, n. *&4). 
200 The identity of Andrea Danovaro is rather neglected by the sources: in Russia and in the 
Danube area, he is never mentioned neither in consular correspondence nor in the guild lists. 
Nevertheless, Danovaro emerges as one of the greatest commissioners of grain cargoes from the 
Black sea. His absence from local sources lead us to assume that he played an intermediate role 
between the Black sea and Genoa. Perhaps, he corresponds to the cav. (“knight”, an honorific title) 
Andrea Danovaro who, in &1$), is granted by the Savoy Kingdom of the noble title of Count in &1$). 
201 R. Tomi, “L’histoire de la Maison de commerce Pedemonte et Fils”, Historical Yearbook, No. 
+, *44$, pp. &&&-&**; C. Ardeleanu, “La comunità italiana nella città portuale di Galati nel periodo 
del Risorgimento (&1+4-&1.$)”, in G. Nemeth and A. Papo (eds.), Unità italiana e mondo adriatico-
balcanico, Trieste: Luglio, *4&*, pp. $.-)1.  
202 AST, Consolati nazionali, Galatz,  
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their company seems to be wholly disappeared, apart from the latest court 
proceedings between Francesco and his creditors.  
An interesting case concerning the evolution of the Genoese presence in Galatz 
and Braila is embodied by the decision of some merchants to move there in 
correspondence to the Crimean War period. For instance, this was the case of 
Gustavo Gerbolini, previously settled in Mariupol: in his dense correspondence 
with the Rocca family, in April "U&% he declared his establishment in Galatz. 
According to his words, the merchant had moved to the Danube in response to the 
outbreak of the Crimean War, which had stopped a significant part of the ongoing 
trade in the Azov ports203. Indeed, to transfer the business to the Danube area was 
in line with the commercial strategies of other Black Sea trade houses (see the 
analogy with George Rodocanachi204) which, as a result of Crimean War and the 
subsequent shutdown of exports from the Russian territories, had sought in Galatz 
and Braila alternative markets. 
 
=.E. Camogli and Black Sea Import trade 
 
The Sardinian and Italian participation in the Black Sea import trade was less 
relevant than into exports. The low demand for merchandises in the Russian ports 
limited Sardinian arrivals with cargo. The Genoese firms settled in the Black Sea 
were highly competitive on exports and handled a significant part of the trade to 
the Mediterranean markets, almost monopolising Genoa and with interests 
towards Livorno and Marseille as well. The competition with the Greek firms was 
critical:  
The import trade to this port [Odessa] on board of Sardinian 
vessels is narrow due to the fact the most easily sold goods are not 
profitable […] and because the several bankruptcies occurring 
 
203 See, for instance, the several complaints about the stop of commercial transactions delivered 
by the Sardinian consuls in Mariupol, Berdyansk and Taganrog. AST, Consolati nazionali, Odessa, 
$.  
204 P. Herlihy, “Greek merchants in Odessa in the nineteenth century”, p. /&$.  
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every year among the retailing shopkeepers, from which the 
Sardinian firms had been repeatedly damaged, has disgusted 
them with regard to importing trade at the point that, apart from 
the goods sold easily in exchange of cash, they are increasingly 
disregarding this branch of trade. On the contrary, the Greek 
firms, enjoying broader relationships, have attracted to them the 
monopoly over imports, and they fill the market to such an extent 
to keep away any competitor. Nevertheless, thanks to the sole 
exports, some Sardinian firms play a remarkable role in the local 
business. In "U&#, the Porro firm moved $ million francs. The Rossi 
firm [moved] # million and D^^ thousand francs and the Rocca 
firm two million.205   
In Table #.U, imports and exports values in the Sardinian and Greek firms are 
compared to shed light over the differences in their business:  
 
Firm Import Total % 
Rocca &&.U"" ".$$&.%^& %,#% 
Dall'orso %U.'U% "."U#.D"" %,"% 
Rossi $.#%& "."&^.#&& ^,$% 
Ralli &"D.U%V #.#^^.'%& #$,&% 
Rodocanachi %V'.$V% ".'U&.DV' #V,%% 
 
205 AST, Consolati nazionali, Odessa, $, Lettera del console di Odessa a Torino, ) aprile &1.+. 
Translation from the original Italian: «L’importazione in questo porto sui legni sardi è assai 
ristretta, perché quei generi che qui sarebbero di facile sfogo non presentano conveniente utile […] 
ed oltre della molteplicità dei fallimenti, che ogni anno più accadono fra i bottegai di piazza, nei 
quali più e più volte le case sarde restarono compromesse, le ha talmente disgustati 
dell’importazione che, eccettuati gli articoli di facile vendita a contanti, vanno poco alla volta 
trascurando questo ramo di commercio. Le case greche, invece, che hanno relazioni più estese, 
hanno attirato a sé il monopolio dell’importazione ed inondano talmente la piazza di ogni genere 
di qualità di merci di consumo, ed in sì gran quantità da svogliare qualunque altro speculatore. 
Malgrado ciò, quasi colla sola esportazione alcune dette case sarde ricoprono un posto non 
indifferente nel giro commerciale di questa piazza. La casa Porro figura nel &1.* per un giro di + 
milioni di franchi. La casa L. Rossi per * milioni e )44 mila franchi e la casa Rocca per * milioni».    
 V" 
Table *.1 – The value of import over the total commercial movement of Sardinian and Greek firms 
settled in Odessa, &1.5. Source: E. Sifneos, Imperial Odessa, Appendix. Table &*.  
The three leading Sardinian firms collected no more than %% of their revenues 
from import trade; the most evident discrepancy between imports and exports 
occurred in the case of Rossi, where imports reached the ^,$% only. Ralli and 
Rodocanachi, on the other hand, earned from import trade, respectively the #$,&% 
and #V,%%. The nature of the trade influenced shipping and maritime activities. 
Indeed, lacking the support of their traditional commercial partners – the Genoese 
merchant houses – the merchant marine contributed only to a lesser extent to the 
imports flow to the Black Sea. Nevertheless, a brief introduction dealing with the 
general trend characterising Black Sea import trade will follow to contextualize the 
operations of Camogli’s people within this scenario.   
From a geographical perspective, imports were mainly concentrated in Odessa 
and Taganrog. Odessa was a natural outlet for colonials and industrial products, 
due to the continuous population growth and its connections with the hinterland; 
concerning the latter factor, Taganrog enjoyed identical conditions. Indeed, the 
city was able to exploit its position and the communications with Rostov-on-Don 
and, therefore, to outnumber the imports of Berdyansk and Mariupol, its natural 
competitors.  
Table #.V compares the progression of British and Italian import trade to Russia 
in the period between "U&^ and "UU^. The data corpus was made available by the 
researchers of the Black Sea Project206. The results underline a relatively reduced 
relevance of Italian merchandises in the Black Sea markets, especially in 





206 Data processed from: Petmezas, A. Papadopoulou et al., Black Sea historical statistics, $>$!–
$M$#, Research Project “The Black Sea and its port-cities, &))/–&5&/. Development, convergence and 




UK Italy Russian Total 
Imports 
 
Value % Value % 
 
67;] "^^."^V #D% $#.VDV V% $'D.''D 
67;6 "^%.^^& #'% $$."VD U% %^#.&#^ 
67;8 VD.$U% #&% $%."%" V% $V%.#U$ 
67;: ""^.VV& #U% $".^^& U% %^#.UV$ 
67;= $$.^"" "$% "&.#^^ '% #'$.U'" 
67;; $.%U$ "% $.'D& "% #'V.%$& 
67;> "%V.DU" #'% $&.^'V '% &U#."#& 
67;7 "&$.D'$ #D% %".%^^ D% &'$.^&" 
67;^ "&".U"' #V% $%.U^^ D% &#'.$&& 
67<] "'%.D^D #U% %^.D"# D% &V#.UUU 
67<6 "D^.%"V #V% %$.^%^ D% &U&.^#V 
67<8 "#%.&&D #%% $'.D^D D% &"$.$D" 
67<: "'U.^%^ #U% $U."D$ '% &V&.^"$ 
67<= "'$.U'" $"% $".&D$ '% &$"."UD 
67<; "&V.&UD #U% $#.&D" '% &D^.UUU 
67<< "'".&'& #U% #U.^^$ &% &U#.##" 
67<> #D$.#"V #U% &$.^^& &% VUD.$$" 
67<7 #D^.^%U #V% %$.%&$ &% V#V."%" 
67<^ #VU.^^& #V% '&.&$$ '% ".^#^.$D' 
67>] $$#."U% $#% &V.%$D '% ".^&$.'DD 
Table *.5 - Italian and English imports to the Russian Empire (&1/4-&1)4). Source: S. Petmezas, A. 
Papadopoulou et al., Black Sea historical statistics, $>$!–$M$#, Research Project “The Black Sea and 
its port-cities, &))/–&5&/. Development, convergence and linkages with the global economy”, *4&*–
*4&., www.blacksea.gr. 
Indeed, according to Table #.V, apart from the favourable period at the 
beginning of "U&^s, when Italian products reached almost "^% of the total value, 
from "U'$ onwards Italian exports averaged for the &% of the total. However, these 
data merge the various pre-unitarian Italian states altogether and does not provide 
any distinction by ports. Indeed, this figure is even more manifest according to 
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more accurate analysis, taking into account the distinction between different ports 
of origin. We utilised the Italian official statistical publications about shipping and 
trade, available for "U'&207, and compared the three main Italian main ports in 
terms of shipping movement, Genoa, Livorno and Messina. Out of the total 
amount of ships – destined either to Russia or to the Danube Principalities – calling 
for commercial operations in these ports, the percentage of those cleared with 
cargo has been estimated. The results illustrate different trends according to each 
port: 
 
Destination Genoa Livorno Messina 
Total Cargo Total Cargo Total Cargo 
No. % No. % No. % 
Southern 
Russia 
"'# ' %% #^ "# '^% #U #' V$% 
Danube 
Principalities 
"" & %&% & $ '^% " ^ ^% 
Table *.&4 - Vessels cleared with cargo the ports of Genoa, Livorno and Messina to Russian and to 
the Danube in &1$.. Source: Statistica del Regno d’Italia. Movimento della navigazione nei porti del 
Regno, Firenze: Le Monnier, &1$), pp. )/-)5.  
The contribution of Genoa’s exports toward Russia, for instance, is negligible (' 
ships, %% of the movement); in Livorno and Messina, instead, the percentages 
increase to '^% and V$%, and also the total numbers grow consistently, to "# and 
#' ships cleared with cargo. Therefore, despite its leading role in terms of both 
ship-ownership and maritime movement, Genoa has little or none direct 
commercial relationships with Russia about local exports. The figure slightly 
changes when taking the Danube Principalities into account, though the relatively 
low numbers may suggest caution. This is an additional indication of the limited 
competitiveness, in Russia, of the products from the pre-unitarian Savoy state, of 
which Genoa was the natural port of export.  
 
207 Statistica del Regno d’Italia. Movimento della navigazione nei porti del Regno, Firenze: Le 
Monnier, &1$).  
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However, in the attempt to estimate the contribution of the Italian and 
Sardinian merchant marine to the trade relationships between Italy and Russia we 
disaggregated the data concerning the whole outbound trade to circumscribe our 
sample to the Italian flag. In Table #."", Italian and foreign ships cleared to 
Southern Russia and the Danube are compared. The percentage of those vessels 
cleared with cargo out of the total ships operating on the same route has also been 
taken into consideration, in order to evaluate the average efficiency of Italian 
shipping engaging the Black Sea trade in comparison with the foreign flag.    
 




Total Cargo Total Cargo 
No. % No. % 
Southern 
Russia 
#&" #U ""% VV U# U$% #&% 
Danube 
Principalities 
#" "# &D% "## ""U VD% V% 
Table *.&& - Italian and foreign vessels cleared with cargo from Italian ports to Southern Russia and 
the Danube principalities. Source.  
The results of Table #."" are indicative of the low proportion of Italian vessels 
sailing to the Black Sea with cargo. Conversely, as far as all the foreign flags are 
concerned, both absolute and relative numbers are much more positive, with an 
average rate of employment over U^%. These indicators, and the general 
evaluation about the Sardinian contribution to Southern Russian import trade, are 
confirmed by the coeval consular accounts from the Black Sea ports. The Italian 
consuls in Berdyansk and Taganrog, in particular, transmitted a large amount of 
documentation, suitable for the purpose to investigate national trade and shipping 
in the abovementioned ports. The general framework witnesses numerous arrivals 
of Italian ships, a figure which was not balanced by an equivalent share of import 
trade. For instance, in "U'", the Italian flag counted for more than half of the ships 
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calling to Berdyansk (&",#^%)208. Meanwhile, as reported in Table #."#, these 
vessels transported in their holds less than "D% of the total imports value mainly 
Mediterranean foodstuff and some colonials.   
 
FLAG ITALY OTHER % ITA 
N° SHIPS "&^ "%$ &",#^% 
OLIVE OIL ""^^ "D"^^ '% 
COFFEE D#^^ ##VU^ $"% 
RICE "^&^   "^^% 
PEPPER   "%&$ ^% 
SUGAR   D$$ ^% 
CITRUSES #U^^ $D"$ D&% 
WINES   #$'U ^% 
WALNUTS   #%$"U ^% 
ALMONDS   &'V ^% 
FIGUES   #&"$ ^% 
CAROBS   ###'D ^% 
MARBLES "'^^   "^^% 
FURNITURES #"^^   "^^% 
HATS '^^   "^^% 
TABLES   &^% ^% 
TOT VALUE "'%&^ VU&"U "D% 
Table *.&* - Imports to Berdyansk according to value (roubles) (August &1$4-August &1$&). Source: 
AMAE, Affari Esteri, Odessa, 15.. 
A few years later, inside the report of the Taganrog vice-consul, published in the 
Bollettino Consolare Italiano, a statistical account about the ports of Mariupol and 
Taganrog provides analogous information concerning Italian trade and shipping. 
The results drawn in Table '.' illustrate an even wider discrepancy between the 
total tonnage calling in the Azov ports and the value of their contribution to local 
imports.   
 
208 AMAE, Affari Esteri, Odessa, 15..  
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  SHIPS IMPORT 
  TONS % VALUE % 
"U'D ""&.%^# #V,&D% D&D.V^^ $,U^% 
"U'U "&$.'V' #D,D&% ".^%^.V%D &,^V% 
Table *.&+ - Italian imports to Mariupol and Taganrog (together) in &1$)-&1$1 compared to tonnage. 
Source: Della navigazione e del commercio nei porti di Taganrog e di Marianopoli nel &1$1 rapporto 
del Cav Avv. Rossi Console a Taganrog, in Bollettino consolare, Torino: Paravia, &1$5, p. *4&.  
According to Table #."$, the imports on the Italian flag counted for the %-&%, in 
the face of an outstanding amount of tonnage available in port, between one fourth 
and one third.  
In quantitative terms, the weight of Italian import trade with the Black Sea was 
low; however, from a qualitative perspective, there were some evident limits, 
connected with a restricted list of articles and genres, mainly dealing with 
Mediterranean foodstuff. These limitations played a crucial role in the failed 
evolution of this commercial sector. As mentioned above, most of these 
merchandises were not produced in Liguria or the northernmost regions of Italy; 
citruses, for instance, one of the main exported articles, were usually loaded at the 
port of Messina, in Sicily, despite the long-standing tradition of the western 
Ligurian Riviera to produce citruses for the international market209.   
The commercialization of citruses had a similar fate to olive oil within a 
different geographical framework. Liguria produced and sold abroad both of these 
articles: however, only southern Italian citruses found profitable markets in Russia, 
whereas the trade of olive oil was mainly managed by Greek merchants and carried 
out on board of Greek ships. Olive oil was indeed highly demanded in Russia, 
mainly for religious purposes, because it was needed to light the lamps 
illuminating the sacred icons210. Nevertheless, neither Ligurian nor southern 
Italian olive oil was able to compete with the Greek counterpart in terms of 
transport costs and market price, despite numerous attempts to introduce such 
 
209 See, A. Carassale and L. Lo Basso, Sanremo, giardino di limoni: produzione e commercio degli 
agrumi all’estremo Ponente ligure (secoli XII-XIX).  
210 AMAE, Affari esteri, Odessa, 15..   
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product in Russia211. On the other hand, other merchandise, rice, succeeded to 
penetrate the Black Sea market as a high-quality alternative to local products. 
Indeed, according to the Italian consular reports, in "U&V the rice of Piedmont was 
first introduced in Russia, in concomitance with a bad harvest occurred in the 
province of Astrakhan. After that, the Italian rice maintained its position, 
appreciated for its flavour and superior cooking qualities212.  
In line with the general framework of Sardinian import trade to the Black Sea, 
the absolute majority of Camogli ships arrived there on ballast, along a straight 
route from Genoa to Constantinople, without intermediate stops. However, to not 
sail on ballast for the whole first leg, some vessels called at Messina – with no 
orders – seeking for some cargo to sell in the Southern Russian ports. The traces of 
this trade have been preserved inside the correspondence of the Neapolitan 
consuls in the Black Sea, as they were requested to compile tables and statistics of 
the commercial relationships between Russia and their home countries, including 
number and details of foreign ships arriving in Odessa from national ports. In the 
first half of "U&", for instance, of "D foreign ships from the Kingdom of the Two 
Sicilies to Odessa, the Sardinian flag was represented by eight vessels (the 
remaining being Russian and Austrians)213. All of these ships were loaded in the 
port of Messina, seven with citruses and one with pumice stones. Among them, 
there were three ships of Camogli, all brigs: Il Pegaso, captain Giuseppe Schiaffino, 
La Tigre, captain Paolo Borzone and the Guardia, captain Gio. Batta Razeto214. In 
January "U&$, a similar table enumerates three more ships of Camogli arrived at 
Odessa from Messina, again with citruses and wine215. Here, the vessels were the 
 
211 Memoria sul commercio di Berdiansk, di Giov. Batt. Giovannetti ex vice-console toscano ($>#> 
e $>#M) in Orano, pp. $.-$$.  
212 Idem, p. $..  
213 ASN, Segreteria e ministero di stato agli affari esteri, Odessa, .*.$.  
214 The brig Il Pegaso (&5) t.), constructed in Varazze in &1/+, was owned by Bernardo Schiaffino; 
the brig La Tigre (&)$ t.), built in the same place and date, and the brig Guardia (+)* t.), built in 
Varazze in &1/1, were owned by Prospero Lavarello. ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &+, No. /4&1 (Il 
Pegaso); Idem, serie &/, No. 1$.5 (La Tigre); Idem, serie &/, No. $)./.   
215 ASN, Segreteria e ministero di stato agli affari esteri, Odessa, .*.$. 
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Grimaldo, Arpia and San Carlo, captained respectively by Gio. Batta Repetto, 
Giuseppe Bertolotto and Gio. Bono Ferrari216. 
Concerning the Azov seaports, the larger corpus of information produced by the 





Ship Captain Cargo Tonnage 
"U%' Genova Concezione G. Razeto coffee "%' 
"U%' Genova La Purità P. Senno 
olive oil / 
furnitures "$$ 
"U%' Malta Chiara D. Schiaffino citruses "'U 
"U%' Messina 
La Sacra 
Famiglia L. Brigneti citruses "'# 
"U%' Messina Unione B. D'Aste fresh fruits "UD 
"U%' Nizza Concezione F. Stagno 
citruses and 
oil "^" 
"U%' Other #" Ballast $D#% 
"U%D Messina Costante P. Mortola citruses "V^ 
"U%D Genova Amore F. Lavarello furnitures "%& 
"U%D Other $D Ballast '^U$ 
"U&"* Messina Elia G.B. Mortola citruses #"^ 
"U&" Messina Costante P. Mortola citruses "V^ 
"U&" Messina San Carlo G.B. Ferrari citruses "UU 
"U&" Messina Rosario G. Mortola citruses "&U 
"U&" Messina Almeria Lavarello  citruses #&% 
 
216 The brig Grimaldo is enrolled in the list of the Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese in 
&1.+, owner Antonio Schiaffino: CMMC, Assicurazioni varie. The brig Arpia was captained by the 
owner, Giuseppe Bertolotto; ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &+, No. /*/.. The brig San Carlo (&11 
tons), built in Varazze in &1+., instead, was owned by Erasmo Schiaffino, one of the leading ship-
owner of the first generation of Camogli’s ship-owners. He was one of the founders of the local 
mutual insurance company. The captain, Gio. Bono Ferrari, was his son-in-law. ASGe, Ruoli di 
equipaggio, serie &+, No. /*.&.  
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Table *.&/ - Camogli ships arrived with cargo in Kerch (&1/$; &1/); &1.&*). *from Neapolitan ports 
only. Source: ASN, Segreteria e ministero di stato agli affari esteri, Odessa, .*.$. 
Whereas Neapolitan consular reports are rich of details for the period "U%'-"U&", 
concerning the following years, up to "U'&, the crew lists help us reconstruct the 
relevance of this trade within the whole figure of Camogli. According to our 
calculations, an average of "^-"" vessels from Camogli (nearly U% of the total) 
annually called at Messina to load cargo to the Russian ports217. However, even in 
the Sicilian port, the relevance of English and Greek competition prevented this 
route from assuming crucial importance in the perspectives of the community 
ship-owners. In particular, in the latest years under consideration, indeed, while 
the ships of Camogli established durable connections with the British ports, 
regular cargoes of coal replaced occasional loads of citruses in the framework of 
their trade to the Black Sea218.  
 
=.F. Camogli and Black Sea Export trade 
 
Despite the existence of import trade from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, 
the presence of Camogli in the area was mainly motivated by the development of 
the grain export trade. An extensive description of the Black Sea grain trade, its 
development throughout several decades and its features and characteristics are 
well beyond the intentions of the chapter. Each geographical area taken into 
account, Odessa, the Azov Sea and the Danube region showed a remarkable 
increase of exports and experienced an exponential economic growth directly 
ascribable to the grain trade.  
 
 
217 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, from &1.+ to &1$..  
218 See the “Destination ports” paragraph.  
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Figure *./ - Export trade from Odessa, the Danube region and the Azov ports (&1+&-&11+). Source: 
S. Petmezas, A. Papadopoulou et al., Black Sea historical statistics, $>$!–$M$#, Research Project “The 
Black Sea and its port-cities, &))/–&5&/. Development, convergence and linkages with the global 
economy”, *4&*–*4&., www.blacksea.gr. 
The competition between each other varied throughout the nineteenth century: 
in general, the loss of the leading position of Odessa observed after the Crimean 
War ("U&$-"U&') was due to significant structural changes in which Russian 
infrastructural investments on railways in the Azov region, the abolition of 
serfdom ("U'") and the loss of Odessa’s free port status ("U&D) merged. The data of 
Odessa’s exports within the total figure of the southern Russian ports reflects the 
declining importance of the city: its share over exports falls from %^% average in 
the "U%^s to #&% average in the "UD^s. 
The main categories of products exported were cereals of different kinds, mainly 
wheat and, then, corn, rye and linseed. In Odessa and the Azov ports, there was 
also some trade in woollen clothes (especially of “merinos” quality) and salt. 
In Table #."&, in the attempt to frame Camogli’s maritime activities in a broader 
context, the Sardinian and Italian percentage ratios within the sea-borne export 




























































  Odessa Azov Danube 
"U&^ "'% "&%   
"U&D "U% "'%   
"U&U "D% "U%   
"U&V #$% "&%   
"U'^ "V% $$%   
"U'"   $#% "^% 
"U'#   ##% "$% 
"U''   #'% $% 
"U'D  #D%  
"U&U  $^%  
"U'V $"% $^%   
"UD^ "%% #"%   
"UD" "'% "V%   
"UD# "D% "V% V% 
"UD$ "&% #%% &% 
"UD%   #"% $% 
"UD&   %D% &% 
"UDD   #%% "% 
"UDU   "#% #% 
Table *.&. - Tonnage percentage out of the total movement of Sardinian and Italian flags in Odessa, 
the Azov ports and the Danube. Source: Commercial reports received at the Foreign Office from Her 
Majesty’s consuls (CRFO), from &1$* to &1)5; Della navigazione e del commercio nei porti di 
Taganrog e di Marianopoli nel $>D> rapporto del Cav Avv. Rossi Console a Taganrog, in Bollettino 
consolare, Torino: Paravia, &1$5, pp.&55-*4$; Stato della navigazione nei porti di Taganrog e 
Marianopoli. Rapporto del Regio console cav. Avv. G. Rossi, in Idem, pp. /$/-/$1; Memoria sul 
commercio di Berdiansk, di Giov. Batt. Giovannetti ex vice-console toscano ($>#> e $>#M) in Orano, in 
Bollettino consolare, Torino: Paravia, &1$1, pp. /.-&4/; Agricultura, industria e commercio della 
Moldavia; rapporto del nobile avv. Bernardo Lambertenghi Regio vice console a Galatz, in Idem, pp. 
&4)-&*1.  
According to this table, the traffics of the Italian merchant marine were more 
regular and had a more consistent weight in Odessa and the Azov, whereas in 
Galatz and Braila they seldom reached "^%. In the Azov Sea ports, the Italian 
participation averaged to ##,'^%; in Odessa to "D,'^%. Indeed, Italian shipping 
system turned out to be one of the most successful in the Azov ports in comparison 
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with the other regions; in the aftermath of the Crimean War, Sardinian vessels 
directed much more decisively to these ports, establishing durable supremacy in 
the Azov export trade. In Taganrog, the tonnage of the Italian ships increased from 
#".D#U tons (V% of the total) in "U&D to "$%.^$' (#V% of the total) in "UD"219. Even 
more impressive is the figure of Berdyansk, where Italian shipping outnumbered 
all the other flags: in the same period, the proportion of the Italian tonnage out of 
the total available in the Russian port passed from %^% to &D%.  
In Figure D.#, the number of Italian ships in Berdyansk is compared with the 
total amount of all flag.  
 
Figure *.. - Italian and all flag ships cleared from the port of Berdyansk (&1.)-&1)5). Source: 
Commercial reports received at the Foreign Office from Her Majesty’s consuls, Berdyansk, from &1$* 
to &1)5; Memoria sul commercio di Berdiansk in Bollettino consolare, Torino: Paravia, &1$1; AMAE, 
Affari politici, Odessa, 15.; I. Lyman and V. Konstantinova (eds.), The Ukrainian South as viewed by 
consuls of the British Empire (nineteenth-early twentieth centuries, Vol. &: British Consuls in the port 
 
219 Report by Mr. Consul Carruthers on the Trade of Taganrog for the year $>D$, in CRFO, London: 
Harrison and Sons, &1$*, pp. */1-*./; Report by Consul Carruthers, in Idem, &1)*, pp. /+&-//*. The 
peak of the Italian share over Taganrog shipping movement was in &1$+ when it reached the +&%. 
In parallel with the tonnage, the ships’ number grew almost accordingly: in &1.) there were &4/ 
Sardinian ships, whereas in &1)& there were +/1. Since Italian ship-owners had invested in newer 
and bigger ships, also the average tonnage witnessed an impressive growth, from *41 tons in &1.) 
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of Berdyansk, Kiev: Institute of Ukrainian Archeography and Primary Sources Studying of M.S. 
Hrushevskyi, *4&1.  
According to the British consuls, the reasons for the Italian success in these 
ports is to be found in various factors. First, the high appreciation toward Italian 
captains, whose «intelligence, activity and exemplary conduct» were praised and 
valued over «the shipmasters of any other nation»220. The second factor, instead, 
was in terms of market competitiveness: due to their lower operational costs, 
Italian captains were able to accept lower freights. More specifically, British 
consuls underlined all the factors determining the Italian comparative advantage 
in terms of costs. Maritime labour in Italy was cheaper than in other merchant 
marines, especially compared to the British one; then, due to the Italian relative 
delay in terms of unionism and class movements, several aspects of sailors’ working 
activities were not strictly regulated as in the case of the British.  For instance, the 
food supplies distributed on board could have been of lower quality, and there was 
no evident limit to their working hours (whereas British sailors did not work on 
Sunday, and their working hours were from six to six)221. The discrepancies in terms 
of the rights of seafaring labourers, therefore, had a direct impact on operational 
costs, both in terms of money and time. However, apart from this brief reference 
to maritime labour, all of these aspects will be more extensively outlined in the 
fifth chapter. Then, Italians were also advantaged for the lower costs of wooden 
ship-building; despite the alleged more safety and endurance of British vessels, 
merchants were not willing to charge the freight differentials on their accounts, 
reversing the risk, instead, on insurance companies222.  
 
220Report by Mr. Consul Carruthers on the trade of Taganrog for the year $>D$, in CRFO, &1$*, pp. 
*/1-*/5. Also in Berdyansk, in &1$/, Italian captains were «preferred by the majority of the 
exporters to any other except British. This might be attributed to the energetic character of their 
commanders, and the great care taken by them in the preservation of cargoes». Report by Mr. Acting 
Consul Wagstaff on the trade of Berdyansk for the year $>D#, in CRFO, &1$., p. &+.   
221 Report by Consul Zohrab on the Commerce and Navigation of Berdyansk for the Year $>12, in 
I. Lyman and V. Konstantinova (eds.), The Ukrainian South as viewed by consuls of the British 
Empire (nineteenth-early twentieth centuries, Vol. &: British Consuls in the port of Berdyansk, Kiev: 
Institute of Ukrainian Archeography and Primary Sources Studying of M.S. Hrushevskyi, *4&1, p. 
/&.. 
222 In this regard the British consul is clear: «the advantages of British vessels, being safer and 
more ably navigated, are lost in the difference of cost, for merchants do not, after all, place so much 
importance on superiorities which benefit insurance companies rather than themselves». Report by 
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These more significant numbers about the Azov ports might be partially 
explained through a combination of technological advances in navigation and the 
peculiar environment of the area. Indeed, whereas in Odessa and the ports of the 
Danube steamers established their rule in the grain trade between the "U'^s and 
early "UD^s, in the Azov Sea the transition from sail to steam in navigation was not 
even close to its conclusion a decade later. For instance, already in "U'D, $D% of the 
value of the goods exchanged in Galatz had been transported on steamships223. In 
"UD#, %#" steamships (of which $"^ hoisting the British flag) cleared the port of 
Odessa (only partially balanced by '#" sailing vessels)224. In the same year, only 'V 
steamers called at Taganrog, out of UD% ships, counting for no more than "U% of 
the tonnage. In Berdyansk, competition among steamers was even less effective: in 
"UD%, the tonnage of steamships cleared from the port counted for the U% of the 
total, since there were only "" steamers out of $#$ ships225. 
Moreover, Berdyansk was the most resilient to the success of steamships: only 
in "UU$ and "UU% steam navigation established on proportions similar to those of 
Odessa and the ports of Danube during the previous decade226. The evolution of 
technological transition in the Black Sea trade had inherent connections with the 
success of one or another merchant marine in different ports. For a wide array of 
reasons, among which ship-building costs, coal availability and prices were 
mentioned, it is to be taken into account also the organizational structure of 
shipping business227; indeed, British controlled a great part of the world steamship 
 
Mr. Consul Zohrab on the Trade and Navigation of the Port of Berdiansk for the Year $>DD, in I. Lyman 
and V. Konstantinova (eds.), The Ukrainian South as viewed by consuls of the British Empire, p. +5).  
223 Agricoltura, industria e commercio della Moldavia, pp. &*&-&*.. The overall data, in Italian lira, 
show that the total movement on steamships counted for &1,/ millions, whereas sailing ships 
transported goods for +&,5 millions. The Italian participation to this movement was of the &*% of 
the total (only on sailing ships).   
224 Report by Consul-General Abbott on the trade of Odessa in $>1!, in CRFO, &1)+, pp. &4*4-&4*&.  
225 Report by Vice-Consul Wagstaff on the Trade and Commerce of Berdyansk for the year $>1#, in 
I. Lyman and V. Konstantinova (eds.), The Ukrainian South as viewed by consuls of the British 
Empire, p. /)&.  
226 Report by Vice-Consul Lowe on the Trade and Commerce of Berdyansk for the Year $>>7, in I. 
Lyman and V. Konstantinova (eds.), The Ukrainian South as viewed by consuls of the British Empire, 
pp. .*4-.*..  
227 All of these factors will be the object of a more extensive presentation in the third chapter.  
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fleet, whereas Italy continued to a large extent to employ sailing vessels on these 
routes228.  
To reconstruct the nature of Italian business in the Black Sea, we must consider 
the following features. First, the bulk of the fixed capital to engage in the sea-borne 
trade was constituted by the sailing fleet of Genoa, in which ship-owner invested 
shipping incomes to modernize and enlarge the fleet. Second, Italian shipping 
seized a significant part of the export trade to the Mediterranean, relying on their 
partnership with the national commercial firms established in the Southern 
Russian ports. Finally, the expansion phase lasted from the "U&^s to the beginning 
of the "UD^s. In this regard, the role of Italian ships increased in the Azov ports 
rather than in Odessa or the Danube, due to the comparative advantage provided 
by lower operational costs, and due to the delayed establishment of steam shipping 
there.  
Therefore, the national framework will provide a fundamental tool to analyse 
the participation of Camogli to this movement, its success, its weight on the total 
figure and its peculiarities.  
The presence of Camogli ships in the Black Sea ports has been evaluated 
through the vast corpus of crew lists available concerning the period from "U&$ and 
"U'&229. Indeed, these documents, apart from the information about ship and 
crews, which will be the object of further discourses, provide an unparalleled 
source of information about all of their routes. These routes have been 
reconstructed through the consular stamps or subscriptions which every Sardinian 
captain needed to obtain before leaving a foreign port.  
 
 
228 According to the statistics tables elaborated by the Norwegian Office for Statistics, in &1)5, 
the British steamship fleet represented the $$% of the world steamship tonnage; Italy counted for 
&,)% of the total. See: A.N. Kjaer (ed.), Navigation maritime. Les marines marchands, Christiania: 
Ahschehoug, &11&, Table No. +, Nombre et tonnage des navires marchands des different pays dans 
chaucune des annes $>1$-$>>2, pp. &1-*.. 
229 The end date is due to the lack of further crew lists in the Genoese archives, because of the 
relocation of most of the material as a result of the Italian unification, which caused huge damages 
to archival conservation.  
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Figure *.$ - Camogli ships loading in the Black sea ports by region. Source: ASGe, Ruoli di 
equipaggio.  
According to Figure #.', the numeric consistency of Camogli’s shipping in the 
Black Sea increased in parallel with the structural growth of the fleet – analysed in 
paragraph ".# of the present chapter. The rise of Camogli’s vessels from '$ units 
before the Crimean War up to the almost "U^ in "U'& is even more evident if 
associated with the boost of the average tonnages, passed from "'$ to #VD tons 
(Figure #.").  
The absolute majority of the fleet of Camogli was employed in the Black Sea 
trade; apart from the persistence of coastal cabotage (dealing with Tuscan 
charcoal, see chapter "), all the ships able to long-distance navigation engaged in 
this business. However, the presence of Camogli vessels within the broader 
framework of the national participation in the Black Sea trade was not an easy task 
due to the dispersion of most of the consular correspondence (particularly 
concerning statistics and tables) between the archives of Turin and Rome230. This 
 
230 The correspondence of the Sardinian consuls of the &1.4s and &1$4s have a peculiar archival 
history: first collected in Turin, the capital of the Kingdom of Sardinia, after the Italian unification 
some of it was transferred to Rome (&1)&) among the documents of the “Archivio del Ministero degli 
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fact was explicitly actual for what concerns Odessa and the Danube ports, whereas 
more information is available for the Azov Sea ports.  
 
  Odessa Berdyansk Mariupol Taganrog Danube 
Cam. Sard. % Cam. Sard. % Cam. Sard. % Cam. Sard. % Cam. Sard. % 
")$( &> ")> "$% &@ >@ &&%       &) "@' &(%   
  
")$) "& "($ (% '" "'( &)%               
  
")$> &) &#> "@% && ""@ &@%       $' "%$ '@%   
  
")#@                           
  
")#" &% &"( ""% "$ "## >% ") "&& "$% %& ")) "(% $" &(' ")% 
")#&       "' "'% "@% "' >( "'% %) &%& "#%   
  
")#%       "% "@& "%% > '> ")% %@ &'# "&% $> %#) "#% 
")#'       "# >" "(% "@ >' ""% %' "## &@%   
  
")#$                   %( ")% &@%   
  
Table *.&$ - Camogli’s share over the Sardinian presence in Odessa, the Black Sea ports and the 
Danube231. Source: ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio; AMAE, Affari Politici, 14, Odessa; ASN, Segreteria e 
ministero di stato degli affari esteri, .*.$; Commercial reports received at the Foreign Office from 
Her Majesty’s consuls, from &1$* to &1)5.  
The little amount of data concerning Odessa restricted the analysis to a few specific 
years. In average, the results show the participation of "^,D&% of the ships in the 
leading Russian Black Sea port.  Hence, further comparisons can be advanced for 
Odessa and the Azov ports. Notwithstanding the total amount of ships going 
toward either the two destinations, the participation of Camogli increases to a 
"%,&^% yearly average in Mariupol, "D% in Berdyansk and, finally, to #",D^% in 
Taganrog.  
Through crew lists information, we were also able to reconstruct the general 
route patterns followed by ships of Camogli to and from the Black Sea. In this 
regard, we might propose three different samples, corresponding to each area of 
destination among Odessa, the Azov and the Danube. The first example might be 
found in the route of the brig Principe di Moldavia ("'V t.), built in Varazze in "U&", 
 
other remained in Rome. See, F. Bacino (ed.), La legazione e i consolati del regno di Sardegna in 
Russia ($1>7-$>D$), pp. 5-*4.  
231 In order to elaborate this table we chose to show only the years in which we possessed data 
for both of the categories (Camogli ships and Sardinian flag) and, therefore, able to the percentage 
calculations and to draw comparisons.  
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owned by Gio. Batta Grimaldo Ansaldo and captained by Gerolamo Lavarello232. 
The ships sailed on the #%th May "U'" from Genoa with the direction of 
Constantinople, an obligated stop to enter and leave the Black Sea, due to the 
presence of passage duties which were demanded by the Ottoman authorities. 
However, far from representing merely a customs house, Constantinople was a 
leading financial and commercial centre, where several trade houses, banking and 
any kind of shipping operators possessed some branches or even the 
headquarters233. In "UD#, for instance, the captain Nicola Schiaffino from Camogli, 
contracted a D.$UV francs bottomry loan from the Greek businessman Antonio 
Inglesis to repair his ship Dittatore Garibaldi which had suffered some damages 
along his route from Taganrog234.  
In the Ottoman capital, the captain either received (from a local commissioner) 
or established his following destination, Odessa, the port from which he would 
have taken a grain cargo to go back into the Mediterranean. The ship left 
 
232 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &/, n. 14./. This is not the first time we found this ship. Other 
voyages (always along Black sea routes) are found in Idem, serie &+, n. /*.4 and Idem, serie &/, n. 
&**&.  
233 The intermediate role for shipping and banking of the city of Istanbul has been underlined 
by recent works, especially for what concerned the presence of Greeks operators. See, E. Eldem, S. 
Laiou and V. Kechriotis (eds.), The economic and social development of the port-cities of the southern 
Black sea coast and hinterland. Late $>th-beginning of the $Mth century, Black Sea Project Working 
Papers vol. V, Corfu: *4&). In particular, see K. Galani, “The Galata bankers and the international 
banking of the Greek business group in the &5th century”, pp. /.-)5. See also, G. Harlaftis and V. 
Kardassis, International shipping in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea: Istanbul as a 
maritime centre, $>12-$M$2, in S. Pamuk and J.G. Williamson (eds.), The Mediterranean Response to 
Globalization Before $ML2, London: Routledge, *444, pp. *++-*$..  
234 MCMC, Noli, Contratto di cambio marittimo tra Nicola Schiaffino e Antonio Inglesis – . 
marzo &1)*. The bottomry loan (cambio marittimo in Italian) has been a fundamental financial and 
risk-sharing tool since the Middle Age and throughout the whole early modern period. It was based 
on a loan connected to the ship, where all the risks were pending on the borrower in exchange of 
high interests. In period when loans with high interests were forbidden or opposed for religious 
reasons, the bottomry loan was allowed due to the as much high risks on  the borrower connected 
with the unpredictability of navigation. Several merchants and businessmen, still in the &1th 
century, practiced the bottomry loan as a proper financial investment, due to the high returns of 
sea-borne trade. In the case under analysis, Antonio Inglesis contracted an interest rate of &*% 
(total 1.*). francs) to be returned within three days from the arrival of the ship to its final 
destination. For a broader introduction to marine insurances and the institution of bottomry loans, 
see: A.B. Leonard (ed.), Marine insurance. Origins and institutions, $722-$>L2, New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, *4&$; G. Salvioli, L’assicurazione e il cambio marittimo nella storia del diritto italiano, 
Bologna: Zanichelli, &11/. See also: A. Delis, “Shipping Finance and Risks in Sea Trade during the 
French Wars: Maritime Loan Operations in the Republic of Ragusa”, International Journal of 
Maritime History, No. */: &, *4&*, pp. **5-*/*.  
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Constantinople on the Uth July "U'". From the Russian port, since the stowage of 
the cargo into the hold could take up to "^-"% days, the Principe di Moldavia 
departed at the end of July. Finally, after a due stop in Constantinople again, it 
sailed to Marseille, where it arrived at the beginning of September ("^th). Following 
a two-week stop in the French port, owing to the discharge of the cargo and the 
recruitment of a new crew, the ship left Marseille towards Constantinople on the 
#Uth September. Then, it sailed along the Odessa-Marseille route another time, and 
in the following year, it went to a Danube port (Galatz) to carry its cargo to 
England. After a two year service and three voyages to the Black sea, in the end, it 
went back to Genoa, for some reparations, a few months stops during winter, in 
order to resume navigation in the following spring.  
The average routes for those ships heading to the Azov and the Danube, 
however, did not differ so relevantly from those going to Odessa (at least in their 
haul to the Black sea). The brig Mentore (#D% t.), for instance, departed from Genoa 
to Constantinople on ""th March "U'#235. There, almost a month later it left the 
Ottoman capital destined to the Azov (no more details were provided); after the 
obligatory stop at Kerch quarantine station, however, it headed directly to 
Taganrog, from where the departure towards English ports took place only in late 
May. In this case, as we will analyse more closely in the next paragraph, the 
Mentore was chartered directly to Falmouth, one of the most trafficked ports for 
orders of the British Isles, to receive the communication about its final direction 
(Amsterdam), on 'th August. To illustrate a sample route to the Danube, instead, 
we might choose the voyage of Sincero ("D# t.). The vessel left Genoa in late 
November "U'"; by the time that the ship would have been in the Black sea, (" and 
½- # months maximum) the entrance to the Azov would have been closed due to 
the icing (in "U'#, its navigation opened on Dth April236). Therefore, it stopped first 
 
235 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &., n. *.4/. The brig was constructed in &1.* in Varazze and 
was owned by the Mortola Bros of Gio. Batta. Active in the Black sea trade at least since the &1.$, 
it was led for six years by the experienced captain Prospero Castagnola of Camogli (ASGe, Matricole, 
register *, n. *&*)). In &1$*, however, the ship changed its captain in favour of Gio. Batta Olivari.  
236 V. Kardasis, Diaspora merchants in the Black sea, p.), Table &.&, Duration of Freezing up of the 
Sea of Azov. For the average routes length and directions, see: A. Delis, “Navigating perilous waters: 
routes and hazards of the voyages to Black Sea in the &5th century”, pp. &-++.  
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in Messina to load some cargo to sell in the Danube and set sails to Constantinople 
at the beginning of January. Afterwards, the ship was checked in the quarantine 
station of Sulina (where the captain denounced to have the hold full of citruses) 
and went to Galatz to discharge. In a few days, perhaps unable to find freight in 
the port, the ship left for Braila, where it finally loaded its wheat cargo and left in 
late March to Falmouth237.  
 
=.O. Trading at war: shipping activities during the 
Crimean War  
 
Between "U&% and "U&', the outbreak of the Crimean War disrupted the Black 
Sea trade system, reducing the traffic to its lowest numbers since the Russo-
Turkish war of "U#D-#U. This historical phase, however, is a unique observation 
point to examine the behaviour of the members of the Camogli merchant marine 
in front of the subversion of most of their commercial activities. Indeed, the rate 
of specialization of Camogli’s shipping from Black Sea trade, and somehow its 
dependency, was relevant, since the fleet consisted in "%$ ships in "U&$238, a great 
deal of them employed along the grain routes. Furthermore, apart from the loss of 
profits for ship-owners, shipping revenues fed the community as a whole, through 
the salaries – or even shares – of maritime labourers.  
Therefore, Camogli shipowners (some of them owning #-$ different ships239), 
unable as they were to readjust to other trades, put the vessels at the service of the 
belligerent powers (the United Kingdom and France at the beginning), for the 
transport of troops and supplies to the Crimean front.  
 
237 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &., n. $*.&. The ship was built in Varazze’s shipyards in &1.. 
for the ship-owner Rocco Schiaffino. In the first years of navigation the ship captain was Ferdinando 
Peragallo. Then in &1$* he was substituted by Filippo Boggiano, who lasted a couple of years and 
then was destined to command Rocco Schiaffino’s newly built ship (Giano, /+4 t., built in &1$*) 
whereas Emanuele Mortola was employed on Sincero.  
238 CMMC, Assicurazioni varie.  
239 Ibidem. Among the most important ship-owners there were Bernardo Degregori (+ ships), 
Biagio Olivari (+), Erasmo Schiaffino (+) and Gerolamo Schiaffino (+). In this period, however, 
concentrated ship-ownership was not a distinguishing trait of the community as it will be in the 
late &5th century. See the fourth chapter.  
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The only available reference for the chartering of the ships of Camogli for the 
war comes by the reports of the Sardinian consul in Malta. A key station both for 
the English and the French fleet before moving troops and provisions directly to 
the war front. The British army relied mainly both on its naval and merchant fleet; 
instead, the French government disposed of more of the Sardinian commercial 
fleet.  
According to such reports, from April "U&% to March "U&&, "%" ships hoisting the 
Sardinian flag were chartered by the French militaries to transport troops and 














Table *.&) - Number of Sardinian ships chartered by the French government divided by place of 
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Table *.&1 - Passengers and cargoes carried on board of Sardinian ships. Source: AST, Consolati 
nazionali, Malta. 
The most significant part of the Sardinian ships carried soldiers and horses from 
Marseille or from Algeria to the Black Sea. Apart from the discrete amount of cattle, 
all the other categories did not represent a considerable amount ("&^^ sacks of 
 ""# 
flour were carried on four ships only). On average, each ship transported up to #^ 
soldiers and an equivalent number of horses.  
However, in order to go a little deeper in the analysis of this trade and to 
investigate destinations as well as the ports of loading, the Maltese data need to be 
paired with the crew list of each ship sailing along this route. The results are quite 
evident: the main ports of discharging were Varna and Kamiesch, both of them of 
serious strategic concern within the French military organization. The port of 
Varna, in Bulgaria, of relative importance in the grain trade routes, from June "U&% 
onwards became a crucial point to retake (by the French and British sides) the 
control over the Danube region240. The small harbour of Kamiesch, instead, a 
natural bay in the surroundings of Sevastopol, constituted the logistic base of the 
French activities in the Crimean Peninsula.  
 
=.P. Destination ports 
 
After having presented the main features of the Russian grain trade and of the 
Camogli’s presence in the Black Sea, the present paragraph, on the contrary, deals 
with the opposite end of the trade, the destination ports. In the Black Sea, the 
vessels of Camogli were chartered to either the Mediterranean or the British Isles. 
The exact destination was communicated to the captains in the ports of charging 
mainly when it concerned a Mediterranean port, either Genoa or Marseille, mostly 
upon Italian commissions; instead, when destined to a port for order, Malta in the 
Mediterranean and Falmouth and Cork in the Atlantic, the cargoes were destined 
to British and Northern European ports. Therefore, we divided all the destinations 
into two geographical categories: the Mediterranean ports, with a focus on Genoa, 
Marseille and Livorno due to their relevance in the trade in general and relation to 
Camogli; the British ports, which composed a maritime system, in which ports for 
 
240 I. Roussev, The Black Sea Port-City in the Road of Modernization, pp. *&/-**+. For a general 
framework of the Crimean War events, see: A. Ramm, “The Crimean War”, in J. Bury (ed.), The New 
Cambridge Modern History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, &5$4, pp. /$1-/5*.  
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orders, grain import ports and coal export ports coexisted and integrated each 
other in a functional perspective.  
Concerning destinations, the route reconstruction operated on crew lists 
produced the following results:  
 
 
Marseille Genoa Livorno British 
ports 
67;: %^% %D% V% %% 
67;= $^% %&% '% "U% 
67;> &#% $D% ^% "^% 
67;7 &#% #&% %% "V% 
67;^ $^% %U% ^% #$% 
67<] %$% #U% ^% $^% 
67<6 $&% "V% D% $V% 
67<8 "&% ##% $% '^% 
67<: #%% $$% '% $D% 
67<= "'% $$% '% %&% 
67<; #U% "V% ^% &$% 
Table *.&5 - Cargo destinations from the Black Sea by year (&1.+-&1$.). Source: ASGe, Ruoli di 
equipaggio, from &1.+ to &1$..   
Table #."V constitutes a fundamental tool to observe the evolution of Camogli’s 
participation in the Black Sea trade throughout the "U&^s and "U'^s. 
Mediterranean destinations, especially for what concerned Genoa and Marseille 
appear to be central in their maritime activities, at least until "U'^-'". After that, 
an impressive increase of cargoes directed to the Atlantic radically transformed the 
trade and had consequences on Camogli’s subsequent development. In the "U&^s, 
the Crimean War years apart, Marseille and Genoa received the %"% each (on 
average) of the grain carried on Camogli’s ships. Moreover, with the inclusion of 
Livorno, the average in the "U&$-"U&V period ascended to U'% of the cargoes to 
Mediterranean ports. Despite this predominance of the Mediterranean 
destinations, the transport of cereals to the United Kingdom began in "U%D as soon 
as the abolition of the protectionist Corn Laws allowed Russian grains to penetrate 
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the British markets241. Such development was so evident that was reported by 
contemporary observers (the Sardinian consul in Odessa, in "U&$): 
The extraordinary increase of grain imports to the United 
Kingdom dates back to the abolition of the Corn Laws. Indeed, 
until "U%&, Great Britain figured for the U% of Odessa’s grain 
exports, whereas now it counts for the %$%, without even 
considering "U%V-&^ when the United Kingdom purchased the 
&^% and '#% of the exports from this port respectively. The 
exports to the Mediterranean, conversely, was affected by this 
transformation and, whereas in "U%& it counted for U$%, now it is 
reduced to %"%. Such diminution is caused by the fact that before 
Livorno, Genoa and Trieste covered the role of intermediate grain 
deposits, keen to supply the British demands; instead, for a few 
years onwards, these demands are directly satisfied in Odessa.242   
However, the participation of the Sardinian ships in the Black Sea-Britain routes 
was affected by their smaller average tonnage vis a vis the northern European 
ships.243 A glance to the average tonnage of Sardinian ships and all of the other 
flags seems to confirm his assertions at least until the "U'^s. To illustrate this 
 
241 On the Corn Laws, their abolition and their impact on the growth of the Black Sea trade, see: 
C. Schonhardt-Bailey, From the corn laws to free trade: interests, ideas, and institutions in historical 
perspective, Cambridge: MIT press, *44$; S. Fairlie, The Anglo-Russian grain trade $>$L-$>D$, Thesis: 
University of London, &5.5; Idem, “The Nineteenth-Century Corn Law Reconsidered”, The 
Economic History Review, No. &1: +, &5$., pp. .$*-.).; Idem, “The Corn Laws and British Wheat 
Production. &1*5-&1)$”, The Economic History Review, No. **: &, &5$5, pp. 11-&&$.  
242 AST, Consolati nazionali, Odessa, $, Lettera del console di Odessa a Torino, ) aprile &1.+. 
Translation from the original Italian: «Lo straordinario aumento nell’importazione dei cereali nel 
Regno Unito, data dalla abolizione della legge eccezionale sui grani. Difatti si vede che sino all’anno 
&1/. la Gran Bretagna non figurava nell’esportazione dei cereali da Odessa che per l’1%, mentreche 
attualmente figura già per il /+%, non contando gli anni &1/5 e .4, nel primo dei qual il Regno 
Unito ritirò il .4% e sul secondo il $*% delle esportazioni di questo porto. L’esportazione invece 
per il mediterraneo risentiva di questa modificazione, e mentre che si vede questo figurare nel &1/. 
per l’1+%, riducesi presentemente al solo /&%. Tale riduzione nasce da che in prima gli scali di 
Livorno, Genova e Trieste figuravano come depositi granarii intermedi, pronti sempre a soddisfare 
ad ogni minima domanda del Regno Unito, mentre che da qualche anno questa domanda viene 
direttamente soddisfatta da questa piazza».  
243 Ibidem.   
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feature, we opted for the port of Taganrog rather than Odessa, in order to rule out 
steamers from the computation: 
Year Sardinian All the flags 
67=> "DV #%% 
67;> #^U #D" 
67<> $## #V^ 
Table *.*4 - Average tonnage in the port of Taganrog in &1/), &1.) and &1$). Source: Commercial 
reports received at the Foreign Office from Her Majesty’s consuls, Taganrog, &1/)-&1.)-&1$).   
Moreover, in the first paragraph of the present chapter, we have underlined the 
rapid growth of the fleet of Camogli in terms of total and average tonnage, 
following a great campaign of new constructions occurred in the period "U&&-&V 
(Figure #.$). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the availability of newly 
built and bigger ships played a decisive role in allowing Camogli’s ship-owners to 
establish in this profitable branch of trade.  
One more obstacle might have been constituted by the utilization of Sardinian 
and Italian ships by Sardinian merchants and trade houses, which sometimes 
possessed a direct interest over the ship, or, relying on long-term partnerships, had 
some sort of priority in their chartering244. In this regard, since the early "U&^s, 
Camogli’s captains had been widely employed at the service of foreign merchants, 
especially Greeks, which chartered them to Marseille.  
In the "U'^-'& period, instead, the relevance of British ports as a destination 
acquired much more importance within the whole figure, passing from a yearly 
average of "%% to %%% with a '^% peak in correspondence to "U'#245. Furthermore, 
an analysis of the ports of destinations matched with their respective ports of 
loading might help achieve a clearer understanding of the factors concurring to 
such evolution.  
 
 
Marseille Genoa Livorno British ports 
Odessa $U% $#% '% #&% 
 
244 See paragraph *...  
245 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, from &1.+ to &1$..  
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Azov Sea $$% $^% $% $%% 
Danube #%% #V% $% %&% 
Table *.*& - Cargo destinations from Odessa, the Azov Sea and the Danube region (&1.+-&1$.). 
Source: ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, from &1.+ to &1$..   
According to this table, indeed, the difference between Odessa, the Azov Sea 
ports and the Danube area concerning their most frequent destinations is 
remarkable. Whereas from Odessa (throughout the same chronological period) 
the Mediterranean ports constituted the overwhelming majority of destinations, 
up to the D&%, the same percentage fell in the Azov regards to ''% and even to 
&'% from Galatz and Braila. Among the numerous factors contributing to this 
trend, the absence, or the more limited extent, of Sardinian business in the Danube 
area is worth mentioning. On the contrary, the Crimean War boosted the 
concentration of Greek businessmen, involved in coastal shipping and 
international trade, in both Galatz and Braila.  
Furthermore, the redirection of the trade from the Mediterranean to the British 
Isles and the Atlantic had an enormous impact on the maritime history of Camogli, 
which cannot be reduced to a mere geographical transfer. Instead, the opening of 
the British shipping market, and the acquaintance with British and Greek subjects 
operating on a more extensive scale of business, were crucial factors for the rise of 
Camogli’s maritime activities.  
 
".,.%. BRITISH PORTS: THE FORMATION OF A WHEAT-COAL 
INTEGRATED ROUTE 
 
The main consequence of the redirection of trade to Britain resulted in a 
profound transformation of the Camogli’s shipping for the whole "U%^s-"U&^s 
period.  
However, in order to illustrate these crucial transformations, some information 
related to the nature of the British maritime system and Camogli’s establishment 
in this area might be needed. To do so, first, we propose a sample of an average 
route from the Black Sea to the British Isles in order to illustrate the main features 
of the grain-coal composite trade deriving from it.  
 ""D 
The bark Verità ($'# t.), built in "U&U in Sestri Ponente, was one of the finest 
and biggest ships built in the booming period of "U&&-&V. Her owner was Fortunato 
Bertolotto, son of Michele, who, at the end of his maritime career became an 
important ship-owner within the community (he also had the ship Giovanni, $DD 
t.). In February "U'#246, sailed in her third voyage to the Black Sea to get a grain 
cargo in Galatz or Braila to the United Kingdom  (the local Italian consul recorded 
her first voyage to Newcastle in "U'^247). Having loaded in Braila, on May #^, "U'#, 
Verità sailed straight to Cork-Queenstown (after Sulina and Constantinople); 
there, the captain (Fortunato Cuneo, employed for a long time on the ship) 
received his final orders to go to Waterford for the discharge (July-August "U'#). 
From there, the ship was directed to Newport, Wales, in order to load coal to Genoa 
on its haul back to the Mediterranean, where arrived on the #%th of September. 
Some months after, instead, Verità was among the first ships of Camogli going to 
New York and to remain actively employed for a couple of years on oceanic routes 
on British commissions248.  
Therefore, Camogli’s presence in the British ports distinguished itself from the 
earlier period mainly for the introduction of a new commodity – coal – which led 
to a radical transformation of the routes of the Black Sea trade, in particular for 
what concerned its cost-effectiveness. The Black Sea – Mediterranean route forced 
the Italian merchant marine to travel on ballast for the first leg (with the unique 
exception of Sicilian exports); then, once the grain cargo was delivered to the port 
of destination, the navigation resumed likewise. The high profitability of Black Sea 
freights covered the inefficiencies of this kind of transport. On the contrary, the 
access to the British markets led to the formation of a composite route; grain trade 
was tied with coal transport to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, resulting into 
more efficient management and leading to higher profitability. According to the 
 
246 ASGE, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &/, n. 5.$4.  
247 AMAE, Affari Esteri, b. 15., Newcastle.   
248 ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare, register &5, n. &.4*1, Bertolotto Michele Mentore. 
Throughout the career of one of the ship-owner sons, embarked as ship-boy on board of the Verità 
from its first voyage in &1.1 to &1$., we were able to reconstruct part of the vessel’s activities after 
the crew list registration of &1$*.  
 ""U 
Italian consular representative in Berdyansk, in "U'U, «the value of a ship, 
employed between the Levant and the ports of the United Kingdom, with the 
auxilium of the coal as return cargo, could be repaid in & to ' years»249.  
Before leaving the British Isles with a coal cargo, however, a ship could reach up 
to three different ports, each of them covering a specific role: a port for orders, a 
port to discharge the wheat cargo, a port to load coal. The main ports for orders 
were Falmouth and Queenstown: in these ports, the captain called in order to 
receive the final instructions for the final leg of the voyage. Falmouth and 
Queenstown received more than U^% of the vessels incoming to the region250. 
Then, the cargo was delivered to its port of discharge; several ports covered this 












































249 Bollettino consolare italiano, pp. 1&-1*. Translation from the Italian original: «Si stima che il 
valore di un bastimento, tenendo la carriera tra il Levante e i porti del Regno Unito britannico, e 
col rincalzo del carico di ritorno di carbon fossile, venga riscattato dopo . o $ anni».  














Table *.** - List of the most frequent British ports for Camogli ships divided by region and primary 
function. Source: ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, from &1.+ to &1$..  
Indeed, Falmouth collected also all the destinations to continental Europe, with 
the Dutch and Belgian ports of Amsterdam and Antwerp in the first line 
(approximately U% of the cargoes). Then, being in front of the eastern side of 
England, most of the ships coming from the continent sailed to the Tyneside 
region, more specifically to Newcastle and Hartlepool to load cargoes either to the 
Mediterranean or straight to the Black Sea. In the "U'^ consular records from 
Newcastle, we find "# ships of Camogli in Hartlepool (out of #V Italian ships, %",$%) 
and "" in Newcastle (out of %" Italians, #',U$%).  
 
Port Provenience Destination 
Hartlepool London U Genoa "$ 
Wisbech # Odessa " 
Dunkerque " 
  
Newcastle Antwerp % Genoa D 
Hull $ Constantinople # 
Leith # Odessa # 
London # 
  
Table *.*+ - List of provenience and destination of Camogli ships in the ports of Hartlepool and 
Newcastle in &1$4. Source: AMAE, Affari Esteri, 15., Newcastle.  
The participation in British coal trade to the Mediterranean, then, will 
characterize Camogli’s shipping activities for an extended period. Although in the 
following decades, up to the "V^^s, the presence of ships of Camogli along the 
Black Sea routes and in the Mediterranean cabotage gradually diminished down to 
their nearly complete disappearance, the coal trade remained a profitable 
opportunity to conclude the oceanic voyages in order to go back to Genoa, for 
 "#^ 
disembarking the crew or due to some ship repairs. To this trade, furthermore, the 
Italian state contributed with direct subsidies over coal cargoes, thus making the 




In a couple of decades, the nature of Camogli’s shipping, and therefore the 
economic structure of the community itself, was transformed dramatically. If 
before the "U$^s Camogli epitomised the average Ligurian seafaring community, 
divided between cabotage, fishing and, occasionally long haul trade, in the late 
"U'^s, it operated on an entirely new level. It engaged in oceanic routes with 
destination the British ports rather than the Mediterranean and increased the 
dimensions of its fleet up to compete on a global scale. The participation in the 
Black Sea trade represented the key to success, and Camogli’s maritime actors 
demonstrated the capability to achieve the highest results from already favourable 
conditions. The early access to the trade allowed them to occupy a market niche, 
but the size of the fleet ("D& ships in the Black sea ports in "U'&, #VD tons of average 
tonnage) and its share in the Black Sea trade is impressive for a seafaring 
community of ca. D.^^^ inhabitants. 
 In a decade ("U&^-"U'&), the most successful ship-owners, as we will see in 
chapter $, reinvested all the shipping incomes in new constructions, leading the 
way to the formation of a considerable fleet, which at its peak, in "UDV, reached $'U 
ships of an average tonnage of %VD tons, a result ranking Camogli at the Dth place 
in the world concerning sailing vessels (#&th counting also steamships)252. The 
premises of such development lied in the Black sea phase, and can be ascribed to 
some crucial factors: first, the strict specialization of all the people of Camogli into 
 
251 The introduction of direct subsidies over a limited list of ‘strategic cargoes’ represented one 
of the most durable accomplishments of the Parliamentary Inquiry about the Italian Merchant 
Marine of &11*, aimed to provide long-term solutions to this industry which was entered in a 
downward phase. Some captains of Camogli benefitted from this subsidies for what concerned coal 
cargoes from British ports to Genoa. This is the case, for instance, of the brig bark Giuseppe Aste, 
in &111: ASGe, Notai III Sezione, $15, n. &4/.  
252 A.N. Kjaer (ed.), Navigation maritime. Les marines marchands, p. &*, Table n. *.  
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shipping; second, the opening to various commercial partners beyond the more 
local Sardinian networks, with a special mention toward Greek merchants. The 
instruments to penetrate the market diverged from most of the Ligurian 
competitors; rather than establishing a direct association with export trade houses, 
the captains of Camogli operated to a great extent on the freight market and 
focused on the upgrade of the fleet (both under qualitative and quantitative 
respects) and the reduction of the operative costs. Finally, as mentioned, the 
consolidation in the British markets (enhanced by the envoy of members of the 
community, who settled in the most strategic ports, as we will see in the next 
chapter) facilitated Camogli’s readjustment to the transformation of the 
Mediterranean and Black Sea shipping market, from which they were gradually 
pushed away by the increased competitiveness of steamers. 
  
 "## 





This chapter is the first to directly address the transition from sail to steam. In 
particular, the first section aims to introduce this theme under a global perspective 
and, therefore, not declined into the specific case-study of Camogli. Thus, it firstly 
deals with purely technological factors, in order to outline all the transformations 
which revolutionised nautical technology throughout the nineteenth century. 
Secondly, it addresses the improvements unfolding in the field of communications, 
logistics and company organisation, which contributed to the birth of 
contemporary shipping as much as the formers.   
Then, the second section will outline the evolution of the fleet of Camogli from 
the end of the Black Sea phase to the immediate pre-war years ("UD^s-"V"%). 
Notwithstanding the late manifestation of actual technological transition – 
culminated into the formation of a fleet of tramp steamers – the section will 
illustrate the trajectory of local shipping, from the peak moment to its gradual 
decline.  
The third section, finally, will underline how the ongoing transition affected 
Camogli indirectly, by means of market pressure. The shipowners of Camogli 
reacted by transferring their maritime activities from the Mediterranean Sea to the 
global scenario: this geographical transfer is the most evident result of Camogli’s 
readjustment to the successful establishment of steam shipping in the 
Mediterranean waters. Accordingly, the last part will tackle the subtle line lying 
between geographic expansion and marginalisation, by outlining the evolution 
into a proper tramp fleet: such dialectic, declinable also as the contrast between 
evolution and resilience, will be delineated through the passage from the first 




?.8. The introduction of new technologies in shipping 
 
In international literature, the Industrial Revolution is such a relevant field of 
studies that giving a detailed presentation of its historical evolution as regard to 
the existing literature is far beyond the purpose of the present dissertation. Even 
to outline the several connections with the transport industry might result in a too 
extensive introduction for this section253. Technological innovation stimulated 
dramatic changes into the transport system, as the utilisation and optimisation of 
both land and water means of communications escalated to unprecedented 
degrees, paving the way to increases in speed and reliability, to several changes in 
the methods of distribution, to the rise in market size and by providing more 
accessible raw materials254. The transition from sail to steam is just a portion of the 
broader scale of transformations that occurred in the framework of the transport 
revolution255. Furthermore, international shipping is only one of the fields of 
application of the new technologies, and among the latest, being the introduction 
of steam engines on board of high-seas ships preceded by railways, inland 
navigation and coastal shipping. The combination of multiple varieties of 
 
253 A significant work on the topic is R. Szostak, The role of transportation in the Industrial 
Revolution. A comparison of England and France, Montreal: MacGill-Queen’s University Press, &55&. 
The author emphasises the role of technological innovation in transport as an agent of change in 
the productive organisation rather than as a result of it. The same approach with a more explicit 
reference to navigation is found in: J. Armstrong and D.M. Williams, The impact of technological 
change. The early steamship in Britain, St. John’s Newfoundland: International Maritime Economic 
History Association, *4&&. Other studies, to mention only the most relevant, are: D.R. Headrick, The 
Tentacles of Progress. Technology transfer in the age of Imperialism, New York: Oxford University 
Press, &554; D.S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus. Technological change and industrial 
development in Western Europe from $1L2 to the present, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
&5$5; S.P. Ville, Transport and the development of the European Economy, $1L2-$M$>, New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, &554; A. Jarvis, “The Nineteenth-Century roots of Globalization: Some 
Technological Considerations”, in D.J. Starkey and G. Harlaftis (eds.), Global markets: the 
internationalization of the sea transport industries since $>L2, St. John’s Newfoundland: IMEHA, 
&551, pp. *&)-*+1 (with noteworthy considerations about “technological determinism”). A good 
attempt to summarise the role of technological advance within the whole context of the global 
transformations of the &5th century is J. Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World. A Global 
History of the nineteenth century, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, *4&/), pp. $+)-$)*. See, 
also: M. Merger, “Una nuova rete di comunicazioni”, in V. Castronovo (ed.), Storia dell’economia 
mondiale. L’età della rivoluzione industriale, pp. /)*-/5&.  
254 R. Szostak, The role of transportation in the Industrial Revolution, pp. +-++.  
255 P.H. Bagwell, The transport revolution, $112-$M>L, London: Routledge, &511.  
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innovative components – as iron hulls, engines and propellers – required more 
time for their optimisation rather than on land communications, where the 
absence of reliable competitors led to the rapid establishment of railways. Then, as 
a result of canals, railways and steamships merging in a deeply renovated system, 
the transport revolution did occur.  
In examining the features embroiled with transport revolution in shipping, a 
distinction between endogenous and exogenous factors might be outlined. Under 
the first category lie those improvements which are strictly entangled with nautical 
technology: compound steam engines, which emancipated navigation from winds 
regimes and dramatically diminished coal consumption on longer routes; screw 
propellers, which substituted side-paddle-wheels, thus improving navigation 
efficiency; iron hulls which increased longevity and weather resistance256. Besides, 
to the growth of the nineteenth-century maritime industry contributed other 
transformations, not directly involved with nautical technology, which 
nevertheless played a key-role to rationalise the flow of merchandises and global 
transports. Regular communications tied to the development of liner shipping, the 
deep-sea cable network and the constructions of the canals – Suez, "U'V and 
Panama, "V^# – dramatically changed traditional routes and trade patterns. 
Nautical evolutions represent the core topic in the next section; the creation of 
liner shipping and the improvements in the fields of logistics and communication 
will be outlined in the following one. 
 
).%.%. THE EVOLUTIONS IN NAUTICAL TECHNOLOGY 
 
!.#.#.#. Steam engine 
 
As steamship technology matured over time, the improvements mostly 
concerned the following factors: speed, reliability, longevity and fuel efficiency. 
The latter represented the most challenging feature to be improved in order to 
meet the economic demands of deep-sea navigation. Before the invention of 
 
256 M. Stopford, Maritime economics. Third edition, New York: Routledge, *445, p. *+.  
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compound engines, steamers were not able to compete with the sail on longer 
routes. Previously, coal consumption was so demanding that steamships must 
either dispose of constant supplies or devote a consistent percentage of their cargo 
capacity to fuel storage. Therefore, deep-sea navigation was barred to steamers, 
which instead grew competitive on coastal navigation. From the "U&^s, with the 
first application of a compound engine257 into a steamer, this trend gradually 
changed. At the beginning of the "UD^s, steamships ruled the Mediterranean 
waters. Their success within the Mediterranean lied into the specific 
characteristics of an enclosed sea, which could be filled with easily accessible coal 
stations.  
 
Figure +.&. Coal consumption (kg) in IPH (Indicated Horsepower) per hour. Source: E. Corbino, 
Economia dei trasporti marittimi, Tav. XIV, p. &1)258.  
 
 
257 R. Knauerhase, “The Compound Steam Engine and Productivity Changes in the German 
Merchant Marine”, The Journal of Economic History, *1, No. + (&5$1), pp. +54-/4+. 
258 E. Corbino, Economia dei trasporti marittimi, Città di Castello: Società Tipografica Leonardo 
da Vinci, &5*$. Similar data are reported with different unit of measurements (lbs.) in several 
further studies: D.R. Headrick, The Tentacles of progress, p. *.; M. Stopford, Maritime economics, 
pp. *$-*); G.P. Allington, “Sailing rigs and their use on ocean-going merchant ships, &1*4-&5&4”, 
International Journal of Maritime History, &$, No. & (*44/), pp. &+.-&+$; S.P. Ville, Transport and the 
development of the European Economy, p. .&; C. Knick Harley, “Aspects of the Economic of 
Shipping”, in L.R. Fischer and G.E. Panting (eds.), Change and adaptation in maritime history. The 
North-Atlantic fleets in the nineteenth century, St. John’s Newfoundland: IMEHA, &51/ p. &)$; Y. 
Kaukiainen, “Coal and Canvas: Aspects of the Competition between Sail and Steam, c. &1)4-&5&/”, 
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As shown in Figure $.", the average coal consumption fell dramatically in the 
first decade of steam shipping. Then, as the evolution decelerated at mid-century, 
it almost halved in the "UD^s. The last sharp decrease is universally associated with 
the invention of triple expansion engines, the definitive instrument for steam 
shipping to compete on oceanic routes. In the meantime, the opening of the Suez 
Canal in "U'V haf shortened the way to India, thus granting steamships more 
advantages in the carriage of high-value cargoes. Still in the "U&^s, in connecting 
Europe and North America, steamers could not rival with the new generation 
clippers, both on passenger and cargo transports259. Also, in the pre-Suez era, 
steamships were excluded from the Indo-European routes, where tea clippers 
dominated the seaborne trade by providing regular connections between the Far 
East and Europe. Afterwards, although steamships could challenge sail on longer 
routes, sailing ships did not disappear but readjusted to new contexts260.  
 
 
Figure +.*. Distribution of world tonnage between sail and steam (&1.4-&11.). Source: A.N. Kiaer 
(ed.), Statistique internationale. Navigation maritime: III. Les marines marchandes, &11)261.  
 
From the appraisal of the existing literature tackling the competition between 
sail and steam and the role of technological improvements in its determination, 
 
259 G.S. Graham, “The ascendancy of the sailing ship, &1.4-&11.”, The Economic History Review, 
IX, No. & (&5.$), pp. )/-11; R.L. Cohn, “The transition from sail to steam in immigration to the 
United States”, The Journal of Economic History, $., No. *, *44., pp. /$5-/5..  
260 See infra.  
261 A.N. Kiaer (ed.), Statistique internationale. Navigation maritime: III. Les marines marchandes, 
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the ascendance of steamers might be portrayed as a sequence of forwarding leaps 
and could be metaphorically represented as a succession of concentric circles 
stemming from the United Kingdom262. From British coal colliers to the Pacific 
Ocean tramp steamers, passing through the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, the 
success of steam shipping exacerbated marginalisation of sails and pushed them 
towards increasingly peripherical markets. According to Knick Harley's 
calculations263, sail competitiveness with steam lasted for the whole second half of 
the nineteenth century. On short routes, steamers rapidly overcame sail; on the 
longer ones, steam did not establish its rule up until the First World War.  
 
!.#.#.-. Iron hulls 
 
Differently from engines, hull evolution was not limited to steam navigation. In 
the nineteenth century, hull materials changed significantly, from wood to iron 
and then from iron to steel. This development affected both sail and steamships, 
turning out to be a decisive factor for sail resilience in shipbuilding, albeit the 
dramatic differences observed from country to country. In the first place, iron hulls 
(and later steel) allowed the construction of bigger ships. Also, weather resistance 
and longevity notably increased, providing a set of transformations paving the way 
for a revolution of shipbuilding and shipping altogether (consider, for instance, the 
advantage of longevity for the creation of a structural sale-purchase market, almost 
non-existent until then264).  
 
262 See C. Knick Harley, “Ocean Freight Rates and Productivity, &)/4-&5&+: The Primacy of 
Mechanical Invention Reaffirmed”, The Journal of Economic History, XLVIII, No. /, &511, pp. 1.&-
1)$; Idem, “Aspects of the Economic of Shipping”, in L.R. Fischer and G.E. Panting (eds), Change 
and adaptation in maritime history. The North-Atlantic fleets in the nineteenth century, pp. &$)-&1$; 
Idem, “The shift from sailing ships to steamships, &1.4-&154: a study in technological change and 
its diffusion”, in D.N. McCloskey (ed.), Essays on a mature economy: Britain after $>#2, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, &5)&, pp. *&.-*+/; D.M. Williams and J. Armstrong, “An Appraisal of the 
Progress of the Steamship in the Nineteenth Century”, in G. Harlaftis, S. Tenold and J.M. Valdaliso 
(eds.), The World’s Key Industry. History and economics of International Shipping, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, *4&*, pp. /+-$+.  
263 C. Knick Harley, “Aspects of the Economy of Shipping”, pp. &))-&)1; G.S. Graham, “The 
ascendancy of the sailing ship, &1.4-&11.”, pp. )/-11.  
264 M. Stopford, Maritime economics, pp. &51-*4).  
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Figure +.+. Number of constructions and mean tonnages of iron and wooden sailing ships (the UK, 
&1))-&1)5). Source: A.N. Kiaer (ed.), Statistique internationale. Navigation maritime: II. Les marines 
marchandes, &11&265.  
 
Figure $.$ examines a sample of mean tonnages of iron and wooden ships 
compared with the yearly number of constructions between "UDD and "UDV. Despite 
the relatively high constructions of wooden vessels, it is clear how it maintained a 
role in low tonnages, devoted to coastal shipping. Meanwhile, iron hulls were 
favoured in more significant constructions, measuring about U^^-V^^ tons, the 
minimum requirement for engaging to oceanic bulk trade.   
In relation to this nautical discourse, the uneven availability of raw materials 
and the diffusion of highly-specialised know-how to handle iron shipbuilding 
exacerbated  the already existing divergence between the United Kingdom and the 
other European countries. In this sense, it is between the "U'^s and the "UD^s that 
matured the future configuration of the world shipbuilding industry: some 
embraced new developments, substituting sail with steam and wood with iron. 
Elsewhere, for instance Italy, notwithstanding the positive performances of the 
national merchant marine, the shipyards stuck to traditional wooden shipbuilding 




265A.N. Kiaer (ed.), Statistique internationale. Navigation maritime: II. Les marines marchandes, 
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Table +.&. Yearly mean tonnage built in Italy and the United Kingdom (&1$.-&545). Source: Sulle 
condizioni della marina mercantile italiana al +& Dicembre &5&/. Relazione del Direttore generale 
della marina mercantile a S.E. il Ministro per i Trasporti Marittimi e Ferroviari, Roma: Officina 
Poligrafica Italiana, &5&$, pp. 14-5..  
 
Table (." neatly describes the impaired competition between the Italian and 
British shipbuilding industries in the wake of the establishment of new 
technologies. Still in the late "*),s, the Italian shipyards were able to fabricate the 
equivalent of one-fifth of the tonnage released by the world leading country. After 
a couple of decades, the same mathematical relationship fell tenfold, to one-
fiftieth.  
Without inclining in energy determinism, part of the reasons underlying such 
diverging developments lied in Great Britain's natural resources266. The whole set 
of raw materials required for the construction of steamships and iron-hulled sailing 
ships and for their activity – iron and coal – were in short supply in the Italian 
territory. Conversely, the country abounded of timber and could rely upon a solid 
tradition for wooden shipbuilding.  
Within this framework, to technological determinism were added other factors 
playing against the transition from sail to steam within the Italian merchant 
marine. Among them, for instance, there was the fact that the earliest attempts to 
transition resulted into dramatic failures, as in the case of the Transatlantica267. In 
general, in the long run, it is possible to observe the increasing regional 
specialisation in the shipbuilding sector resulting into the gradual exclusion of 
traditional centres to the advantage of the most advanced ones, or of those who 
adapted better to the innovative techniques and the market demands.  
 
266 See J. Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World, p. $/+-$/. and $.&. The author 
enumerates what he considers factors of comparative advantages for England against the rest of the 
world: the creation of a consumption marked of the so-called upmarket products; the disposal of 
colonial outlets to absorb the growth of production; the normalisation of technological advance.  
267 On Rubattino’s activities and particularly on the unsuccessful experience of Transatlantica 
see G. Doria, Debiti e navi. La compagnia di Rubattino ($>7M-$>>$), Genova: Marietti, &55&.  
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Furthermore, technological advance triggered remarkable changes in the 
international distribution of tonnage. As seen, the Italian shipbuilding sector had 
experienced its golden period in the "*),s up until the biennium "*%#-%(268. Then, 
it entered in a deep crisis of which dependency from foreign-built and second-
hand ships represented the most evident results. In the context of high-seas 
navigation, such development interested both steamships and sailing ships. The 
crisis was not limited to shipbuilding but it was widely associated with the ongoing 
global transformations within shipping as a whole. In this period, competition 
between sail and steam revealed its downsides, such as the freight rates declining 
trend269 and the increasing globalisation which harmed the least developed 
economies. From the very beginning of the introduction of steamers in Italian 
shipping, the dependency from foreign production is neatly observable. In "*)%, 
amid a positive cycle for the Italian merchant marine, out of $* steamships only 
five were built entirely in Italian shipyards (eight disposed of Italian hulls, but 
foreign engines), and all of them were wooden-hulled270. One decade later, in the 
period "*%(-"*%$, the purchases on the foreign market outnumbered domestic 
constructions ()" to #)). Again, an observation to average tonnages underlines an 
even higher gap, presenting respectively '*",*# tons per unit (foreign) and "*','* 
(Italian)271. 
 
).%.". LINERS, COMMUNICATIONS, LOGISTICS AND INFRASTRUCTURES 
 
Although the most tangible factors to determine the transition from sail to steam 
were inherently connected with the development of nautical technology, it cannot 
 
268 See Statistica del Regno d’Italia. Movimento della navigazione nei porti del Regno. Anno $>D1, 
Firenze: Stabilimento G. Civelli, &1$1 and other data from: G. Giacchero, Genova e la Liguria nell’età 
contemporanea: un secolo e mezzo di vita economica $>$L-$MDM, Genova: Cassa di risparmio, &5)4.  
269 In the third section of this chapter I will present most of the studies on the correlation 
between transition and the evolution of freight rates.  
270 Data extracted from Statistica del Regno d’Italia. Movimento della navigazione nei porti del 
Regno. Anno $>D1. Marina mercantile e costruzioni navali, pp. &45-&&4 (Table n. /: Quadro 
descrittivo dei piroscafi per compartimenti marittimi d’iscrizione).  
271 Data extracted from A.N. Kiaer (ed.), Statistique internationale. Navigation maritime: II. Les 
marines marchandes, pp. $*-$+ (Table n. 1: Détails sur les acroissements et extinctions relatifs à 
l’effectif des marines marchandes pendant les année &1)+-&1)5).  
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be restrained within such borders. Indeed, the transport revolution taking place in 
shipping needs to be contextualised and entangled with the transformations 
occurring in the field of communications and logistics272. As we will see, during the 
nineteenth century the organisational sector of shipping changed as much as 
shipbuilding273.  
The circulation of valuable information has always been an essential factor to 
the development of seaborne trade. Since nautical developments reduced shipping 
costs, thus making sea transports more profitable on longer routes, the transfer of 
commercial knowledge assumed more importance. As a result, the traditional ways 
to gain and transmit information needed improvements to adapt to the needs of 
the globalised market. Both traders and shipowners required a smoother and 
quicker information flow, based on regular and up-to-date communications.  
Maritime historians put the introduction of steam engines at the beginning of 
this process. Notwithstanding most of the technical aspects, the leading 
innovation of the application of steam power to navigation consisted of the 
emancipation from wind regimes, whose rule had lasted since pre-history. Thus, 
steamers surmounted weather unpredictability and provided scheduled services 
between different ports. Soon the routes were organised according to fixed 
schedules, paving the way for the birth of liner shipping274. However, the 
revolutionizing character of this transformation impacted well beyond shipping. 
Regularity and predictability became crucial to private merchants and public 
 
272 J. Armstrong and D.M. Williams, “«A new and very modern Business». The traffic and 
operations of the early steamships”, in Id., The Impact of Technological change, pp. &1+-*4+.  
273 These developments are outlined in a vast bibliography: M. Stopford, Maritime economics, 
pp. *+-+.; G.H. Boyce, Co-Operative Structures in Global Business: communicating, transferring 
knowledge and learning across the Corporate frontier, New York: Routledge, *44*; P.N. Davies, “The 
impact of improving communications on commercial transactions: nineteenth-century case studies 
from British West-Africa and Japan”, International Journal of Maritime History, &/, No. & (*44*), pp. 
**.-*+1. In a broader interpretation connected with Imperialism, see J. Black, The power of 
knowledge. How information and technology made the modern world, New Haven: Yale University 
Press, *4&/, pp. *)$-*)5. 
274 M. Stopford, Maritime economics, pp. *.-*1; P.N. Davies, “The development of liner trades”, 
in K. Matthews and G. Panting, Ships and Shipbuilding in the North Atlantic Region, St. John’s 
Newfoundland: Memorial University of Newfoundland, &5)1, pp. &)+-*4$;  
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governors. Then, the movement volume of news, people and merchandises 
considerably increased275.  
In the formation of liner shipping, state intervention represented a key-factor: 
since the earlier stages of development, steamship companies obtained privileged 
contracts to transport mail in exchange for postal subventions276. Within 
historiography, subsidised companies had attracted a great deal of attention277: 
public aids have been awarded in almost every country with a maritime projection, 
including the most committed supporter of free market, the United Kingdom. 
Indeed, in the history of the development of subsidised lines engaging to postal 
services, Great Britain is at the forefront278.  
At the onset of steam navigation, when coal consumption was still inefficient to 
transport bulky cargoes, the allowance of subventions for mail cargoes granted to 
steamers a crucial advantage. Postal communications were obviously critical in the 
rulers' objectives, particularly for a colonial country as the United Kingdom279. The 
establishment of regular and steady connections with India engaged the English 
society for a protracted period. Mail transport represented a mean to run political 
and economic integration, especially in terms of power projection and colonial 
administration. From direct public management, postal services rapidly passed 
under private handling, thus leading the way to the state subsidies policy which 
from Britain spread in all the European societies280. The presence of privileged 
companies in a free market was sharply criticised and opposed by the competitors: 
 
275 See L.U. Scholl, “The global communications industry and its impact on international 
shipping before &5&/”, in D.J. Starkey and G. Harlaftis (eds.), Global markets: the internationalization 
of the sea transport industries since $>L2, pp. &5.-*&.. 
276 See coeval studies such as: R. Meeker, “History of shipping subsidies”, Publications of the 
American Economic Association, $, No. +, &54., pp. &-**5.  
277 The debate between free navigation (and free trade) and protectionism is continuously 
present in economic discourses through the second half of the century. Flag privileges and public 
subsidies represented the main tools to protect the national merchant marine: for the Italian case, 
see: Inchiesta sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana e sui mezzi più acconci ed efficaci per 
assicurarne l’avvenire e promuoverne lo svolgimento, Roma: Tip. Eredi Botta, &11*, voll. $.  
278 R. Meeker, “History of shipping subsidies”, pp. .-/*.  
279 D.R. Headrick, The tentacles of progress, pp. 5)-&//.  
280 A. Giuntini, Le meraviglie del mondo. Il Sistema internazionale delle comunicazioni 
nell’Ottocento, Prato: Istituto di studi storici postali, *4&&, pp. +.-51.  
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hence, shipping became a central field in the broader discourses between the 
sponsors of protectionism and those of free-trade281.  
Furthermore, subsidies facilitated the development of liner shipping and, thus, 
the rapid seizure from steam companies of crucial markets, such as passengers 
transport282. From the late "*',s, fuel efficiency improved with the introduction of 
compound engines: thus, steamships, relying upon the advantages of being able to 
offer scheduled services, won the competition against sail in migrant transoceanic 
transports283. Previously, steam liners had filled shipping sector for general cargo: 
by this locution we mean «many small consignments, each too small to fill a ship, 
that had to be packed with other cargo for transports»284 as opposed to bulk 
cargoes, which consisted of «large homogenous parcels big enough to fill a whole 
ship»285.  The neatly diverging evolution of the two typologies based on 
commodities exacerbated the distinction based on shipping types between liners 
and tramps, as the latter specialised in bulk cargoes286.  
Leaving to further discourses the sketching of these two kinds of shipping, an 
introduction about the rise of liners is suitable to deal with the mentioned 
 
281 See the theoretical framework of shipping subsidies developed by Meeker: R. Meeker, 
“History of shipping subsidies”, pp. &)*-*&1.  
282 Passengers transport rapidly became one of the main market for international shipping. 
There is a huge bibliography on the topic, due to its involvement in wider themes of historiography, 
such as migration and globalisation. From a maritime perspective, the main references on the topic 
are: T. Fey, L.R. Fischer, S. Hoste and S. Vanfraechem, Maritime transport and migration. The 
Connections between Maritime and Migration networks, St. John’s Newfoundland: IMEHA, *44); T. 
Fey, The Battle for the Migrants. Introduction of Steamshipping on the North Atlantic and its impact 
on the European Exodus, St. John’s Newfoundland: IMEHA, *4&). Despite the clear advantages of 
steam shipping over time, at the beginning (early &1.4s) also sailing ships competed on this 
transport. For the Italian case, see, for instance, the experience of Gio. Batta Lavarello, a ship-owner 
from Varazze (Genoa): G. Giacchero, Genova e Liguria nell’età contemporanea. Un secolo e mezzo 
di vita economica, $>$L-$MDM, p. *$5; G. Doria, Investimenti e sviluppo economico a Genova alla vigilia 
della Prima Guerra Mondiale, Milano: Giuffré, &5)+. This context offered also some interesting 
features, like the recurrent presence of mixed-propelled ships. See, G. Gropallo, Navi a vapore ed 
armamenti italiani dal $>$> ai giorni nostri, Genoa: Bertello, &5.1, pp. ))-)1.  
283 R.L. Cohn, “The transition from sail to steam in immigration to the United States”, The 
Journal of Economic History, $., No. *, *44., pp. /$5-/5..  
284 M. Stopford, Maritime economics, p. $4.  
285 Ibidem.  
286 On the subject of the distinction between liner and tramp shipping, a general reference is: 
M. Stopford, Maritime economics, pp. *.-*1. The detailed descriptions of the two are in M. 
Stopford, Maritime economics, pp. /&)-/*) (tramp) and .4.-.&* (liner).  
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evolution in communications. The formula of the «steamship as an agent of 
modernisation287», coined by Armstrong and Williams might be suitable to this 
context: liners offered scheduled services, thus providing regular exchanges of 
mail, goods and people from one point to another. As a result, they surely 
contributed to the escalation of the international flows of information and transfer 
of knowledge. Indeed, as argued by Peter Davies288, the transition from sail to 
steam impacted directly on the history of information and communications. In his 
studies about the commercial activities which British merchants maintained with 
West Africa and Japan, the contribution which the creation of liner shipping made 
to commercial expansion emerges vigorously289.  
One further example can be offered by the activism of the Italian shipowner 
Raffaele Rubattino in designing a liner connection between the Italian ports and 
the Far East immediately before the opening of the Suez Canal290. According to his 
project, the route was intended to increase Italian exports to the Far East, through 
the establishment of monthly connections between Genoa, Livorno, Naples and 
Messina with Bombay, Calcutta, Singapore, Hong-Kong and Yokohama. At the 
beginning, Rubattino’s steamers transported samples of Italian merchandises and 
manufactures to promote national production abroad. Then, by the 
accomplishment of encouraging commercial results, the liner connection was 
subsidised by the Italian state291. 
 
287 J. Armstrong and D.M. Williams, “The Steamship as an agent of modernisation”, International 
Journal of Maritime History, &5, No. & (June *44)), &/.-&$4. 
288 P.N. Davies, “The impact of improving communications on commercial transactions: 
nineteenth-century case studies from British West-Africa and Japan”, pp. **.-*+1. 
289 Idem, pp. **)-**1. Particularly meaningful is the case of West Africa, where, with the 
foundation of the African Steam Ship Company in &1.*, was instituted a weekly connection with 
London and, later on, Liverpool. This development attracted investors, leading to a commercial 
escalation of the trade between the area and England.  
290 ASGe, Camera di commercio, box +5. The first formulation is attributable to a member of the 
Genoese Chamber of Commerce, Errera.  
291 NGI (Navigazione Generale Italiana): it represents the result of the fusion between 
Rubattino’s company and the one of Florio, based in Palermo. See ACS, Ministero della marina, 
Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Divisioni premi compensi e tasse, box $&, Movimento 
generale della navigazione, Bombay: in &15&, are found five steamships regularly connecting Genoa 
and Bombay (Po, Domenico Balduino, Singapore, Raffaele Rubattino and Manilla) and two that 
covered the section from Bombay to Hong Kong (Bisagno and Bormida).  
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Then, after the establishment of liner steam shipping within mail transport, the 
invention, in rapid succession, of the deep-sea cable network revolutionised the 
world information system292. To the year "*', corresponds the first laying of cables 
between Dover and Calais commencing a process concluded in a couple of decades 
("*%#), when Singapore, Hong-Kong and Yokohama were finally included in the 
world network. Hence, most of the maritime world was connected.  
Steamships, by providing regular and faster connections, had qualitatively 
improved commercial communications; then, submarine telegraphy radically 
enhanced the globalisation and the commercial integration between remote areas. 
Before cable telegraphy, a London merchant carrying business in India needed 
several months to perform a single commercial operation; afterwards, the same 
person could exchange #'-(, words in a minute293. Naturally, these improvements 
echoed into the organisation of shipping: among the various transformations, we 
might mention the formation of an autonomous managerial structure, distinct 
from the personnel operating on seas294. In this regard, the evolution of the 
relationship between shipowners and captains is one of the most discernible 
effects295. In the pre-cable era, shipowners could not handle first-hand all the 
commercial operations. Instead, they ought to delegate decision-making in the 
hands of reliable and trustworthy people or, otherwise, to command the ship by 
filling the captain's position296. Indeed, the mastering of both navigational and 
 
292 Submarine telegraphy is a well-studied topic in the British and American historiography, due 
to the preponderant involvement of these two countries in its development. A valuable summary 
is D.R. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, $>L$-$M#L, 
New York: Oxford University Press, &55&. The same author has repeatedly emphasised how 
telegraphy might be studied from both a political and economic perspective: D.R. Headrick and P. 
Griset, “Submarine Telegraph Cables: Business and Politics, &1+1-&5+5”, The Business History 
Review, LXXV, No. +, *44&, pp. ./+-.)1. In Italian, a good reference is: A. Giuntini, Le meraviglie 
del mondo. Il Sistema internazionale delle comunicazioni nell’Ottocento.  
293 A. Giuntini, Le meraviglie del mondo, p. &.*.  
294 P.N. Davies, “The development of liner trades”, in K. Matthews and G. Panting, Ships and 
Shipbuilding in the North Atlantic Region, p. 5).  
295 See also Chapter ..  
296 On the various aspects about the relationships between ship-owners and captains and the 
role of the captains on board, see: Y. Kaukiainen, “Owners and Masters: management and 
managerial skills in the Finnish Ocean-Going Merchant Fleet, c. &1/4-&114”, in L.U. Scholl and M.L. 
Hikkanen (eds.), Sail and steam. Selected maritime writings of Yrjo Kaukiainen, St. John’s 
Newfoundland: IMEHA, *44/, pp. .+-$1. Another important contribution about the evolution of 
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commercial skills figured among the professional prerequisites to be possessed by 
captains. Afterwards, submarine telegraphy suppressed most of the pre-existing 
intermediate passages and allowed shipowners to manage all the required 
operations personally. 
Conversely, on the captains' side cable telegraphy was perceived as «a 
controlling device that curtailed their freedom as masters of the ship297». Their 
capabilities as businessmen were no longer required. The increase of informational 
speed and business competitiveness created the need to dispose of personnel on 
the ground, permanently connected with the global network of information 
through the cable telegraphy. In a broader perspective, it is not dissimilar from the 
process of substitution of owner-capitalists with hired managers observable in the 
industrial sector, as a result of capital concentration and cartelisation298. Within 
Italian shipping, apart from big companies such as NGI, this development occurred 
on a smaller scale, since owners turned themselves into managers and left 
navigational operations to trustworthy members of their broader kinship.  
Then, to the improvement of shipping logistics, the amelioration of port 
facilities aimed at shortening the time spent in ports represents another key-factor. 
As steamships, by increasing speed, reduced the loaded days at sea, the idle time 
ashore became more significant in terms of income foregone. Thus, the 
optimisation of cargo-handling diminished the no-income and costly intervals 
between subsequent voyages. Where possible, the governments invested in the 
construction of docks to adapt to the increase of trade volumes, as congested port 
traffic impacted severely on shipping enterprises. Besides, technological advance 
made its crucial contribution even in this field: since the early nineteenth century, 
pump-machines and mechanical elevators were installed in the most advanced 
ports to exploit the fundamental principle whereby «all the lifting is done in a 
 
the figure of merchant captains: J.M. Witt, “«During the Voyage every Captain is Monarch of the 
Ship»: The Merchant Captain from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth century”, International 
Journal of Maritime History, &+, No. *, *44&, pp. &$.-&5/.  
297 L.U. Scholl, “The global communications industry and its impact on international shipping 
before &5&/”, in D.J. Starkey and G. Harlaftis (eds.), Global markets, p. *&*.  
298 J. Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World, p. $/5.  
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single initial stage, after which successive movements are carried out chiefly or 
wholly by gravity299».  
The introduction of mechanical devices to optimise cargo handling in ports 
constituted a crucial achievement for the escalation of seaborne economy. Then, 
in the same conceptual direction were channelled the efforts to curtail the number 
of total handlings within single transports. Notwithstanding the single 
improvements developed in each field, the need of numerous transhipments, from 
ship to ship, from ship to warehouses and from there to railways impacted severely 
on the cost-effectiveness of sea-transports. Within this framework, the greatest 
achievements to the benefits of shipping logistics involved the radical 
transformation of geography. Indeed, the realization of monumental 
infrastructures, such as canals and railway tunnels, aimed at overcoming 
geographical constraints and, thus, to fulfil human ambitions to control nature. 
The most practical accomplishments of such ambitious designs were converted 
into a huge boost for the international trade and into the optimisation of the global 
transport system. Among the various case-studies, such as the Alpine railway 
tunnels – which redirected a substantial part of the European seaborne trade to 
the Mediterranean basin – the opening of the Suez Canal in "*)$ is the most 
emblematic.  
The construction of the Suez Canal can be placed at the culmination of long-
standing designs pointed at the development of inland waterways. In competition 
with railways, the rise of canal systems in certain countries has always been 
associated with steamships as a result of the technological implementations in 
transport logistics300. Indeed, since the earlier phases of development of the 
technology of steam shipping, inland waterways offered a crucial source of 
 
299 A. Jarvis, “The Nineteenth-Century roots of Globalization: Some Technological 
Considerations”, in D.J. Starkey and G. Harlaftis (eds.), Global markets, p. **+.  
300 See the attention given to canal systems in various works on the subject: S.P. Ville, Transport 
and the development of the European Economy, $1L2-$M$>, pp. +4-/1; A. Grubler, The rise and fall of 
infrastructures. Dynamics of Evolution and Technological change in Transport, New York: Springer-
Verlag, &554, pp. )+-1&. A comparison between British and French canal networks is in R. Szostak, 
The role of transportation in the Industrial Revolution, pp. ./-$4 and 1&-1/.  
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employment: on short distances and under specific conditions, steamers even 
withstood the competition with railways301.  
Then, Suez represented a great leap forward within the deeply rooted tradition 
for canals, by transferring on international shipping what had been widely 
deployed in inland navigation. Leaving to a further section the representation of a 
few details about the alterations that the opening of the Suez Canal aroused in the 
Italian shipping sector, in this context we will develop some discourses about the 
role of the Suez Canal in determining broader transformations302.  
First of all, from a technical point of view, navigating into the Canal represented 
a troublesome challenge for sailing vessels. Since the limited depth and the 
variable winds and currents hindered the passage of big sailing ships even in the 
waters of the Red Sea, captains were obliged to hire steam tugboats for the entire 
course. Indeed, despite advertised as much as one hundred meters large, in width 
the Canal measured more realistically around sixty meters and the central section 
– where the ships were supposed to navigate – stretched for no more than twenty-
two meters303. Likewise, also common knowledge about depth presented similar 
discrepancies between the official data and the reports of first-hand witnesses: in 
several cases, ships with a draught measuring about five meters incurred in 
collisions and groundings, despite the alleged eight meters depth304. These 
troubling conditions affected voyage safety and, as a result, could be translated 
into higher insurance premia (the same went for the Cape circumnavigation, which 
was listed among the dangerous routes and, therefore, required additional costs).   
However, it was the usage of tugboats (mandatory for sailing ships over ', tons) 
to epitomise one of the most evident comparative disadvantage for sails against 
steamships which could instead navigate without additional costs. The impact of 
tugboats rentals and passage fares on voyage costs was indeed substantial. In 
 
301 S.P. Ville, Transport and the development of the European Economy, $1L2-$M$>, pp. +4-/1.  
302 For a general account: M.E. Fletcher., “The Suez Canal and World Shipping (&1$5-&5&/)”, 
Journal of Economic History, No. /, &5.1, pp. ..$-.)+.  
303 G. Boccardo, Il Bosforo di Suez in relazione con il commercio del mondo e segnatamente con il 
commercio dell’Italia. Cenni ed osservazioni, Forlì: Febo Gherardi Editore, &1$5, pp. $-). 
304 Ibidem.   
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return, Suez offered just a slight time reduction which, however, in the economy 
of a sailing ship, determined nothing more than a proportional diminution of 
labour cost, insufficient to cover the higher expenditure. The equivalent factor 
(time saved), instead, retained a much more significant value for the benefit of 
steam voyages where, together with labour costs, fewer navigation days meant a 
relevant cut in coal consumptions, a critical item in steamers operational 
budgets305. Summing it up, the Suez Canal provided impair advantages to steam as 
opposed to sailing vessels for which, instead, the passage was economically 
unsustainable.  
Thus, the Indo-European traffics, utterly strategic to the English interests, were 
rapidly monopolised by steam navigation. Although, at first, the United Kingdom 
expressed its opposition to the construction of the Canal, tolls registrations 
illustrate how British steamers soon seized the route. Already in the first year 
("*%,), British ships dominated the traffic: on &*$ ships passing (&&".*$, tons), 
("& belonged to British shipowners (#$".)*, tons). In other words, )&% of the 
vessels and ))% of the tonnage passed through the Canal could be reconducted to 
British shipping306. Afterwards, in "*$), such supremacy was even neater, as %,% 
of the cargo and postal ships hoisted the Union Jack flag307.  
As we will see, however, not every kind of shipping was immediately redirected 
through the Canal. In virtue of their enormous advantage, steam liners 
monopolized the transport of general cargoes, which granted high freights to cover 
toll expenses and related fees. Meanwhile, because the freights for bulky 
commodities were hardly satisfactory to grant profits to the tramp shipping 
industry, sail withstood the competition with steam for a longer period. In 
 
305 For instance, within the proceedings of the ministerial inquiry about the conditions of the 
merchant marine, we found various calculations and comparisons of sailing vessels and steamers 
operational costs. According to the Cadenaccio Bros., ship-builders, for instance, coal consumption 
(together with oil, fat and routine maintenance of the engines) accounted for about &4-&.% of the 
monthly expenditure. See, Inchiesta parlamentare, vol. I, pp. 1$-1).  
306 Data from: G. Giacchero, Genova e Liguria nell’Età contemporanea, p. +.). 
307 Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile al 7$ dicembre $>MD. Relazione del direttore generale 
della marina mercantile a S.E. il Ministro della Marina, Roma: Tipografia Ditta Ludovico Cecchini, 
&15), p. .$*.  
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particular, in the connections with the Far East, sailing vessels lasted until the end 
of the century.  
This introductive section was aimed to illustrate the transformations in the 
global shipping occurring in concomitance with the third phase of evolution of 
Camogli’s maritime activities. All the mentioned factors – nautical technology 
(hulls and propulsion), communications (liner shipping and cable telegraphy) and 
logistics (cargo handling in ports and infrastructures) – contributed to determine 
the unique trajectory which Camogli underwent throughout the last decades of the 
nineteenth century and until the First World War. More than ever, the macro-
historical processes, operating at the global and structural levels, influenced the 
micro-historical and local dimension.  
 
?.=. The Camogli merchant fleet on the global scale (8POSs-8T8C) 
 
In tight continuity with the comparable section of the previous chapter, this 
section will address the development of the fleet of Camogli throughout the period 
under analysis ("*%,s-"$"&). The first source to be used is the "**( list of the ships 
enrolled to the local mutual insurance association308. Then, to examine the 
evolution of the fleet in the last decades of the nineteenth century, we resorted to 
the "$,# book of the Registro Navale Italiano, which recorded all the Italian 
merchant marine at the end of December "$,"309. Finally, we will take into account 
its "$") publication which, for recording all the Italian ships in "$"', provides the 
last depiction of Camogli's fleet dimensions before the First World War310.  
In the wake of the economic rise of the community after the Black Sea period, 
the fleet of Camogli entered into an expanding phase lasting until the early "**,s. 
Throughout the last third of the century, the bulk of Camogli's merchant marine 
 
308 CMMC, Assicurazioni varie, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua 
Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese, Genova: Tipografia dell’Istituto Sordo-Muti, &11+. 
309 Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro $M2!, Genova: Pietro 
Pellas, &54*.  
310 Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro 
registro $M$D, Genova: Pietro Pellas, &5&$.  
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stemmed from an impressive campaign of constructions which took place at the 
turn of the "*),s and the "*%,s. 
 
 
Figure +./. Number of constructions within the fleet of Camogli (&1.4s-&11+). Source: CMMC, 
Assicurazioni varie, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione 
Marittima Camogliese, Genova: Tipografia dell’Istituto Sordo-Muti, &11+.  
Indeed, as graphically represented in Figure (.&, %*% of the constructions 
occurred between "*)) and "*%). Throughout this period, more than two hundred-
forty ships were built: the resulting figure, measured in "**(, consisted of (,% ships 
enrolled to the Mutua.  Already in the "*',s, as we saw in the previous chapter, 
many shipowners built numerous ships in order to renew the fleet and adapt it to 
the needs of the Black Sea trade. From the late "*),s, however, they started a new 
massive campaign of constructions which transformed the nature of the fleet 
completely. After this period, Camogli's merchant marine achieved its most 
significant and most competitive (in terms of international shipping) 
configuration: in particular, the mean tonnage rose outstandingly. In "**(, it 
measured about '$' tons: at the lower extreme, there were the brigs Annetta ("*' 
t.) and Etra ("$% t.), built in the "*',s. On the other side lied the newly built (right 
in "**() full-rigged ships, Fede e Amore ("((" t.), Gio. Batta Repetto ("#&& t.) and 
Indus ("""")311.  
 
311 The respective owners were Giacomo Olivari (Annetta), Andrea Cichero (Etra), Gio. Batta 












Figure +... Ships enlisted in the &11+ Mutua divided per tonnage categories. Source: CMMC, 
Assicurazioni varie, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione 
Marittima Camogliese, Genova: Tipografia dell’Istituto Sordo-Muti, &11+.  
Figure (.'. illustrates the growth of the fleet by tackling the ships according to 
their tonnage ("**(). Whereas in the early "*),s, the presence of vessels bigger 
than three hundred tons was extraordinary, the first shipbuilding campaign of 
"*))-"*%) totally transformed the fleet of Camogli. These remarkable 
accomplishments were made possible by various factors: firstly, through the 
revenues of the Black Sea phase and the results of the first approaches to oceanic 
navigation; secondly, due to the massive inflow of maritime credit which Camogli 
underwent in the early "*%,s, which will be the object of more reasoned analyses 
in the next chapter312.  
 
Lavarello (Indus). See: CMMC, Assicurazioni varie, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione 
di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese.  




































From a nautical point of view, apart from few exceptional cases (&,')% of brigs, 
",$' % three-masted schooners and ,,$%% full-rigged ships), the fleet was 
composed for an overwhelming majority of barques ($(,")%).  
In a broader perspective, these exceptional performances in the shipbuilding 
sector granted to Camogli the inclusion among the most critical shipping centres 
of the world. More in details, in "**", a study published by the Norwegian Statistical 
Bureau ranked the small seafaring community as the fifteenth shipping port of the 
world for locally-owned tonnage313.  
 
 
Ports Steamships Sailing ships Total 
6 Liverpool '#("*# ",%%*#% "),",,$ 
8 London '%,(,* )"$%)& ""$,,%# 
: New-York #,)%** '((("# %&,",, 
= Glasgow (%$%*( ('(,"' %(#%$* 
; St. John '(%' #))$$# #%#()% 
< Boston ")(&" #($)"# #''$'( 
> Sunderland ",)'*) "",$(& #"%'#, 
7 Hamburg %&'"* "&#&'# #")$%, 
^ Bremen '$)'' "'%#*& #")$($ 
6] Marseille "'),($ '%#'* #"(#$% 
66 Greenock ('"%$ "%,,)' #,'#&& 
68 Newcastle "(%)%# '$*&% "$%'"$ 
6: Syros )$)* "*%)'# "$&)#, 
6= Hull "'#()$ ($()% "$"%() 
6; Camogli , "*(,#) "*(,#) 
6< Philadelphia '#&%( ""&*$# ")%()' 
6> Yarmouth &(% ")"',' ")"$&# 
67 San 
Francisco 
'#(&" ",'#$' "'%)() 
 
313 A.N. Kiaer (ed.), Statistique internationale. Navigation maritime: II. Les marines marchandes, 
Bureau Central de Statistique du Royaume de Norvége, Christiania: &11&.  
 "&& 
6^ Arendal )** "'&")) "'&*'& 
8] North-
Shields 
*,"'* %#(*' "'#'&( 
86 Genoa (&##" ""'$,' "',"#) 
88 Barcelona &"%,) $$')% "&"#%( 
8: Bath #"#( "(,)'* "(#%*" 
8= Le Havre '&%%* %&#)# "#$,&, 
8; Aberdeen ##"** $%)"$ ""$*,% 
Table +.*. Ranking of world shipping centres (&11&). Source: A.N. Kiaer (ed.), Statistique 
internationale. Navigation maritime: II. Les marines marchandes, Bureau Central de Statistique du 
Royaume de Norvége, Christiania: &11&. 
 
According to this study, Camogli ranked above remarkable competitors, such 
as San Francisco, Philadelphia, Genoa, Barcelona and Le Havre. Among the ports 
of the Mediterranean, it even ranked third, under Marseille and Syros only. Finally, 
when taking into account sailing tonnage only – since Camogli was among the few 
ones to completely lack steam tonnage – the position of Camogli upgraded to eight 
and second – depending on the geographic sample – within the whole world and 
the Mediterranean. By comparing these data with further statistical sources, it is 
also possible to observe how "*,&*% of the Italian tonnage (sail and steam 
together) belonged to the shipowners of Camogli314. In other words, at the 
beginning of "**,s, the results of the massive shipbuilding of the previous years 
granted to Camogli a leading role within the Italian and European shipping.  
However, the late "*%,s represented the peak of the maritime development of 
the Ligurian community. As seen in Figure (.&, the rate of yearly constructions fell 
dramatically from "*%' (#)) to "*%% ((). Even in the following years, it never 
recovered: amid a global freight crisis, which accelerated the decline of sail 
 
314 Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana al 7$ Dicembre $M$#. Relazione del Direttore 
generale della marina mercantile a S.E. il Ministro per i Trasporti Marittimi e Ferroviari, Roma: 
Officina Poligrafica Italiana, &5&$, p. &4.. In &11*, the total tonnage of the Italian merchant marine 
was calculated to measure 554.44/ tons (sail and steam altogether), of which 11..*1. (15,+5%) 
consisted of sailing vessels.  
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shipping, Camogli shipowners stopped to invest in new ships and entered in a 
downward trend.  
 
 
Figure +.$. Evolution of the merchant fleet of Camogli by tonnage (&1)5-&5*4). Source: CMMC, 
Assicurazioni varie, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione 
Marittima Camogliese, Genova: Tipografia dell’Istituto Sordo-Muti, &11+; Sulle condizioni della 
marina mercantile al 7$ dicembre $>MD; Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile al 7$ dicembre $M$#; 
Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro $M2!; Registro Nazionale Italiano 
per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro $M$D; Registro Nazionale 
Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro $M!$.  
Figure (.) outlines the overall evolution of the total tonnage of Camogli's 
merchant marine, from "*%$ to "$#,. As we can see, from the early "**,s onwards, 
its dimensions followed a downward curve until "*$), before improving once again 
at the turn of the century until the First World War. Nevertheless, the inversion of 
the trend of the end of the century requires more in-depth analysis. Although mean 
tonnage began to increase after a protracted declining phase, the list of the ships 
belonging to Camogli shipowners in "$,# highlights some noteworthy features 
concerning the practical conditions of Camogli's merchant marine. Indeed, 
although the mere quantitative aspects might indicate a trend inversion, a more 
accurate qualitative analysis revealed some troublesome aspects.  
In "$,#, the fleet of Camogli consisted of $% ships, measuring $** tons on 
average315. In comparison with those of the preceding periods, a crucial 
characteristic of the "$,# fleet lied into the average age. For example, in "**(, since 
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most of the vessels had been built between "*)) and "*%), they were "( years old 
on average. In "$,#, the same measure rose to almost #% years old: out of $% vessels, 
only thirteen had been built after "**(. Just one ship was less than ten years old, 
while almost one-third of them were older than thirty years316.  
In broader terms, throughout the last decades of the nineteenth century, 
Camogli's investments toward shipbuilding stopped almost completely. The ships 
built during the «golden era» still composed the bulk of the fleet in "$,#. 
Furthermore, instead of constructing new ships, most of the shipowners purchased 
second-hand ships on the foreign market: indeed, in "$,#, the '),%,% of the fleet 
was constructed abroad, mostly in British shipyards317. The reliance of Camogli's 
shipowners onto the second-hand foreign market responded to their need to 
renovate the fleet to compete in terms of tonnage and technology on bulky cargoes 
routes and, at the same time, it compensated for their lack of resources318.  
Starting from the late "*%,s, the conditions of the national shipbuilding 
industry were not as prosperous as before: notwithstanding the transition from sail 
to steam, technological competition pushed for the replacement of wood with iron 
(and later steel) for hulls. These transformations found unprepared the Italian 
shipbuilders: a significant share of them still worked on improvised and seasonal 
shipyards along the beach. The Italian shipbuilding industry, in sums, lacked both 
the natural resources and the professional skills to adapt in a brief time to the 
market requirements.  
The declining trend of the Italian shipbuilding showed a similar pattern to that 
of Camogli: throughout the "*),s and up to "*%', the rate of yearly constructions 
 
316 The newest was the wooden-hulled barque Precursore (&.41 t.), built in Liguria for Prospero 
Schiaffino; the oldest, apart from the steamer Filippo Chicca, built in &1.+, were the iron hulled 
barque Oriana (&4.4 t.), built in the UK in &1$/ and purchased second-hand by Stefano Razeto, 
and the wooden hulled barque Marion (./* t.), built in the same year in the UK and purchased 
second-hand by Giuseppe Schiaffino. See, Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. 
Libro registro $M2!.  
317 Ibidem.  
318 Identical strategies were adopted by Norwegian shipowners: see, B.E. Johnsen, “Cooperation 
Across the North-Sea: The Strategy behind the Purchase of Second-hand British Iron and Steel 
Sailing Ships by Norwegian Shipowners, &1).-&5*.”, International Journal of Maritime History, No. 
&): &, *44., pp. &.&-&$5.  
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amounted to the ca. %,.,,, tons319. Afterwards, it entered in a neat crisis, 
culminating with an average built tonnage of '.,,, tons per year in "**%-"***320. 
Although in the pre-war period the performances of national shipbuilding slightly 
ameliorated (around #&.,,, tons per year), they never returned to the peak level. 
From "**', the state had embraced protectionist policies aimed at safeguarding 
the national shipyards from foreign competition321. However, at that time, second-
hand prices were too attractive for Camogli shipowners, who implemented the 
renewal of their fleets, at least under a technological perspective.  
In "$,#, for example, #$,*$% of the fleet was iron-hulled. Sometimes overaged 
second-hand ships were modified – with iron structure and wooden planking – in 
a second moment, to increase their durability322. The gradual toughening of the 
fleet with the substitution of wood with iron offered advantages in many regards, 
as for insurances. For instance, in "$,%, as a sign of the time, the local mutual 
insurance company "Cristoforo Colombo" accepted iron-hulled ships only323.  
Finally, the last noteworthy feature which we can retrieve from the "$,# 
composition of the fleet is Camogli’s attempt to transition. Throughout the list, 
indeed, it is possible to find four steamers: the Filippo Chicca (()% t.; &,, ihp) and 
the NS del Boschetto ("&," t.; "",, ihp), belonging to Stefano Razeto, the Maria 
Teresa ((&* t.; (&' ihp), owned by R. Repetto, and the Luigino ("(#" t.; %,, ihp), 
ownership of Emanuele Bozzo324. Whereas the Filippo Chicca and Maria Teresa are 
small-sized steamers, mostly employable on cabotage routes, the NS del Boschetto 
and Luigino were medium-sized. All of them had been purchased second-hand 
 
319 Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana al 7$ Dicembre $M$#, pp. 1&-1*.  
320 Ibidem.  
321 See infra and Chapter /.  
322 See, for instance, the case of the barque Dilbhur (&*1& t.), belonging to Giuseppe Mortola. The 
hull was originally constructed in wood in &1$., but it was renewed in &15), with the consolidation 
of the structure with iron. See, Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 
$M2!, p. */$.  
323 CMMC, Assicurazioni varie, Statuto dell’Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima 
Cristoforo Colombo, &54), art. &.  
324 Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro $M2!.  
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abroad: the oldest was the Filippo Chicca, whose hull and engines had been built 
in "*'(; the relatively newest was the Luigino, built in "*%$.  
This embryonal group of steamships, witnessing Camogli's attempt to 
transition, was then enlarged and developed until the First World War. Indeed, in 
"$"', the steam fleet of Camogli was composed of thirteen elements:  
 
 






ASCARO "*$" Sunderland (#&& "#', 
AVALA "*$, Stockton ((*& "*', 
DEIPARA "**) Hull ##"$ "#(& 
ELIOFILO "*$% Glasgow ('#( "',, 
ELIOPOLI "*$% Glasgow ((&& "',, 
ESPERO "**# Blyth $$$ *"# 
LUIGINO B. "**' Newcastle "$%" )#* 
MADDALENA "*$" Willington #),, ""', 
MESSICANO "*$" Barrow &#,# "*#' 
ORIANA "**) Belfast ("(# "(', 
PATRAS "*$' Newcastle "),# ""', 
POLYNESIA "**" Newcastle "#$& $', 
TRENTINO "*%) Hartlepool "#*( %#, 
Table +.+. List of steamers owned by Camogli shipowners in &5&.. Source: RINA, &5&$.  
Right before the outbreak of the war, Camogli’s steam tonnage accounted for 
almost &,% of the total. Finally, Camogli had engaged the path to transition, at 
least nominally: indeed, throughout a slightly positive shipping cycle, the 
community had retained almost the same tonnage between "$,# and "$"'325. 
Nonetheless, from the peak moment ("*%$-"**(), its dimensions halved in absolute 
terms and performed even worse in comparison with national and international 
competitors. The mean tonnage (#'## t.) and age (more than #) years old) of 
Camogli's steamship fleet were no longer competitive within the oceanic tramp 
shipping market which, until the "$",s, many shipowners embraced as the primary 
road to resilience. As we will see in the following pages, Camogli's steamers 
 
325 M. Stopford, Maritime economics, p. &&4, Figure +.1.  
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engaged mainly to Mediterranean cabotage and specialised as tramp carriers of 
bulk commodities within the European maritime borders.  
Then, the First World War stroke the final blow to Camogli's permanence 
within the international shipping market. According to local historians, German 
torpedoes sank many ships326. In "$#,, at the end of the conflict, barely twelve 
ships had survived: among steamers, the Patras was the only one to get past the 
war unscathed327. The total tonnage owned by the members of the community 
(",.(,$ tons) decreased well beneath the "*'( levels (#'.,&')328. The «golden age 
of sail» was finally over and, along with it, the trajectory of what had been once the 
third shipping centre of the Mediterranean.  
  
?.?. Fleeing the Mediterranean: the effects of transition on 
Camogli's sail shipping 
 
In the following section, in continuity with the representation of Camogli's 
maritime activities of the previous chapter, we will tackle the evolution of local 
shipping in the aftermath of the Black Sea phase. Indeed, as seen, from the early 
"*%,s onwards, the ships of Camogli were gradually ousted from the 
Mediterranean and the Black Sea routes as a result of the victorious advent of 
steam navigation. According to a definition of the transition from sail to steam as 
a «succession of forwarding leaps», as opposed to the interpretations stressing its 
graduality, it might be possible to argue that, by late "*%,s, steamships had seized 
Mediterranean long cabotage. However, the establishment within the British ports 
and the creation of the integrated wheat-coal trade granted to Camogli's shipping 
system to access alternative markets, an essential step to readjust to the late 
nineteenth-century new configuration of global seaborne trade.  
 
326 G.B. Ferrari, La città dei mille bianchi velieri, pp. *5/-*5$.  
327 Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro 
registro $M!$. 
328 Ibidem.  
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In order to achieve a better understanding of the original features and 
distinguishing traits of Camogli's maritime activities throughout this period, these 
accomplishments will be outlined and examined in the next sections with a critical 
distinction. The first section will aim at proposing a general framework of the 
conversion from the European to the global dimension, bearing in mind the total 
absence of systematic sources as far as the "*%,s-"**,s decades are concerned. The 
second section, instead, drawing on vast and plentiful archival material, will tackle 
the resilience phase: from the "**,s onwards, the vital spark which had animated 
Camogli's shipping until that moment left the room to instinct for survival. Instead 
of conquering new markets, the ships of Camogli retreated to firmer positions, 
until finally returning to Mediterranean cabotage at the turn of the century.  
 
).).%.  THE EXPANSION TOWARDS THE OCEANS (%,23S-%,,3S) 
 
As anticipated, between "*)' and the late "**,s, the most classic maritime 
sources, such as crew lists or logbooks, are utterly silent. Beginning with "*)', crew 
lists, to which we widely resorted for the completion of the previous chapter, 
completely disappeared from the Italian archival map329. Conversely, logbooks, 
which provide an even broader set of data, appear from the year "**", though a 
more robust collection begins from the "*$,s and become then systematic in the 
new century330. Thus, owing to the silence of the mentioned maritime sources, the 
only feasible choice was to gather parcels of information and discontinuous 
notions from the miscellaneous archival funds of the administration of the Italian 
merchant marine which, still, cover the "*)"-"*)$ period and then, from the late 
"**,s onwards331.  
 
329 After a brief phase of continuity with the Piedmont administration, the state reunification 
was supposed to reorganise the administration of maritime affairs. De facto, neither the State 
Archives of Genoa ever received more recent crew lists, nor these documents were transferred to 
the centre (National Central Archives of Rome).  
330 See infra.  
331 See, ACS, Ministero della Marina, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea 
Uffici Diveri, &1$&-&1$5. This archival collection gathers sources of all sorts about the administration 
of the merchant marine within this period; it consists of hundreds of boxes containing, with no 
chronological, typological or thematic order, a wide variety of documents, ranging from desertion 
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Moreover, further details might be found in the proceedings of the already 
mentioned Inquiry into the conditions of the merchant marine, which took place 
in "**" and "**#. Basically, in Camogli, the local shipowners questioned themselves 
and discussed about the extant potential and the foreseeable future of sailing 
shipping; in doing so, they examined the actual conditions of their traffics, thus 
bringing on the floor clear samples of their activities332.  
On this precarious archival basis this section is geographically divided into two 
parts: first, it deals with the Latin American subcontinent where, owing to the 
creation of various interests intermingling with the formation of migrant 
communities, the ships of Camogli are found with unbroken continuity. Secondly, 
it analyses the access to the Southeast Asian markets in the wake of the 
construction of the Suez Canal and the subsequent inclusion of the Italian 
merchant marine in the transport of bulk commodities from and to this region 
through the Cape route.  
 
!.!.#.#. Migrants, guano, coolies and other traffics: scattered 
information about the presence of Camogli ships in the Latin 
American area (late #ABCs-early #AACs) 
 
Postponing to a later stage the critical discourse about Ligurian migration flows to 
the Latin American countries, the presence of the ships and seafarers of Camogli 
in this area deserves a general overview nonetheless. From the late "*),s, it is 
possible to record increasing numbers of Camogli-owned ships in the ports of Latin 
America. Although – owing to the lack of sources – to contextualise the traces of 
their presence to a systematic framework might present some difficulties, some 
main features can be exposed. First, these ships converged in two neatly distinct 
areas: the Plata basin and the Pacific coast. Secondly, relying on cross-references 
and secondary literature, these movements can be reconducted to the handling of 
 
processes, the papers required for captains’ licenses, news about the selling of national ships 
abroad, ministerial inquiries about various subjects etc. Furthermore, the subsequent archival fund, 
covering the &1)4-&114 period, is not inventoried and, therefore, not available to researchers.  
332 Inchiesta sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana, vol. &, pp. &+/-&$..  
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the early waves of migrant transports, to the commercialisation of the Peruvian 
guano and even to the carriage of coolies across the Pacific, from China to Peru.  
As early as in the "*(,s, it is possible to date the first attempts of Camogli 
shipowners to establish within the transport of passengers to America. The crew 
list of the brigantine L'Indio ("', t.), belonging to Pellegro Marciani, might 
represent an antecedent of this traffic. Departed on #%th September "*(), it arrived 
at Montevideo in late December. Somewhat surprisingly, it consisted more of a 
collective migration than a real business, as all the members of the crew transferred 
there with their families. Hence, the brigantine was sold in Buenos Ayres in 
February "*(%333. Apart from this unusual and unique event, from the early "*),s 
onwards, it is possible to find somewhat regular passenger transports taking place 
on board of the ships of Camogli. For example, in autumn "*)&, the barque Nina 
Figari crossed the Atlantic to Montevideo with "&$ passengers on board334. Built in 
"*)( for Prospero Figari – who also commanded the ship – and measuring &($ t., 
the Nina Figari ranked among the most weighty ships of Camogli in that period. 
Other similar voyages are recorded for the barques Nuova Ottavia (&)* t.), 
Ascensione (($' t.) and Fison ((#' t.) which, between "*)" and "*)' engaged to the 
transport of migrants to Montevideo and Buenos Ayres335. Before steam technology 
annihilated the competitiveness of sail within this specific business sector, migrant 
transport was highly profitable: in a single voyage, shipowners could cover a 
significant part of the initial costs336.  
Although a vast literature targeted the establishment of steamers within 
transoceanic passenger transports and their decisive impulse to mass migration, 
few studies have highlighted the role of sailing vessels in sustaining the earliest 
manifestations of such movement337. As a partial exception, the works of Raymond 
 
333 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, n. /)&5, &1+$. 
334 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &$, n. 54+4.  
335 Idem, serie &/, n. 1///; Idem, serie &$, n. &$1& and n. //*$.  
336 See, ASGe, Fondo miscellaneo, $&, Ricevute del passaggio su brigantine sardo Il Guerriero per 
Montevideo, &1/*.  
337 T. Fey, The Battle for the Migrants. Introduction of steam shipping on the North Atlantic and 
its impact on the European Exodus, St. John’s Newfoundland: IMEHA, *4&).  
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L. Cohn targeted mass migration under sail as a research objective, even in 
connection with the theme of the transition from sail to steam within this specific 
shipping market338.   
Mass migration in the age of sail was characterised for its minimal organisation: 
multiactivity and irregularity represented unique features of the sail handling of 
migration transports. From a nautical point of view, there were no substantial 
differences between cargo and passenger sailing vessels: in the latter case, the hold 
was provided with temporary intermediate decks where to allocate migrants339. 
Thus, shipowners could engage to both cargo and passenger transports without 
remarkable differentiation. This feature granted extreme elasticity in terms of 
market opportunities and represented a fundamental prerequisite to dedicate to 
this business. Obviously, for the inherent characteristics of migration flows, it was 
no possible for ships to find passengers in both directions. Therefore, most of the 
vessels involved in the migrant traffic transported people from Europe to America 
and, then, sought for return cargoes to Europe.  
Although Cohn, in analysing the migration from Atlantic (Ireland and Great 
Britain) and Central (France and Germany) Europe to the United States, 
demonstrated that the transition manifested from the early "*),s onwards, in the 
Latin American case, source evidence might suggest postponing this line. Still in 
"*)*, for instance, the Italian consul residing in Montevideo reported the news of 
the shipwreck of the Camogli-owned brig schooner Due Sorelle, commanded by 
Bartolomeo Ferro, before the Brazilian coasts. Although a few details are provided, 
the consul is explicit about relating about the conditions of the «passengers», who 
ended up safely to their intended destination, Buenos Ayres340.  
 
338 R.L. Cohn, Mass Migration Under Sail. European Immigration to the Antebellum United States, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, *445; Idem, “The transition from sail to steam in 
immigration to the United States”, The Journal of Economic History, $., No. *, *44., pp. /$5-/5.. 
339 See, Regio Decreto !2 novembre $>1M n. L$DD che approva il regolamento per l’esecuzione del 
testo unico del Codice per la Marina Mercantile. Art. ./$. For a broader analysis see, A. Molinari, Le 
navi di Lazzaro. Aspetti sanitari dell’emigrazione transoceanica italiana: il viaggio per mare, Milano: 
Franco Angeli, &511; Idem, “Emigration Traffic in the Port of Genoa between the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth centuries: Shipping and Problems of Social Hygiene”, Journal of American Ethnic History, 
&+, No. &, &55+, pp. &4*-&&1.  
340 ACS, Ministero della marina, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea Uffici 
Diversi &1$&-&1$5, b. +/*, Corrispondenza Montevideo, &4 Maggio &1$5.  
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Most frequently, it is shipwrecks and the related events to provide news about 
the presence of Camogli ships in the area. Many cases were usually reported from 
the consuls of Valparaiso and Lima and targeted Cape Horn, well-known for being 
among the most troublesome passages for oceanic navigation. In February "*)$, 
for example, the actions of Emanuele Ferro, captain of the barque Itala, were 
praised for having salvaged the crew members of the ship Matteo «from certain 
death»341.  
News concerning the presence along the Latin American Pacific coast of people 
and vessels from Camogli regarded mainly Peru and, to a lesser extent, Chile. 
Basically, as we will see in the last chapter, some members of the community 
moved to Callao since the early "*(,s and there started their businesses: later, by 
process of «diffusion» and «feedback»342, various people of Camogli started to orbit 
around the Peruvian economic system. Notwithstanding coastal cabotage, which 
the Ligurian migrant community rapidly seized and controlled throughout the 
nineteenth century, the foreign seaborne trade of Peru relied mainly upon guano 
exports to Europe. The «age of guano» represented a milestone within the history 
of Peru: at the end of the independence process, the country entered in serious 
financial troubles and declared bankruptcy in "*#). Consigned the national debt 
in the hands of foreign (British) investors, the discovery of the fertilising qualities 
of guano represented a crucial breakthrough for enabling the country to 
resuscitate financially343. The heyday of guano trade lasted roughly from the early 
"*&,s to the late "*%,s: the value of its exportation «routinely exceeded two million 
pounds sterling per year»344. The significant part of the exports was destined to 
 
341 Ivi, Sul naufragio del Brick Bark “Matteo”, *& Febbraio &1$5.  
342 See, J.D. Gould, “European Inter-continental Emigration: The Role of «Diffusion» and 
«Feedback»”, The Journal of the European Economic History, *, &514, pp. *$)-+&..  
343 Concerning the guano age, its exploitation and the importance to Peruvian foreign trade and 
national finances, see: E.F. Frank, “History of the Guano mining industry”, Journal of Cave and Karst 
Studies, $4, No. *, &551, pp. &*&–&*.; W.M. Mathew, “The Imperialism of Free Trade: Peru, &1*4-
)4”, *&, No. +, &5$1, pp. .$*–.)5; Idem, “Foreign contractors and the Peruvian Government at the 
outset of the Guano Trade”, The Hispanic American Historical Review, .*, No. /, &5)*, pp. .51–$*4; 
Idem. “Peru and the British Guano Market, &1/4-&1)4”, The Economic History Review, *+, No. &, 
&5)4, pp. &&*-&*1; C. Vizcarra, “Guano, Credible Commitments, and Sovereign Debt Repayment in 
Nineteenth-Century Peru”, The Journal of Economic History, $5, No. *, *445, pp. +./-+1).  
344 C. Vizcarra, “Guano, Credible Commitments, and Sovereign Debt Repayment”, p. +$1.  
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improve the British agricultural performances: in the year "*%,, for instance, the 
UK imported #*,.,,, tons of guano345. Although the rights of exploitation were 
in the hands of the state, which reserved to British merchants and companies (i.e. 
the Anthony Gibbs & Sons) a sort of monopoly over its commercialisation abroad, 
it is reasonable to assume that the captains of Camogli were able to establish 
themselves into the carriage of this commodity. Already in "*)', the Italian consul 
of Callao invited his government to stimulate the arrival of national vessels to the 
Peruvian ports. In doing so, he praised guano cargoes for their profitability at the 
point that many ships travel on ballast from Europe to be satisfied with the sole 
return freight346. Alternatively, he noted, coal was the primary outbound cargo 
from the United Kingdom. Being, on the one hand, well-introduced in the British 
coal trade and, on the other hand, practical of the Peruvian market, owing to their 
deep-rooted presence in Callao, the establishment of Camogli's shipping within 
this back and forth route seems to be plausible. Lacking of further data, from the 
reading of the proceedings of the "**# Inquiry into the conditions of the Italian 
merchant marine it was possible to withdraw numerous statements about the 
exploitation of the guano trade by Ligurian sailing vessels in the "*),s and early 
"*%,s347. Most of the references to Peruvian guano lied into optimistic assumptions 
about the permanence of the sailing predominance over steam within this 
transport. They could not be more wrong: not only concerning the general 
evolution of sail against steam but also for the actual state of guano trade. As the 
extracting costs of guano rose, the Peruvian natural manure lost its competitive 
edge against nitrate of soda, abundant in nearby Chile348. Already in the "*%,s, its 
 
345 J. Glover, “Tonnage statistics for the decade &15&-&544”, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 
$., No. &, &54*, p. ., Table I – Showing the quantities of certain articles exported and imported in 
&1$4, &1)4, &114, &154 and &544.  
346 AMAE, Affari Esteri, b. 1&), Lima, &1$..  
347 Inchiesta sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana, vol. &, pp. &+/-&$..  
348 W. M. Mathew, “Peru and the British Guano Market”, pp. &&5-&*1. For the Italian participation 
to the trade of Chilean nitrates see: J.P. Vallejos, “La presenza italiana nel ciclo del salnitro: 
Tarapacà, &1$4-&544”, in Il contributo allo sviluppo del Cile, Torino: Edizioni della Fondazione 
Giovanni Agnelli, &55+, pp. &5)-**..  
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exportation sharply declined to negligible levels, being finally substituted by 
various competitors349.   
Still in Peru was based another profitable trade to which Camogli's shipowners 
dedicated: the transport of Chinese indentured labourers (coolies) from Macao, 
destined to work either in guano mining or in plantations350. The origins of this 
trade lied in the Peruvian depressed demography as opposed to the increasing 
demands for cheap labour which both landowners (plantations) and the state 
(guano mining) sought to introduce in the country351. In "*&$, through the 
publication of the first ley chinesca, the afflux of Chinese labourers began and 
lasted until "*%& with some discontinuities (it stopped between "*') and "*)"). In 
slightly more than two decades, this traffic moved from the Asian to the Latin 
American shores of the Pacific almost ninety thousand human beings352.  
The outbreak of a conflict (the Chincha Islands War of "*)'-"*))), the 
intricacies of maritime fiscal and administrative jurisdictions and the passionate 
activism of the coeval Italian consul of Lima provided us with an insightful archival 
collection concerning the participation of Italian shipowners and seafarers to this 
«infamous trade»353. Among these categories figured Giovanni Figari, arguably the 
leader of Camogli's migrant community in Callao, owner of numerous ships 
devoted to both cabotage and high-seas shipping. Within a list compiled by the 
consul Pietro Castelli, Giovanni Figari emerged as the shipowner of a full-rigged 
ship (Provvidenza, ')& t.) and a barque (Lima, #'' t.) which from January "*)' to 
 
349 Ibidem; C. Vizcarra, “Guano, Credible Commitments, and Sovereign Debt Repayment”, p. 
+$1, Figure + – Peruvian Guano Exports.  
350 About coolie trade exists a vast bibliography. The most classical reference is: W. Stewart, 
Chinese bondage in Peru: A History of the Chinese Coolie in Peru, $>#M-$>1#, Westport: Greenwood 
Press, &5)4. More recent are: E. Young, Alien nation. Chinese migration in the Americas from the 
coolie era through Worl War II, Charlotte: The University of North Carolina Press, *4&/; A.J. 
Meagher, The Coolie Trade. The Traffic in Chinese Laborers to Latin America $>#1-$>1#, Philadelphia, 
Xilbris Corporation, *441. See also: M. Foster Farley, “The Chinese Coolie Trade &1/.-&1).”, Journal 
of Asian and African Studies, +, No. /, &5$1.  
351 For the political framework underlying the coolie trade see: M.J. Gonzales, “Planters and 
Politics in Peru, &15.-&5&5”, Hispanic American Historical Review Comparative Studies in Society and 
History J. Lat. Amer. Stud, $*, No. ., &51*, pp. *$*–5*.  
352 W. Stewart, Chinese bondage in Peru, pp. )/-)..  
353 ACS, Ministero della Marina, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea Uffici 
Diversi &1$&-&1$5, b. /)., Lettera del comandante della Pirocorvetta Racchia, +4 luglio &1$5.  
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June "*)) sailed three times along the Macao-Callao route with a total of $,* 
coolies354.  
The allegation to Camogli as an Italian seafaring town of the business and 
activities performed by the migrant communities formed by its inhabitants 
represents a much more complicated discourse, which we will partially tackle in 
the last chapter. Indeed, the matter of the identification of migrant communities 
with their native social groups represents a broader discourse with which 
migration historians deal. Although in the methodology of the thesis, the general 
preference has been to treat as different the members of the original community 
from those who settled permanently abroad, in attaching coolies trade to Camogli, 
with no further evidence about the active participation of actual Camogli-owned 
ships (as opposed to those of migrants of Camogli's origins), the main purpose is 
to be clear and transparent on this argument. Indeed, the coolies trade has always 
represented a troublesome matter for the history of the Ligurian seafaring 
community: local historians, devoid of the mentioned methodological concerns, 
included coolies trade among the various enterprises to which the members of the 
community engaged with high profits. Nevertheless, in so doing, they transfigured 
the nature of the traffic, which was considered as standard passenger transport, 
notwithstanding all the implications deriving from coercion and the characteristics 
of the nineteenth-century indentured labour.   
 
!.!.#.-. Camogli's shipping and the alternatives to Suez  
 
After the abandonment of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea routes, Southeast 
Asia constituted another geographical area to which Camogli shipowners turned 
the attention for the first time. Surprisingly, the establishment of Ligurian sailing 
shipping in the area followed the inauguration of the Suez Canal ("*)$), which in 
standard literature is deemed to be crucial for granting steam shipping a decisive 
 
354 ACS, Idem, b. *)+.  
 "'* 
leap forward in the competition with sail355. Instead, the earliest accomplishment 
of the Canal arguably consisted into the division of Indo-European trade into two 
sub-categories. On the one side, steamers navigated through the Canal with 
general cargoes composed of high-value commodities; on the other one, sail vessels 
belonging to second-comers merchant marines specialised into the transport of 
bulk merchandises around the Cape356.  
As said, whereas Rubattino (the absolute leader of the Italian steam shipping 
sector) looked with interest at the construction of the Suez Canal and, through 
personal investments (the purchase of the Assab Bay) rapidly embarked upon the 
Canal business357, the vast majority of the Italian shipowning elites, who 
persevered in sailing constructions, lacked the structural characteristics to follow 
his lead along the same path. Therefore, the NGI ships limited to the transport of 
general cargoes: liner steamers dealt with domestic trade by carrying national 
products to India and withdrawing highly demanded valuable commodities from 
Asia to Italy358.  
Meanwhile, in the second half of the nineteenth century, an increasing number 
of Italian ships called to the ports of the Far East. Indeed, although Suez had 
gradually absorbed most of the highly-profitable transports, the Cape route was 
still active, and numerous sailing vessels carried low nominal value cargoes 
 
355 For a general account on the relationships between Italy and the Suez Canal, see: S. Bono, “Il 
Canale di Suez e l’Italia”, Mediterranea Ricerche Storiche, No. 1, *44$, pp. /&&-/**; U. Spadoni, “Il 
Canale di Suez e l’inizio della crisi della marina mercantile italiana”, Nuova Rivista Storica, No. ./, 
&5)4, pp. $.&-$)*.  
356 Although not specifically on the Italian merchant marine, but as an overall perspective, the 
delimitation of a market niche for sails after the construction of the Canal is exemplary outlined by 
Gerald S. Graham. See, G.S. Graham, “The ascendancy of the Sailing Ship: &1.4-&11.”, The Economic 
History Review, 5, No. &, &5.$, pp. )/-11.  
357 On Rubattino and his interests toward the Suez Canal, see: A. Codignola, Rubattino, Bologna: 
Licinio Cappelli, &5+1, pp. *+1-+)5. At pp. *14-*1&, the author reports the contract between 
Rubattino and the Italian State for the institution of a regular line of steamers connecting the Italian 
main port cities with Alessandria and Bombay. In &1)), then, the future Navigazione Generale 
Italiana obtained a more profitable contract which extended the line to the Southeast Asian ports 
and Hong Kong.  
358 See, for instance, the &11) logbook of the steamship Manilla: ASGe, Giornali nautici, &&.1/&. 
The outbound cargo included: wine, sulphur, almonds, national and foreign liquors, marmalades, 
marbles, silver bars, cement, coral, mirrors and jewellery. From Bombay, instead, the Manilla 
transported wheat, raw cotton (mainly), spices, china potteries, indigo and coffee to Naples, 
Barcelona and Genoa 
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(cereals, coal, timber) according to the 'old way'. Not only Cape Town retained its 
status of a crucial hub for Indo-European trade but was also part of a broader 
international framework. The participation of Italian shipowners (and of those of 
Camogli, in the first line) to this shipping movement arguably lied in their previous 
experiences as cross-traders, as in the last phase of the Black Sea trade. Again, the 
link with the success achieved in the previous decades seems to cover a primary 
role in determining subsequent developments. In the British ports and, in 
particular, in Cardiff, data evidence witnesses the development of high demands 
for sea transports to Cape Town, loaded with coal cargoes. In the biennium "**)-
"***, for instance, approximately ninety Italian vessels left the British ports to the 
Cape, and more than ),% of them departed from Cardiff359. The reference to the 
following period is made out of the absence of archival sources referring to the 
previous one. Cross-quotations and secondary literature suggest the relative 
continuative presence of Camogli's ships in the area.  
One of the leading causes underlying this coal movement lied into steamers' 
success in the Indian Ocean: in order to navigate, steamships needed significant 
quantities of coal, which was scarce in these regions. In broader terms, the Suez 
Canal increased the presence of steamships in Asia; then, steamships stimulated 
the regional demands for coal, whose transport, paradoxically, was performed on 
sailing vessels and passed through the Cape instead of the Canal. Somehow, steam 
navigation nurtured its sail counterpart by providing abundant and incessant coal 
freights. From the opposite perspective, the low operational costs met by sailing 
vessels constituted an indispensable factor for steam navigation to expand into 
peripherical markets, where its economic sustainability depended on the 
availability of low-cost coal supplies.  
After their arrival to the Cape, some ships continued to the ports of the Far East 
to discharge coal or ballast and then reached Rangoon, Singapore, Batavia or 
Moulmein, from where most of them loaded rice or teak cargoes360. In the already 
 
359 ACS, Ministero della Marina, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Divisione premi 
compensi e tasse, Movimento nazionale nei porti esteri, Capetown, b. .)-$&.  
360 Ibidem.  
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mentioned declarations of Italian shipowners at the Inquiry, rice trade played the 
same role of guano: in their perception, it represented a crucial transport to which 
sailing ships would have always succeeded over steam361. Throughout the "*%,s, 
the rice trade became so strategic for the Southeast Asia area that, in the coeval 
common understanding, the places of exportation of the eastern cereal were 
defined as «rice ports» ("porti del riso")362. Once again, most of the rice cargoes 
were demanded by the British market: from "*), to "**,, rice imports to the 
United Kingdom rose dramatically from ".'('.,,, to %.*$$.,,, cwts363.  
As a testimonium of Camogli's presence within rice trade, the Maritime 
Museum of Camogli kept some charter party receipts belonging to Emanuele 
Boggiano, a leading shipowner during the "*%,s and "**,s364. The survival of this 
document is of fundamental importance for reconstructing the mechanisms of 
chartering vessels and, in general, to analyse the shipping practices of the period. 
The contract, dated to London, 'th April "**,, concerned the chartering of the 
barque Quaker City (*%# t.) belonging to Boggiano365, by the G.B. Haynes company 
of London, under the mediation of the shipbroker company H. Clarkson & Co. The 
document prescribed a medium-term arrangement: at the moment of the 
agreement, the ship was said to be «at Rice Ports or left for Europe»366. Then, «after 
completion of present voyage it shall have option to load for the East, River Plate 
 
361 Inchiesta sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana, vol. &, pp. &+/-&$..  
362 About the development of the international rice market, in particular from Burma delta, see: 
M. Adas, The Burma Delta: Economic Development and Social Change on an Asian Rice Frontier. 
$>L!-$M#$, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, &5)/. See also, P.A. Coclanis, “Distant Thunder: 
The Creation of a World Market in Rice and the Transformations it Wrought”, The American 
Historical Review, No. 51: /, &55+, pp. &4.4-&4)1; Idem, “Southeast Asia's Incorporation into the 
World Rice Market: A Revisionist View”, Journal of South-East Asian Studies, No. */: *, &55+, pp. 
*.&-*$).  
363 J. Glover, “Tonnage Statistics of the decade &114-&154”, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 
.., No. *, &15*, p. *4), Table I - Showing the quantities of certain articles exported and imported in 
&1$4, &1)4, &114 and &154.  
364 CMMC, Contratti di noleggio e vari, Contratto di noleggio “Quaker City” &114.   
365 The barque Quaker City was registered in the &11+ list of the Mutua. See, CMMC, 
Assicurazioni varie, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione 
Marittima Camogliese. In that year, the Quaker City composed Emanuele Boggiano’s personal fleet 
together with the Rocco Schiaffino (&4+4 t.) and the Fedele (/)1 t.).  
366 CMMC, Contratti di noleggio e vari, Contratto di noleggio “Quaker City” &114. 
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or Port on the way»367. Hence, therefore, the ship «shall sail and proceed as ordered 
at the port of discharge of the outward cargo of Akyab, or Elephant Point, Rangoon 
or Diamond Island, Bassein, for orders (to be given within &* hours)»368. Finally, it 
«shall load from the said Charterer or his Agents, a full and complete cargo of 
Cargo Rice in Bags»369. On its way back to Europe, «being so loaded, it shall 
therewith proceed to Queenstown, Scilly, Plymouth or Falmouth for orders, to 
discharge at a good and safe port in the United Kingdom or on the Continent 
between Bordeaux or Hamburg»370.  
Similar and somehow complementary in terms of geographic proximity was the 
teak trade, which took place in the same broader regional area and followed the 
same route pattern371. Unfortunately, the paucity of available sources prevents us 
from delimiting the chronological limits within which the ships of Camogli 
devoted to this trade. In the proceedings of the Inquiry ("**#), only the consul of 
Hamburg mentioned teak transports from the Burma delta: interestingly, however, 
he refers to teak as an unexploited opportunity, which could complement rice 
cargoes and enlarge the spectrum of available cargoes in the Southeast Asian 
region372.  Thus, although an earlier establishment in the "*%,s might be 
farfetched, inevitably some ships of Camogli engage to teak trade in the late "**,s. 
It is the case, for instance, of the barques Calunnia (*%, t.), Draguette (%#* t.) and 
Stella B. (*), t.) which, between "**) and "*$,, were recorded in Moulmein and 








371 For a general overview, see: C. Rai, Control and Prosperity: the teak business in Siam $>>2s-
$M7!, Hamburg: PhD Dissertation, *4&$.  
372 Inchiesta sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana, vol. &, p. *54.  
373 ACS, Ministero della Marina, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Divisione premi 
compensi e tasse, Movimento nazionale nei porti esteri, Capetown, b. .)-$&. The three ships were 
captained respectively by Prospero Schiappacasse, Davide Schiaffino and Antonio Figari.  
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).).".  THE RESILIENCE AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY (%,53S-%5%$) 
 
Differently from the conditions of the previous decades, the archival material to 
outline the maritime activities of Camogli from the late "**,s to "$"& is vast and 
offers a wealth of information. The primary source is embodied by the enormous 
archival collection of logbooks of the Ligurian merchant marine, which is kept in 
the State Archives of Genoa and covers the period from "**" to the mid-twentieth 
century374. Among the Italian maritime historians, this source has rarely been 
exploited: only Paolo Frascani addressed, in a seminal article, the potential of 
logbooks to investigate the history of Italian shipping and seafaring during the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth-century375. The lack of studies might be 
reconducted to the delays of the inventory process within the Italian archival 
system, as in the actual case of Genoa. Indeed, the State Archives of Genoa made 
available their vast collection of logbooks only in the last years.  
The utilisation of logbooks within the Italian merchant marine was regulated by 
the "*%$ Regolamento che approva l'esecuzione del testo unico del Codice della 
Marina Mercantile376. Despite within the "*)) "Code for the merchant marine" 
logbooks were mentioned, their usage in onboard bureaucratic practices was taken 
for granted377. In "*%$, instead, from articles (&' to ()", it is possible to find all the 
instructions and regulations concerning logbooks. According to the law, there 
were three different typologies of logbooks: ") general logbook; #) navigation 
logbook; () hold logbook. The captain exerted absolute responsibility over the first 
one, which contained all the relevant information concerning the voyage, such as 
the crew lists, their payments, the eventual accidents and, more broadly, all the 
 
374 The archival collection of logbooks kept in the State Archives of Genoa kept the logbooks of 
*4)1 different ships, from the &114s to the &5.4s.  
375 P. Frascani, “Tra la bussola e il negozio: uomini, rotte e traffici nei giornali di bordo delle navi 
a vela dell’144”, Società e storia, &44, *44+, pp. /1)-.&4. Some references can be found also in: Id., 
“Una comunità in viaggio: dal racconto dei giornali di bordo delle navi napoletane (&1$&-&544)”, in 
Id., A vela e a vapore, pp. &&/-&&..  
376 Regio decreto !2 novembre $>1M n. L$DD.  
377 Codice per la marina mercantile del regno d’Italia, Milano: Fratelli Borroni, &1$., p. +*, art. 5*.   
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data which the captain deemed needed to record378. The navigation logbook, 
instead, could be compiled either by the captain or the mate: it provided the 
information and measures concerning the route, with details about atmospheric 
events and manoeuvres379. Finally, the hold logbook was routinely updated by the 
mate under the captain supervision. Structured schematically, it contained 
valuable information related to the cargo, including the place and dates of loading 
and discharge, the nature and quantity of the merchandises and the names of 
charterers and consigners380.   
Despite each type offers outstanding potential for maritime studies, having in 
mind to investigate the traffics carried out by Camogli's ships from the "*$,s to 
the First World War, we opted for concentrating on the third type, the hold 
logbooks.  
Cross-investigations allowed us to identify seventeen logbooks which are 
undoubtedly attributable to Camogli shipowners: their operations cover the 
chronological arc from "**" to "$"&, distributed into &,* different routes. In this 
case, we chose to define as «route» all the voyages from one port to another aimed 
to load or discharge the cargo in its majority (even if the ship was on ballast); 
therefore it does not include the eventual intermediate ports of call (which 
whatsoever are seldom recorded in the hold logbooks).  
In the structure of our analysis, for each route, we noted the ports of loading 
and discharge and the nature of the merchandise. Owing to the great variety of 
these elements, both the ports and the cargoes were then grouped in broader 
categories. While the ports were naturally clustered into macro-areas according to 
geographical proximity, as far as the commodities were concerned, we decided to 
categorise them according to their functions and intended use. Thus, we obtained 




378 Regio decreto !2 novembre $>1M n. L$DD, art. +/)-+/1.  
379 Idem, art. +/5-+.4.  
380 Idem, art. +.&.  
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Table +./. Categories of ports and merchandises.  
 
!.!.-.#.  The geography of Camogli's sailing cross-trade 
 
During the period between "**" and "$"&, Camogli's specialisation into oceanic 
cross-trade of bulky cargoes reached its apex. In particular, the null correlation 
with domestic production considerably affected the first outgoing leg from the 
Mediterranean to the outer seas. Conversely, returning to the Mediterranean 
systematically implied the procurement of cargoes destined either to Genoa or 
Marseille. In tight continuity with the previous phases, beginning with "**', many 
captains resorted to subsidised coal shipments as to return to Italian ports with 
cargo381.  
In general, although in the "*%,s and "**,s Camogli had expanded its range to 
the outskirts of the Pacific Ocean, in the last period most of the activities seem to 
concentrate around a figurative triangle between Europe, North-America and 
Latin America. To outline more evidently the geographical patterns of Camogli's 
shipping, we chose to submit their whole scheme, with regard to the broader 
regional areas of loading and discharge. The difference between the two tables 
owed to our choice to distinguish between voyages with cargo and on ballast, in 
order to achieve a more refined understanding of the commercial and shipping 
networks to which Camogli seafarers participated. Tables (.' and (.) represent all 
the routes collected in Camogli's logbooks except for those belonging to the 
voyages of two steamers (counting to ",$), which will be treated in a separate 
section.  
 
381 The issue of subsidised routes and the development of maritime protectionism within the 
Italian merchant marine, see Chapter /; see also, S. Palmer, “The British Coal Export Trade, &1.4-
&5&+”, in D. Alexander and R. Ommer, Volume not Values: Canadian sailing ships and the world trade, 
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Table +.$. Geography of Camogli’s routes on ballast (&11$-&5&/). Source: ASGe, Giornali nautici.  
 
From a first general overview, Tables (.' and (.) illustrate two totally different 
patterns as to regard the interactions between the ports of loading and discharge. 
More broadly, however, it is possible to discern an absolute predominance of the 
Atlantic area – which can be reconducted to the broader categories of Atlantic 
Europe (EUR atla) and to the east coasts of North and Latin America respectively 
(NA east and SA east). Indeed, among the voyages with cargoes, these three areas 
taken altogether encompass %#,"#% of the loading ports and '',(,% of the 
discharging ports. More precisely, the weighty role of Northern American region 
was much more considerable as far as loading ports were concerned, whereas the 
Latin American ports covered a primary role as cargo destinations; the 
contribution of Atlantic Europe was instead slightly balanced between the two382. 
On the opposite side, an examination of ballast voyages highlights the purely 
exporting position of North America, where ended up )$,*)% of the routes 
 
382 The North American ports accounted for +.,1/% and &+,*)% respectively, whereas Southern 
American ports for &.,4/% and */,)1% and Atlantic Europe for *&,*/% and &),*.%. See, ASGe, 
Giornali nautici, &11&-&5&/. 
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without cargo, as much as the total absence of exports from the Mediterranean 
area (&',#"% of Camogli's voyages on ballast departed from the Mediterranean).  
Furthermore, going deeper into the analysis of the trade relationships between 
specific areas, the North American outbound voyages towards Mediterranean 
Europe and Latin America cover the most considerable share of the routes sailed 
by the ships of Camogli, followed by those to Atlantic Europe and the ones from 
there to Latin America. In sum, Camogli's seafarers sailed with continuity across 
the Atlantic both in the horizontal and vertical directions, carrying out trades 
inside a sort of nineteenth-century version of the "Atlantic commercial triangle". 
Usually, the permanence of the ships outside the Mediterranean lasted from one 
year and a half to more than two years. For example, the barque Edinburgh ("#$$ 
t.), belonging to Biagio Mortola, remained from July "$," to October "$,( outside 
the Mediterranean waters, after having carried out commercial operations in 
Cadiz, Buenos Ayres, Port Elizabeth (South Africa), Pensacola (US.), Hamburg and 
Pensacola again383.  
Quite surprisingly, therefore, the presence of Camogli in the waters of the 
Pacific seems to rarefy in the last decade of the century and before the First World 
War: on the one hand, owing to the growth of Ligurian-born local merchant 
marines, which hoisted the Latin American flags, the actual Italians might have 
been cut off from the area. Furthermore, the gradual disappearance of the natural 
resources of guano and the subsequent loss of centrality of the Camogli-born 
community in Lima might have played a role in this regard384.  
About the absence of Camogli from the Southeast Asian ports, instead, might 
be more complicated to find reasonable explanations with no further sources: 
perhaps, although rice and teak transports proved to be resistant to transition for 
an extended period after "*)$, at the turn of the century such process was 
accomplished. To corroborate this assumption, we may underline that almost all 
 
383 The logbook of the barque Edinburgh is exceptional within our sample even for its typology, 
being a general logbook (the hold logbook was nowhere to be found). Nevertheless, owing to the 
outstanding precision and abundancy of details which the captains deployed in the composition of 
the general logbook, we were able to reconstruct the routes and cargoes of the ship even in absence 
of the apposite logbook. See, ASGe, Giornali nautici, n. $4*/&.  
384 For a broader analysis, see Chapter $.  
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of the shipments related to this area were concentrated between "**" and "*$#. 
Thus, the shrinkage of the chronological sample would result in a reasonably 
sizable ),)%% of Southeast Asian loading ports ("**"-"*$#), as opposed to the 
,,),% of the following period ("*$(-"$"&)385. 
Now, after a brief introduction concerning the route patterns of Camogli cross-
trade, the same argument will be outlined more extensively through the analysis 
of single trades under the lens of the specific commodity transported. In the end, 
the entanglements between different merchandises and distinct regional areas will 
allow us to reconstruct the subtle but coherent organisation of Camogli's 
international shipping in its last decades.  
   
!.!.-.-.  Merchandises 
 
The following pages will target single commodities whose transport was central 
within Camogli's late-nineteenth-century shipping. Accordingly, the analysis will 
mainly deal with timber and wood products in general, fossil fuels and foodstuff, 
leaving to the broader discourse any noteworthy detail concerning the raw 
material for industries, construction materials and fertilisers.  
For its overwhelming importance, the timber trade is the first commodity to 
taken into account. Out of #() voyages with cargo, in (',),% of the occasions the 
ships of Camogli transported timber of any kind.  
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Table +.). Camogli’s timber trade (&11$-&5&/). Source: ASGe, Giornali nautici.  
 
In representing the geography of Camogli’s participation to timber trade, the 
Table (.% provides a first enlightenment about the predominance of North 
American ports within our previous figures. The absolute majority of shipments 
from this area, indeed, concerned timber trade, in particular in its pitch-pine 
version, which underwent a massive commercialisation in the second half of the 
nineteenth century386. More precisely, most of the exports of pitch-pine were 
concentrated in the Gulf area, along the coasts of the US states of Florida, Alabama 
and Mississippi387. From our data collection, evidence suggests the predominance 
of the port of Pensacola, followed by Gulfport and Mobile. According to an official 
statistic of "$"(, these three districts – taken together – exported more than half of 
the US yellow pitch-pine lumber and two-thirds of sawed pitch-pine timber388. In 
the case of Camogli, the port of Pensacola corresponds to the most frequented port 
to load cargoes overall. Still in the early twentieth century, sailing vessels were a 
valid alternative to steam for timber and lumber shipments. Sails were favoured by 
the exporters because of the relatively less complex organisation required to load 
medium-sized sailing vessels in comparison with large steamers389. In particular, 
 
386 See, E.E. Pratt (ed.), The export lumber trade of the United States, Washington: Government 
Printing Office, &5&1.  
387 J.A. Eisterhold, “Lumber and Trade in Pensacola and West Florida: &144-&1$4”, The Florida 
Historical Quarterly, .&, No. +, &5)+, pp. *$)-*14; Idem, “Charleston: Lumber and Trade in a 
declining Southern Port”, The South Carolina Historical Magazine, )/, No. *, &5)+, pp. $&-)*; Idem, 
“Lumber and Trade in Lower Mississippi Valley and New Orleans, &144-&1$4”, Louisiana History: 
The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association, &+, No. &, &5)*, pp. )&-5&; O. Clubbs, “Pensacola 
in Retrospect: &1)4-&154”, The Florida Historical Quarterly, +), No. +, &5.5, pp. +))-+5$.  
388 E.E. Pratt (ed.), The export lumber trade, pp. &)-&1. The distinction between lumber and 
timber is related to different processing degrees of the wood. Timber identifies cut and sawn wood, 
which still retains its original form; lumber involves more processes and corresponds to the wood 
exported in form of boards, planks and deals.  
389 Idem, pp. ..-.).  
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the possibility to deal with smaller cargoes was seen with favour by single sewing 
enterprises rather than by large companies.  
From Pensacola and, more broadly, the whole Northern American region, 
timber and lumber were transported either to Latin America or to Europe. Going 
to Europe directly meant seldomly the best option in terms of shipping 
productivity: since most of the westward crossings of the Atlantic were on ballast, 
European ships needed to obtain more than one freight to have a return from the 
operational costs. In this historical phase, Camogli's vessels practised pure tramp 
shipping. Thus, they rarely sailed along linear routes – back and forth within the 
same trade – but fancied more complicated trades. For example, at their first arrival 
to Pensacola from Europe, many ships opted for accepting freights to the Plata 
region, where pitch-pine was widely sought for internal constructional purposes390.  
From Plata, Camogli ships were usually presented with two options: either 
returning on ballast to Pensacola (or the nearby ports) to resume pitch-pine trade 
or accepting freights to Europe. Interestingly, in some instances, the shipment of 
pitch-pine lumber to these ports was followed by the transport of a different variety 
of wood product, the quebracho. The commercialisation of this specific typology 
was connected to its unique characteristics, which made it widely appreciated in 
leather manufacturing as a natural dye. Quebracho was mostly shipped to Europe 
and especially to Genoa, thus representing one of the possible cargoes for Camogli 
ships to return loaded to the Mediterranean directly. 
Nevertheless, among the goods which Camogli's vessels exported from Buenos 
Ayres and Montevideo to Europe, on more than one-third of the instances 
((&,#$%) these were animal bones391. This merchandise found employment in 
agriculture as a natural fertiliser, in the same fashion of Peruvian guano and 
Chilean nitrates. The ships of Camogli transported animal bones mainly to various 
ports of the UK (Glasgow and Berwick) and Northern Europe (Rotterdam, 
 
390 Idem, p. &&+. Between &11& and &5&/, pitch-pine cargoes arrived to Buenos Ayres (&/), 
Montevideo (.), Rosario (*) and to Rio de Janeiro, Bahia Blanca and Santa Fé (&).  
391 The cargoes of animal bones from Buenos Ayres, Montevideo and Santa Fé were &&, ) and & 
respectively. ASGe, Giornali nautici.  
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Hamburg and Dunkerque). Only once, this type of cargo was brought to the 
Mediterranean, to Savona.  
Calling to one of the Atlantic European ports could be followed either by the 
return to the Mediterranean, in order to change the crew and anchor the ship for 
maintenance, or by the continuation of tramping. The way back to Genoa, as said, 
was usually associated with the transport of coal cargoes. Starting from "**', the 
shipment of coal from outside the Mediterranean to the Italian ports benefitted 
from public subventions granted in the wake of the maritime protectionist policy 
which the Italian state adopted to aid the national merchant marine392. However, 
the premium, calculated in " lira per ton of coal, was reserved to ships built in the 
Italian shipyards (much state efforts targeted the protection and development of 
national shipbuilding)393. Therefore, as the shipowners of Camogli began to 
purchase their iron-hulled barques and full-rigged ships on the second-hand 
foreign market, the effectiveness of the incentive faded gradually. Nevertheless, 
even without subsidies, British coal remained a steadily sought option by the ships 
of Camogli, which – it might be worth reminding – had been sailing along this 
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392 See, Legge D dicembre $>>L, n. 7L#1. Sui provvedimenti riguardo alla marina mercantile. See, 
also its update: Legge !7 luglio $>MD, n. 7$>. Riflettente la concessione di compensi di costruzione e 
premi di navigazione ai piroscafi ed ai velieri nazionali.  
393 See Chapter / and also: E. Corbino, “Il protezionismo marittimo in Italia: le industrie 
marittime fino al &11.”, Giornale degli economisti e rivista di statistica, $&, No. &&, &5*&, pp. +)4-+15; 
Idem, “Il protezionismo marittimo in Italia”, Giornale degli economisti e rivista di statistica, $*, No. 
*, &5**, pp. $.-1&; E. Giretti, “I succhioni della marina mercantile”, Giornale degli economisti, +4, 
&54., pp. +)-.5. 
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Table +.1. Camogli’s trade in fossil fuels (&11$-&5&/). Source: ASGe, Giornali nautici.  
As we have seen in the previous sections, British coal was also transported to 
different places than the Mediterranean. Being the most demanded merchandise 
of the globe, coal was shipped everywhere: not surprisingly, Table (.* illustrates 
how one-third of the coal shipments from Atlantic Europe were directed to South 
Africa (Cape Town and Port Elizabeth)394. Once again, by supplying with coal 
cargoes highly demanding areas, the ships of Camogli sailed along one of the most 
strategic routes for global shipping.  
From the late "**,s, the success of a new typology of fossil fuel – oil – led to the 
creation of new route patterns and, in the following century, rose to wholly replace 
coal and, as a result, favoured the passing of the torch from the United Kingdom 
to the US as world-leading powers. The presence of Camogli in this trade is not 
intense and systematic: oil was loaded in three different ports (New York, 
Philadelphia and Savannah), all of them being along the US east coast. Oil, 
commercialised in tins or boxes, was shipped to the most different ports, Latin 
America (Montevideo), Southeast Asia (Batavia) and to the Mediterranean 
(Palermo, Catania, Alger and Alessandria).  
Remaining in the discourse of fossil fuels, some Camogli ships transported shale 
oil from Sidney, on account of the Australian Kerosene, Oil and Minerals 
Company395. Shale oil was extracted from shale rocks through the application of 
various thermal and chemical processes. The final product showed qualities 
comparable to petrol. In general, the inclusion of Australia within the route pattern 
of Camogli took place from the "*$,s, but it reached an actual continuity in the 
twentieth century. To the Australian ports, Camogli ships travelled either on 
ballast or with the rarest general cargoes; there, they retrieved shale, railway 
sleepers, chrome and timber. For example, in "$,,, the barque Andaman  ($"$ t.), 
ownership of Gaetano Olivari, reached Sidney after having discharged in Port 
Elizabeth (South Africa) a cargo of coal and concrete retrieved in London396. There, 
 
394 See, A. Mabin, “The rise and decline of Port Elizabeth, &1.4-&544”, The International Journal 
of African Historical Studies, No. &5: *, &51$, pp. *).-+4+.  
395 See, ASGe, Giornali nautici, n. &&5/&. 
396 ASGe, Giornali nautici, n. &&5/&.  
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the captain embarked shale destined to Genoa. After a few years spent between 
Marseille and the French Caribs (Martinique and Guadalupe), in "$,&, the 
Andaman left the French port with the load full of bricks to be discharged in 
Dunedin (New Zealand). Then, the return cargo was found in Queensland 
(Australia), where the captain filled the hold with chrome to Baltimore ("$,'). 
From there, not surprisingly, the Andaman returned to the well-known pitch-pine 
trade from Gulfport to Buenos Ayres and, finally, loaded quebracho to Genoa 
("$,)).  
Finally, turning back to the available cargo options for Camogli ships in the 
Atlantic area, it might be worth noting the few existing profitable freights for 
covering the passage from Europe to America. Indeed, in commenting Table (.' 
and (.), we underlined how most of the westward voyages to the Americas were 
on ballast. For Camogli, the lack of profitable outbound cargoes from Europe was 
associated with the absence of bulky merchandises. Indeed, the European 
countries exported to America mainly two cargo typologies: passengers, whose 
transportation was the first to be absorbed by steamships397 and general cargoes, 
which rapidly followed the same path. Therefore, it was natural that sailing vessels 
serving on tramping routes would hardly find outbound bulky cargoes to America. 
Nevertheless, the constant presence of Camogli's vessels in the port of Cadiz might 
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Table +.5. Camogli’s trade in foodstuff (&11$-&5&/). Source: ASGe, Giornali nautici.  
As seen in Table (.$, from "**$ to "$"&, many ships called at Cadiz to load sea 
salt cargoes toward Latin America before engaging the Atlantic. The frequency and 
repetition of these cases might imply the inclusion of this trade within a more 
systematic route network in which reliability upon outbound cargoes to Latin 
America was fundamental to increase cost-efficiency. Among the merchandises 
included under the "foodstuff" category in Table (.$, sea salt is indeed the most 
recurrent (&#,)#%). Although Cadiz covered the absolute majority of the cases, sea 
salt was loaded in Ibiza and Trapani as well: then, most of the shipments went to 
Montevideo ("#) and Buenos Ayres ($). Less systematic seem to be the US demands 
for European sea salt, as it was possible to count only one cargo each for Portland 
and Halifax.  
Another commodity which we labelled under the foodstuff category was wheat. 
As said, Camogli had a long history into wheat trade. However, following the loss 
of the commercial competition for the Black Sea grain with steam, the ships of 
Camogli were rarely seen engaging in this specific trade. Nevertheless, the 
transformation of the international wheat market and the integration of extra-
European productors (United States, Argentina and Australia) provided new 
opportunities. Actually, the contribution of Camogli to these flows was never 
crucial; the load of wheat cargoes in the Americas (Montevideo, Buenos Ayres but 
also New York and Philadelphia) was still a rare event (#,)'% of the total routes 
with cargo)398. The practice of wheat trade was completely a-systematic: as in many 
other cases, it was transported to Europe (mostly UK and Northern European 
ports) as an improvised return cargo, within the lack of organisation which wholly 
reflects the tramp shipping model.  
 
 
398 ASGe, Giornali nautici.  
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!.!.-.!.  The steam fleet of Camogli: routes and shipping patterns  
 
As said, starting from the early twentieth century, some shipowners of Camogli 
attempted to transition from sail to steam and purchased, with the same attitude 
demonstrated for sail vessels, second-hand steamers in the foreign markets. 
Despite the relatively minor importance of steamships within the general 
framework of Camogli's shipping, the analysis of the primary features of their 
routes and the commercial use which the shipowners of Camogli made out of them 
might be somehow useful. On the one hand, it will serve to outline the sharp 
differentiation between the shipping markets for sail and steam; on the other hand, 
some features will help us to outline a sort of continuity in Camogli's approach 
towards the two.  
Among the hold logbooks in our possession, the following analysis will draw 
from the ones of two steamers, Deipara ("&,# t.) and Luigino ("(#" t.)399. They 
belonged respectively to Gaetano Maggiolo and Emanuele Bozzo who, at the same 
time, owned also sailing vessels400. From our recognition of the logbook archival 
collection kept in Genoa, we also identified the hold logbook of a third steamer, 
the Filippo Chicca (()% t.), ownership of Stefano Razeto. Due to its limited tonnage, 
it only engaged to Italian cabotage. Therefore, the inclusion of a ship presenting so 
strikingly different structural characteristics would have hindered the sample 
consistency: given that, the Filippo Chicca will remain outside of our analysis.  
Firstly, the primary element to propose a distinction between sail and steam lies 
in the observation of the respective rates of voyages with cargo and on ballast. 
Indeed, whereas concerning sailing vessels the number of voyages on ballast 
reached almost one-fourth of the total (#&,&"%), the figure sharply decreases 
("",,"%) as far as steamers are concerned. In other words, even in the hands of 
shipowners who were traditionally bound to sail shipping, steamers productivity 
was higher than its counterpart.  
 
399 ASGe, Giornali nautici, n. ..)/& and &&++/&.  
400 According to the &54* Italian register, Emanuele Bozzo possessed also the barque Maria 
Madre B. ()// t.) and Gaetano Maggiolo owned the barque Caterina G. ($*) t.). See, Registro 
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Table +.&4. Geography of Camogli's routes with cargo – Steamers (&11&-&5&/). Source: ASGe, Giornali 
nautici, n. ..)/& and &&++/&. 
 
Secondly, Table (.", outlines a totally different scenario with regard to route 
patterns. The analysis of the voyages with cargo underlines the dramatic 
discontinuity between sailing vessels, whose core point was the Atlantic ocean, and 
steamships. Indeed, most of the commercial activities concerned the 
Mediterranean and Atlantic Europe, with the substantial participation of Northern 
African ports. With the partial exception of Western Europe, all the mentioned 
regions covered a secondary role within the geography of Camogli's sailing tramp 
shipping. In the case of steamers, instead, they were central. In particular, 
concerning the loading ports, the share of the Mediterranean area, comprehending 
both the European and the Northern African shores, increased from "*,"&% to 
)',$*%. In broader terms, the steamers of Camogli, notwithstanding their 
remarkable tonnages, engaged mostly to the Mediterranean cabotage.  
Moreover, a comparative overview of the cargoes transported within their 
traffics might lead us to achieve a better understanding of the nature of these 




Figure +.). Merchandises transported by Deipara and Luigino. Source: ASGe, Giornali nautici, n. 
..)/& and &&++/&.  
First of all, in contrast to the general trends of steam shipping, Camogli's 
steamers rarely transported general cargoes (",,(,% of the total). Apart from the 
already mentioned Filippo Chicca, which engaged to national cabotage and 
established regular connections between Genoa and Naples, the rarest occasions 
in which Deipara and Luigino carried general cargoes (mainly composed of various 
foodstuff articles) either involved a passage to Buenos Ayres (in "$,), the first 
recorded voyage of Deipara) or were directed to Odessa and Alessandria. Indeed, 
rather than engaging to regular liner connections, the shipowners of Camogli 
opted for using steamers in the same manner of sailing vessels. Indeed, they were 
mainly deployed into the transport of bulky merchandises within the 
Mediterranean/Atlantic range, where sailing vessels had lost their competitiveness 
during the previous decades.  
One of the leading indicators of such an approach might be identified in the 
return, after roughly three decades, to the Black Sea ports. Between "$,, and "$",, 
indeed, both Luigino and Deipara called at the wheat ports of Taganrog (' times), 
Odessa (#), Braila (#), Berdyansk, Novorossiysk and Theodosia (" time each). The 



















shipowners of Camogli, who had built their fortunes on the Black Sea trade before 
turning to oceanic routes as a result of the transition. Therefore, there is no 
surprise about the fact that, after completing the transition, the ships of Camogli 
would have returned to the Black Sea ports. Then, owing to the mentioned global 
transformations of the cereal trade, all the wheat was discharged within the 
Mediterranean basin, mainly in Genoa, but also in Marseille, Venice and in 
Southern Italy.  
Another traditional merchandise to which Camogli's steamers engaged was 
coal. As said, although it lost part of its importance, the transport of British coal 
remained essential within the tramp shipping system of Camogli as a fundamental 
resource to obtain return cargoes to the Mediterranean. For steamers, instead, coal 
transports from the British ports to Genoa and Savona (with the slightest 
participation of Alessandria, Syros and Piraeus) recovered their centrality ("),&$% 
against (,'&% of sailing vessels). Interestingly, within the broader category of fossil 
fuels, also Camogli steamers engaged to oil transports (#,,)% of the total voyages 
with cargo). However, instead of retrieving it from the United States, the Luigino 
loaded oil – in boxes – at the port of Batum, on the easternmost shores of the Black 
Sea401. The Luigino called at Batum two times, firstly in "$,, and then five years 
afterwards. On the first instance, it brought it to Lisbon; on the second to 
Alessandria402.   
Moreover, throughout the first decade of the century, Camogli's steamships 
specialised into three specific types of transport of bulk merchandises: iron ore, 
pyrite and phosphate. To this regard, it is worth mentioning that, for handling 
these commodities, the steam fleet of Camogli showed wholly comparable 
 
401 For an overview about the easternmost region of the Black Sea area, see: G. Harlaftis, V. 
Konstantinova, I. Lyman, A. Sydorenko and E. Tchkoizde (eds.), Between grain and oil from the Azov 
to the Caucasus: the port cities of the eastern coast of the Black Sea, late $>th – early !2th century, 
Rethymon: Centre of Maritime History IMS-FORTH, *4*4. In particular about oil trade, see: E. 
Tchkoizde, “Oil and soil: the role of Batoum’s economic development in shaping of political 
significance of the Caucasus”, in G. Harlaftis et al. (eds.), Between grain and oil from the Azov to the 
Caucasus, pp. /$&-.**.  
402 ASGe, Giornali nautici, &&++/&.  
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characteristics with the coeval British steam tramp shipping403. Iron ore was 
usually loaded in North African (Alger) and Italian ports (Rio Marina, in the Elba 
Island). Then, it was discharged in Venice (# times), Ancona (#), Glasgow (#), 
Newport (#), Rotterdam and Genoa (" each)404. Pyrite, instead, was mainly 
retrieved in the port of Huelva ("& times), in Spain, and, secondarily in Stratoni (#), 
north of Greece: the commercialisation of this mineral was usually associated with 
the production of sulfuric acid405. Finally, the steamers of Camogli loaded 
phosphate in Northern Africa, in Sfax ("# voyages), from where it was destined to 
Venice () times), Cartagena (#), Genoa, Galatz, Rotterdam and Belfast (" each). 




This chapter aimed to outline the evolution of Camogli’s maritime activities in 
the age of the transition from sail to steam. During this historical phase, the 
application of technological improvements to navigation and the advent of steam 
shipping entangled with broader transformations which revolutionised the 
previous transport system. At the turn of the century, international shipping 
business was dramatically modified: in particular, it was divided into two distinct 
sectors, liner and tramp shipping, being the former specialised to general cargo 
and passenger transports and the latter to bulk cargo. In light of these global 
processes, in the same period the seafaring community of Camogli underwent an 
extraordinary growth (from the "*),s to the early "**,s) followed by a steady 
decline (late "**,s-"$"&) which culminated into the loss of the remaining fleet 
throughout the First World War. Although the economic roots of the rising phase 
lied into the successful establishment of Camogli’s shipping within the Black Sea 
trade of the previous decades, the readjustment to the mutated conditions of the 
 
403 R.S. Craig, “Aspects of tramp shipping and ownership”, in K. Matthews and G. Panting, Ships 
and Shipbuilding in the North Atlantic Region, St. John’s Newfoundland: Memorial University of 
Newfoundland, &5)1, pp. *4)-**1.   
404 ASGe, Giornali nautici, n. ..)/& and &&++/&.  
405 Ibidem.  
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international seaborne trade as a result of the onset of steam shipping is still 
remarkable. Not only Camogli shipowners survived to the loss of their prevalent 
source of income (the transport of the Black Sea grain), but also managed to 
increase shipping profits and, by investing them in shipbuilding, to enhance the 
position of their community within the international shipping world. In terms of 
economic shipping trends, the declining cycle begun in the early "*%,s took the 
shape of a global freight crisis: then, the contraction of profits paired with the 
difficulties for Italian shipping to engage the path of transition pushed the 
Camogli’s maritime activities to increasingly marginal routes. From the "*$,s 
onward, Camogli shipowners entered into the resilience phase. The high rates of 
purchases on the second-hand market and the rise of the mean age of the fleet 
pointed out the qualitative decline of shipping in comparison with the previous 
period. Finally, the attempt to transition, marked by the creation of a modest steam 
tramp fleet might indicate, in its own configuration, the incipient structural 









PART II   
THE MARITIME COMMUNITY “WITHIN”:  
SHIPOWNERS AND SEAFARERS  
 "*( 
A. SHIPOWNERS AND THE EVOLUTION OF MARITIME 
BUSINESS IN CAMOGLI 
 
Introduction 
This chapter aims to outline the historical trajectory of Camogli’s shipping 
business from the perspective of the shipowning elites composing the community. 
In particular, it highlights the relationships between the development of maritime 
activities from Tyrrhenian cabotage to oceanic tramp shipping and the mutations 
which modified the nature of shipownership. Similarly to what done for maritime 
activities, the present chapter aims to delineate the efforts of the Camogli 
shipowning elites to readjust to the transformations occurred within the shipping 
business.  
In the first section, the chapter reconstructs the activities of some of the most 
influential shipowners and shipping families of Camogli.    
Then, in the second section, the reliance upon the forms of shared-ownership 
and the cardinal role of family and community mechanisms in shaping Camogli's 
maritime success is at the centre of the analysis. Great emphasis is also on the 
formation of a collective maritime credit system. To this purpose, the role of 
Camogli's mutual maritime insurance association in developing forms of 
interdependence in the local shipping business is taken into account.  
The third section focuses on the rising phase ("*),s-"*%,s). It aims to correlate 
the development which Camogli underwent from the infrastructural, social and 
cultural points of view with the individual activism and collective dedication of the 
shipowners' class toward the whole community.  
Then, reminding the critical role of the technological transition to alter the 
dynamics of the nineteenth-century shipping market, the fourth section will 
outline the shipowners' interests and decision-making in dealing with this issue. 
In particular, the section will primarily draw from the proceedings of the National 
Inquiry for the conditions of the merchant marine, to which Camogli's shipowners 
actively participated. To provide an insight into the troublesome conditions in 
which Camogli entered from the "*%,s onwards, the chapter attempts to outline 
 "*& 
the financial difficulties experienced by local shipowners. In particular, the crisis 
of the community is presented under the light of structural, conjunctural, 
communitarian and individual events. Indeed, the late-nineteenth-century 
shipping which Camogli underwent derived from factors which operated on 
various levels: structural, as the global transformations and the characteristics of 
small-scale shipping centres influenced the potential evolution of the Ligurian 
community; conjunctural, as the freight crisis hit Camogli's shipowners in the 
moment of their greatest weakness (late "*%,s); communitarian, as widespread 
decisions accelerated or delayed crucial processes; individual, since personal 
choices, initiatives and business skills still played a decisive role in determining 
either the resilience or the catastrophe of single shipping enterprises.   
 
C.8. Shipping families of Camogli (8PE?-8T8E) 
 
From a methodological point of view, the chapter draws on the existing literature 
rather than the others. First, because local historians devoted rivers of ink to 
shipowners (not without confusion) and to the inner development of Camogli: on 
the one side, they mostly relied upon oral testimonies; on the other side, many of 
these works are the product of meticulous drills in the archives of the local 
institutions, the city-hall and the maritime museum (which are, indeed, relatively 
scarce). Secondly, since it was not possible to locate any private archive to shed 
some light on shipowners. The total lack of commercial correspondence, account 
books and any sort of business papers represented a severe obstacle for us to 
contextualise the great quantity of information retrieved in public archives.  
Furthermore, referring to the naming system dominating the nineteenth-
century Camogli, it might be fundamental to explicit the intricacies encountered 
in the preparation of the present chapter. First of all, the bulk of the shipowners of 
Camogli (e.g. to whom belonged more than ),% of the ships in "**() can be 
reconducted to a list of ten family names: Schiaffino, Razeto, Olivari, Mortola, 
 "*' 
Degregori, Bertolotto, Repetto, Cichero, Bozzo and Ferrari406. However, since the 
early modern period, most of them had divided into different branches: thus, 
within the communitarian system which will be outlined, the relationships 
between people holding the same surname were no stricter and more relevant that 
those with members of the whole community. In broader terms, arguing the 
existence of a sort of self-consciousness or a sense of belonging based on a surname 
distinction would have been hardly satisfactory to illustrate the social environment 
of Camogli. At the same time, the identification of single individuals and their 
direct kinship proved to be highly complicated: sticking to the previous example, 
in the list of ships of "**(, about &,-&' different individuals were holding the 
surname Schiaffino. To complicate even more the recognition, most of the 
inhabitants of Camogli held the same names (which can be mainly reconducted to 
local saints), such as Pellegro, Prospero, Gio. Batta, Giovanni and Fortunato. Thus, 
the paucity of details provided in the ship lists and in most of the other maritime 
sources (e.g. in crew lists, only the given name and the surname are mentioned as 
far as shipowners are concerned) made almost impossible the search for 
individuals, with a few exceptions corresponding to utterly exceptional cases. 
Therefore, we will adopt the subdivision based on family groups limitedly to 
general quantitative analyses. Then, we will attempt to frame individual 
trajectories within the broader discourse and in developing qualitative analyses.  
 
















Schiaffino &, ('% Schiaffino )( #"% Mortola #& #'% Mortola "* (#% 
Olivari "" ",% Razeto #) *% Schiaffino #, #"% Dapelo ' $% 
Mortola $ *% Olivari "$ )% Razeto "% "*% Olivari ' $% 
Degregori * %% Degregori ") '% Bertolotto % %% Bozzo & %% 
Bertolotto % )% Mortola ") '% Olivari % %% Schiaffino & %% 
Lavarello % )% Bertolotto "# &% Repetto ' '% Degregori ( '% 
Razeto ) '% Repetto "" &% Figari ( (% Valle ( '% 
Brigneti ' &% Cichero ", (% Bozzo # #% Bertolotto # &% 
 
406 According to the period, to this list could be added Lavarello, Ottone, Ansaldo, Figari, Valle, 
Ferro, Oneto, Boggiano, Casabona, Maggiolo, Chiesa, Aste etc.  
 "*) 
Ferrari ' &% Bozzo ", (% Degregori # #% Figari # &% 
Cichero & &% Ferrari * (% Casabona # #% Razeto " #% 
 
Table /.&. Ten greatest shipping families of Camogli (&1.+; &11+; &54*; &5&.). Source:  
Table &." illustrates the ten greatest shipping families found in Camogli from 
"*'( to "$"'. The data reported outline the number of ships belonging to each 
group and, owing to the remarkable oscillations of numbers, their respective 
percentages over the whole fleet of Camogli. From the Black Sea period until the 
"*$,s, the general trend delineates a relative predominance of the family 
Schiaffino over the others. Until the turn of the century, the large group of 
Schiaffino was followed by Mortola, Razeto and Olivari; also, Bertolotto and 
Degregori were able to maintain continued participation.  
These family groups present different characteristics: on the one side, there 
were the Schiaffino, who gathered from #, to &, individual shipowners, hardly 
tied by kin relationships. On the other side, there were minor families, such as 
Bertolotto and Degregori, composed of less single households residing in Camogli, 
whose success was tied with the initiatives of single individuals and their closer 
kinship. In the middle, there were broader family groups, such as Mortola, Razeto 
and Olivari, whose establishment within local shipping was nevertheless 
dependent on individual entrepreneurship.  
 
$.%.%. SCHIAFFINO  
 
The primary differentiation, therefore, lies between the Schiaffino and all the 
other. The recurrence of identical and most ordinary names among the members 
of the family prevented us from discerning one from another. Furthermore, apart 
from a few exceptions, the same obstacles hindered cross-checking between 
different sources, thus impeding us to provide a broader contextualisation for any 
of them. Among the exceptions, however, it may be worth mentioning Erasmo 
Schiaffino ("%$,-"*))), son of Giovanni, and founder of the local mutual marine 
insurance association in "*'( with his cousin Niccolò Schiaffino and Giuseppe 
 "*% 
Degregori407. He owned the brig San Carlo ("** t.) and the barque Erasmo ("#,, 
t.). As local historians narrate it, Erasmo’s personal story is rather romantic: 
captured with his father by Algerine corsairs in "*,', he was sold as a slave to a 
local merchant who gave him an instruction and, at the moment of his death, freed 
him and donated to Erasmo a part of his wealth408. Back to Camogli, Erasmo 
married with Caterina Schiaffino: from their union derived two sons (Giovanni and 
Lorenzo) – who became shipmasters – and four daughters, Geronima, Maria, Rosa 
and Cecilia, who were married to local captains, some employed by Erasmo on 
board of his ships409.  
Although it was possible to single out a few more individuals to whom belonged 
#-( ships as a maximum, this high dispersion of shipownership among the 
Schiaffino makes such operation negligible in terms of a broader analysis. In this 
light, even the loss of the predominance observed from the late nineteenth-century 
is hard to interpret. Indeed, from the "*',s to "$",s, there were no Schiaffino 
shipowners able to concentrate their resources into single shipping enterprises. 
The theme of capital dispersion (see, infra) is fundamental to explain both the 
success and decline of Camogli’s shipping. Arguably, the dimension of this family 
group and the impressive numbers of single-ship shipowners – from the earliest 
stages – exacerbated its loose composition. Conversely, the other family groups 
were established more recently, as a result of the entrepreneurship of individual 
and more identifiable nuclear families.  
 
 
407 About Erasmo Schiaffino, son of Giovanni, see: G.B. Ferrari, La città dei mille bianchi velieri, 
pp. &+1-&/& and /4$-/4). For the Mutua, see infra. He must not be confused with Erasmo Schiaffino, 
son of Gio. Batta, born in &14* and owner of the brigs Idea (*11 t.) and Stefano (&)/ t.). Source: 
ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &/, n. *&4) and serie &$, n. 54&).  
408 Ibidem.  
409 Some of these information were drawn from an unpublished manuscript of Gio. Bono Ferrari, 
Fasti e nefasti della famiglia Ferrari. Differently from his other works, this manuscript, composed 
in form of a diary, was intended for private use to hand down family memories to the new 
generations. We were able to read it by the kindest concession of Gianni Oneto, one of the 
descendants of the author.  Geronima married with Gio. Bono Ferrari (&1*/-&5&1), who commanded 
for many years the San Carlo and then became a shipowner on his own: ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, 
serie &+, n. /*.&. Maria married Giuseppe Pace (b. &1*)). Rosa married Bartolomeo Chiesa: ASGe, 




Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, to the shipping family of 
Olivari belonged a relevant share of Camogli’s fleet (see, Table &."). Most of the 
fortunes of this family were related to two different branches. The first was tied to 
Biagio Olivari son of Prospero; the second to Fortunato Bartolomeo Olivari, son of 
Gio Batta (b. "*"*). Both of them were active in the Camogli’s shipping field since 
the early "*',s. In "*'(, Biagio owned the brig Lucchina (#%# t.), and the brig 
schooners Imparziale (""% t.) and Zenobia ("," t.)410. Two years later, he built the 
brig Emilia (#"' t.); with these ships, Biagio participated in the Black Sea trade. 
Then, in "*)% he commissioned the barque Lucco ('"' t.); in "*%,, followed the 
construction of the Gio. Battista O. (&*" t.) and of Lucchino (%$( t.) in "*%); finally, 
Biagio built the Prospero e Davide (*$# t.) in "**"411. The latter one was named 
under his sons, Prospero and Davide Olivari, who succeeded to him as shipowners 
of the same barque and also purchased from abroad the iron-hulled full-rigged 
ships Pellegrina O. ("'$" t.) and Biagio O. (#,%, t.)412.  
The individual trajectory of Fortunato Bartolomeo Olivari (b. "*"*) is 
comparable with that of Biagio. Active in the Black Sea trade since the earliest 
period, during the "*',s and "*),s, to Fortunato belonged the Angiolina (")" t.), 
Aurelia ((#, t.), Colombo ("(' t.) and Protezione ("%, t.)413. After the construction 
of the Aurelia in "*)(, he commanded the brig in its inaugural voyage to Taganrog 
and then Belfast414.  Throughout the late "*),s, Fortunato added to his fleet the 
barques Fortunata Camilla (&%, t.), Giuseppe Revello (&*$ t.) and Teresa Olivari 
 
410 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &/, n. $.5$-$5*1-1$++.  
411 CMMC, Assicurazioni varie, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua 
Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (&11+).  
412 Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro $M2!; Registro Nazionale 
Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro $M$D. The Prospero e 
Davide is still active in &54*; the Biagio O. was purchased later, before &5&$.    
413 CMMC, Assicurazioni varie, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua 
Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (&1.+) and ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &+, n. 5$+&; serie &/, 
n. **$+-$15&-5.5); serie &$, n. /$+4.  
414 Idem, serie &$, n. /$+4.  
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(*#) t.)415. Still before his death, in "$,#, Fortunato had transferred to his son 
Gaetano Davide Olivari his rights over the Teresa Olivari, to which Gaetano Davide 
added the iron-hulled barque Andaman ($"$ t.), employed in oceanic transports of 
bulk cargoes416.  
 
$.%.). MORTOLA  
 
The family group of Mortola, instead, presents a more complicated structure. 
Similarly to the Schiaffino, until the "*$,s, their shipping properties were 
dispersed among numerous people, whose actual identities and relationships 
between each other are hard to define. In "*'(, the Mortola represented the third 
group for the number of ships owned ($)417; thirty years later – the peak for 
Camogli’s shipping – they owned ") ships and occupied the fourth rank, after 
Schiaffino ()(), Razeto (#)) and Olivari ("$), having the same numbers of 
Degregori ("))418. Few details are available about the Black Sea period. 
Nevertheless, the intriguing trajectory of Francesco Mortola might be worth 
noting; indeed, according to local reconstructions, throughout his traffics in the 
Black Sea, Mortola became friend with «a great wheat merchant of Russian 
origins»419. Besides, the fact that, in "*)&, his son Prospero Mortola named his new 
barque Scaramanga (($" t.) seems to corroborate such chronicle420. Of course, this 
is a remarkable witness about the relationships tied between the shipowners and 
captains of Camogli with Greek wheat merchants421.  
 
415 CMMC, Assicurazioni varie, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua 
Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (&11+).  
416 Registro italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro $M2! and see also: ASGe, 
Giornali nautici, &&5-&, which is the hold logbook of the Andaman and covers from &544 to &54$.  
417 CMMC, Assicurazioni varie, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua 
Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (&1.+).  
418 Idem, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima 
Camogliese (&11+).  
419 G.B. Ferrari, Capitani di mare e bastimenti di Liguria, p. +.5.  
420 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &$, n. 154..  
421 See Chapter *.  
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However, the relative success of the Mortola began later, from the "*$,s 
onwards. In "$,#, they were the only family group to have improved the number 
of ships from the preceding period (#"). From this moment on and until the First 
World War, the Mortola became the leading shipowners of Camogli. The most 
significant part of their fleet belonged to two different branches: on the one side, 
there were Biagio and Luigi Mortola (‘u liggia) sons of Antonio Agostino; on the 
other side, there was Giuseppe Mortola (sanrocchin), son of Gio. Batta422.  
Biagio and Luigi were the founders of the Fratelli Mortola (Mortola Bros.) 
shipping company which, in "$,#, counted eight ships423. Their fleet was composed 
of one full-rigged ship –  the Trojan (")#& t.) –, four iron-hulled barques – the 
Edinburgh ("#$, t.), the Anna M. (*(# t.), the Aline (%($ t.) and the Scottish Chief  
(%,) t.) – and three wooden-hulled barques – the Due Cugini ("#'* t.), the 
Elmstone (%(% t.) and the Angelo ()*$ t.)424. Apart from the Due Cugini and the 
Angelo, they were all purchased second-hand on the foreign market. In line with 
Camogli’s shipping business in the early twentieth century, the Fratelli Mortola 
company engaged to oceanic tramp shipping (e.g. between "*$* and "$,(, the 
Edinburgh was very active in the trade of pitch-pine from Pensacola)425. In "$"', 
their properties were reduced to the mentioned Anna M. to which the iron-hulled 
full-rigged ship Rosa M. ("(), t.) was added 426. The latter even survived to the First 
World War427.  
Giuseppe Mortola (sanrocchin), son of Gio. Batta, was arguably the leading 
shipowner of Camogli between the "*$,s and the First World War. His fortunes 
were tied to those of Vittorio Emanuele Bozzo, his brother-in-law, with whom he 
formed a partnership lasting even after the war. In "$,#, taken together, Giuseppe 
 
422 In Camogli, nicknames and family names were fundamental to discern one group from 
another. In this case, both of them refer to the specific neighborhood of their origins.     
423 Registro italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro $M2!. 
424 Ibidem.   
425 ASGe, Giornali nautici, $4*-&.  
426 Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro 
registro $M$D.  
427 Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro 
registro $M!$.  
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Mortola and Vittorio Emanuele Bozzo owned a tramp fleet of thirteen elements, 
including a steamship – the Luigino ("(#" t.)428. In "$"' only, the two shipowners 
owned twelve ships.  
 
Register Name Tons Type Hull Place Year 
"$,# Luigino "(#" Steamship Iron Foreign "*%$ 
"$,# Elise "#$, Full-rigged ship 
  Foreign "*)$ 
"$,# Indus """" Full-rigged ship Iron Sestri "*%& 
"$,# Caldera "'%& Barque   Foreign "**& 
"$,# Ines Elisa "&$' Barque   Foreign "*%$ 
"$,# Dilbhur "#*" Barque   Foreign "*)' 
"$,# Corona ""'# Barque   Foreign "*)) 
"$,# Vermont $%* Barque   Chiavari "*%& 
"$,# Bianchetto $&& Barque Iron Lavagna "*%' 
"$,# Giuseppe P. %', Barque   Sampierdarena "*%) 
"$,# Maria Madre B. %&& Barque 
  Sestri / 
"$,# Riconoscenza ),$ Barque   Sestri "*%# 
"$,# Gio. Batta Padre '$% Barque 
  Sestri / 
"$") Trentino "#*( Steamship Iron Foreign "*%) 
"$") Eurasia "*%( Full-rigged ship Iron Foreign "**' 
"$") Combermere "%"% Full-rigged ship Iron Foreign "**" 
"$") Loch Garve "%"" Full-rigged ship 
  Foreign "*%' 
"$") Bianchetto "))$ Full-rigged ship Iron Foreign "*%% 
"$") Macdiarmid ")#& Full-rigged ship 
  Foreign "**( 
"$") Blanche "'#% Full-rigged ship Iron Foreign "*%% 
"$") Ortrud "',% Full-rigged ship Iron Foreign "*%' 
 
428 See for the Luigino the Chapter + and ASGe, Giornali nautici, &&++-&.  
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"$") Cognati "',' Full-rigged ship Iron Foreign "**, 
"$") Merioneth "($' Barque Iron Foreign "*%' 
"$") Herat "((# Barque Iron Foreign "*%% 
"$") Roberto G. '*% Barque Iron Foreign "**" 
 
Table /.*. Fleet of Giuseppe Mortola and Vittorio Emanuele Bozzo (&54&-&5&.). Source: Registro 
Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro &54*; Registro Nazionale Italiano per la 
visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro &5&$.  
The fleet of Mortola and Bozzo was composed of large vessels suitable to engage 
to the oceanic tramp routes. Apart from the smallest barques (still measuring more 
than ),, tons), most of the fleet was purchased second-hand from the British 
market. This factor influenced the average age of the ships, mostly built 
throughout the "*%,s and in "**' at the latest. In addition, most of the full-rigged 
ships were iron-hulled as opposed to barques, which mostly presented a wooden 
structure. From a diachronic perspective, Mortola and Bozzo renovated their fleet 
entirely from the first to the second decade: this feature may indicate two different 
things. First, it underlines the short-term usability of the "$," fleet, composed of 
vessels of more than #* years old on average. Secondly, the changes might be 
interpreted as a sign of the relatively good shipping profits collected during the 
first period, which allowed these shipowners to renovate their fleet with few or 
none fixed capital in their hands (the value of forty years old vessels must have 
been proximal to zero). During the war, the submarine attacks of the German navy 
destroyed almost completely this fleet: already at the end of "$"%, Mortola and 
Bozzo had remained with just four ships (the Roberto G, Blanche, Herat and 
Eurasia)429. Finally, at the end of the war, they had lost the Blanche too: in "$#" the 
fleet of Mortola and Bozzo counted three ships (being one of them the forty-one 




429 Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro 
registro $M$>.  
430 Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro 
registro $M!$.  
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$.%.$. RAZETO  
 
Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, the family Razeto (the 
alternative versions Razzeto and Razetto are rarely attested) is composed of 
different family groups dedicated to shipping and shipownership. Although 
various members of this family were already active in the early "*',s, these 
shipowners obtained the most successful results from the latest years of the Black 
Sea phase until the end of the first decade of the twentieth century431.  
Starting from the "*),s, Giovanni Razeto ("*#(-"*$)), son of Michele, was one 
of the most influential shipowners of Camogli. Owner of the barques Dittatore 
Garibaldi ((,% t.), Anita Garibaldi ('$% t.) and Emilia M. ()%*), Giovanni claimed 
to maintain friendly relationships with Giuseppe Garibaldi. He even donated one 
share of his first ship (built in "*)") to the «hero of the two worlds». The Dittatore 
Garibaldi sailed mostly from and to the Black Sea, engaging to the transport of the 
Russian wheat432. Instead, the Anita Garibaldi, built in "*)', and the Emilia M., in 
"*%(, were both employed in oceanic routes. In "**(, the former was found in Haiti, 
under the command of Michele Razeto, son of Giovanni433. The latter anchored in 
Saint Helena in "**), on its way back from Moulmein, where it was loaded with a 
teak cargo434.  
Nonetheless, most of the data found in the notarial archives concerned one 
specific family group, whose first member was Prospero Razeto (ca. "*,,-"*%)), 
son of Martino. In "*'%, he wrote his testament in favour of his wife, Emanuela 
Mortola, from which Prospero had three sons, Francesco, Gaetano and Martino. In 
the period of the Black Sea trade, he owned the brig Il Prospero ("%, t.), 
commanded by his son Martino435. In "*%), at the moment of his death, Prospero 
left to the heirs (Martino and Francesco’s sons, dead before his father) his 
 
431 See Table /.&.  
432 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &/, n. )5++; serie &., n. $*./; serie &$, n. /.11 and 1)15.  
433 G.B. Ferrari, La città dei mille bianchi velieri, p. +.*.  
434 ACS, Ministero della Marina, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Divisione premi 
compensi e tasse, b. .).  
435 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &+, n. .+.$ and 1*4). Later, it was commanded by Fortunato 
Marciani: see, Idem, serie &/, n. $1&. and 1$4).  
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properties, including the barque Mio Padre (&&# t.), later named Prospero Razeto 
by Martino436. Thus, in "**(, Martino Razeto (b. "*##), son of Prospero, was a 
prominent shipowner with four vessels: the Prospero Razeto, the Camogli (&)) t.), 
the Boschetto (),# t.) and the N.S. del Boschetto ()#' t.)437. Meanwhile, his first 
son Stefano owned three ships, the Gentili (*,, t.), Martinin (%"& t.) and Lorenzino 
($,) t.)438. Twenty years later, Stefano was Camogli’s second greatest shipowner 
after Giuseppe Mortola439. In that circumstance, he owned two steamers, two full-
rigged ships and two barques. One of his steamships, the Filippo Chicca (()% t.), 
was employed in regular connections between Genoa and Naples440. The rest of 
the fleet, among which figured the steamer N.S. del Boschetto ("&," t.) and the iron-
hulled full-rigged ships Annibale ("'*# t.) and Stefano Razeto ("$,$ t.) – the latter 
one was the biggest of Camogli – engaged to oceanic tramp shipping441.  
 
$.%.9. OTHER SHIPOWNERS (REPETTO, BERTOLOTTO AND DEGREGORI) 
 
For absolute numbers and continuity over time, these four family groups were the 
leaders within Camogli’s shipping sector. Nevertheless, the history of the 
community recorded various individual shipowners who, limitedly to specific 
conditions and historical phases, were able to compete and even to surpass them.  
One of them was Gio. Batta Gaetano Repetto «Perrucca» ("*,&-"*$#), son of 
Agostino. His career as a shipowner began late, considering that in the Black Sea 
period Gio. Batta Gaetano still commanded the ship of his father Agostino and 
then of his brothers Prospero (b. "*,$) and Fortunato, the N.S. del Boschetto ("") 
 
436 ASGe, Notai III sezione, r. $)5, n. ++4.  
437 CMMC, Assicurazioni varie, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua 
Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (&11+).  
438 Idem. In his works, Gropallo delineated the trajectory of Stefano Razeto son of Martino; 
however, more than once the author made confusion between him and Stefano Razeto son of 
Antonio, owner of the Monte Tabor and Oriana. See, G. Gropallo, Il romanzo della vela, p. &$+.  
439 Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro $M2!.  
440 ASGe, Giornali nautici, n. )$+/&.   
441 See, for instance, the logbook of the barque Martinin, active between &11& and &54$. Idem, n. 
&*.*/&.  
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t.)442. Then, in "**(, he appears in the list of the Mutua as the shipowner of eight 
vessels: the Agostino Repetto ('"% t.), Beppino R. ()"' t.), Boschetto M. (&#* t.), 
Fortunato Repetto (%"% t.), Gaetano Repetto ()## t.), G.B. Repetto ("#&& t.), Maria 
Repetto Figlia (*&( t.) and the Stefano Repetto ()"% t.)443. The construction of this 
fleet began in "*)', with the Boschetto M.; then, it intensified between the late 
"*),s and early "*%,s, when culminated in the G.B. Repetto, the biggest ship of 
Camogli at that time. Some of the ships were named under Gio. Batta Gaetano’s 
sons, Fortunato, Prospero and Stefano, who became captains and shipowners. 
After the death of «Perrucca», his three sons entered into litigation between each 
other and with the heirs of their uncles, partners of Gio. Batta Gaetano in his 
business444. The litigation was settled only through the intervention of the Civil 
Court, which divided into four parts the real estates and the shipping properties of 
Gio. Batta Gaetano445. At the end of this troublesome phase, the three sons of 
«Perrucca» merged their shipping activities and founded the company Fratelli 
Repetto (Repetto Bros.). Arguably in virtue of the complicated inheritance, in "$,#, 
the Fratelli Repetto company had lost all of the vessels received ten years before. 
In exchange, they owned three full-rigged ships, the Gio. Batta Repetto ("&#' t.), 
Prospero Repetto (""*" t.) and Beecroft ("'&& t.), all of them purchased second-hand 
abroad446. Neither these nor different ships belonging to any Repetto is found in 
"$"'447.   
Furthermore, also the family groups of Bertolotto and Degregori gave a decisive 
contribution to Camogli’s shipping, though for limited periods. As seen in Table 
&.", their fortunes concentrated in the central years of Camogli’s maritime history, 
between the "*),s and the "**,s. From the analysis of their evolution, these 
families present similar characteristics; in particular, both of them seem to rely on 
 
442 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &+, n. .+$4.  
443 CMMC, Assicurazioni varie, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua 
Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (&11+).  
444 ASGe, Notai III sezione, r. &$&., n. /./.  
445 Ibidem, Allegato A.  
446 Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro $M2!.  
447 Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro 
registro $M$D.  
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the control of various activities beyond shipping, such as politics, banking and 
maritime insurances. Emblematic is, in this sense, the personal trajectory of 
Fortunato Bertolotto (b. "*"&), son of Michele, shipowner, banker and mayor of 
Camogli in "*%&. Although his dealings with politics and banking – fundamental 
to understand some critical features of Camogli’s evolution – will be developed in 
the following pages, his career as shipowner can be delineated in this section.  The 
first news concerning this figure date to "*'(, when Fortunato commanded his 
barque India ((** t.), in and out the Mediterranean, along the Black Sea routes448. 
The structural characteristics of the ship and its origins were exceptional: in that 
period, the India was the biggest ship of Camogli and the only one built abroad 
(Hamburg)449. A few years later ("*)"-"*)&), Fortunato owned the barques 
Giovanni (($, t.) and Verità (()# t.), commanded respectively by Pellegro 
Schiaffino and Fortunato Cuneo450. These ships made enormous profits along the 
integrated wheat-coal routes from the Black Sea to the British islands, back and 
forth451. As we will see in the following section, in "*%#, he purchased a total of one-
hundred and forty carati (shares). Thus, he became the major shareholder of ten 
ships: Abele, Adelfide, Antonio, Favorito, Fortunato, Francisca, Maria Cichero, 
Nuova Verità and Teresa Ester (average tonnage: '(' t.)452. 
Nevertheless, this massive operation was associated with more complicated 
affairs: for example, a couple of years later, most of them (all but Nuova Verità) 
were entitled to shipowners enlisted in the mutual insurance association of his 
foundation, the Nuova Camogliese (see infra and Table &.') – the Abele to his 
brother Diego Lorenzo Bertolotto453. Afterwards, limitedly to his shipping 
properties, there is no evident data until "*%*, when he is defined as the owner of 
 
448 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &+, n. /**+. During its first voyage, Fortunato Bertolotto 
brought the ship from London to Theodosia, where he loaded wheat to Genoa.  
449 CMMC, Assicurazioni varie, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua 
Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (&1.+); see also: G.B.R. Figari, La Società di Mutua 
Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: $>L7-$>>>, p. 5.  
450 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &/, n. )5). and 5.$4; serie &$, n. /$++ and $*4+.  
451 Ibidem.  
452 ASGe, Notai II sezione, &5$/, n. *1-&+/. 
453 ASGe, Tribunale di commercio, Sentenze, 115-544; 5&+-5*/; 5+)-5/1. 
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four barques, namely Giovanni, Ninfa, Cassa marittima and Nuova Verità ()', t.). 
About these ships, except for the already mentioned Giovanni and Nuova Verità, 
we possess few notions apart from the fact that, altogether, they were not sufficient 
to cover a debt of (##.,,, lire454.  
To the same broad family group also belonged Lazzaro Bertolotto ("*"*-"$,)), 
shipowner and, later, professor of Astronomy and Navigation at Camogli’s nautical 
school. Active in the Black Sea routes until the early "*),s, at the command of his 
brig Laura ("*' t.)455, Lazzaro abandoned his maritime career quite early456. 
Instead, Vittorio Bertolotto ("*''-"$(&), his son, resumed shipping business. 
Already in "**%, he had purchased from Giacomo Schiaffino the barque Gimello 
('*$ t.), which he renamed Sirio457. Fifteen years later, Vittorio Bertolotto owned 
the full-rigged ships Narcissus ("#%, t.) and Euphemia ("((* t.) and the barque 
Angela (*%# t.)458. In "$"', then, his fleet was reduced to the full-rigged ship Andreta 
("%'' t.)459.  
The family Degregori unfolds similar characteristics: its most influential 
members were all involved in matters beyond shipping on its own. In particular, 
some of them covered a role in the direction of the local mutual insurance 
association and banking. For example, Giuseppe Degregori (b. "%$)), son of 
Francesco, appears among the three founders of the Mutua, together with Erasmo 
and Niccolò Schiaffino. Already in "*(), he sailed to Odessa, at the command of 
his brig Il Prudente (")$ t.), to retrieve grain cargoes destined to the Mediterranean 
 
454 Idem, 5//, n. &**4.  
455 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &+, n. /4*& and serie &/, n. $1&&.  
456 G.B. Ferrari, La città dei mille bianchi velieri, pp. //.-//$.  
457 See, CMMC, Assicurazioni varie, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua 
Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (&11+); Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. 
Libro registro $>>1.   
458 Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro $M2!. Interestingly, the 
ship Narcissus is the setting at the centre of Conrad novel The Nigger of the “Narcissus”: A Tale of 
the Forecastle: the author had embarked on the ship in &11), many years before Vittorio Bertolotto 
acquired it in &155.  
459 Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro 
registro $M$D.  
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ports460. In "*&&, Giuseppe built the brig La Gloria ("%* t.), employed in the same 
routes461.  
However, the most successful household among the Degregori can be 
reconducted to the activities of Bernardo and Agostino, sons of Gio. Batta, and 
their descendants. Throughout the "*',s and "*),s, both of them owned various 
ships with which engaged to the Black Sea grain trade. Agostino owned the brig 
San Rocco ("%( t.) and the barques Dante (#%* t.) and Italico (()$ t.), the last one 
built in "*)(462. Bernardo was the owner of a brig schooner, three brigs and two 
barques, the biggest one – Conte Serra ((#% t.) – built in "*'%463.  
Agostino had six sons: Antonio (b. "*(&), Bernardo (b. "*&(), Fortunato (b. 
"*&)), Francesco (b. "*&'), Gio. Batta (b. "*(#) and Luigi (b. "*(*). Bernardo had 
two: Gio. Batta and Giuseppe. The business and professional relationships between 
the two brothers were deeply rooted and also involved the respective spawns. 
Apart from the fact that Agostino employed most of his sons on board of his ships 
(Luigi and Gio. Batta as captains, the other in minor positions464), even Bernardo 
resorted to his nephews to man his ships: for example, in "*)#, Antonio 
commanded the brig San Paolo and embarked his younger brother Francesco as a 
cabin boy465.  
Later, the second generation succeeded to their parents: despite is not possible 
to clearly distinguish between Gio. Batta, son of Agostino, and Gio. Batta, son of 
 
460 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie +, n. /.&5.  
461 Idem, serie &/, n. 5.)& and serie &., n. $*/*.  
462 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &/, n. $)+5 (San Rocco); serie &/, n. 5/51 (Dante); serie &$, n. 
15.5 (Italico).  
463 The list of his ships comprehended: the brig schooner Bayruttino (&4. t.), built in &1+4; the 
brigs N.S. del Carmine (&&4 t.) and San Bernardo (&/+ t.), built respectively in &1./ and &1/$; the 
barques Conte Serra (+*) t.) and San Paolo (*5) t.), the last one built in &1./. See: ASGe, Ruoli di 
equipaggio, serie &+, n. /&)4 and 55*); serie &/, n. *&+& and **&+; serie &., n. */./; serie &$, n. &$$5 
and /.+4.  
464 See, ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &/, n. 5/51.  
465 See, Idem, serie &., n. */./.  
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Bernardo, in "**(, the eight cousins owned a fleet of thirteen ships of a 
considerable average tonnage (ca. %), t.)466.  
 
NAME TONS YEAR OF 
CONSTRUCTION 
BARON PODESTÀ %'* "*%& 
BERNARDO %&* "*%) 
BIAGIO *)* "*%) 
DEGREGORI A. *(, "*%& 
ESEMPIO &%& "*)$ 
FRATELLANZA *$# "*%* 
MODERATO '&& "*%, 
PROSPERINA )"' "*)& 
RICORDO %*" "*)$ 
SEI FRATELLI '%% "*%, 
SPEME '#% "*)% 
UNICO ))( "*%# 
ZEHLIMA &%' "*), 
Table /.+. Fleet of the sons of Agostino and Bernardo Degregori (&11+). Source: CMMC, 
Assicurazioni varie, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione 
Marittima Camogliese (&11+).  
In addition, some of them occupied influential positions within the local society. 
Gio. Batta, son of Bernardo, engaged to banking and founded the Cassa di sconto 
Camogliese, active in the maritime credit sector. About this banking institution, 
there is no existing bibliography. Although G.B.R. Figari dates its foundation after 
"**,467, from an overview of the archival sources produced by the Commercial 
Court of Genoa, the Cassa di sconto Camogliese emerges in "*%& at the earliest468. 
His brother Giuseppe, instead, is repeatedly mentioned in the notarial sources as 
his proxy in the handling of various affairs, in particular for purchasing ships at 
public auctions469.  
 
466 CMMC, Assicurazioni varie, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua 
Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (&11+).  
467 See, G.B.R. Figari and S. Bagnato Bonuccelli, La marina mercantile camogliese dalla guerra di 
Crimea all’Inchiesta Parlamentare Boselli: $>LL-$>>!, Genova: Tolozzi, &51+, p. 51.  
468 See, ASGe, Tribunale di commercio, Sentenze, r. 115, n. 54 and &*$.  
469 See, ASGe, Notai III sezione, r. $1&, n. &&.$-&*&*. For instance, in &1)1, their partnership 
involved the acquisition of the barques Rosa Lavarello and Francesco Borzone.  
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Similarly, Luigi, son of Agostino, became very close to Fortunato Bertolotto and 
his own banking institution (the Banco Camogliese Fortunato Bertolotto), at the 
point to be appointed as its liquidator (together with Emanuele Boggiano)470.  
Finally, Francesco was the director of the Mutua during the "**,s, until its first 
liquidation in "***.  
 
C.=. Individual ownership and communitarian shipping 
 
Since the earliest stages, the shipping system of Camogli largely depended on 
forms of shared-ownership and collective entrepreneurial initiative. Such 
dependence derived from its specific economic and maritime environment: in 
other words, the nineteenth-century shipowners of Camogli had inherited long-
standing traditional practices to share risks and investments which were typical of 
fishing communities471. Indeed, shared-ownership and the other forms to reduce 
individual responsibilities fit the needs of low-capital enterprises suffering from 
scarce financial resources. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the long-
established practices to finance, own and manage small vessels for fishing and 
coastal cabotage were transferred to high-seas shipping with no relevant 
discontinuities.  
Still in "*'(, from the examination of the fleet of Camogli emerges a fragmented 
framework, in which at least ninety-three people owned "&# ships472.  
 
 
470 See, infra.  
471 See chapter &...  
472 See, CMMC, Assicurazioni varie, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua 
Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (&1.+). The ratio of ships per man might also be rounded up 
due to the faulty identification of some shipowners with identical names and surnames. For 
instance, under the highly common name of Prospero Schiaffino were registered seven ships: 
researching across different sources led us to identify at least two different Prospero Schiaffino, one 
son of Giacomo, owner of the brig Industria and the barque Prosperoso, and the other one son of 
Giuseppe, surely attested as the owner of the brig Volontà di Dio. Same procedure was followed to 
distinguish between Giuseppe Mortola son of Biagio, to whom belonged the brig Due Fratelli and 
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Table /./. Ships and shipowners in Camogli (&1.+-&54)). Source: CMMC, Assicurazioni varie,  
 
The data reported in Table &.& analyse the dispersion of the shipping capital 
among family groups and individuals within the same households. The ratio of ",'# 
ships per man ("*'() indicates a remarkable fragmentation of shipownership. Few 
people possessed more than one vessel: for example, the case of Prospero Lavarello, 
to whom belonged five ships, is exceptional within the framework of the period473. 
More widespread was, instead, the presence of various relatives: this was the case, 
for example, of Prospero and Luigi Bertolotto, sons of Filippo and brothers between 
one another, respectively owners of the brigs Le Grazie and Delia which were active 
in the Black Sea trade from the early "*',s onwards474.  
It was the household to represent the nuclear unit for engaging and sustaining 
shipping entrepreneurship. Before the definitive establishment of stock-
companies in most of the productive sectors, the contribution of direct and 
acquired kinship in developing a business was essential. As seen in the previous 
section, in most cases, family members split their involvement and responsibilities 
according to age criteria: the older generation was in charge of ashore 
responsibilities and assumed the proper functions of shipownership; the younger 
generation, instead, covered one or more roles within the onboard hierarchy, on 
the top (captains and mates) or at the bottom (cabin-boys) depending on the age.  
The family-based maritime business was not an isolated feature of small-scale 
places: on the contrary, even some of the most influent British tramp shipping 
companies shared the same background. However, not surprisingly, in the context 
of small communities, the households extended well beyond the borders of nuclear 
 
473 CMMC, Assicurazioni varie, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua 
Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (&1.+). On this figure, see also: G. Gropallo, Il romanzo della 
vela, p. &*/.  
474 CMMC, Assicurazioni varie, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua 
Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (&1.+); ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &+, n. /*&& and /+44.  
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families up to overlap, instead, with the community itself. In this regard, the 
extensive and long-standing habit of using the ancient juridical institution of carati 
might be one of the neatest exemplifications of how communitarian business and 
private entanglements overcame the restricted boundaries of individual 
households.  
 
$.".%. THE "CARATI" SYSTEM 
 
The adoption of carati to divide shipownership among different people is in clear 
continuity with the past of Camogli. Every ship was partitioned in #& carati: at the 
end of the nineteenth century, however, source evidence reports the existence of 
various subfractions, like half, one-quarter or one-eighth of carato. During the 
ancient regime, the usage of this instrument to fraction shipownership was 
widespread all over Europe and still resisted in nineteenth-century sailing 
shipping.  
Despite the similarities, the utilisation of carati must not be confused with the 
form of payment alla parte475. The former regarded shipownership; the latter was 
an alternative to salaries and a tool to ascribe labour costs to the profits of single 
voyages. Therefore, from a juridical and practical point of view, these concepts 
regarded different spheres of shipping activities, though it was possible for some 
crew members – in particular in fishing enterprises – to be also shareholders. The 
use of carati limited the impact of the initial and running costs of shipping on 
single individuals. The splitting of the expected profits counterbalanced this effect.  
In the ancient regime, the reasons underlying the success of this form of 
shipownership lied into the extreme dangerousness of the Mediterranean 
navigation. By splitting the investments among more coparticipants, the 
entrepreneurial risk was proportionately reduced. Similarly and differently at the 
same time, after the European powers annihilated the threat of Northern-African 
piracy (from the "*(,s onwards), the use of carati fit the needs for financial support 
of small-scale shipowners.  
 
475 See chapter &./ and, for a more detailed analysis, chapter ..  
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Boggiano Giuseppe Prospero 
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Denegri Giuseppe Bartolomeo 
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Schiaffino Diego " 
Mortola Gio. Batta 
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Brignati Lorenzo ,,' 
Table /... List of shareholders of the brig Ulisse, &1... Source: CMMC, Carature, n. +-&5.  
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Gardella Giuseppe   ,,' 
Massone Caterina Pellegro Simonetti Gio. 
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Schiaffino Antonio   ,,' 
Schiaffino Fortunato   ,,' 
Schiaffino Giovanni Gio. Batta 
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Schiaffino Felicina Erasmo 
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Simonetti Andrea Lorenzo 
 
" 
Simonetti Prospero Lorenzo 
 
,,' 
Table /.$. List of shareholders of the barque Aquila, &11/. Source: ASGe, Notai III sezione, r. $1), n. 
*$5..  
The examination of Table &.' and &.) provides us with a glimpse of the extreme 
atomisation of Camogli's shipownership. The first case addresses the 
coparticipants in the construction of the brig Ulisse, belonging to Gio. Batta 
Ferrari, son of Giuseppe476. The list was reconstructed through the papers which 
shipowners consigned to shareholders to recognise their legal rights over the ship. 
Conversely, the second case is withdrawn from the sale agreement of a vessel, 
registered by a local notary. On 'th October "**&, Fortunato Schiappacasse (the 
shipowner) and the whole group of shareholders sold the barque Aquila ((#" t.) to 
Camillo Reali, a shipmaster from Livorno. The transaction took place for "%.&,, 
lire, %#' per carato477.  
In both cases, family members and collaterals (as in the case of Niccolò Ferrari 
and Maria Schiappacasse) were in the list. However, the range of participants 
extended to a much broader spectrum of members of the community. According 
to the typical structure, one shareholder (Gio. Batta Ferrari and Fortunato 
Schiappacasse) possessed the relative or absolute majority of the shares; in the first 
case, the plenary of shareholders was required to appoint, by notarial deed, a 
shipowner to be responsible for the ship before the law478. The responsibilities and 
prerogatives of shipowners comprehended to find freights, to ensure the vessel, to 
contract loans in case of need, to maintain and repair “body and equipment” of the 
 
476 CMMC, Carature, n. +-&5. He was brother to Gio. Bono Ferrari (grandfather of the 
homonymous founder of the local maritime museum), which we mentioned in the second chapter 
as the captain of the brig San Carlo, owned by Erasmo Schiaffino. More information about the brig 
Ulisse (*4+ t.) can be found in ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &/, n. &*+) and $144 and serie &., n. 
*.*$.  
477 ASGe, Notai III sezione, r. $1), n. *$5.. The notary was Angelo Doberti. 
478 This type of document was called Atto di dichiarazione di armatore: some examples can be 
found in ASGe, Notai III sezione, r. $)5, n. *15 and ++4.  
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ship, to hire and pay the crew, to appoint the captain, to file lawsuits and show up 
in judgment, to declare the abandonment of the ship and, finally, to sell it479.  
By using carati, despite their primary aim, consisting of capital and risk sharing 
in single enterprises, the people of Camogli had a tool to diversify the investments 
into different ships. Diversification was essential for mid-nineteenth-century 
Camogli seafarers and shipowners. To illustrate the role of this economic practice 
within the shipowning framework of Camogli, the testaments proved to be 
remarkably useful, mainly when, due to the need to divide the legacy among 
different inheritors, the notary compiled inventories. A noteworthy example of the 
source is represented by the following list of the properties of Gaetano Schiaffino, 
son of Martino: 
 
N Carati Ship Value 
(lira) 
N Carati Ship Value 
(lira) 
"&,' Martino $*'*, ,,(( Stella 
d'Oriente 
#)) 
#,%' Prospero $&&( ,,(( Pellegro (#) 
# Perseveranza &&&( ,,(( Pietro ",'' 
",#' Lucchina C. (($, ,,(( Meeting )(" 
" Semplice &,,, ,,(( Ottavia %*$ 
" Nipote (,,, ,,(( Eva &)) 
" Lucchino ",,,, ,,#' Gaetano S. #)&, 
" Lucchino 
("*'() 
&,, ,,#' Camogli ',$ 
" Maria 
Casabona 
()', ,,#' Giorgina )#' 
,,' Pellegra Figari (,,, ,,"% Marequita ',, 
,,' Monte A. (',, ,,"% Cognato #'' 
,,' Zio Battista &"#' ,,"% Temo #&) 
,,' Maria 
Schiaffino 
&''( ,,"% Ascolta #%% 
,,' Maria Madre #,)* ,,"% David (', 
,,' Mio #"#$ ,,"% Po ("( 
,,' Domenico (,%$ ,,"% Pellegro #", 
,,' Virginia "',' ,,"% Flora "") 
,,' Buoni Parenti ",** ,,"% Mio Padre "'( 
,,(( Duilio #',, ,,"% Beppino A. %(* 
 
479 ASGe, Notai III sezione, r. $)1, n. &*.  
 #,) 
,,(( Tre Fratelli (,, ,,"% Michele 
Picasso 
("# 
,,(( Stefano ",, 
   
Table /.). List of carati belonging to Gaetano Schiaffino of Martino at his death, &$th June &1)). 
Source: ASGe, Notai III sezione, r. $14, n. ..$.  
The impressive amount of carati shown in Table &.% provides us with an insight 
into the investment practices of Camogli shipowners. In total, Gaetano Schiaffino 
owned (',), carati belonging to forty-one different vessels, whose sum valued 
"%'.)(, lire. Contextualised within the assets and real estate transmitted to his 
underaged son Martino, the investments of Gaetano in shipping accounted for 
*,,##% of the total480. Most of the value derived from the activities of the ship 
Martino, of which Gaetano was the shipowner and primary shareholder. 
Meanwhile, he diversified his investments and purchased more than #, carati from 
forty other ships. In addition, more accurate examinations suggest that the 
investments covered a broad chronological arc. For instance, the acquisition of a 
share over the brig Lucchino (#%# t.), built in "*'(481, might have probably occurred 
a couple of decades before the one over the barque Lucchino (%$( t.), built in 
"*%)482. Furthermore, the variation between different ship types (as emerges from 
the unitary values of the carati) allowed Gaetano to engage in various shipping 
markets. Sticking with our previous example, the maritime activities of a #,-years 
old brig of #%# tons must have been intrinsically dissimilar from those of a newly-
built barque weighting %$( tons: such contrast is even more evident from the 
comparison of their unitary values, respectively &,, and ",.,,,. 
Moreover, the carati presented a market value and, therefore, were subjected to 
market exchanges as ordinary assets. Not surprisingly, it is possible to observe the 
creation of speculative operations around carati trading. Single carati and their 
 
480 ASGe, Notai III sezione, r. $14, n. ..$. At the end of the inventory, the notary had calculated 
an active capital of *&1.5*1,/4 lire, of which &)..$+4 derived from carati, +$.+44 from real estates 
and the remaining $.551 from minor belongings.  
481 CMMC, Assicurazioni varie, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua 
Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (&1.+). The brig Lucchino belonged to Biagio Olivari. It sailed 
along the Black Sea routes, at least from &1$& to &1$.: ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &/, n. $5*1 
and serie &$, n. /$4/ and 54)1.  
482 CMMC, Assicurazioni varie, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua 
Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (&11+). Also the barque Lucchino belonged to Biagio Olivari.  
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subfractions demonstrated the rights of a person over a ship. Therefore, they could 
be sold both for need (like as debt repayments) and for speculative purposes. In 
this regard, the operations of the already mentioned Fortunato Bertolotto, son of 
Michele, might represent a borderline case: in "*%#, in only two months, (from "*th 
February to #&th April), Fortunato undertook eighteen transactions of carati (ten 
of purchase, eight of selling). Through these movements, he purchased "&, carati 
for %(.,,, lire and sold ",( carati for &$.,,, lire483.   
 Summing it up, in the nineteenth century, the use of carati satisfied numerous 
needs of small-scale maritime communities: firstly, it enabled low-capital 
entrepreneurs to compete with more structured and foreign maritime actors; 
secondly, the interchangeability of carati, within a vivacious shipping 
environment, offered the tools for investments diversification and financial 
speculation. Together with the local mutual maritime insurance institution, the 
carati facilitated the development of the local shipping business and contributed 
to its success within the international shipping market.  
 
$.".". THE SOCIETÀ DI MUTUA ASSICURAZIONE MARITTIMA CAMOGLIESE 
(%,9%) 
 
Although the adoption of the carati system entailed the implementation of risk-
spreading strategies, the foundation of a locally-based mutual insurance society 
represented a step forward and prompted other forms of self-protection and 
mutual collaboration.  
Recently, the history of maritime insurances has attracted the attention of 
several scholars, both stemming from the Italian and international 
environments484: with maritime insurance, according to the most extensive and 
 
483 ASGe, Notai II sezione, r. &5$/, n. *1-&+/.  
484 For the Italian scenario, apart from the more classica references, see: G. Giacchero, Storia 
delle assicurazioni marittime. L’esperienza genovese dal Medioevo all’età contemporanea, Genova: 
Sagep, &51/; V. Piergiovanni, “Le assicurazioni marittime”, in Id, Norme, scienza e pratica giuridica 
tra Genova e l’Occidente medievale e moderno, Genova: Atti della società ligure di storia patria, *4&*, 
pp. 1$5-11*; Idem, “L’Italia e le assicurazioni nel secolo XIX”, in Id. Norme, scienza e pratica 
giuridica, pp. 1*)-1$1. For a recent comparative perspective, still influenced by several essays of 
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straightforward definition, we identify every instrument used «to transfer the risks 
of navigation to a third party». Marine insurances could cover either cargoes or the 
ship itself (the modern hull and equipment): both of the applications are attested 
since the late Middle Ages485. From a geographical perspective, historians agree on 
the asynchronous diffusion between the Mediterranean area and the Atlantic and 
Northern Europe486. In the latter regions, indeed, the introduction of marine 
insurances is imputed to the presence of Italian merchants and shipping operators 
in the Flanders, from which insurances would have spread in the nearby regions487.  
Until the nineteenth century, most of the marine insurances were premium-
based: the contractor paid a percentage of the insured value to the insurer, in 
exchange for his risks coverage. Instead, mutual maritime insurances spread and 
established themselves as a reliable and profitable alternative only from the mid-
nineteenth century onwards488. In particular, both Piergiovanni and Giacchero 
correlated the development of mutual insurance institutions to the specific 
historical and economic context of the Ligurian region under the Savoy 
domination. As said, the depression of Ligurian shipping in the aftermath of the 
Napoleonic Wars was then followed by a new expansive phase which, nevertheless, 
was not driven by the Genoese bourgeois, but found its vital spark in the small 
communities of the Rivieras. There, mutual insurance institutions spread from the 
mid-nineteenth century onwards: for them, mutualism represented the alternative 
of the small scale to compete with big centres. Moreover, from a historiographic 
perspective, Giacchero and Piergiovanni revaluated the mutual insurance 
institutions, which had previously suffered from prejudices of backwardness489.  
 
Italian setting, see: A.B. Leonard (ed.), Marine insurance. Origins and institutions, $722-$>L2, New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, *4&$.  
485 G. Giacchero, Storia delle assicurazioni marittime, pp. )1-)5.  
486 D. De Ruysscher, “Antwerp &/54-&.54: Insurance and speculation”, in A.B. Leonard (ed.), 
Marine insurance, pp. )5-&4$; S. Go, “Amsterdam &.1.-&)54: Emergence, Dominance and Decline”, 
in A.B. Leonard (ed.), Marine insurance, pp. &4)-&+4;  G. Rossi, “England &.*+-&$4&: The Beginnings 
of Marine Insurance”, in A.B. Leonard (ed.), Marine insurance, pp. &+&-&.4.  
487 See, . De Ruysscher, “Antwerp &/54-&.54”, p. )5.  
488 G. Giacchero, Storia delle assicurazioni marittime, pp. &$.-*44; V. Piergiovanni, “Alle origine 
delle società mutue”, in Id. Norme, scienza e pratica giuridica, pp. &4&+-&4+*.  
489 V. Piergiovanni, “Alle origine delle società mutue”, in Id. Norme, scienza e pratica giuridica, 
pp. &4&+-&4+*.  
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The primacy of the Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese, 
founded in "*'" as the first of its kind in Liguria, aroused most of the attention. 
Within historical discourses, the Mutua of Camogli was so crucial that historians 
coined the model of the nineteenth-century mutual insurances from this 
exemplar490.  
In contrast with this attitude, before proceeding with the analysis of the Mutua 
and its role within the nineteenth-century shipping of Camogli, it is worth 
mentioning some antecedents of mutualistic forms of maritime insurances drawn 
from the international scenario, also in the attempt to stimulate the Italian 
historiography to re-discuss the theme under more comparative approaches. 
Recently, many attentions were directed to the so-called «seamen's boxes» 
attested in various places from the early decades of the seventeenth-century. In 
particular, the role of these boxes is questioned in most works about the Dutch 
Republic in the early modern period, mostly when the geographic scale is set on 
maritime communities491. Labelled as «seamen's boxes» or «insurance boxes», 
scholars have identified their core activity in mutual aid assistance for seamen who 
were captured at sea (in particular in the Mediterranean492) or fell sick during their 
service493. Conversely, Sabine C.P.J. Go noted that, in the case of Groningen, the 
«insurance boxes» of one of the leading guilds of the town (gathering «Great 
Skippers») served precisely for insuring purposes494. More specifically, 
unambiguous references to forms of mutual marine insurances can be found 
within the regulations of this mutual box. The formal mechanisms differed in 
 
490 Both Giacchero and Piergiovanni, in the mentioned works, dealt with marine mutual 
insurances by the resorting to Camogli’s exemplary institution: G. Giacchero, Storia delle 
assicurazioni marittime, pp. &$.-*44; V. Piergiovanni, “Alle origine delle società mutue”, in Id. 
Norme, scienza e pratica giuridica, pp. &4&+-&4+*. 
491 See: K. Davids, “Seamen's Organizations and Social Protest in Europe, c. &+44-&1*.”, 
International Review of Social History, No. +5, &55/, pp. &/.-&$5; Id., “Local and global: Seafaring 
communities in the North Sea area, c. &$44–*444”, International Journal of Maritime History, No. 
*):/, *4&., pp. $*5-$/$.  
492 See A. Zappia, Mercanti di uomini. Reti e intermediari per la redenzione dei captivi nel 
Mediterraneo, Novi Ligure: Città del Silenzio, *4&1.  
493 K. Davids, “Seamen's Organizations and Social Protest in Europe”, pp. &.&-&.$.  
494 S. Go, “Mutual Marine Insurance in the Province of Groningen, c. &$4.-&))4: A case of 
financial innovation”, International Journal of Maritime History, No. &):&, *44., pp. &*+-&/5.  
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various regards from the nineteenth-century counterparts (for instance, refunds 
were still premium-based); nevertheless, being the primary purpose to share risks 
among a list of associated shipowners, the case of Groningen still represents an 
intriguing basis for comparison deserving more accurate studies.  
Turning back to Camogli's Mutua, the Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima 
Camogliese was founded in "*'" by the initiative of Giuseppe Degregori, Erasmo 
Schiaffino and his cousin Niccolò Schiaffino, who became the first president of the 
association. About the Mutua arose various studies, of academics, such as the 
already mentioned Giacchero and Piergiovanni, and of local historians, like G.B.R. 
Figari495. Drawing from the rich archival collection kept in Camogli's maritime 
museum, Figari delineated the institutional development of the Mutua, from its 
foundation to its liquidation ("***), in proper research published in the series of 
Quaderni del Museo496. Figari commented on the original statutes of the 
association by adding notes and legal considerations; he also provided a general 
framework of the historical evolution of the Mutua, contextualised with local 
dynamics497. Therefore, the chapter is limited to a general overview and, when 
possible, it aims at filling some gaps through archival findings.  
In its original form – composed of "* articles – and published in "*'( (a couple 
of years after the foundation), the first statute of the Mutua lacked a clear 
definition of its associational purposes. Ten years later, these objectives were 
unambiguously declared in the second article: «the association has as its object the 
mutual insurance for every maritime risk, in deep-seas as in port, bay or coast, as 
 
495 Apart from the already mentioned works of Giacchero and Piergiovanni, we must mention 
here the considerable and valuable production of G.B.R. Figari about the Mutua: G.B.R. Figari, La 
Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: $>L7-$>>>, Quaderni del Museo, No. /, &5)$; 
G.B.R. Figari, S. Bagnato Bonuccelli, La marina mercantile camogliese dalla guerra di Crimea 
all’Inchiesta Parlamentare Boselli: $>LL-$>>!, Genova: Tolozzi, &51+.  
496 CMMC, Assicurazioni varie, etc. The archival corpus concerning the Mutua is rather 
remarkable: the Museum possesses the original statute (&1.+) and its updates (&1$* and &1$1), plus 
the lists of the ships (&1.., &1$*, &1)4, &11&) which we used sparsely in the text.  
497 G.B.R. Figari, La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: $>L7-$>>>, Quaderni 
del Museo, No. /, &5)$.  
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a result of fires, pirates, robberies or due to the captain's and crew's guilt or 
incompetence; smuggling, forbidden trade, and war risks are excepted»498.  
The functioning of the Mutua was straightforward: at subscription, each 
member paid a fee of "% of the insured value499. After that, unless of unfortunate 
events, he retained his membership for three years (then increased to six). In case 
of wrecks, the captain or the shipowner would order a professional assessment of 
the damages. Then, the results were communicated to the Mutua. This phase was 
critical, and in many cases, the Mutua contested the first assessment and 
pretended to appoint trusted assessors for a new evaluation500.  Once all the 
disputes between the Mutua and the injured party were settled, the Director 
requested from the associates their respective shares to be paid within "' days. 
Finally, within a month, the Director forwarded the sum to the damaged insured.  
A core rule of the statute prescribed a minimum number of associates (%,, then 
",,): the reasons underlying this article aimed at keeping the average payments 
within a threshold level, beyond which resorting to the Mutua would have been 
unbearable501. Nonetheless, until the mid-"**,s, the Mutua never suffered from 
reduced subscriptions; on the contrary, at its peak, the number of the associates 
exceeded three hundred.  
In "*),, in a report in which the Genoese Chamber of Commerce examined the 
phenomenon of mutual insurance institutions, these were praised for being «so 
useful that, in a short time, [they] obtained the consensus of almost all of the 
Ligurian shipowners [the reference is to all the Ligurian associations], and the best 
 
498 Personal translation from: Art. *, Convenzione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima 
Camogliese. Oggetto e condizioni della società, &1$*, in G.B.R. Figari, La Società di Mutua 
Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: $>L7-$>>>, pp. 5-&1.  
499 Art. &4, Statuti della Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese, in G.B.R. Figari, 
La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: $>L7-$>>>, p. *. 
500 See, for instance, the litigation between the Mutua, represented by its director Bernardo 
Degregori, and Antonio Cichero, owner of the brig Il Camoglino, wrecked nearby Liverpool. The 
captain had proceeded with a first assessment reporting that the damages exceeded the ).% of the 
value and, as a result, the shipowner declared its formal abandonment. The director of the Mutua 
went to the Genoese Commercial Court to ask a new assessment, which was, in the end, denied. 
ASGe, Tribunale di commercio, Sentenze, 14), $1, &5 gennaio &1$/.  
501 Art. &), Statuti della Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese, in G.B.R. Figari, 
La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: $>L7-$>>>, p. &&.  
 #"# 
ships and most skillful captains are inscribed to them»502. More specifically, «the 
total value of the vessels enrolled within the two associations of Genoa and 
Camogli accounted for ##-#( million francs, over which shipowners saved, from 
insuring premia, mediations and commissions, more than ),,.,,, lire per 
year»503.  
Notwithstanding the specific mechanisms, the restriction of the membership to 
shipowners and captains from Camogli represented a defining element of the 
association504. Even more pervasive was the rule according to which when 
shipowners formed the crews, they ought to give priority to captains born or living 
in Camogli; otherwise, the appointment of the captain was subordinated to the 
approval of the Mutua assembly505.  
The exclusion of the exogenous elements and the circumscription of all the 
relationships within a specific community-based pool was, indeed, a key factor for 
granting the success to mutualistic institutions. Local exclusivity was the key to 
maintain the operations of the Mutua quick and effective. Being the members tied 
either by kin relationships or daily-basis acquaintances, infringing the rules, 
delaying payments or even refusing could lead to disasters. Negative behaviors 
could degenerate into the rupture of the business and commercial interactions 
with the whole community. Thus, the role of trust relationships in developing 
business, which was crucial in the early modern period, is perpetuated in small-
scale and community-based associations. Mutual aid between ships and crews of 
the associates was mandatory in every situation (in addition to those cases for 
which consuetudinary laws already prescribed mutual aid, such as shipwrecks and 
rescues at sea); otherwise, the captain (we remind, forcibly from Camogli) would 
have been expelled from the association and «dishonoured»506.  
 
502 Relation discussed in the Genoese Chamber of Commerce (*/th January &1$4), in G. 
Giacchero, Storia delle assicurazioni marittime, p. &5).  
503 Ibidem.  
504 Art. *, Statuti della Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese, in G.B.R. Figari, 
La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: $>L7-$>>>, p. *.  
505 Art. ), Idem.  
506 Ibidem.  
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For its crucial weight within the design of the local shipping, the examination 
of the historical evolution of the Mutua, in terms of numbers of ships, types and 
values, would represent a mere repetition of the previous chapters. Instead, 
turning the perspective to shipowners might offer some valuable insights on the 
distribution of tonnage among the members of the community and to isolate a few 
noteworthy individuals.   
Also, some historians have exploited the list of agents of the Mutua. Scattered 
in the European and world ports, their presence is a strong testimonial of the 
expansion of the range within which Camogli's ships might have needed their 
assistance. Despite refraining from providing the whole lists, some key features 
must be noted.  
In the early "*),s, the Black Sea trade absorbed the most considerable part of 
the fleet: the Mutua had agents in every relevant place, including Constantinople 
and Odessa, the ports of Azov (Kerch, Taganrog, Berdyansk, Mariupol) and Galatz. 
In this region, most of the agents were Italian resident merchants, not necessarily 
of Camogli's origins, but able to provide the required assistance to the captains 
(there are, among others, Dall' Orso, Tubino, Amoretti and Lanfranco). Moreover, 
the Mutua had its representatives at the opposite end of the trade, in the United 
Kingdom, since it had agents in London, Cardiff, Falmouth, Newcastle and 
Queenstown. Even there, except Gio. Bono Avegno, the agent in Cardiff, no people 
belonged to the community. Finally, the Mutua had agents in New York, Buenos 
Ayres and Lima, with Giovanni Figari (whose personal trajectory will be the object 
of more accurate treatise in the last chapter), being the only one from Camogli507.  
Conversely, the list of agents dating to "**" is a clear expression of the dramatic 
geographical expansion which Camogli's maritime activities underwent in a couple 
of decades508. First of all, the total number of representatives passed from (" to )'. 
Then, their spatial distribution was utterly uprooted. First, we observe the gradual 
withdrawal from the Black Sea region, with the disappearance of Taganrog, 
 
507 See, Agenti della Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese, in G.B.R. Figari, La Società di 
Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: $>L7-$>>>, p. &5.  
508 See, CMMC, Assicurazioni varie, Rappresentanti all’estero dell’Associazione di Mutua 
Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (&11&).  
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Mariupol and of the ports of Danube from the list. Secondly, there is an escalation 
of the number of agents in the British ports, with the addition of Belfast, Glasgow, 
Leith, Liverpool, North-Shields and Great Yarmouth. Such dramatic intensification 
of representatives in this area is just one more indicator of the increased 
dependence of Camogli's shipping on British cross-trade. Thirdly, also the 
American continent witnessed the inclusion of new ports, like Baltimore, the 
Island of Bermuda, Montevideo (which was previously covered by the agent of 
Buenos Ayres) and Savannah. Finally, the Far East appeared for the first time with 
Batavia and Rangoon: evidently, the Mutua had recognized the first attempts of 
Camogli shipowners to enter the Indo-European trade by taking over the bulk 
trades around the Cape509.  
In conclusion, not willing to anticipate anything about the crisis of the Mutua, 
since it will be treated in a much more comprehensive analysis targeting the almost 
total collapse of the local shipping system from the late "*%,s, we will conclude 
with few words concerning the short-lasting competitor of the Mutua, the 
Assicurazione Marittima "Nuova Camogliese".  
 
K.-.-.#. The foundation of the Nuova Camogliese (#AM!-#AMA) 
 
In autumn "*%#, thirty-three dissident members of the Mutua decided to withdraw 
and to gather in a new concurrent institution, the Assicurazione Marittima "Nuova 
Camogliese", officially founded on the 'th January "*%(510. According to local 
reconstructions, both political and economic factors might have weighed in the 
determination of the rupture; in this perspective, the rebellious association was 
composed by the so-called liberali, as opposed to the conservative party of the 
paolotti, remained in the original Mutua511. Gio. Bono Ferrari repeatedly wrote 
 
509 See, Chapter +.  
510 To investigate the history of this institution, there are just a few and sparse documents: apart 
from the statute, reported by G.B.R. Figari, even in the notarial and processual sources there are 
few references.  
511 The political rivalry between these two parties is mentioned in G.B. Ferrari, La città dei mille 
bianchi velieri, pp. /&1-/*&; /.$-/.).  
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about the existence of this political rivalry in order to outline the ardent political 
environment of the post-unitarian period. In particular, the conflict involved the 
figure of Garibaldi: the “Hero of Two Worlds” enjoyed broad support among the 
younger generations of Camogli, also because of his professional maritime 
background512. For example, Simone Schiaffino, expression of the liberali, 
participated in the "Expedition of the Thousand" and perished in Calatafimi513. 
Giovanni Razeto, as said, named his two ships Dittatore Garibaldi and Anita 
Garibaldi and, allegedly, kept a regular correspondence with the "Hero of Two 
Worlds"514. Finally, when the greatest Italian shipowners gathered in Camogli for 
the First General Conference of Italian Shipowners ("**,), they dedicated their 
assembly to Garibaldi, who even sent his greetings to the participants515.  
Furthermore, in the opinions of G.B.R. Figari, the members of the group 
gathered in the Nuova Camogliese shared a cutting-edge vision of shipping 
business, based on single ship properties and the avoidance of carati516. Until now, 
the absence of institutional sources produced by the association had prevented 
previous historians even from identifying the associates. Thus, there was no means 
either to support or to oppose these assumptions. Recently, an overview of the 
processual documents of the Trade Court of Genoa517 allowed us to gather some of 
their data and, thus, to start with their identification. 
 
Name Surname Ship Name Surname Ship 
Fortunato Ansaldo Alfa 
Antonio Marini 
Adelfide 
Gio. Batta  Ansaldo 
Mia Madre Marini A. 
Occidente Giovanni  Mortola Pontida 
Venti Settembre Nicolò Mortola Ida 
 
512 See, G.B.R. Figari and R. Buelli (eds.), Camogli paese modello... : $>$L-$M$L: uomini e storie del 
Risorgimento : catalogo [della mostra]: Camogli, Castello della Dragonara, +4 luglio - +4 ottobre 
*44., Genova: Corigraf, *44/.  
513 G.B. Ferrari, La città dei mille bianchi velieri, pp. /&1-/&5.  
514 Idem, pp. /*5-/+4.  
515 See, infra.  
516 G.B.R. Figari and S. Bagnato Bonuccelli, La marina mercantile camogliese, pp. 1&-1*.  
517 About this institution, see: G.S. Pene Vidari, “I tribunali di commercio”, in Assereto G., Bitossi 
C. and Merlin P. (eds.), Genova e Torino. Quattro secoli di incontri e scontri, Genova: Società Ligure 
di Storia Patria, *4&., pp. +))-+51.  
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Gio. Batta Avegno 




Fortunato Bellagamba Matilde Bellagamba 
Teresa Ester 
Diego  Bertolotto Abele Gio. Batta  Olivari  Affezione   
Giuseppe  Bertolotto Virginia Luigi  Olivari  Affezione C. 
Emanuele Boggiano Fedele Gaetano Pellerano Po 
Filippo Boggiano Sperimento Giuseppe Pellerano Adem 
Giuseppe Bozzo Luigi Luigi Pellerano Suez 
Andrea Cichero Manin Cichero Emanuele Schiaffino Ottavina 
Antonio Cichero Mirra Filippo  Schiaffino Armonia 
Gio. Bono Cichero Nuovo Dovere 
Gaetano Schiaffino 
Amalia 
Fortunato Cuneo Sì Catterina 
Antonio Degregori Sei Fratelli Prospero 




Luigi  Degregori Semplice Fratelli Doge 
Gio. Batta Figari Po Prospero 
Doge 
Maria  Figari Fortunato Prospero Schiaffino Piccino 
Prospero Figari Messina Andrea Simonetti Simonetti 
Fortunato Marini Fortunato Gaetano  Valle Memore 
 
Table /.1. List of shipowners enrolled to the Nuova Camogliese. Source: ASGe, Tribunale di 
commercio, Sentenze, 115-544; 5&+-5*/; 5+)-5/1.  
  From "*%& to "*%*, the shipowners listed in Table &.* were involved in processual 
litigations between the original Mutua and the Nuova Camogliese. The biggest 
group is composed of thirty-one shipowners who passed directly from the Mutua 
to the new one. They were brought to court by Prospero Schiaffino, Director of the 
Mutua, to be forced to the repartitions of the wrecks that occurred in the past year 
("*%&)518.  According to G.B.R. Figari, the litigants found an elaborate agreement 
which involved a third party, the Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima "La 
Fiducia Ligure". The Fiducia Ligure was one of the most successful mutual marine 
insurance association of Genoa. Apparently, in virtue of private agreements with 
the direction of the Nuova Camogliese (in "*%), Giacomo Schiaffino is the 
 
518 ASGe, Tribunale di commercio, Sentenze, 15/, n. &&*4-&&.+.  
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Director519) and with Fortunato Bertolotto, director of the credit institution Banco 
Camogliese Fortunato Bertolotto, the Fiducia Ligure offered to repay the pending 
debts left by the dissidents.  
The involvement of Fortunato Bertolotto arose from the strict correlation 
between the Nuova Camogliese and his interests.  The statute expressed in various 
articles a sort of financial dependency from the Banco Bertolotto. Indeed, all the 
cash operations ought to pass through the Banco. More specifically: the article #, 
prescribed that, at the moment of associating, every member ought to pay to the 
Banco F. Bertolotto an anticipation fee equal to "% of the insured value; the article 
#' deputed the Banco F. Bertolotto to the collection of fines and financial interests 
which associates would be required to pay; finally, the article '" recognised the 
right of the Banco F. Bertolotto to yearly withdraw ,,#,% of the total insured 
values in exchange of the administrative services performed520.  
Nevertheless, the fortunes of the Nuova Camogliese did not last long, albeit the 
involvement of wealthy and skilful shipowners (e.g. in the "**,s, Emanuele 
Boggiano owned one of the most modern and bigger fleets of Camogli), and the 
alliance with the most potent Fortunato Bertolotto (even elected mayor in "*%&). 
The commitment to Bertolotto and his bank turned out to be decisive in 
determining its disaster when it was dragged to the bottom by the sudden collapse 
of Camogli’s shipping finances.  
 
C.?. The rising phase: the investments toward the community 
(8PESs-8POSs) 
 
Notwithstanding shipping business, the period lasting from the frequentation of 
the Black Sea ports to the first ventures along the oceanic routes played a crucial 
role in the development of the community as a whole.  
 
519 Idem, 5*4, n. &41..  
520 See, artt. *4-*.-.&, Statuto Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Nuova Camogliese, in 
G.B.R. Figari, La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: $>L7-$>>>, pp. +&-++. 
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Although a significant part of the maritime revenues was reinvested into new 
ship constructions – which led Camogli to gather one of the most important fleets 
of the Mediterranean – a great wealth remained within the community. It was 
destined to various projects and was instrumental to the development of the town 
under several regards. Within these designs, the active role of shipowners in the 
political, social and economic life of the community was essential.  
As the most prominent members of the community, the class of shipowners 
engaged to local administration with continuity: some served as mayors, many as 
council members. As noted by Figari and Bagnato Bonuccelli, already in "*&*, out 
of thirteen members of the town council, eleven belonged to the maritime elites, 
including the mayor, Francesco Schiaffino521. Then, various families followed each 
other at the top of the city administration: Schiaffino, Bellagamba, Ansaldo, 
Mortola, Bozzo were all surnames of shipowners who became mayors in the "*',s 
and the "*),s. Then, in the mid of an expansive economic phase, the election of 
Fortunato Bertolotto in "*%& coincided with the most impressive achievements, 
right before a downward spiral led Camogli to its most profound crisis.  
Unable to deal with all the projects, this section focuses on three subjects: the 
infrastructures (harbour and railway), the educational institutions (e.g. the 
nautical school) and the recreative places (in particular, the Social Theatre).  
 
$.).%. THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT OF CAMOGLI AND ITS INFRASTRUCTURES 
 
There is one town, Camoglia, with its little harbour on the sea, 
hundreds of feet below the road; where families of mariners live, 
who, time out of mind, have owned coasting vessels in that place, 
and have traded to Spain and elsewhere. Seen from the road 
above, it is like a tiny model on the margin of the dimpled water, 
 
521 G.B.R. Figari and S. Bagnato Bonuccelli, La marina mercantile camogliese, p. &*&. The town 
council was composed as such: Francesco Schiaffino, mayor; Gio. Batta Ansaldo, Antonio Olivari, 
Bernardo Olivari, Giacomo Brignati e Prospero Costa, regular councilmen; Giuseppe Olivari, Gio. 
Batta Olivari, Andrea Tassara, Bernardo Queirolo, Fortunato Bellagamba, Michelangelo Chiesa, 
Gerolamo Oneto, Gaetano Schiaffino, deputy councilmen. Among them, only Tassara and Queirolo 
were not shipowners.  
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shining in the sun. Descended into, by the winding mule tracks, 
it is a perfect miniature of a primitive seafaring town; the saltest, 
roughest, most piratical little place that ever was seen. Great rusty 
iron rings and mooring chains, capstans, and fragments of old 
masts and spars, choke up the way; hardy rough weather boats, 
and seamen's clothing, flutter in the little harbour or are drawn 
out on the sunny stones to dry; on the parapet of the rude pier, a 
few amphibious looking fellows lie asleep, with their legs dangling 
over the wall, as though earth or water were all one to them, and 
if they slipped in, they would float away, dozing comfortably 
among the fishes; the church is bright with trophies of the sea, 
and votive offerings, in commemoration of escape from storm and 
shipwreck. The dwellings not immediately abutting on the 
harbour are approached by blind low archways, and by crooked 
steps, as if in darkness and in difficulty of access they should be 
like holds of ships, or inconvenient cabins under water; and 
everywhere, there is a smell of fish, and seaweed, and old rope.522 
 
Inspired by his visit to Camogli in "*&&, these words of Charles Dickens 
portrayed the Ligurian town in the period which preceded the shipping boom. 
Indeed, the vast urbanisation of Camogli took place from the "*',s onwards523. At 
that time, the positive results of maritime activities were directed to the 
improvement of the town infrastructures, both to the sea (the harbour) and to the 
countryside (vehicular roads and railway), the latter one described by an Italian 
traveller through «the immense number of fruit trees of any kind, which adorn the 
upper hills of Camogli»524.  
 
522 C. Dickens, Pictures from Italy, London: Bradbury and Evans, &1/$, pp. &//-&/.. 
523 See: A. Manzini, “Camogli città “moderna”. Da approdo a porto – da borgata a città”, Bollettino 
Ligustico, No. **, &5)4, pp. &+)-&.); C. Campodonico and S. Ferrari, “Camogli. Le vicende 
urbanistiche”, in C. Campondonico and M. Doria (eds.), Camogli: persistenza e trasformazioni di un 
borgo di mare, Milano: Motta Cultura s.r.l., *445, pp. &4-&5. 
524 D. Bertolotti, Viaggio nella Liguria marittima, Torino: Tip. Eredi Botta, &1+/, p. /*. 
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Already in the early "*,,s, the structural improvement of the port of Camogli 
was considered as a priority525. The interests of the Napoleonic administrators 
toward Camogli and its port were framed within a broader design of reorganization 
of the Ligurian port system, including Genoa itself. Camogli was labelled as a 
«commercial scale of public interest»526 and, therefore, occupied a remarkable role 
within the French projects for the Ligurian maritime trade. The primary concerns 
of the administrators were: a) the reparation and prolongation of the dock; b) the 
drainage of the seabed from stones and other materials; c) the reinforcement of 
the breakwater.  
 
Figure /.&. Map of the port of Camogli (&145). Source: A. Pellegrini, “Napoleone e il porto di 
Camogli”, p. &./.  
Despite the initial allocation of four thousand francs, already in "*,), the 
engineers quantified the needs in approximately more than forty thousand527. Most 
of the resources were then conceded to the director of works Giuseppe Bisagno 
and between "*,* and "*"# the works advanced considerably. The main endeavour 
 
525 On the topic, see: A. Pellegrini, “Napoleone e il porto di Camogli”, in G.B.R. Figari (ed.), 
Camogli da borgo a città, pp. &++-&)/.  
526 Idem, p. &+5.  
527 Idem, p. &/).  
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involved the transfer of rocks and stones from the interior to the outer margin of 
the port, thus accomplishing the double purpose of widening and reinforcing the 
harbour.  
Although the Napoleonic works decisively contributed to the improvement of 
the port width, access and protection, the small medieval harbour could not keep 
pace with the outstanding growth of Camogli’s fleet observed throughout the 
nineteenth century. Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the port 
underwent various adjustments, like the predisposition of a slipway ("*#") or the 
construction of the inner quay ("*#&)528.  
 
Figure /.*. Map of the port of Camogli (&1.1). Source: A. Manzini, “Camogli città “moderna”. Da 
approdo a porto – da borgata a città”, p. &.*.  
 
Nevertheless, already in "*&%, the port was undersized to satisfy the needs of 
local shipowners: according to the contemporary geographer De Bartolomeis, «one 
hundred and thirty big ships belonged to this port [of Camogli], which could hardly 
host ten of them»529. The activities, including that of repair and naval maintenance, 
were transferred to the port of Genoa and that of Camogli was downgraded to 
anchoring for smaller vessels. Nonetheless, the project of Gaetano Mortola, son of 
 
528 A. Manzini, “Camogli città “moderna”. Da approdo a porto – da borgata a città”, pp. &.*-&./.  
529 L. De Bartolomeis, Notizie topografiche e statistiche sugli stati sardi dedicate a A.S.S.R.M. 
Carlo Alberto, Torino: Tipografia Chirio e Mina, &1/), p. &/5&.  
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Biagio, can still be dated in the early "**,s. In "**", he wrote to the Parliamentary 
Commission for the Inquiry about the conditions of the merchant marine:  
Since we lack a safe harbour where to repair our vessels, and 
because the port of Genoa is not suitable to allocate a specific area 
to these operations without incurring in various issues; and owing 
to the fact that there is no safe harbour along the coast between 
Genoa and Spezia for those ships which may need refuge under 
difficult weather conditions, I have done the technical studies for 
the construction of a breakwater in the place called Giazze […].530   
Then, Gaetano Mortola admitted that, despite having already obtained the 
authorization to form a society for the construction, the incoming crisis of the 
Italian merchant marine had discouraged him from embarking on such a costly 
enterprise (calculated in about &,,.,,, lire)531. According to G.B. Ferrari, 
Mortola’s project was markedly ambitious: the breakwater was designed to close 
the whole town from the easternmost neighbourhood (San Rocco) aimed at 
obtaining a port which could even rival with Genoa532.  
Then, local administrators carried out various projects to increase the total 
building area of the town and to improve land connections with the nearby 
communities. These efforts concerned the construction of vehicular roads at the 
back of the residential area, mainly: this strip of land was seldom populated, but 
the terrains were usually cultivated with fruit trees or olives. Thus, it is possible to 
observe various instances of expropriation of lands and pre-existing buildings for 
infrastructural purposes. The intricate negotiations between the town council and 
various shipowners (including Erasmo Schiaffino, founder of the Mutua) for the 
makeover of the «road at the back of Camogli», which was widened and 
straightened, might offer an example533.  
 
530 ACS, Ministero della marina, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Commissione 
parlamentare per l’Inchiesta sulle condizioni della marina mercantile, b. /, f. +$, b. *.  
531 Ibidem.  
532 G.B. Ferrari, La città dei mille bianchi velieri, pp. /*4-/*&.  
533 ASGe, Notai II sezione, b. &)$, n. /*.   
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However, notwithstanding the efforts toward road transports, the real 
improvement of Camogli's communication network with the rest of the region 
passed necessarily through the construction of the railway534. When the first 
projects to build a railway line to connect Genoa with the towns of the Eastern 
Riviera were designed, the town council of Camogli struggled to obtain its passage 
through the town. The conformation of the area was not very attractive in terms 
of cost-effectiveness. Hills and heights closed the town both eastward and 
westward, a factor which complicated the construction and raised the costs. Since 
"*'), the mayors of Camogli and the neighbouring town of Santa Margherita 
concerted actions against the idea to bypass the two towns by connecting Recco 
and Rapallo directly535. Indeed, these towns opposed the realisation of this project, 
which would have hampered their growth and favoured the old-dominating 
centres of Recco and Rapallo.  
 
 
534 About the construction of the railway in Camogli, see the monumental and well-documented 
essay of Vittorio Bagnasco: V. Bagnasco, “La ferrovia a Camogli: la locomotiva a vapore dopo la 
vela”, in G.B.R. Figari (ed.), Camogli da borgo a città, pp. *&-1$.  
535 Idem, p. **.  
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Map /.&. Railway track between Recco and Rapallo and the alternative project.  
 
Indeed, the expected costs of the two alternatives differed consistently: the 
inland track between Recco and Rapallo was almost flat and required few 
investments while comprehending Camogli and Santa Margherita would have 
raised the costs for excavating numerous tunnels. In "*)", the town council 
committed itself to contribute to the fixed capital with "",.,,, lire to satisfy the 
requests of the construction company, which would have opted for the flatland 
track. Finally, the line was completed in "*)*.  
Notwithstanding the contributions to the construction, the town commitment 
to this enterprise can also be evaluated from the data of expropriations, whose 
costs reached more than #,,.,,, lire. The analysis of the nature of the 
expropriated land and their owners provided the following results: )&,*"% of the 
land was cultivated with olive oils, "),)%% with vineyards and ",,"*% was a 
chestnut grove536. In addition, the landowners belonging to the shipowning class 
covered almost )'%537.  
Finally, few words should be spent on the utilisation of the railway by the 
community itself: due to the nature of Camogli's shipping business, already in the 
early "*%,s railway connections took little or no part in the development of the 
local maritime activities. As said for the harbour, Camogli’s shipping business was 
no more tied with the original environment of the community. The voyages 
departed from Genoa, and the practice of cross-trade kept the ships outside the 
Mediterranean for extended periods. Nevertheless, the daily railway connections 
with Genoa were instrumental to the transformation of traditional practices: 
already in the early "*%,s, passenger traffic reached outstanding levels. It has been 
calculated that more than one hundred and fifty commuters moved every day to 
Genoa for work. The overwhelming inflow of people forced the railway 
administration to enlarge the station just three years after the inauguration 
 
536 Idem, p. +*.  
537 Idem, p. +$.  
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("*%")538. It is in this period that many shipowners settled their activities in Genoa, 
where they opened their own shipping offices; there, with the vital support of cable 
telegraph, the most various shipping operations were held.  
 
$.).". THE INSTITUTION OF THE NAUTICAL SCHOOL (%,2$) 
 
Still, in the "*%,s, local shipowners and the administrative authorities decided to 
centralise the nautical education to Camogli, in order to provide continuity to the 
long-standing maritime traditions of the place. Before that, countless captains 
used to obtain an informal education in private schools539 or, otherwise, went to 
the nautical school of Genoa, founded at the beginning of the century.  
Arguably, the decision stemmed from the positive shipping phase which 
Camogli was experiencing and was also in line with the proliferation of similar 
institutions in the surrounding towns, as in Recco, Rapallo or Chiavari. It was 
natural that Camogli’s elites, aspiring to stand apart from the local milieu, 
conceived as overwhelmingly attractive the possibility to host a nautical school in 
their territory.  
Thus, in "*%&, the school was founded – the town administration being led by 
Fortunato Bertolotto – and the activities started the following year. In order to 
emerge among the many competitors, the town requested the Ministry of 
Education the “governmental” label, a prestigious formal recognition. Its 
obtainment, however, was slowed down by the high competition in the area. In 
"*%*, the closure of the schools of Recco and Rapallo led the government to grant 
the demanded acknowledgement540.  
 
538 Idem, p. /$.  
539 Various information are reported about a school founded in &)14, which lasted until the end 
of the Napoleonic period. Then, the education of the future captains was administered on a private 
basis: there some testimonies about the activity of the local priest Erasmo Schiaffino and about 
other initiatives of this kind. See, M.S. Rollandi, Istruzione e sviluppo nella Liguria marittima ($>$L-
$M!$), Genova: Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, *44., pp. +.*-+.+; G. Guidotti, “Il nautico 
di Camogli dalla Fondazione ai giorni nostri”, in Il Nautico. $>1L-$M1L, numero unico a cura del 
Comune di Camogli e dell’Istituto Nautico “C. Colombo”, &5)., p. 5.  
540 Idem, pp. +./-+...  
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Nonetheless, though the nautical school (in "**# entitled to Cristoforo 
Colombo) was steered in a prosperous direction, the materialisation of various 
issues in the early "**,s put a strain on its development. Right after the creation 
of a program for naval engineers ("**() to attract more students, the town council 
lamented its inability to cover the costs and opted for suppressing the school.  
Indeed, the economic conditions of the community had radically changed from 
the previous decade: the global adverse conjuncture for maritime freights together 
with more locally-based issues had impoverished the class of shipowners and, by 
extension, the community itself. Nonetheless, in the eyes of the government, the 
nautical school of Camogli had now become strategic and, therefore, received 
extraordinary contributions541. From this moment onwards, however, it is possible 
to observe the following dialectic between the town and the central state: the 
former repeatedly threatened to shut down the institute, and the latter responded 
with the grant of extraordinary subsidies542.   
The pivotal studies of M.S. Rollandi about the life and activities of the institute 
delineate relatively good numbers. After the promising beginning in "*%&, with ""& 
students, the school entered into a troublesome phase for a decade ("*%%-"**%), 
during which the average enrolled students were slightly more than seventy 
(%#,&'). Then, in the wake of few remarkably positive years (in "*$# the number 
was "#'), the institute entered again in a depressing trend (whose worst result 
corresponded to '% students in "*$'), from which recovered only with the turn of 
the century (an average of "&(,' students per year between "$,, and "$"&)543. In 
addition, Rollandi outlined some qualitative analysis about the origins and the 
class into which the students enrolled (deck officials or engineers). This provides 
an even more accurate evaluation of the quantitative figure. The first noteworthy 
element corresponds to the percentage of the students residing in Camogli, which 
 
541 Idem, p. +.$.  
542 Again in &11), the town council decided for its closure just to be receive extraordinary 
subsidies from the Ministry. The suppression of the school of Chiavari, one of the last remaining in 
the area, convinced even more the government to sustain the institute of Camogli. Idem, p. +.$-
+.1.  
543 Data drawn from: M.S. Rollandi, Istruzione e sviluppo, pp. +$*-+$/.  
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passed from *#,()% ("*%'-"*%*) to (%,"%% before the First World War. Throughout 
this period, the turning point occurred in the late "*$,s, before definitively 
establishing in "$,,s544. 
Apart from the most proximal area (Recco, Sori, Pieve and Bogliasco), it is 
possible to observe how, in the twentieth century, the contribution of the province 
of La Spezia steadily increased until the "(,()%. On the same level, the rise of the 
group labelled as «other Italians» might be even more impressive, as it exceeded 
"'% in the last period.  
These data provide an unconventional insight into the conditions of local 
shipping and about the interconnections between the nautical school and Camogli 
seafarers. In the beginning, the primary pool from which students could be 
gathered was that of Camogli: the fleet numbers and the characteristics of the 
labour system – defined as «endogenous» in the next chapter – allowed the school 
to count on significant and continuous inflows of students. The foundation of the 
nautical school was instrumental to the creation of a locally-based shipping 
system, in which the community itself provided the basic requirements for 
shipping (capital, maritime insurances, supplies of specialized seafarers and low 
workforce).  
Later, the chain failure of the nearby competitors – though its fruits became 
substantial only from the new century – rendered Camogli a collecting centre for 
nautical education within the whole region lying eastward than Genoa.  
Finally, the last key to interpreting the quantitative data of the school 
corresponds to the numeric comparison between the class of engineers and deck 
officials. In the most critical phase of sail shipping, engineers represented a suitable 
alternative to deck professions: from "**) to "*$%, the two categories almost 
rivalled with each other, and in "**% and "*** engineers outnumbered the class of 
deck officials545. In the twentieth century, however, captains and mates regained 
their primacy until "$"(. Theoretically, the crisis of sail would have been a factor in 
pushing prospective seafarers to engine careers: in fact, few people from Camogli 
 
544 Idem, p. +$5.  
545 Idem, pp. +$*-+$+.  
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found employment aboard of steamers, almost none as engineers546. The sailing 
tradition of Camogli was too deep-rooted, and the entanglements between 
shipowners and deck officials were too robust for the system to leave valuable 
human resources who could pursue engineering careers.  
 
$.).). THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE TEATRO SOCIALE OF CAMOGLI (%,2=) 
 
Although a significant part of the efforts was aimed at improving the 
infrastructural and economic resources of the community, some energies were 
channelled into alternative projects. The case of the construction of the Social 
Theatre of Camogli547, for example, can be perceived as an attempt to raise the 
cultural level of the community and to consolidate the social status of its elites, 
transformed by the vertiginous economic escalation of the previous years. These 
social and educational purposes were made clear in the shareholders' first 
declarations at the moment of the foundation: the theatre was built «to embellish 
the city, to bring prestige to the promotors who associated their names to a 
magnificent work, and to be the vehicle to educate and instruct the population»548.  
Started in "*%&, the foundation of the Social Theatre involved many shipowners: 
among the leading personalities it is possible to recognize Fortunato Bertolotto, 
president and legal representative of the Society. Indeed, the foundation of a social 
theatre envisaged the creation of a formal association, composed of shareholders, 
who financed and administered the activities of the theatre.  
Anna Pizzi Baroffio, relying on posterior sources and testimonies, ascribed the 
foundation of the theatre to the liberal faction of Camogli549. The examination of 
Camogli’s notarial deeds, instead, disclosed an outstanding source, witnessing the 
formal partition of the theatre boxes, assigned to each shareholder by the draft 
 
546 See, chapter ..  
547 The main bibliographical reference is constituted by the essay of Anna Pizzi Baroffio, who 
studied the activities of the theatre from its foundation to the second half of the twentieth century. 
See: A. Pizzi Baroffio, “Il Teatro Sociale di Camogli: eventi”, in G.B.R. Figari (ed.), Camogli da borgo 
a città, pp. 1$-&+*.  
548 ASGe, Notai III Sezione, b. $)5, n. *+..  
549 A. Pizzi Baroffio, “Il Teatro Sociale di Camogli”, pp. 5*-5+.  
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process550. This source is remarkable for a double set of reasons: first, for its 
objective historical importance associated with the role which the Social Theatre 
played within the community; secondly, it is fundamental to identify some of the 
members of the mentioned liberal faction, which overlaps with the second 
generation of shipowners of Camogli and, for extension, corresponds to many 
subscribers of the Nuova Camogliese.  
The list of coparticipants was composed of sixty-one people, all shipowners born 
and resident in Camogli, except for the notary Marco Mosto, and the doctor Luigi 
Leale, born in Pozzolo Formigaro (Lombardy) but living in Camogli551. During the 
operations, all the sixty theatre boxes belonging to the first three levels were 
distributed – by draft – to the associates in proportion with the number of shares. 
The primary shareholder was, not surprisingly – being president and inspirator – 
Fortunato Bertolotto, son of Michele, to whom belonged four shares and, 
therefore, four boxes; then, apart from Giovanni Schiaffino, son of Erasmo, who 
had two shares, the remaining participants possessed only one share each; some of 
them even at half.  
The juxtaposition of the list of shareholders of the Social Theatre with the 
members of the Nuova Camogliese led us to single out twenty-two recurring 
people. Given the incompleteness of the subscribers of the Nuova Camogliese 
obtained through the Trade Court papers, the process might provide even more 
consistent results. Leaving aside Fortunato Bertolotto, some of the most prominent 
shipowners of Camogli appeared in both of the lists: still in "**", in the mid of the 
crisis, ten of them possessed almost #, ships. The list included Emanuele 
Boggiano, owner of the barques Fedele (&%* t.), Quaker's City (*%# t.) and Rocco 
Schiaffino (",(, t.); Andrea Cichero, who had inscribed to the Mutua his ships 
Lucchina C. ('#$ t.) and Manin Cichero ('&, t.) and Antonio Degregori, son of 
Agostino, to whom belonged the barques Ricordo (%*" t.) and Sei Fratelli ('%% t.)552. 
 
550 ASGe, Notai III Sezione, b. $)5, n. *+.. The notary was Angelo Doberti: the division took place 
within the hall of the theatre, on the *&st September &1)$.   
551 Ibidem.  
552 CMMC, Assicurazioni varie, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua 
Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (&11+).  
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To the Social Theatre also participated Fortunato Ottone, owner of three barques, 
the Antonietta O. ($&" t.), the Madre Rosa (%&, t.) and the Ottone ()&& t.)553.  
These people might be indeed reconducted to the so-called "second generation 
of shipowners", the descendants of those who guided the community through the 
Black Sea phase. They usually owned more than one ship and engaged steadily to 
the oceanic freight market, as emerged from the dealings of Emanuele Boggiano in 
London, mentioned in the previous chapter554.  
Resuming with the economic organisation and the fortunes of the social theatre, 
this notarial deed allows us to advance the following considerations. Firstly, the 
ownership of theatre boxes constituted only one of the shareholders' benefits. The 
theatre had four rows, but only the boxes of the first three were distributed among 
the associates. The last one was reserved to outsiders, and the revenues from their 
selling and their hiring were divided accordingly555. Moreover, trading theatre 
boxes was allowed, both between members and to outsiders: the ownership could 
be alienated, but such operation did not lead to the automatic transfer of the 
relative shares. In this regard, a general survey of notarial sources led us to identify 
various transactions involving the purchase or sale of theatre boxes. According to 
these documents, the value of the boxes could vary depending upon their position: 
in "*$", for example, Assunta Schiaffino, daughter of Lorenzo, had inherited a first-
line theatre box and sold it to Lorenzo Mortola for (,, lire plus ', more for the 
furniture556. A few months later, Stefano Repetto, son of Gio. Batta Gaetano 
“Perrucca”, purchased a second line box for #', plus ', lire from Gottardo 
Bertolotto557. In the same year, however, the liquidators of one of the local credit 
institutions, the Banca operaia marittima, assessed the value of the theatre boxes 
as «reduced to almost nothing»558.  
 
553 Ibidem.  
554 See Chapter +.  
555 ASGe, Notai III Sezione, b. $)5, n. *+.. 
556 ASGe, Notai III sezione, b. &$&/, n. &)/.  
557 ASGe, Notai III sezione, b. &$&., n. +*.. In this context, the notary also provides a brief 
description of the furniture, which consisted of «a golden mirror and four wooden chairs».  
558 Idem, n. &)+.  
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Indeed, after a promising beginning from the cultural and economic point of 
views, the activities of the theatre followed a downward trend. The economic crisis 
affecting the city from the early "**,s was reflected into the cultural programme: 
operas and dramaturgy gradually rarefied to be substituted by private feasts, 
conferences and public assemblies (in "**,, the First General Congress of Italian 
Shipowners took place in the hall of the theatre)559.  
   
C.C. The shipowning class of Camogli and transition (8POC-8PPP) 
 
In the early "*%,s, the favourable conditions of the international freight market, 
the gross revenues of maritime business and the abundant availability of credit 
created the conditions for a rapid expansion of the town of Camogli (which in "*%% 
was given the status of «city») under all regards: economic, infrastructural, 
political, and cultural. Nevertheless, the future decline for sailing vessels, the 
appearance of negative shipping cycles, in which the fall of freights played a critical 
role, were all factors in determining a radical inversion of the trend. The late "*%,s 
crisis hit Camogli and its shipowners harshly and put a strain on the survivability 
of the local shipping system. Many factors, both endogenous and exogenous, 
contributed to the escalation of such crisis. First, resuming the personal trajectory 
of Fortunato Bertolotto, we will examine the hypertrophic growth of Camogli's 
shipping system, which led to the large chain of bankruptcies of "*%*. Then, 
resorting to the activism of the local institutions to elicit a national discussion 
about the conditions of the merchant marine and the measures to be taken to 
improve them, we will evaluate the response of the local shipowners to the test of 
time. In broader terms, the last paragraph will try to identify and examine the 
attitudes and proposals of Camogli shipowners towards transition and, therefore, 
the reasons which brought them to opt for resilience within marginal sailing 
freight markets instead of converting to steam.  
 
 
559 A. Pizzi Baroffio, “Il Teatro Sociale di Camogli”, pp. 5.-&4..  
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$.$.%. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE COMMUNITARIAN 
MARITIME CREDIT SYSTEM (%,2,-%,,,) 
 
The late "*%,s represented a crucial breakthrough for Camogli’s history. On the 
one side, the international freight market entered in a downward spiral, which 
hampered the development of Camogli. On the other side, local events brought 
the community at the edge of a collective bankruptcy, which damaged the local 
business structure severely and limited the shipowners’ ability to react to the 
ongoing shipping transformations.  
The role of Fortunato Bertolotto, son of Michele, within this framework was 
critical. Leaving aside his shipowning career, as seen, Fortunato Bertolotto became 
a point of reference for many shipowners, as a banker, as a politician or, in general, 
as a leading member of the community560. In this case, the primary interest lies in 
the foundation and administration of the Banco Camogliese Fortunato Bertolotto, 
a credit institution which became hugely influential throughout the "*%,s. As 
G.B.R. Figari reported, the Banco Camogliese was founded in "*%, as a limited 
partnership, with an initial capital stock of *,,.,,, lire, increased to ".',,.,,, in 
the following year561. As seen, the Banco Camogliese handled the administrative 
operations of the mutual insurance Nuova Camogliese, from which it retained 
,,#,% of the total insured value per year562. 
From notarial sources and the papers left by the Trade Court of Genoa, it is 
possible to infer how Fortunato Bertolotto – who, meanwhile, in "*%& was elected 
mayor, founded the nautical school and led the construction of the social theatre 
– played a critical role in financing and supporting the life of the community and, 
 
560 See, above for his shipping properties. Compare also with his influence in the matters of the 
Nuova Camogliese, in the decision to found the Nautical School and as president of the Social 
Theatre. In general, about this fundamental figure for the history of Camogli, there are various 
contributions produced by local historians. Gio. Bono Ferrari, for instance, mentions his nickname 
“Barbin” and, furthermore, outlines his rather apologetic portray: G.B. Ferrari, La città dei mille 
bianchi velieri, pp. /**-/*/. According to Ferrari, Fortunato Bertolotto enjoyed of an outstanding 
reputation among the society of Camogli’s shipowners: nevertheless, most of the events and the 
characteristics of the role which Bertolotto covered in the years of crisis, which we reconstructed 
from archival sources, found implicit confirmations in Ferrari’s account. 
561 G.B.R. Figari, La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: $>L7-$>>>, p. *5.  
562 See, above.  
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in particular, its shipping sector. Firstly, he exerted almost absolute control on the 
mutual insurance Nuova Camogliese; secondly, in his role of director of the Banco 
Camogliese, Fortunato Bertolotto supplied with outstanding amounts of maritime 
credit the community of Camogli and, in particular, the group of people of his 
closest acquaintance – most of them found in the Nuova Camogliese or as 
subscribers of the Social Theatre. The resources to sustain such a great endeavour 
consisted of stocks of the Cassa Marittima, a private credit institution located in 
Genoa. As seen in Chapter (, in the early "*%,s, the fleet of Camogli was 
systematically enlarged and transformed into a modern tramp fleet to engage in 
the oceanic markets563. Meanwhile, Bertolotto’s financial operations must have 
provided a fundamental contribution to these processes, as confirmed by the 
numbers of his fleet (from four to nine vessels) and by those of his closest 
collaborators (see Table &.*).  
In "*%%, however, the hypertrophic financial system set up by Fortunato 
Bertolotto started to waver. The first element to fall was the Nuova Camogliese, 
which had suffered from scarce subscriptions from the moment of its foundation. 
In "*)#, the original Mutua had prescribed a minimum number of associates of 
one hundred members to cover the costs of possible wrecks and accidents and 
maintain the singular expenses to sustainable levels564. The Nuova Camogliese 
never reached these numbers and handled bigger ships, which naturally resulted 
in more expensive mutual repartitions. As liquidators were appointed Giacomo 
Schiaffino and Pellegro Marciani, subscribers of the Nuova Camogliese565.  
Afterwards, it was the turn of the Banco Camogliese to collapse. In February 
"*%%, Fortunato Bertolotto had mortgaged his real estates to cover loans for 
"#,.,,, lire: his properties were composed of a mansion, three apartments, two 
pieces of land – one cultivated with vineyards, the other with olives – and a 
 
563 See Chapter +.  
564 See, footnote 51.  
565 These two figures are mentioned in various litigations and liquidations concerning the Nuova 
Camogliese and its associates. For instance, see: ASGe, Tribunale di commercio, Fallimenti, r. &$4+-
&$4.; Idem, Sentenze, r. 5/&, n. .+).  
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building under construction, consisting of eight apartments566. Then, in autumn, 
the Banco Camogliese entered in liquidation: Emanuele Boggiano (shipowner), 
Gio. Batta Mosto (notary) and Luigi Degregori (shipowner), who represented the 
Banco in court against both its creditors (mainly the Cassa marittima) and debtors 
(half of the shipowners of Camogli and Fortunato Bertolotto himself). The 
obtainment of  a neat picture of all the ongoing trials turned out to be impossible; 
nonetheless, the court papers shed light on some significant features. 
Firstly, the Banco and many shipowners had contracted loans with the Cassa 
marittima for hundreds of thousands of lire. In collecting its credits, the Cassa 
marittima moved in two directions: on the one hand, it sought the condemnation 
of Fortunato Bertolotto for more than ',,.,,, lire in stocks, as director of the 
Banco567. The legal action involved the foreclosure and preservation of Bertolotto's 
private properties: then, he was condemned to the payment of "''.,,, lire.  
Secondly, the Cassa marittima sued many morose shipowners, who had 
indebted themselves through Bertolotto’s intermediation. This processual course 
of action generated dozens of trials568.  
Meanwhile, in virtue of their role, the liquidators of the Banco began analogous 
credit collections from the morose associates and called to trial Fortunato 
Bertolotto himself. Indeed, according to their conclusive report, Fortunato 
Bertolotto had alienated #($% and a half shares of the Cassa Marittima from the 
Banco to his personal properties: thus, on "(th August "*%*, Bertolotto was 
condemned to refund the Banco for #($.$', lire.  
From a broader perspective, the meltdown of the financial bubble – in which it 
is impossible to deny Bertolotto’s responsibilities – occurred within an already 
deteriorated framework (the freights contraction) and, thus, paved the way for 
 
566 ASGe, Notai III Sezione, b. $14, n. /4/.  
567 ASGe, Tribunale di commercio, Sentenze, r. 5//, &**4.  
568 Idem, r. 5+)-5/1. For instance, we can mention the trials against Niccolò Mortola (&..444 It. 
Lira), Prospero Schiaffino and Gio. Batta Ansaldo (*/.444 It. Lira), Santo Sanguineti (1.444 It. 
Lira), Giuseppe Brigneti (&).444 It. Lira).  
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serial bankruptcies among shipowners. Indeed, just in "*%*, nine shipowners 
bankrupted with an aggregate liability of (.%$&.#%) lire569.  
This fact opens a stimulating window on the traditional arguments used by 
historians to explicate the unsuccessful transition from sail to steam of small-scale 
seafaring communities. Indeed, the lack of transition is often ascribed to the 
absence or insufficiency of maritime credit570. Quite the opposite, contemporary 
observers pointed out the dramatic effects of credit overabundance, which allowed 
improvised individuals to engage in shipping without possessing skills and a well-
rounded knowledge of the international freight market. In this regard, it is possible 
to mention the words of  Ulrico Risch (Director of the Risch-Eberle company, 
creditor) and Luigi Pescetto (Director of the Cassa Marittima, major creditor). In 
the pages of their conclusive report as liquidators of Antonio Olivari, son of 
Emanuele, bankrupted with &#*.',, lire of passive, they lucidly expressed the 
reasons underlying the generalised crisis of Camogli's shipping:  
[…] based on all these reasons, we can infer that a potential cause 
of disasters lied in the fact that those shipowners had built their 
ships counting on (we should say abusing of) the advantages 
provided by a large availability of credit. Often happens that, the 
value of the interests on these sums, besides granting the expected 
profits, added to the original debt, thus making it grows 
indefinitely. This assumption seems to find a confirmation in the 
bankruptcy of Antonio Olivari, since, from the inspection of his 
conditions, it was easily noted that he had undertaken the 
construction of his ships without no personal means or at least 
possessing a capital commensurate to the stature of the affair, but, 
 
569 ASGe, Tribunale di commercio, Fallimenti, &$4*-&$4/.  
570 See, in particular, M. Doria, “Attività economiche e cambiamento nei secoli di un borgo 
rivierasco”, in C. Campondonico and M. Doria (eds.), Camogli: persistenza e trasformazioni di un 
borgo di mare, pp. +4-+&.  
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on the contrary, relying on the abundant availability of credit, 
often awarded lightly.571 
The broad availability of credit was a recurring argument for liquidators to 
identify the underlying reasons for bankruptcies. In the case of Gio. Batta Ansaldo, 
son of Filippo, they denounced «the abuse of credit and the excessive range of 
operations»572. Then, they added, «disposing of limited capitals, he [Ansaldo] 
engaged to seaborne trade on a large scale and, lacking the financial means, 
resorted to credit by exploiting the good reputation which the shipowners of 
Camogli enjoyed»573.  
The list of their debts can highlight, once more, the prominent role of the Banco 
Bertolotto and the Cassa marittima. As emerges from Table &.$, these institutions 
contributed to form the financial bubble denounced by most of the liquidators in 
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Table /.5. List of credits of Nuova Camogliese, Banco Camogliese Fortunato Bertolotto and Cassa 
marittima toward bankrupted Camogli’s shipowners. Source: ASGe, Tribunale di commercio, 
Fallimenti, &$4*-&$4..  
 
In addition, another feature – limitedly to the cases of Pellegro Schiaffino, Gio. 
Batta Ansaldo, Gio. Batta Demarchi, Bartolomeo Figari and Prospero Schiaffino – 
related to the existence of a so-called «giro di comodo», namely the practice to 
 
571 ASGe, Tribunale di commercio, Fallimenti, r. &$4*, n. /)*, Deposito di relazione da parte degli 
stralciari del fallimento di Antonio Olivari fu Emanuele.  
572 Idem, r. &$4/, n. )55. Liquidators of this bankruptcy were Gio. Batta Patrone and David Viale.  
573 Ibidem.  
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share among many people revenues and debts deriving from personal 
obligations574.  
Despite apparently innocuous, it was labelled as a «malicious system of loans 
and traffic of promissory notes», a «reckless practice», because «whereas the 
revenues were divided among the informal associates, at the same time they 
contracted the whole debt personally»575. Resorting to the «giro di comodo» 
implied a direct correlation with the emergence of serial bankruptcies among the 
contractors.  
The case of Bartolomeo Figari – inherently tied with that of Pellegro Schiaffino 
– might be worth mentioning576. According to the liquidators, «after having 
struggled to make a fortune in America», Bartolomeo Figari, son of Gerolamo, 
«returned to his hometown and began to build, with the assistance of his friends, 
a ship»577. Then, they added, «it was notorious that Figari, illiterate, entrusted the 
management of his business to Pellegro Schiaffino who, not only abused of his 
position, but also used Figari's signature to throw him in burdensome obligations 
and, as a result, to drag him down with him»578.  
In its extremity, the illiteracy of Bartolomeo Figari – rare among Camogli’s 
shipowners – links to another distinguishing feature reported by liquidators: the 
total absence or misuse of bookkeeping and accounting. The negative judgement 
about business records and account books was indeed widespread and targeted all 
the bankruptcies analyzed. For instance, about Pellegro Schiaffino, his liquidators 
wrote that «[they] could not expect from the bankrupted to keep the books in the 
 
574 See, Ibidem; Idem, r. &$4., n. 5/5 (bankruptcy of Pellegro Schiaffino).   
575 Idem, r. &$4/, n. )55.  
576 The same outcomes concerned the bankruptcy of Gio. Batta Demarchi, son of Antonio. 
According to his liquidators, «the declaration of bankruptcy of his brother-in-law, Pellegro 
Schiaffino, affected severely his [of Demarchi] conditions, due to the fact that the suppliers of the 
Rosa D. [Demarchi’s ship], also creditors of Schiaffino, refused to delay more and asked for 
immediate payments».   
577 Idem, r. &$4*, n. /*1. Liquidators were Carlo Pantassi (agent of the Banco di sconto e sete of 
Turin) and Santo Monteverde (merchant living in Genoa).  
578 Ibidem.  
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strict sense, owing to his attitude and the long-established abuse, among the 
shipowners of Camogli, to consider this activity as an unnecessary luxury»579.  
The analysis of the critical issues recorded within the shipping environment of 
the community, however, cannot obscure the role of the exogenous processes lying 
beyond the actual control of Camogli’s shipowners. Undoubtedly, endogenous 
factors, such as individual and collective responsibilities, more familiar to local 
historians than academicians, played a crucial role in pushing shipping to 
overperform in comparison to their practical possibilities. In this way, the creation 
of a precarious system based on abstract credit rather than substantial shipping 
revenues led many shipowners to be financially exposed and unprepared to global 
transformations. This coexistence of exogenous factors with the mentioned 
malpractices can be found in the liquidators’ accounts. For example, about the 
bankruptcy of Cristino Lazzaro Razeto, owner of Delfino P. and Nuovo Rosina 
Canepa, his liquidators observed:  
It is well-known the widespread absence of freights and, likewise, 
it is well-known the miserable fate of shipowners who, often, 
rather than obtaining profits from shipping, they incur in losses, 
because of the disproportion between the operating costs and the 
freights collected.580  
In the early "**,s, the shipowners of Camogli became aware about the ongoing 
conditions of the shipping market and focused on the role of transition from sail 
to steam in determining their crisis. These arguments became objects of various 
discussions, which culminated in the organization of the First General Congress of 
the Italian Shipowners ("**,) and were then confronted with other realities in the 
context of the Parliamentary Inquiry about the conditions of the Italian merchant 
marine ("**"-"**#).  
 
 
579 Idem, r. &$4., n. 5/5.  
580 Idem, r. &$4/, n. $5$ (bankruptcy of Cristino Lazzaro Razeto).  
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$.$.". THE PARTICIPATION OF CAMOGLI SHIPOWNERS TO THE NATIONAL 
MARITIME DEBATE (%,,3-%,,))  
 
As we saw in the third chapter, from "*%& ca. onwards, the effects of the global 
transformations and the decline of sailing shipping hit Camogli and his 
shipowners.  
The shipowning elites did not remain passive in front of the upcoming crisis. 
Conversely, not only they stimulated an active debate among Italian shipowners, 
but also elicited the creation of a dialogue with the national maritime institutions. 
Thus, in "**,, in Camogli was organised the First General Congress of Italian 
Shipowners, an occasion to address and discuss the main issues of the Italian 
merchant marine581. Afterwards, they took an active part within the "**# Inquiry 
into the conditions of the Italian merchant marine, which was carried out by the 
congressman Paolo Boselli in all the major shipping centres of the country.  
On ",th and ""th October "**,, the First General Congress of Italian Shipowners 
was gathered in Camogli. The purpose of the event, as expressed at the welcoming 
greetings, was to propose to the government the measures to rescue the Merchant 
Marine from its critically declining status. In this context, the primary causes of 
the crisis were identified in the diminution of traffics and in foreign competition, 
made incredibly unsustainable by the French laws, which introduced public 
subsidies to shipping582.  
More than three hundred shipowners ((#() congregated to the assembly: 
Giuseppe Bozzo, mayor of Camogli, oversaw the operations as president of the 
Committee of Camogli Shipowners, to be intended as the first nucleus and 
promotor of the event. Among the main objectives lied the reform of the Cassa 
Invalidi della Marina Mercantile – to relieve shipowners from these subsidies – and 
the reduction of consular and maritime health customs, which weighed too much 
on the balances of shipping voyages583. The discussion then moved on the French 
 
581 See, P. Gardini (ed.), Atti e resoconto stenografico ufficiale del Congresso degli Armatori 
Italiani in Camogli, Genova: Giovanni Sambolino, &114.  
582 P. Gardini (ed.), Atti e resoconto stenografico, pp. .-$.  
583 Idem, p. &&.  
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law about public subsidies to the national merchant marine ("*%$), which had 
completely upset the international shipping paradigm, forcing concurrent 
shipowners to develop and propose the measures to resist and oppose them.   
The participation of the shipowners of Camogli was active and extremely 
knowledgeable: in particular, Francesco Schiaffino, son of Gaetano, and a member 
of the family Olivari (his name is never mentioned) raised their voices repeatedly. 
Another leading figure was David Viale, a shipowner and liquidator from Genoa, 
who had established long-standing acquaintances and private interests in Camogli 
to be almost included among that society (he was a member of the Committee of 
Camogli Shipowners). Viale was also among Camogli’s participants to the Inquiry 
into the conditions of the merchant marine, taking place in Camogli on the ##nd 
August "**". In that occasion, he was very active, provided many details about the 
state of his business and formulated various proposals584.  
The declining status of the Italian merchant marine was always at the core of 
the discussions: indeed, according to the vivid expression proposed by Viale, «the 
disaster [was] blatant and self-evident»585. To corroborate with data his 
assumptions, the Genoese shipowner reported how, in the previous years, the 
shipping values insured to the Ligurian mutual insurance societies had fallen from 
""& to )*,' millions of lire and, thus, the yearly mutual repartition of damages had 
increased from (% to '%586. The reasons of the decline were reconducted to 
different spheres of interest: firstly, commercial, in connection with the 
international shipping trends; secondly, technological, addressing the correlation 
of the decline of sail shipping with the rise of steam navigation; thirdly, 
institutional, related to the unequal customs and tariffs system which the Italian 
ships underwent in comparison with foreign competitors.  
 
584 The whole list of the people questioned in Camogli comprehended: &) Giuseppe Bozzo, mayor 
of Camogli; *) Filippo Schiaffino, son of Giuseppe, director of the Mutua Assicurazione Camogliese; 
+) David Viale, shipowner and liquidator; /) Antonio Carbone, shipowner and councilman of the 
Cassa Invalidi della marina mercantile; .) Gerolamo Nossardi, shipowner and director of the Mutua 
of Nervi; $) Gaetano Cavalli, shipowner; )) Emanuele Boggiano, shipowner; 1) Gaetano Mortola, 
son of Biagio, shipowner. See, Inchiesta sulle condizioni della marina mercantile, vol. &, pp. XXII-
XXIII.  
585 P. Gardini (ed.), Atti e resoconto stenografico, p. &1.   
586 Ibidem.  
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Coeval observers, such as the economist Jacopo Virgilio, were well aware of the 
fall of freights, which, for instance, he had measured in a ('-&,% decrease between 
"*%' and "**,, even on the marginal routes of the Far East rice (-(*%), Peruvian 
guano (-&,%) or U.S. wheat (-#'%)587. Concerning the technological factor, 
instead, more than one shipowner of Camogli underlined the decisive role of 
technological improvements, such as the reduction of coal consumption (from ( 
kg to ,,*# Kg per ton/mile), to increase steam competitiveness over the sail588.  
In the eyes of Camogli’s shipowners, the institutional framework was critical. In 
this regard, the adoption of a comparative perspective was fundamental to develop 
effective countermeasures to adapt to the international scenario. The suffocating 
taxation imposed by the Italian State over the shipping business was the primary 
target. The congress calculated the average customs and fees pending on Italian 
ships in comparison with the leading European countries:  
 





United Kingdom ,,&# 
Table /.1. Comparison of average maritime and consular taxes by flag. Source: P. Gardini (ed.), Atti 
e resoconto stenografico ufficiale del Congresso degli Armatori Italiani in Camogli, Genova: Giovanni 
Sambolino, &114, pp. &1-&5.  
 The primary responsibility for the existing discrepancies between Italy and the 
rest of the maritime powers were identified in consular fees, which the assembly 
proposed to cut for %'% of their value589. Then it was the turn of the tax on movable 
properties, which resulted in a "(,#,% yearly rise of shipping expenses590.  
 
587 Ibidem.  
588 Idem, p. *1. See, Chapter +.  
589 See, Idem, pp. $1-)&. The Congress expressed this measure in the ninth article of the proposal 
sent to the government.  
590 About the so-called Tassa sulla ricchezza mobile, the shipowners of Camogli published a 
specific pamphlet to oppose against its application to ships. See, Difesa degli armatori di Camogli, 
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Many complaints also targeted the unsustainable bureaucracy which Italian 
ships suffered in comparison with foreign ships. The events involving the ship 
Ricordo – reported by Ravenna, president of the Associazione marittima di Genova 
– were emblematic to illustrate these issues. The ship left from Brazil, where it was 
forced by an incident to repair in a port contaminated by yellow fever; after a long 
route with no cases onboard, it arrived in Genoa. According to the national rules, 
having spent – in the crossing – more than a quarantine with no ill people, the ship 
ought to be subjected to a lighter and shorter version of quarantine. Instead, it was 
forced to the so-called «hard quarantine», which prescribed the discharge of the 
cargo in a dedicated place. Meanwhile, a British ship – to which the Ricordo had 
consigned part of the cargo in Brazil – arrived from the same destination to Genoa 
with one ill person. With some diplomatic pressure, the ship was rapidly freed from 
its obligations and discharged591.  
In addition, steamships were generally favoured over sailing vessels: for 
instance, they could load and unload the cargo during nights and were given 
priority to access the docks592.  
Finally, the most critical discourse regarded the opportunity to request shipping 
subsidies to support the Italian fleet in the wake of the French case. Therefore, the 
debate was transformed into a broader discourse about political economics and 
the subject of maritime protectionism; in this sense, it related to the gradual shift 
of the Italian political atmosphere from the free market to protectionism593. 
Traditionally, the shipowners of Camogli opposed to protectionism, despite the 
many benefits enjoyed through flag privileges at the exordium of the Black Sea 
 
attori contro le Regie Finanze convenute, per l’esonero dalla tassa di ricchezza mobile, Genova: 
Tipografia del commercio di Genova, &1)5, in ACS, Ministero della marina, Inchiesta parlamentare 
sulle condizioni della marina mercantile, b. /, Camogli.  
591 P. Gardini (ed.), Atti e resoconto stenografico, pp. +*-++.  
592 Idem, p. +5.  
593 E. Del Vecchio, La via italiana al protezionismo: le relazioni economiche internazionali 
dell’Italia, $>1>-$>>>, voll. &-., Roma: Archivio Storico, &5)5-&514. More specifically on the Italian 
maritime protectionism, see: E. Corbino, “Il protezionismo marittimo in Italia: le industrie 
marittime fino al &11.”, Giornale degli economisti e rivista di statistica, $&, No. &&, &5*&, pp. +)4-+15; 
Idem, “Il protezionismo marittimo in Italia”, Giornale degli economisti e rivista di statistica, $*, No. 
*, &5**, pp. $.-1&; E. Giretti, “I succhioni della marina mercantile”, Giornale degli economisti, +4, 
&54., pp. +)-.5.  
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period. Various people openly sustained the laissez-faire policies and requested 
from the State just to annihilate the bureaucratic and fiscal obstacles to free market 
and free navigation. Thus, the primary target of their requests naturally became 
the reduction of tax burdens. However, the French law on subsidies altered this 
situation: the need to compete against foreign protectionist policies pushed 
Camogli’s shipowners toward maritime protectionism. To shed light on this 
process, the long intervention of Francesco Schiaffino is emblematic:  
[…] until today, we were satisfied with requesting to the 
government to relieve us from the burden of taxes and customs 
affecting us; […] then came out the French law about subsidies, 
which will strike the deadly blow to our marine which, aside from 
being subjugated to the usual vicissitudes which have already 
exhausted it, will be totally annihilated by the impossible 
competition with the ships of the mentioned country. […] Given 
the law above, the total abolition of taxes to the flourishing 
marines of Sweden and Norway, the similar upcoming laws in 
Russia, the tangible facilitations and subsidies which, albeit not 
openly, are conceded to the Austrian ships, our committee, 
according to the famous saying in extremis, extremity, decided to 
gather together in order to identify the best measures to arm 
ourselves against the incipient ruin. […] The lowering of taxes, 
which has been the object of all our requests so far, today would 
be just a disappointment, a medication applied to a wooden leg, 
as opposed to the grants of foreign marines and, in particular, of 
the French one.594   
The French law granted to the national flag various typologies of subsidies, both 
for ship constructions and navigation. The subventions for national constructions 
aimed at stimulating and protecting national shipyards: on the one hand, every 
shipowner received an amount of money proportionated to ship tonnages, a great 
 
594 P. Gardini (ed.), Atti e resoconto stenografico, pp. &.-&$.  
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aid to reduce the impact of starting costs on shipowners; on the other hand, ship-
building was concentrated into national shipyards, thus providing them large and 
incessant orders. Then, the second type of subsidies regarded navigation: they 
consisted of direct subventions of ",', Fr. per ",,, miles and ",', Fr. per ton, with 
little or no limitations. Through subsidies, French governors granted considerable 
advantages to the national flag, estimated to a "/( of a freight: in this way, French 
captains could lower the freights to unsustainable levels for Italians595.   
As a reaction, the shipowners of Camogli claimed analogous subsidies to grant 
the Italian flag the same conditions of foreign competitors. These demands, 
however, moved past laissez-faire policies and took the form of open 
encouragements for maritime protectionism. The development of the proposals 
was long and laborious: in "**, emerged a program articulated into ten points, 
which, during the "**" Inquiry, the people gathered in Camogli substantially re-
submitted in the same form. Notwithstanding various details, which underwent 
several modifications before the law became active in "**', some features are 
worth noting to discuss the general disposition of Camogli shipowners and their 
understanding of the national and international scenarios. 
The most debated argument, for example, consisted of identifying the 
beneficiaries. Naturally, this discourse opened much broader discussions about the 
evolution of the international market and the fate of sail and steam. Whereas the 
previous chapter addressed the competition between sail and steam through 
objective factors (coal consumption, market segmentation etc.), the next pages will 
focus on the subjective side of the same argument, formed by the partial 
perceptions of Camogli’s contemporary observers.  
The implementation of the economic concept of «path dependence» might be 
appropriate to delineate Camogli's general disposition in front of technological 
transition. By resorting to «path dependence», we intend to underline the role 
played by past events and decisions to influence later evaluations related to the 
 
595 Idem, pp. &5-*4.  
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adoption of new technologies596. In the case of Camogli, the «path dependence» 
can be reconducted to different processes: firstly, from a cultural and social 
perspective, it was correlated to the long-standing attachment to sailing traditions, 
which had made the fortunes of the community. Secondly, by stressing the 
economic factor, the «path dependence» materialized in the protection of the 
previous investments in sailing shipping, which had reached their peak in the early 
"*%,s. These two elements, traditional thinking and investment protection, 
represent the primary endogenous factors in determining Camogli's slow 
transition from sail to steam.  
In the sources, the «path dependence» was expressed through the refusal of the 
incipient decline of sail. Although some shipowners perceived iron and steam 
vessels as the future for shipping, many professed their faith into the profitable 
alternatives offered by marginal tramping routes: that was, in fact, the market 
sector to which most of Camogli’s ships engaged until the First World War. There 
were also some intermediate positions, still involving path dependence, as in the 
case of Viale. During his intervention to the Congress – and in the oral and written 
memories produced for the National Inquiry – Viale articulated his discourse 
around the distinction between transformation to and creation of a modern iron-
hulled steam-propelled fleet597. The conditions of the Italian merchant marine 
made impossible the «transformation» from sail to steam but required its 
«creation» from scratch. In the meantime, the Italian State ought to protect the 
interests of the existing sailing fleet, because sail still represented the wealth and 
the capital of Italian shipping. In other words, protecting the existing fleet and 
shipping capitals constituted the priority. The protection of sailing shipping was 
fundamental to endure the negative cycle; then, as soon as a positive phase 
occurred, the collection of abundant capitals would have gathered the resources 
needed to create a steam fleet.  
 
596 For a general overview, see: P. Garrouste and S. Ioannides (eds.), Evolution and Path 
Dependence in Economic Ideas. Past and Present, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, *44&.  
597 P. Gardini (ed.), Atti e resoconto stenografico, p. **.  
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Therefore, in Camogli’s proposals, sail shipping still played a critical role. 
Indeed, the shipowners recognized the need to protect it in the short/medium run. 
Some even pushed for the complete equalization of sail and steam to benefit from 
construction and navigation subsidies. Olivari even proposed to grant an identical 
sum (', It. Lira per ton) to wooden and iron constructions: he was optimistic about 
the future of wooden-hulled vessels and praised the plenty of wood within the 
Italian territory as opposed to the paucity of iron and steel598.  
Then, in "**', drawing from the copious set of proposals collected during the 
Inquiry, the Italian government opted for maritime protectionism, through the 
determination of subsidies to the national merchant marine599. In historical 
discourses, shipping subsidies are traditionally associated with steam navigation, 
used to finance strategic transports, such as postal services600. With the "**' law, 
instead, the Italian State committed itself to the protection of the merchant marine 
in its entirety: in particular, it aimed at supporting it on the international stage and 
stimulating its modernisation. This involvement acted in three different regards: 
") construction subsidies; #) navigation subsidies for coal transports; () general 
navigation subsidies601.  
The articles from " to % regulated the subsidies in favor of constructions: 
steamships and iron-hulled sailing vessels were aligned and received ), lire per 
ton. Instead, wooden-hulled vessels were given "' lire per ton602.  
The eighth article prescribed " lira bonus per ton of coal carried to the Italian 
ports from a place outside the Gibraltar Strait603. This measure interested both sail 
and steam vessels and reflected the Italian needs for this strategic transport: as 
 
598 Idem, p. ...  
599 See, Legge D dicembre $>>L, n. 7L#1. Sui provvedimenti riguardo alla marina mercantile, artt. &-
&/ and its &15$ update: Legge !7 luglio $>MD, n. 7$>. Riflettente la concessione di compensi di 
costruzione e premi di navigazione ai piroscafi ed ai velieri nazionali, artt. &-&1. See, also: E. Corbino, 
“Il protezionismo marittimo in Italia: le industrie marittime fino al &11.”, pp. +1+-+15; Id., “Il 
protezionismo marittimo in Italia”, pp. $.-)+.  
600 See Chapter +.  
601 Legge D dicembre $>>L, n. 7L#1.  
602 Idem, art. &.  
603 Idem, art. 1.  
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seen in Chapter (, some ships of Camogli exploited these subsidies to increase the 
cost-effectiveness of the return leg to the Mediterranean.  
Finally, the tenth article granted ,,)' lire per ton and the same amount per ",,, 
miles to the vessels which navigated beyond Suez or the Gibraltar Strait604.  
Summing it up, the efforts made by Camogli shipowners found satisfaction in 
the publication of the "**' law. The inauguration of the protectionist phase for the 
Italian merchant marine was seen as a necessary evil to withstand foreign 
competition605. However, the characteristics of Camogli’s fleet were subjected to 
more rapid changes: from the mid-"**,s, and in particular, at the end of the 
century, most of the shipping investments were directed to second-hand foreign-
built ships, which were not covered by the Italian state subsidies. Indeed, although 
intended to guide the Italian merchant marine to transition, the shipping subsidies 
obtained the most tangible results toward Italian iron and steam shipbuilding606. 
Thus, the subsidies never became a structural source of income for Camogli, which 
was progressively cut off from the Italian bounty system and relegated to a 




In "***, even the original Mutua was liquidated. The shipping capital and the 
number of associates were no more sufficient to cover the expenses607. A few years 
before, in "**&, a group of shipowners had founded another mutual insurance, the 
Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima "Cristoforo Colombo"608. The 
Cristoforo Colombo targeted a distinct shipping market, as the statute prescribed 
 
604 Idem, art. &4.  
605 Both construction and navigation subsidies were diminished by the law number )/. of the 
&+th July &5&&. See: Legge $7 luglio $M$$, n. 1#L. Che approva provvedimenti a favore dell’industria delle 
costruzioni navali.  
606 E. Giretti, “I succhioni della marina mercantile”, pp. +)-.5.  
607 G.B.R. Figari, La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: $>L7-$>>>, pp. +5-/&.  
608 CMMC, Assicurazioni varie, Statuto della Mutua Assicurazione Marittima “Cristoforo 
Colombo” in Camogli. &4 Luglio &11/.  
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the prohibition for the insured ships to cross the Strait of Gibraltar and to sail 
beyond Constantinople609. Thus, it concerned mostly cabotage ships, a factor 
confirmed by the introduction of a threshold value of "'.,,, lire for coverage.  
The disappearance of the Mutua and the gradual recovery of Camogli's shipping 
elicited various modifications to the statute of the Colombo. In "$,%, it was wholly 
reformed: now, it accepted iron and steel vessels only and increased the maximum 
value of insurance to "',.,,, lire. Those who survived to the "**,s crisis, indeed, 
began to purchase second-hand iron-hulled ships on the foreign market and 
engage to tramp shipping of bulk merchandises610. Joint partnerships became the 
dominant pattern of business: the individualistic competition among the members 
of the same family – mitigated by the whole set of risk-sharing tools described 
above – was substituted by mutual collaboration and capital concentration. This 
was perceived as the only way to contrast the massive rise in costs determined by 
technological advance.  
However, although Camogli's maritime activities slightly recovered in the 
"$,,s, the flourishing past was over. The widespread community of shipowners, 
who exceeded two hundred elements in "**(, was reduced to few elements. Then, 
the First World War stroke the final blow. Even fewer survived to the war period; 
However, despite Camogli had lost its shipowning position within the 
international scenario, the community preserved its maritime projection through 
seafaring labour. Under this light, the foundation of the nautical school, with its 
#&# students of local origins between "$,$ and "$"(611, represented the most 
durable accomplishment of the «golden age of sail» of Camogli.  
 
609 Idem, Articolo Addizionale del + Ottobre &11/.  
610 See, Chapter +.  













B. MARITIME LABOUR IN THE AGE OF TRANSITION 
 
Introduction 
This chapter addresses Camogli seafarers’ lives through the lens of the 
transformations which the transition from sail to steam triggered on the individual 
lives and collective structures of the community. Differently from the previous 
chapter, in the following pages the subject shifts from shipping business and the 
ship-owning elites to maritime labour and sea workers, in the attempt to grasp the 
impact of technological advancements from a social, more than economic, 
perspective of seafaring communities. In so doing, the resilience of Camogli’s 
shipping will be reinterpreted under the light of maritime labour, that is, the 
evolution of vertical mobility, salaries, the duration and continuity of seafaring 
careers and the tensions within on board relationships and discipline. Whereas 
usually historiography tends to examine seafaring communities ashore in selected 
maritime towns and districts for studying seafarers’ social tensions and dynamics, 
our primary point of research will be the ship, the seafaring community on board 
the vessel. Indeed, particularly concerning small seafaring towns, there seems to 
be an inherent link between worlds at sea and ashore, and ships can be viewed as 
entire microcosms reproducing all the dynamics and tensions belonging to the 
community. In other words, ships might be conceived as full-fledged «floating 
communities», social and human places where ashore communitarian dynamics 
are repeatedly transferred and evolve to new directions.   
 
E.8. The sources 
 
The chapter draws on a broad set of archival sources, which were produced in 
different moments and for different purposes and, therefore, entail different 
analyses.  
 #'" 
The information on the career of the seamen from Camogli is drawn from the 
registry of the Matricole della gente di mare, kept at the State Archives of Genoa612. 
The material of this source is combined with data from crew lists and logbooks. 
These type of sources will provide evidence on questions such as the composition 
of the crews, the professions on board and their wages. Finally, more qualitative 
sources, withdrawn from the archival collections of the Italian merchant marine 
administration613, will be fundamental to broaden the spectrum of information and 
to provide vivid samples of the realities, as on board and events such as tensions, 
insubordinations and desertion.  
The Matricole della gente di mare was based on the French system of the 
Inscriptions maritime, adopted in the Napoleonic period and then preserved by the 
Savoy administration. Such classification of French sea workers into distinct 
categories dated back to ")*$ Ordonnances de la marine, then updated in "%$'614. 
According to the regulations of the Sardinian Kingdom, later passed to Unified 
Italy, every seaman needed to register into the first or the second category of 
maritime professions in order to work. The former served for the on board 
professions within the national merchant marine and high seas fishing. The latter, 
instead, concerned ship-builders and coastal fishermen615.  
The Ligurian seafarers registered in the  Matricole in the first category of seamen 
cover the period between "*&( and "**), before and after the Italian unification. 
The formal structure of these registrations varied over time due to several 
bureaucratic adjustments; nevertheless, the records contain comparable data, such 
as enrolment years, career advances and few necessary details concerning each 
embarkment along with the date and cause of the career’s cessation. In light of the 
mentioned adjustments, the source presents two different serial progressions: the 
 
612 ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare, registers &-+5.  
613 ACS, Ministero della marina, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea Uffici 
Diversi, &1$4-&1$5. 
614 J. Captier, Étude historique et économique sur l'inscription maritime, Paris: V. Giard & E. Brière, 
&54); P. Villiers and P. Currelier, “Du système des Classes à l'Inscription Maritime”, Revue 
Historique des Armées, &/)/*, (&51*), //-.+.  
615 Codice per la marina mercantile del Regno d’Italia, Milano: Fratelli Burroni, &1$$, art. &1, pp. 
&&-&*.  
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first begins in "*&(, at the number ""$#, and proceeds up to "*)) (number #'()%). 
From that date onwards, due to the publication of a new Code for the Merchant 
Marine, the serial progression restarted from zero. Nevertheless, together with 
these bureaucratic transformations, the archival collection presents some gaps in 
terms of serial continuity. The Genoa State Archives possess only "' registers of the 
second series, spanning from number &(#&, in "*)*, up to the #*&#(, in "**). 
Despite such limits, nonetheless, the material preserved within this archival 
collection contains data of extraordinary value for more than thirty thousand 
seafarers.  
The records were collected in registers, each of them embracing an average of 
six or seven hundreds individuals: then, each folio was divided into three 
horizontal sections, each of them reserved for different subscribers. Then, the lines 
were further divided into columns: the first displayed all the personal information, 
such as the serial number, name, surname, family details, place and date of birth, 
place of living, date of enrolment and the career advancements. Then, from the 
second column up to the end of the following page, we can find the list of 
embarkments, which provide the date of the beginning and end of service, the 
name and type of the ship, the captain’s name and license type, the prospective 
destinations, some of the ports of call and the days of active service.  
Despite their outstanding value for nineteenth-century maritime research, 
Italian academia never approached this material. Its problematic accessibility 
might be one of the reasons.616 Another reason is probably the immense amount 
of available data that can discourage any single researcher, particularly in the 
context of wide-ranged and comparative studies. The existing literature has usually 
relied on aggregate data, tables and statistical analyses processed by the Italian 
public maritime administrations from the late nineteenth century onwards617.  
 
616 For example, in Genoa these registers are kept in a peripheral storage house, accessible just 
once every two weeks under reservation. This is a general issue for nineteenth-century maritime 
sources, a problem which has note really changed since Paolo Frascani complained revealing this 
problem  in the early *444s: P. Frascani, “Una comunità in viaggio: dai racconti dei giornali di 
bordo delle navi napoletane”, in Idem, A vela e a vapore, pp. &45-&+5.   
617 See, M.S. Rollandi, Lavorare sul mare. Economia e organizzazione del lavoro maritimo fra Otto 
e Novecento, Genova: Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, XLII/*, *44*. In particular, we point 
at the fundamental source represented by the yearly statistical publication about the conditions of 
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Aggregate data, however, highly useful for analysis of geographic areas and 
overviews, conceal local development of specific places.618 In this way, Camogli’s 
unique case disappeared in the course of overall analyses which bring out Genoa’s 
administrative district as the central statistical unit. 
Even in a broader and comparative perspective, however, the use of career-
length sources such as the Matricole seems to be rare in the literature on 
nineteenth-century maritime labour619. Most scholars analyse by focusing only on 
the economic side, devoting considerable attention to wages and retributions. 
According to this perspective, which is indeed fundamental for the comprehension 
of broader dynamics, the existing international literature focuses on seafarers as a 
part of a collective, the crew, and, as a result, preferred crew lists, logbooks and 
crew agreements are used rather than career records620. Similarly to the Italian 
situation, these studies have also drawn mainly from aggregate and state-produced 
data to reconstruct the society of seafarers within specific national markets 
quantitatively. Furthermore, whereas concerning the Scandinavian countries there 
is no mention of archival material comparable to the Italian Matricole, Sarah 
Palmer and David M. Williams, in dealing with British maritime labour, confirm 
the existence of equivalent sources (the Registrar General of Shipping and 
Seamen), whose utilisation was deemed as «a theoretical rather than practical 
possibility»621.  
 
the Italian merchant marine. Sulle condizioni della Marina Mercantile Italiana al 7$ dicembre. 
Relazioni del Direttore generale della Marina Mercantile a S. E. il Ministro della Marina, Roma, &15$-
&5&/.  
618 There is some sparse reference to Camogli concerning the national distribution of tonnage 
by cities, which we mentioned in Chapter +.  
619 See, P.C. Royen, J. Bruijn and J. Lucassen (ed.), Those emblems of hell?: European sailors and 
the maritime labour market, $L12 – $>12, Saint John's: Memorial Univ. of Newfoundland, &55); L.R. 
Fischer (ed.), The market for seamen in the age of sail, Saint John's: Memorial Univ. of 
Newfoundland, *4&5; R. Gorski, Maritime Labour: Contributions to the History of Work at Sea, $L22-
!222, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, *44). 
620 Y. Kaukiainen, Sailing into Twilight, pp. &4*-&4/; K. Davids, “Maritime labour in the 
Netherlands, &.)4-&1)4”, in P.C. Royen, J. Bruijn and J. Lucassen (ed.), Those emblems of hell?, pp. 
/&-)*; S. Palmer and D.M. Williams, “British sailors, &)).-&1)4”, in Idem, Those emblems of hell?, 
pp. 5+-&&1; M. North, “German sailors, &$.4-&544”, in Idem, Those emblems of hell?, pp. *.+-*$$.  
621 S. Palmer and D.M. Williams, “British sailors, &)).-&1)4”, p. &4).  
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In contrast, in the French case, such archival material has been used: one 
example is the recent work of Nicolas Cochard622. Cochard has used a similar 
spatial and chronological approach studying the seafarers of Havre in the 
nineteenth century, which represents the closest comparison to the present work. 




From Matricole, we gathered a sample of three hundred seamen to represent 
Camogli’s seafaring population for the period "*&,s-"$",s. We classified the 
archival material into three groups according to chronological criteria, e.g. date of 
birth623. The first group ("*) includes one hundred seafarers born from "*#' to "*('. 
These seamen undertook seafaring from the late "*(,s to "*'#. The second group 
(#*) encompasses seafarers born during "*&'-"*'' born: these began their 
professional career at sea between "*'' and "*%". The third group ((*) includes 
those born during "*)'-"*%' period which began from the late "*%,s to "**).  
The chronological span depends on the chronological boundaries of the archival 
sources. Nevertheless, provided that each registration recorded seafarers’ entire 
careers, the three groups embrace up to seventy years of Camogli’s maritime 
history (from "*&( to "$"&).  
During data collection, we recorded both quantitative and qualitative 
information related to seamen; in particular, apart from biographical details 
concerning seafarers – including origin, service duration, and career advancements 
– the Matricole offered details regarding the career paths undertook. The sources 
provide affluent evidence on all the ports of call or the prospective destination of 
each seaman. It would be impossible, however, to record and compare this 
 
622 N. Cochard, Les marins du Havre: gens de mer et société urbaine au XIXe siècle, Rennes: 
Presses universitaires de Rennes, *4*4. Enric.  
623 In the analysis of the statistical sample, the sources taken into consideration will be referred 
to the database drawn from: ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare, from register & to register +5, n. 
&)11-*1/*+, covering the period &1/+-&111. In &1$), as a consequence of the publication of a new 
Code for the Merchant Marine, the serial progression was interrupted and restarted from zero. 
Therefore, there will be two serial progressions, each of them around thirty thousand registrations.  
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evidence for each seaman considering the thousands of services due to the 
following two reasons. Firstly, a doctoral dissertation has a time limit, and 
processing also this kind of data is practically unfeasible. Secondly, there are 
serious gaps and discrepancies in the level of details provided in the different 
registers. In this regard, our methodology involved the implementation of broader 
categories that include comprehensively different kinds of career paths which 
seamen followed through different embarkments. In this way, we adopted the 
Italian juridical classification of shipping, based on geographical range criteria. 
From the Code of the Merchant Marine ("*))), we followed the distinction 
between cabotaggio, gran cabotaggio and lungo corso624. Cabotaggio – coastal or 
short-range navigation – corresponded to national sea routes; gran cabotaggio 
included «the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea, the Azov Sea and, leaving the 
Strait of Gibraltar, along the oceanic coasts of Spain, Portugal, France and the 
British islands, the North and the Baltic Sea and the western African coast, up to 
Senegal»625; lungo corso, instead, was unlimited and encompassed all the routes 
outside the previously mentioned borders626.  
 
9.%.". MARITIME ACTORS 
 
Our maritime actors, the seafarers, had different roles on board and different 
skills; we have followed further categorisations according to them in order to 
enrich and deepen our analysis on the different maritime trajectories. Some recent 
studies – addressing the technological and economic consequences of transition 
on nineteenth-century maritime labour – have produced a categorisation based on 
their professional level, their specialised skills and the execution of specific 
activities on board627. During the age of sail, such operation led to the adoption of 
 
624 Codice per la marina mercantile del Regno d’Italia, art. .5, pp. *4-*&.  
625 Ibidem.   
626 See Chapter + for an extensive presentation of Camogli’s traffics throughout the oceanic 
phase.  
627 J. Ojala, J. Pehkonen and J. Eloranta, “Deskilling and decline in skill premium during the age 
of sail: Swedish and Finnish seamen, &).&–&5&+”, Explorations in economic history, *4&$; S.M. 
Hynninen, J. Ojala and J. Pehkonen, “Technological change and wage premiums: Historical 
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three different categories of maritime workers: low-skilled, middle-skilled and 
high-skilled seamen628. According to this model, the first category embraced cabin-
boys, deck-boys and ordinary seamen: since their tasks were mainly physical, these 
profiles required little or no skills to fulfil their duties at sea. The second category 
included able-bodied seamen, stewards and boatswains who handled more 
complicated tasks, whose pursuit required routine skills and a certain degree of 
expertise. On top stood ship-officers – masters and mates – who combined 
practical experience with abstract knowledge to manage navigation.  
The adoption of such categorisation in our work revealed to be substantially 
effective and quite representative of Camogli’s seafaring professional trajectories. 
The main critical issue arose in the representation of the lowest category, that of 
cabin boys and ordinary seamen, in relation to the upper professional groups. 
According to existing studies629, low-skilled seafarers are distinguished from the 
other categories on the basis of a supposed labour competition, which shipowners 
triggered in their attempt to increase the share of low-skilled seafarers and 
diminish labour costs. In contrast, the case of Camogli – according to a model 
which might be replicable to other seafaring communities – does not seem to 
present such features. Shipowners, on the one hand, did require cabin-boys and 
ordinary seamen to handle low-skilled activities; it was only natural and expected 
that they would be trained by the other more skilled seamen. Therefore, in a closed 
and endogenous labour system as the one of Camogli, as we will see, the existence 
of labour competition between younger (below than eighteen years old) and older 
seamen seems hardly sustainable in the long term, as low-skilled professions 
represented more a formative step within the seafaring career than a class on its 
own.  
Nonetheless, this skill-biased model seems to fit appropriately into the Italian 
legal and customary hierarchy on board, despite the low-skilled incongruence. 
 
evidence from linked employer–employee data”, Labour Economics, *4&+, */, pp. &-&&; A. Chin, C. 
Juhn, and P. Thompson, “Technical change and the demand for skills during the second industrial 
revolution: evidence from the merchant marine, &15&–&5&*”, The Review of economics and statistics, 
*44$, 11:+, pp. .)*-.)1.  
628 J. Ojala et al., “Deskilling and decline in skill premium during the age of sail”.  
629 See, footnote n. $*o.  
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This model was first applied to the analysis of skill-premia, namely the wage 
differentials between skilled and unskilled seafarers630. Summing up, the model 
based on seamen’s skills provided us with some of the most important critical tools 
for the analysis of the present chapter. The skill-focused model has been, of course, 
adjusted to the Italian maritime labour framework and legislation.  
In order to be recognised as marinaio (sailor as a general reference, able-bodied 
seaman according to the broadly recognised British terminology), seafarers were 
required to reach the age of eighteen years old and to spend twenty-four months 
at sea631. In the period before such legal requirements, Italian seamen were either 
mozzi (cabin and deck-boys) or giovinotti (ordinary seamen), depending on the 
experience acquired. During their first twelve months, cabin and deck-boys were 
engaged in basic physical tasks and learned more on ship handling and navigation 
by observing their more experienced peers. There was a thin line of distinction 
between work and apprenticeship: in slightly more than *% of the cases, for 
instance, cabin-boys did not receive a salary throughout their period at sea632.   
Then, cabin-boys were upgraded to the rank of giovinotto. The sources, 
however, indicate discrepancies between the common shipping practice and the 
Maritime Law. On the one hand, the Italian Code of the Merchant Marine never 
mentioned the rank of giovinotti among the official ranks or statuses of the Italian 
seafarers. On the other hand, the Ligurian crew agreements included the rank of 
giovinotto, and the role of giovinotto is repeatedly found in Camogli’s crew 
agreements from the "*(,s to the first decade of the twentieth century633. What is 
more, to make things even more complicated, sometimes shipmasters tended not 
to distinguish them from cabin-boys in the compilation of crew agreements. 
Nonetheless, in terms of practice, this distinction seems to be fundamental to 
clarify some evident discontinuities in the earliest stages of seafarers’ careers, 
 
630 See the historiographical debate presented in S.M. Hynninen et al., “Technological change 
and wage premiums”, pp. &-* and in A. Chin et al., ““Technical change and the demand for skills 
during the second industrial revolution”, pp. .)*-.)+.  
631 Codice per la marina mercantile del Regno d’Italia, art. *&, p. &&.  
632 See infra. ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, &1+&-&1$..  
633. ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, &1+&-&1$.; Idem, Giornali nautici.  
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concerning wages: evidence suggests, that ordinary seamen or, when this 
nomenclature is missing, more experienced cabin-boys, received almost double 
salary than their less experienced counterparts634.  
Subsequently, after #& months of experience at sea and when seamen reached 
the age of eighteen, the completion of the apprenticeship period on board led to 
the obtainment of the qualification of marinaio (able-bodied seaman), which 
meant a seaman with little or no professional education. This rank qualified 
seamen to handle routine tasks, for which a certain degree of expertise was 
required. A contemporary shipowner, with some exaggeration, asserted that «to 
become able-seamen takes at least ten years; they must begin as cabin-boys on 
sailing vessels, in order to acquire the expertise and bravery needed to fight against 
winds and seas»635. In the age of sail, able-bodied seamen represented the crucial 
productive workforce on board: handling the ropes and sails to manoeuvre the ship 
was their principal duty which required high expertise.  
The rank above the able-seamen was the nostromo (boatswain) and the 
dispensiere (steward). Despite their widespread diffusion in the Italian merchant 
marine, both of them lacked a clear definition within the national maritime 
legislation. Theoretically, the nostromo (boatswain) ranked among petty officers, 
along with coastal pilots and master carpenters (whose influence was limited to 
their specific areas of competence): boatswains’ were responsible for the ship 
equipment and their primary duties concerned to direct the execution of 
manoeuvring operations under masters’ and mates’ direct orders636. Also, the 
boatswain was the representative of the crew before officials and was the most 
experienced seaman (even more than the captains) on board. 
Italian legislation was even less generous in describing the stewards 
(dispensiere). This profession is mentioned just in one instance where the 
lawmaker pointed to captain’s responsibilities to «declare, during the enrolment, 
 
634 See infra, Table ..5.  
635 Inchiesta Parlamentare sulle condizioni della Marina Mercantile, vol. I, p. .$.   
636 Codice per la marina mercantile del Regno d’Italia, art. $$, pp. *+-*/.  
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the qualification of nostromo and dispensiere»637; all the other qualifications had 
specific legal requirements. Therefore, the Code for the Merchant Marine nowhere 
mentions the stewards’ job description at sea. To worsen the situation, as far as the 
literature about nineteenth-century Italian maritime labour is concerned, the role 
of dispensiere received little or no attention, despite his broad recurrence in 
maritime sources638. Likewise, nautical vocabularies were short in details too: the 
dispensiere was generically considered in charge of the hold of provisions and their 
distribution to the crew639. Considering that cooks are never mentioned in sailing 
vessels’ crew agreements, it seems that stewards were also in charge of cooking. 
Apart from that, it is not clear whether he received from the captain 
responsibilities on provisions and food supplies in ports or not, and to what extent 
he was also engaged in works on board as a regular sailor. Boatswains were 
required on board for their expertise; stewards for possessing collateral practical 
skills.  
Finally, a group of highly-skilled, experienced and educated seafarers – masters 
and mates – stood above low and middle-skilled seamen. The role of formal 
education was crucial in determining the distinction of one group from another. 
Able-bodied seamen and boatswains were not required of any sort of theoretical 
education, apart from practical experience. It was only officers that were required 
to have a formal theoretical education. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Code 
for the Italian Merchant Marine differentiated shipmasters’ into three categories: 
padroni, capitani di gran cabotaggio and capitani di lungo corso640. These labels 
were bound to specific geographical navigational limits in home waters 
corresponding to cabotage (padroni), great cabotage (capitani di gran cabotaggio) 
and deep-sea going shipping in international waters and high seas (capitani di 
 
637 Regolamento per la Marina Mercantile, art. /+4, in M. Vocino (ed.), Codice marittimo, Firenze: 
G. Barbera, &5*&, pp. *&*-*&+.  
638 For instance, in her work on the Italian maritime labour, Maria Stella Rollandi only mentions 
once the figure of dispensiere, without providing any detail: M.S. Rollandi, Lavorare sul mare, p. 
+)).  
639 See, Dispensiere in S. Stratico, Vocabolario di marina in tre lingue. Tomo I, Milano: Stamperia 
Reale, &1&+, p. &)&; Dispensiere in F. Piqué, Dizionario di marina, Milano: Natale Battezzati Editore, 
&1)5, p. &$4.  
640 See, Codice per la marina mercantile del Regno d’Italia, art. .)-$., pp. *4-*+.  
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lungo corso). All the seaman aspiring to those positions needed to possess specific 
prerequisites: the padroni, at least at the age of ## years old, were asked for a three-
year experience at sea; the capitani di gran cabotaggio, had the same age 
requirements, but needed four years of navigation; the capitani di lungo corso, had 
to be of a minimum age of #& years old, and had to comply with four years of 
navigation, with one year on sea voyages outside the Mediterranean641. 
 
E.=. The ships of Camogli: “floating communities” 
 
This section will outline the main characteristics of Camogli’s maritime labour 
system, the mechanisms ruling its labour market, before and after the transition 
from sail to steam affected the evolution of local shipping and led to its 
marginalisation into the transport of oceanic bulk commodities. Moreover, we will 
focus on the persistence of family and communitarian structures within on board 
social relationships, a fundamental feature of Camogli’s shipping.  
 
9.".%. THE ENDOGENOUS LABOUR MARKET BEFORE THE %,,3S 
 
The existence of an endogenous labour market was a crucial characteristic of 
Camogli’s maritime labour system, before the geographical transfer of Camogli’s 
shipping from the Mediterranean and Black Sea routes to long-distance oceanic 
routes. The concept of “endogenous market” partially derives from the distinction 
proposed by Karel Davids in his seminal article about maritime communities642: 
according to his definition, maritime communities could be divided in endogenous 
and exogenous, depending on the relationship which the community of seafarers 
maintained with both the urban environment and with the other professional 
groups living there. Thus, old traditional seafaring centres, such as Marstal or 
 
641 Idem, art. $*.  
642 K. Davids, “Local and global: Seafaring communities in the North Sea area, c. &$44–*444”, 
pp. $+&-$+/.  
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Scarborough643 – and, in this group, we can include Camogli – were defined as 
endogenous due to the high relative weight of seafaring within the economy of the 
community. In these places, maritime activities represented, at the same time, the 
most rewarding business and the most reliable source of employment. This 
combination of shipping and maritime labour in the same space and within the 
same human community is the groundwork for our conception of “endogenous 
labour market”, in which local demands and supplies for maritime labour tended 
to their mutual satisfaction. Data evidence withdrawn from crew lists and 
matricole seem to support this hypothesis – at least until Camogli’s shipping was 
marginalised to the oceanic outskirts as a result of technological advancements in 
navigation644.   
 
 
Figure ..&. Geographical origins of crew members of Camogli-owned ships (&1.4-&1$.). Source: 
ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, &1+&-&1$..  
Figure '." displays the origins of seafarers on board on Camogli-owned ships 
during "*("-"*)'. Among them, seamen born in Camogli cover nearly half of the 
figure and, in general, the Ligurian area provides **% of the total maritime 
workforce. Out of this percentage, the high share of towns and villages along the 
 
643 Idem, p. $+&. On the analogies between Camogli and Scarborough, see Chapter & and C.R. 
Foy, “Sewing a safety net”, pp. &-*1.  














Eastern Riviera, most of them around Camogli, might induce to enlarge the 
perspective to a broader sub-regional area, in which various neighbouring 
communities referred to Camogli as the primary source of maritime employment. 
Then, apart from Genoa, whose administrative borders blur the sources, the 
importance of the other categories like the “Other Italian States” and “other origin” 
is very low. Camogli’s maritime labour pool was entirely Ligurian. 
This model presents some valuable differentiation according to specific 
professional categories (Figure '.#). The share of high-skilled seamen (shipmasters 
and mates) from Camogli, living in Camogli, accounted for )%% of the records. The 
rest came from Genoa and the Eastern Riviera. Then, low-skilled seafarers (cabin-
boys and ordinary seamen) from Camogli measured slightly beyond the average 
(&(%). The origins of able-bodied seamen, boatswains and steward varied more; 
only ((% of them was born in Camogli.  
 
Figure ..*. Geographical origins by skill-levels. Source: ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, &1+&-&1$.. 
Aggregate data fails to effectively outline a large number of cases that are 
representative of this era. On the one hand, for example, on the brig Alfa (##" t.), 
in "*'$, there were eleven seamen, all of them – from master to cabin-boys – from 
Camogli645. On the other hand, the crew of the brig Regolo in "*)&, was composed 
 
645 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &/, n. ***).  
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only of three people from Camogli – the master, the steward and a cabin-boy –, 
whereas the others lived in nearby towns, such as Recco, Rapallo, Nervi and 
Portofino646.  
The relatively high numbers of ship officials born in Camogli testifies the strong 
correlation between masters and ship-owners. As we will see later more clearly647, 
in the selection of shipmasters, kinship and trust relationships played fundamental 
roles. It was understandable, therefore, that the shipowners’ preference targeted 
captains from a community-based labour pool market. An analogous discourse, 
then, ruled the recruitment of cabin-boys who, in several cases, were close relatives 
either of owners or masters.  
Moreover, the results shown in Figure '." might encourage us to widen the 
perspective. The rupture of the imaginative borders of Camogli’s seafaring 
community and their enlargement to a broader sub-region suggest a new 
framework in which Camogli’s leadership created relationships (in terms of 
seafaring demand and supply) with the neighbouring communities. In the 
nineteenth century, Camogli witnessed a demographic boom as a result of the 
extraordinary growth of its shipping activities – which created new labour 
opportunities. Demographic data are available from "*)" onwards: in "**", the local 
population had passed from roughly eight thousand to more than ten648. In the 
decade between "*)" and "**", the growth rate was of "$,#%, in contrast with a 
),*% average of the neighbouring towns649.  
The evolution of Recco in the same period, for example, followed the opposite 
trend. From the times of the Republic of Genoa until the mid-nineteenth century, 
Recco had represented the hegemonic power in the area, whereas Camogli was a 
poorly populated fishing village. Still in "*'$, according to the readjustment of 
Ligurian administrative units, Camogli was subordinate to Recco, although, in 
terms of population, the former outnumbered the latter. Then, the subsequent rise 
 
646 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &$, n. /$1/.  
647 See, infra.  
648 Istituto Centrale di Statistica (ISTAT), Comuni e loro popolazione ai censimenti dal $>D$ al 
$ML$, Roma: Azienda Beneventana Tipografica Editoriale, &5$4, pp. .+-./.  
649 Ibidem.  
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of Camogli found recognition only in "*%%, when of its number inhabitants were 
double than those of Recco and was officially promoted as a city650. 
Conversely, to understand the features of the endogenous labour market, we 
can overturn the perspective adopted in Figure '.". There, the geographical 
distribution of the seamen embarked on Camogli-owned vessels is shown; now, we 
address the analysis of the embarkments of the sailors from Camogli, whether they 
embarked on Camogli-owned vessels or not. The results outline how, before the 
late "**,s, the seamen of Camogli found employment in the domestic fleet, with 
little or no exceptions; only afterwards, as a result of the downgrading conditions 
of local shipping, some seafarers sought for further opportunities into different 
markets, particularly on cargo and passenger steamers651.  
As presented in the previous chapters about Camogli’s maritime activities, in 
the "*&,s and "*',s, most of the seamen began their careers in cabotage, pursuing 
long-standing local interests along the Tyrrhenian routes, especially those for the 
transport of charcoal652. Then, they engaged on longer deep-sea going routes 
towards the Black Sea trade, which represented a trademark for most of them, 
before moving even further to oceanic navigation.  
Throughout its rising phase, Camogli’s shipping stimulated considerable 
demands for the workforce, which led shipowners and captains to expand to 
neighbouring towns labour markets. This phenomenon might also be an 
explanation for the low rates of cases of desertion aimed to embark on foreign 
ships, a well-established and widespread phenomenon in other merchant 
marines653, up to the late "**,s. Before the last decades of the nineteenth century, 
desertion, whose evolution will be further discussed in the next chapter, responded 
to different needs and was tied to migration flows, according to which some 
seafarers quitted the ships and sought for a new life in the Americas.  
 
650 G.B. Roberto Figari (ed.), Camogli da borgo a città. Notizie storiche e spunti di ricerca.   
651 ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare, registers from & to +5.  
652 See, Chapter & and the similarities with the &)th century British case outlined in: R. Davis, The 
rise of the English shipping industry in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  
653 See, Chapter $.  
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Notwithstanding the last phase (the "**,s-"$",s), therefore, the existence of an 
endogenous labour market – ruling local demand and supply of seafaring 
workforce – represents a fundamental characteristic of Camogli’s maritime 
evolution. From a social perspective, this endogenous way to form the crews 
resulted in the persistence of the land features at sea. Family ties, kinship and, 
more broadly, all sorts of direct relationships established ashore were continued 
on board, into crew inter-relationships and in the mechanisms of keeping 
discipline during navigation. Life on board, therefore, was a sort of re-enactment 
of the life ashore. In a contemporary polemical pamphlet, these characteristics 
were neatly described through a metaphor, which compared every ship to a moving 
migrant family: 
Since the ships were relatively scarce [in numbers and tons], their 
crews were composed by people from the same town, where also 
shipownership was concentrated; yet, the supply of sailors 
exceeded their demand. This led to limited and contiguous 
relationships, which never went beyond the local and narrow 
geographical and professional clusters. Also, this resulted in the 
fact that all these people, anxious for their livelihoods, had to 
remain bound, industrious and disciplined. Every ship, therefore, 
is like a family that emigrates for some time.654 
In Camogli’s case-study, however, this persuasive metaphor, which the author 
used to blame Ligurian backwardness in shipping, can be pushed further, from 
family to community. Indeed, under this light, the fleet of Camogli can be 




654 G. De Rossi, “La Marina mercantile italiana”, Nuova Antologia, &11&, p. ., in ACS, Ministero 
della marina, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Commissione parlamentare sulle 
condizioni della marina mercantile, b. /.    
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9.".". KINSHIP AND COMMUNITY: ON BOARD RELATIONSHIPS IN TRADITIONAL 
SEAFARING 
 
In Camogli, seafaring careers began rather early, soon after the completion of 
primary school, which represented the highest degree of education for most of the 
seamen (except the masters). Maritime culture and traditions played a crucial role 
in directing most of the boys towards seafaring. In broad terms, the most common 
behaviour consisted of taking service between age eleven and fourteen and for 
short voyages, in order to adapt to life at sea progressively.  
 
Range of age "* (")&$-")%$) &* (")'$-")$$) %* (")#$-")($) 
>"" % "' @ 
""-"& '( $' &" 
"%-"' %) &@ $% 
"$-"# "" "" &' 
"#> " @ % 
Average (y-d) "& y - &'@ d "&y – %# d "%y – &$> d 
Table ..& Age of first enrolment (series &-+). Source: ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare, registers 
from & to +5.  
In the years preceding the first official embarkments, several youngsters 
underwent their own informal “baptism of the sea”, in the context of seasonal 
fishing campaigns – like those for anchovies in Gorgona655 – where they learned 
the fundamentals of navigation. Afterwards, upon parental permission, which was 
mandatory for under-aged seafarers656, these prospective sailors enrolled within 
the first ranks of the Italian merchant marine as mozzi. The first steps of the cabin 
boys in the maritime world constituted a fundamental stage in the sailors’ practical 
education. Indeed, in sailing ship navigation, the transfer of seafaring knowledge 
was an intergenerational process involving all the members of the crew. 
Professional expertise was handed down from one generation to another, through 
observation and first-person repetition of the fundamental operations performed 
 
655 See, Chapter &.  
656 Codice per la marina mercantile del Regno d’Italia, art. )+, in M. Vocino, Codice marittimo, p. 
*..  
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at sea. In broader terms, the ship – to be perceived as a communitarian human 
space – attended to its social responsibilities toward the younger members of the 
community rather than demanding cheap labour force. Cabin-boys represented a 
transitional workforce; they were active members of the community, and their 
participation in its maritime activities was part of their maturity to manhood and 
seamanship. In this framework, the dimensions of family and community 
overlapped, as testified by the broad recurrence of father-son relationships 
between masters and cabin-boys observed in the crew agreements of the Black Sea 
period. This was, for instance, the case of Giuseppe and Gio. Batta Bozzo, 
respectively shipmaster and cabin-boy, enlisted in the crew of the barque N.S. della 
Concezione ((,' t.), which left Genoa in June "*'$ to the Azov Sea657. The same 
pattern is seen for Giacomo and Diodato Schiaffino, on board of the brig Genio 
(((* t.) over which, however, Giacomo was both owner and captain658. In the 
selection of the crew members, shipowners and shipmasters coexisted and shared 
their control; yet, when these figures merged in the same individual, family 
relationships on board became the rule.  
Apart from the need for the education of future captains and shipowners, which 
represented the most common typology of kinship relationships on board, the 
composition of the crews may consist in the transfer of entire families at sea. In 
"*)#, this was the case of Agostino Degregori, owner of the brig Dante (#%* t.), 
who appointed his two sons, Gio. Batta and Luigi, respectively as shipmaster and 
mate. Two years later, as soon as Luigi was licensed as captain, he was promoted 
to master, whereas his brother Gio. Batta was given the command of the barque 
Italico (()$ t.), still owned by Agostino659. Moreover, on the brigs Eto ("&( t.) and 
Le due to marie ("&& t.), same family members on board were respectively three 
and four, shipmaster, mate and boatswain in the former, and shipmaster, mate, 
 
657 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &/, n. +)1+.  
658 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &/, n. $14+.  
659 See, Idem, serie &/, n. 5/51 and serie &$, n. /$+& and 15.5. See also, ASGe, Matricole della 
gente di mare, register $, n. $14* and Idem, register &4, n. &&5*4.  
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boatswain and a cabin-boy in the latter660. Besides, these extraordinary cases shed 
light on a noteworthy feature concerning the fluid definition of the role of 
boatswains on board. In the previous section, boatswains were defined as 
responsible for the ship equipment and the management of the more complicated 
operations at sea. Their duties required long-term experience in navigation, and 
boatswains were usually chosen among the most skilled seamen available. On the 
other hand, archival evidence suggests the existence of underlying mechanisms 
which complicated somehow the adoption of this straightforward paradigm. For 
instance, data concerning the age of boatswains returned a result of an average age 
of (&,' years and, in some records, of less than #' years661. Such cases are the 
boatswains Luigi Olivari (on board Eto) and Fortunato Aste (on board Le due to 
marie), #, years old, at the time of their embarkments662. Both embarked under 
their respective fathers, who were shipmasters, and Aste Fortunato was even in his 
two brothers’ company, who were enlisted as mate and cabin-boy. In the course of 
their careers, both Luigi and Fortunato became shipmasters after a few years663.  
In these cases, the extension of family ties to crew members implied the partial 
reshaping of boatswains’ character. This phenomenon is connected with 
overabundant supplies of high-skilled and educated seamen, in the context of 
seafaring communities which are distinguished for solid shipowning traditions. 
The absence of law requirements to embark as boatswain allowed underaged, but 
qualified, masters and mates to compete for the same position: the aim was to 
accumulate months of navigation and to spend the time intercurrent between the 
completion of the school and the minimum age to be officially mates and masters. 
Thus, the boatswains’ professional profile, whose trademark was superior 
experience on board, was technically turned upside down: on board, the boatswain 
 
660 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &+, n. /4+& and serie &/, n. $)51, bricks Eto (&/+ tons.) and Le 
due Marie (&// tons.), both of them headed to Black Sea ports (Odessa and Galatz). 
661 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, &1+&-&1$..  
662 Idem, serie &+, n. /4+& and serie &/, n. $)51.  
663 ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare, register $ and &&. Luigi Olivari (n. )&/*) became master 
in &1$& and then upgraded his licence for oceanic routes in &1$). Fortunato Aste (n. &&/1*), was 
promoted to master in &1$) and in &1$1 commanded the brick bark Aste Giuseppe (named after his 
father) along great cabotage routes. See, ACS, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, 
Miscellanea, box. /+$.  
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was no more the most experienced sailor but became a temporary position for 
young prospective deck officials. 
Apart from increasing the control of shipowners over the ship’s life at sea, 
through the imposition of family members, the communitarian dimension shaped 
the social attitude of shipowners towards sailors. Northern European and 
American scholars have used nineteenth-century literature to support evidence on 
a widespread and generalised negative stance of shipowners against seamen based 
mainly on the British and American societies664. Common seafarers are described 
as rude, uneducated, prone to drunkenness, to violence and all sorts of malicious 
behaviours; yet, owners needed them to man their ships and, therefore, devised 
any kind of measure to control and limit their “spontaneous” malice. Camogli’s 
endogenous and community-based pool for recruiting sailors raises a striking 
contrast with this general interpretation. Shipowners and seamen are respected 
members of cohesive family communities with tight relations. There are no clues 
about shipowners’ judgemental or harsh behaviour against crews; a sharp 
difference which can be related to the enclosed society and shared space where 
behaviour on board was immediately made known ashore.  
Most of the shipowners' kinship was limited to the ruling ranks (plus cabin-
boys, for the mentioned educational purposes): sons and relatives usually filled the 
best positions, such as those of shipmaster, mate and boatswain. Shipowners’ 
direct relatives were rarely engaged to low and middle-skilled positions for long 
periods. There are some instances of close-relatives enlisted as able-bodied 
seamen, but these cases tend to be scarce and short-termed in the expectation of 
more qualified positions. This is the case, for instance, of Andrea and Filippo 
Razeto, cousins between each other and sons, respectively, of the shipmaster and 
mate of the brig La Rosa. They enlisted as AB seamen at age nineteen, but as soon 
as they acquired more experience, both of them obtained the licence of captain665.  
 
664 G.J. Milne, People, Place and Power on the Nineteenth-Century Waterfront. Sailortown, 
Palgrave Macmillan: *4&$, pp. +*-+5.  
665 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &/, n. $.5+; ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare, register &&, n. 
&&+.. and &&.11.  
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In other instances, the concentration of relatives on board, could entail some 
drawbacks and produce problems within the hierarchy and the control of the crew. 
This might have been the case, for instance, of the events which took place on 
board of the ship Nuovo Filadelfo, where there was a conflict between the 
shipmaster Carlo Aste and his steward Gio. Batta Vaccarezza. In "*)%, the latter 
was denounced by the shipmaster for violent conduct against the captain to the 
Italian consul of Cardiff’. This fact triggered an official inquiry, performed by the 
consul who later transmitted it to the Ministry, to shed light on the events. 
According to the consul, the dispute had started because of the steward 
insubordination against the master, which led to a fight between the two parts. 
The captain had denounced the affair relying on his strong juridical position, as he 
had witnesses to his favour, the mate of the ship and the boatswain. However, since 
both the mate and the boatswain were brothers to the captain, the consul 
considered that their testimony was not impartial and, therefore, they were not 
accepted as witnesses666.  
The same incident might also be worth noting and emblematic for another 
purpose. Indeed, the following events might represent a most convincing case of 
what was previously theorised as the transfer of the communitarian dynamics 
outside the geographical borders of the community. Every ship of Camogli was a 
small community and, with their voyages, they could transfer the community in 
foreign countries and ports. While the ship was anchored, as the procedures were 
still ongoing, captain Carlo Aste was approached by Giacomo Vaccarezza, master 
of the barque Avola Pellegrina – newly arrived in Cardiff – and brother of the above-
mentioned steward. Informed about the facts, captain Vaccarezza verbally and 
physically attacked Carlo Aste, with the purpose to support his own brother’s 
position on the quarrel. To intricate even more the situation, the consul reported 
that, in the previous years, captain Aste had served as mate under captain 
Vaccarezza’s command.  
 
666 ACS, Ministero della marina, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea Uffici 
Diversi &1$4-&1$5, b. /+$.  
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The Nuovo Filadelfo affair in Cardiff draws on just one of the several files kept in 
the Archives of the merchant marine. However, the mixture of personal and 
professional relationships, which involved five people belonging to two different 
families, is emblematic to outline the pervasiveness of the communitarian and 
family structures in Camogli’s shipping, in different geographical areas in which all 
these events took place.  
 
9.".). THE SEAFARERS OF CAMOGLI AND THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE  
 
As Camogli’s maritime activities expanded to the oceanic shipping market, its 
locally-based and endogenous labour system gradually changed, losing some of its 
main features and entangling with international and global dynamics and tensions. 
Discussions about the existence, or its formation from the "*',s onwards, of a 
global and integrated maritime labour market have set against different historians, 
who have developed their analyses on this theme. Although most of the scholars 
agreed on the effective transformation of maritime labour as a result of 
technological advance and globalisation, remained wide range for dissensus 
whether it was possible to attach the label global to this new system or not. The 
main issue, raised among others by Lewis Fischer, concerned the existence of real 
integration in terms of wage differentials. In his work on Norwegian communities, 
Fisher contested the effective integration drawing on capillary archival research, 
which led the author to outline how even the existence of a national maritime 
labour market was debatable. His assumptions rooted in the persistence of 
substantial wage differentials between several Norwegian ports still in the late 
nineteenth-century667. The discourse addressing the effective integration within 
national maritime labour markets might also be translated to the Italian context, 
which, also owing to a recent national unification, presented several incongruences 
and discontinuities from one place to another. Whereas specific studies have 
targeted local labour markets, few have produced comparative analyses suitable 
 
667 L.R. Fisher, “The efficiency of maritime labour markets in the age of sail: the post-&1.4 
Norwegian experience”, in Idem (ed.), The market for seamen in the age of sail, St. John’s, 
Newfoundland: International Maritime Economic History Association, &55/.  
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for an organic reconstruction of the Italian market for seafarers. M.S. Rollandi, in 
her original work on the Italian maritime labour, has been one of the few to address 
these subjects, drawing on the data provided by the Parliamentary Inquiry.  
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Table ..*. Comparison of AB seamen average wages in different Italian ports (&1)&-&114). Source: 
Inchiesta parlamentare sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana, vol. III, p. &11; M.S. 
Rollandi, Lavorare sul mare, Tabella *. Medie mensili dei salari (in lire) dei marinai imbarcati nei 
porti italiani (&1)&-&114), p. +*&.  
The average wages reported in Table '.# represent a unique comparison tool 
provided by the Italian authorities in "**". Out of it, none of the aggregated data 
and statistical tables produced and published up to the First World War contained 
reliable and useful information concerning the evolution of salaries in general and 
from one port to another. Nevertheless, Table '.# needs to be used in the awareness 
of its limited period and in the light of the international context, dominated by the 
fall of freight rates, which dramatically modified the price for maritime labour in 
all the merchant marines668. Therefore, though the relative convergence of salaries 
might indicate the progressive diminution of geographical wage differentials, the 
absence of data beyond this narrow period impedes further analyses. Lacking the 
tools of the classical economy to assess national and global maritime labour 
markets, we can investigate the influence of the increased geographical mobility of 
seafarers between previously self-governing worlds on maritime labour systems. 
Indeed, the discourse concerning the existence of an integrated global maritime 
labour market exceeds the purposes of this dissertation; yet, the encounters and 
 
668 See chapter +.  
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entanglements between the local and international markets for seafarers had their 
undeniable effects, which will be at the core of the following pages.  
The intensification of seamen mobility can be included among the most evident 
results of the historical evolution of Camogli’s shipping. As outlined in the previous 
chapters, since the last phase of the Black Sea trade, Camogli-owned vessels, 
accustomed to navigating within the borders of the Inner Sea, moved beyond them 
and established a firm foothold along northern European and, then, oceanic 
routes. These vessels were indeed manned by seafarers, who had been traditionally 
bounded to the Mediterranean in the same manner: this process began as 
intragenerational, with middle-aged seamen, reminiscent of their past along short-
cabotage routes, embarking on new challenges. Then, it became intergenerational, 
as most of their descendants grew well-aware of their enlarged working 
environment and, perhaps, a little oblivious of their past.  
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Table ..+. Percentage of employment in different categories of navigation (months &-*/). Source: 
ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare, registers from & to +5.  
In Table '.(, we divided Camogli’s seafarers first embarkments (months "-#&) in 
three different categories (plus fishing) according to the type of trade routes. These 
categories were drawn from the Italian legislation which identified, respectively, 
coastal and short-cabotage, Mediterranean cabotage (including the Black Sea and 
Northern Sea) and oceanic navigation. The pre-eminence of short-cabotage 
observed among the members of the first row, in comparison to the increase of 
long-cabotage and oceanic navigation in the latter two, is an adequate 
reproduction of the different stages of Camogli’s maritime activities. As argued in 
the previous section, first embarkments responded to educational purposes as 
much as to labour demands. Therefore, seafarers’ initiation to navigation was more 
 #%& 
likely conducted on shorter and safer voyages in comparison with mature and 
more experienced seamen, whose employment depended exclusively on the needs 
of the shipping market. However, the dramatic fall of short-cabotage emerging in 
the second and third cohorts is more or less in line with the market framework. 
Also, the high percentage of youngsters – from the third row – who embarked 
straight on oceanic voyages is a clear representation of the relative dismissal of the 
low-paced, discontinuous and staged formation onboard to the gain of a more 
rapid adaptation to high seas navigation.  
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Table ../. Percentage of employment in different categories of navigation (months *.-/44). 
Source: ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare, registers from & to +5.  
Table '.& translates the same categorisation into the careers of both middle-skilled 
and high-skilled Camogli’s seamen and takes into consideration all the 
embarkments from their twenty-fourth month to the end of their careers. These 
data derive from the approximation of seamen’s embarkments, which has been 
based on the duration of employment: each seafarers’ career was divided into a 
maximum of four sections, each of them corresponding to roughly one hundred 
months of service at sea. The first section comprehended the embarkments from 
month #' to month ",,; the second section, months "," to #,,; the third, months 
#,"-(,,; the last section, from (,, months to over four hundred (only eight 
seamen out of our three hundred samples worked for more than four hundred 
months). Finally, every career section was labelled according to the category of 
relative majority within each timeframe. The outcomes, albeit rough from a 
statistical perspective, represent the achievable results which, moreover, reflect 
once more the robust correlation between the evolutions of maritime labour and 
shipping.  
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To the first cohort ("*) belonged the first generation of seafarers who underwent 
the progressive abandonment of Tyrrhenian cabotage in favour to the Black Sea 
trade ('$,(,%); in their latest years of service, a discrete group of them ("#,$*%) 
lasted as long as to move to the oceanic phase. The second cohort (#*) lived 
through the economic peak of Camogli’s shipping: these seamen started on board 
of three-masted barques, sailing from the Black Sea to the British ports ('&,)*%) 
and ended up on iron-hulled “cape horners” ((%,&(%). The third ((*), instead, 
underwent the most troublesome shipping cycles of the "*%,s-"*$,s and the 
progressive marginalisation of sailing vessels to peripherical markets ('*,&&%). 
The utilisation of inter-generational samples allowed us to observe the steady 
transition from local to global, which Camogli’s seafarers underwent within the 
"*&,s-"$,,s period. At the same time, the coexistence of different categories 
within the same cohort provides us with some clues about intra-generational 
transformations, which led seamen trained in short-cabotage to sail in oceanic 
waters. One of them was Gaetano Giovanni Figari, born in "*#' from Gio. Batta 
and Maria Morchio669. Gaetano Giovanni enrolled for the first time in "*&(, rather 
late for Camogli’s standards, six months before turning eighteen years old. In his 
first six years of service, he embarked continuously on short-cabotage vessels, 
where he matured )' months of experience, most of them at the service of the 
same master Mortola670.  Afterwards, he began to serve in the Black Sea trade, 
where he acquired more than ##, months of navigation until "*%". Only then, he 
turned to oceanic navigation, reaching ports such as Cape Town, Montevideo, 
Valparaiso and Rangoon. On "st September "**(, after a whole career as an able-
bodied seaman, Gaetano Giovanni embarked on board of the ship Indus (captain 
Bozzo) as boatswain. This was his last voyage as, in "**', when he reached age ),, 
he moved definitively to Buenos Ayres, after &,$ months of navigation.  
 
669 ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare, register /, n. +)/&. Then, in &1$+, he was passed to the a 
new serial number, in Idem, register *1, n. &5.)4.  
670 In the sources, he is defined as padrone which identified masters who were allowed to 
navigate on short-cabotage routes only.  
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Different, instead, was the personal trajectory of Andrea Dellacasa, who was born 
in "*((671. Having obtained his parents’ permission, Andrea embarked as cabin-boy 
at age ten and collected more than ), months of navigation, divided between short 
and Mediterranean cabotage, before turning eighteen. In "*'', after a few Black 
Sea voyages as a sailor, he suspended his services until "*),. Arguably, this period 
was devoted to studying for his shipmasters’ exams, as in "*)" Andrea was licensed 
for great cabotage. In "*)%, he received his first command on board of the brig 
Luchino (#$( t.) toward the ports of Azov. In the same year, Andrea had obtained 
the license for unlimited navigation and, thus, from the early "*%,s, engaged 
regularly in oceanic routes, in particular in North American timber trade, at the 
command of the three-masted schooner Salvatore (&,, t.)672. Finally, in "**$ he 
retired after ((% months of navigation.  
These seamen – and all their peers –  were first-person witnesses of the radical 
transformations occurred in Camogli’s shipping throughout the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Some of these changes began in the Black Sea phase, before 
ascending to further levels at the ‘global turn’.  
 
9.".$. LOCAL AND GLOBAL IN CONFLICT  
 
Uniformity and cohesion onboard were natural consequences of the resorting 
to local endogenous labour resources (see Figure '."). As said, during the Black Sea 
phase, the vast majority of seafarers was recruited in Camogli and then embarked 
in the port of Genoa; the main alternatives to this pattern were Marseille and 
Livorno, the two Mediterranean ports which were complementary to Genoa within 
the Black Sea trade framework. Sometimes, the captain of a ship headed to one of 
these two cities needed to replace some seamen or even to change the entire crew; 
the new crew was recruited in that place, in order to save time and not to call to 
Genoa unnecessarily. In some instances, due to the relative proximity of these 
ports to Liguria, the new elements were directly summoned from Camogli. This 
 
671 ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare, register /, n. /4*4. Then, in &1)5, he was registered in 
Idem, register *), n. *4*/4.  
672 Registro navale italiano, &11), p. &$5.  
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was the case, for instance, of the brig Mercurio ("*, t.) which changed the entire 
crew (except the master) in Livorno ("*)"). Among the nine new sailors embarking 
(including the mate, the boatswain, five AB seamen and two cabin-boys), seven of 
them were from Camogli, the remaining from other Ligurian towns673.  
Nevertheless, in some instances, the need to replace sailors occurred in more 
distant ports. Death at sea, desertions or agreed discharges were frequent events 
within ship voyages. These resulted in more casual replacements, depending on 
the availability of sailors in that specific port. Priority was conceded to seafarers 
from Camogli and Liguria, but, in several cases, captains had to enrol foreign 
seamen. This is the phase when it is possible to observe the earliest entanglements 
between different national labour forces: despite the relatively negligible numbers, 
the advent of Greeks (","#%), Austrians (,,)&%) and English (,,&%%) must have 
had an impact on previously rather homogeneous groups. However, more 
impressive was the number of seafarers from other pre-unitarian Italian states 
(),%%%), whose integration remained ineffective for an extended period674.  
Therefore, there is no surprise if the expansion of Camogli’s shipping range 
blew a significant hit on its traditional local system.  
 
 
673 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, serie &/, n. $)/+. The brig Mercurio, owned by Giuseppe Mortola 
and captained by Luigi Mortola, arrived in Livorno in late November &1$4, from Berdyansk with a 
grain cargo. The new crew was embarked on the &*th January &1$&.  
674 See infra.   
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Figure ..+. Geographical origins of crew members of Camogli-owned ships (&11.-&54.). Source: 
ASGe, Giornali nautici 
The main radical change emerging from Figure '.( in comparison with the Black 
Sea phase crews’ composition (Figure '.") is the drastic fall of the share of Ligurian 
people from **% to )(%. This gap was filled by the remarkable increment of the 
other Italian seafarers (from %% to #'%) and, partially, from the more than double 
figure of foreigners (from '% to "#%). Non-Ligurian Italians reached almost the 
same share of those from Camogli; their increased statistical weight on board is a 
sign of the broadening of Camogli’s labour market, whose local and endogenous 
characteristics were gradually replaced by the opening to the national dimension.  
Notwithstanding the discourse about wage differentials, the matter of national 
integration in the Italian merchant marine is crucial to advance our understanding 
of the nineteenth-century maritime labour transformations. Unfortunately, so far, 
no studies have been attempted to deal, organically and comparatively, with this 
issue, which remains, however, beyond the scopes and possibilities of the present 
dissertation675. Of course, the massive paperwork collected in the archives of the 
 
675 The lack of an Italian perspective (together with the Greek one) in the most exhaustive 
attempt to study the European maritime labour market is somehow surprising: see, P.C. Royen, J. 
















Italian merchant marine witnessed the problematic relationships deriving from 
onboard dynamics, several of which involved Ligurians and southerners. Although 
clashes and fights among crew members and especially between higher and lower 
ranks were frequent in all the world merchant marines, even among individuals 
coming from the same place, the introduction of foreigners aboard could boost 
these tensions. Ligurian seafarers, for example, lamented the «unfair competition» 
engaged by southern Italian seamen seeking for employment in Genoa. Here, local 
demands for maritime labour was higher of the other national ports, a factor 
playing a crucial role in the uneven concentration of seafarers in the Ligurian 
city676.  
Desertion, which will be the object of more extensive analysis in the next 
chapter, was another factor that affected the communitarian homogeneity 
onboard, then, concurred the widespread phenomenon of. Nevertheless, the rise 
of desertion among Italian seamen, in particular in the American ports, had severe 
implications on the formation of crews. In the owners’ and captains’ perspectives, 
desertion constituted a significant economic and social issue, because numerous 
sailors needed to be replaced in foreign ports. This practice, however, led to the 
increase of labour costs, since seamen were recruited according to the average 
salaries of the specific port in which they were needed, which were always higher 
than those of Italy. Such a dynamic is plainly outlined by the "*)$ Commissione 
per la repressione delle diserzioni:  
Frequently, when captains reach foreign ports – in particular 
those of America – sailors jumped their ships; this causes the 
interruption of work [discharging and charging the cargo] and 
delays the departure. Therefore, new seamen needed, at higher 
costs; furthermore, these seamen often lack good reputation and 
ethical behaviour and, during the journey, they can easily 
 
market, $L12 – $>12, Saint John's: Memorial Univ. of Newfoundland, &55); L.R. Fischer (ed.), The 
market for seamen in the age of sail, Saint John's: Memorial Univ. of Newfoundland, *4&5.  
676 M.S. Rollandi, Lavorare sul mare, p. +.4. A striking problem between North and South was 
on wage differentials, reported in every economic sector. See: V. Daniele and P. Malanima, 
“Regional Wages and the North-South Disparity in Italy after the Unification”, Rivista di Storia 
Economica, No. ++: *, *4&), pp. &&)-&.1.  
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endanger captain’s life and the interests of shipowners and 
merchants.677  
The increased mobility of seafarers and desertion, therefore, accelerated the 
nationalisation and, then, globalisation of the Italian crews. The presence of dense 
national communities in Latin American ports, such as Buenos Ayres and 
Montevideo, facilitated the recruitment of Italian seamen to replace deserters or 
legal emigrants. In some instances, these sailors embarked for shorter voyages, 
often limited to the American continent. This was the case, for instance, of the 
events involving the barque Cadice, which witnessed the desertion of seven sailors 
in Buenos Ayres. There, the captain recruited two Italians (from Palermo and 
Castellammare), three Britons, one Portuguese and an Argentinian citizen. Six of 
them, then, disembarked in Pensacola where, in order to sail back to the 
Mediterranean, the master was obliged to employ two more Englishmen, two 
Germans, one Danish and a man from New York678. The crew of Cadice, which in 
June "*$% had left Marseille with twelve Italians out of thirteen members (one 
Mexican), less than a year afterwards (February "*$*) departed from Pensacola to 
the Mediterranean with more than half of the crew composed of foreign citizens. 
This example, and several other of the same kind, may provide a strong 
representation of the effects of globalisation on Camogli’s crews.  
  
E.?. Wages and professionalization: the evolution of upward 
mobility 
 
The extension of the geographical range of the maritime activities, the 
dismantlement of the endogenous labour system, and the loss of communitarian 
cohesion on board might have been among the factors that transformed Camogli’s 
maritime labour from the "**,s onwards. Furthermore, these broader processes 
 
677 ACS, Ministero della marina, Miscellanea Uffici Diversi, b. /)/, folder &..  
678 ASGe, Giornali nautici, n. +.+/&, Cadice.  
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had their impact on more measurable labour features, such as vertical mobility and 
wages, which will be at the core of the following pages.  
First, vertical mobility and wages are deeply intertwined between each other. On 
a ship, higher wages are associated with higher positions throughout maritime 
professional ranks. Skill-premiums represent this correlation between wage 
differentials among crew members and labour expertise. The existence or absence 
of regulations to control vertical mobility from one rank to another and the 
transformation of the relative distribution of skilled labourers onboard are crucial 
factors to determine skill-premiums evolution overtime. Scholarly studies 
underlined how, whilst facilitating the growth of international trade and shipping, 
technological change and globalisation led to deskilling in maritime labour and, as 
a result, to the reduction of skill premiums and of relative demands for skilled 
labour679. If this assumption has been repeatedly validated for steam navigation680, 
Jari Ojala transferred the theory in the context of Scandinavian sailing fleets, with 
valuable findings681. In this section, we will attempt to test such analysis on 
Camogli’s sample, in order to validate or discuss the potential transferability of this 
theory within a Mediterranean seafaring community specialised in sail shipping.  
 
9.).%. FROM “SHARE” TO SALARY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
To investigate the evolution of wages and the utilisation of other forms of 
payment will be crucial to assess skill-premiums and, in broad terms, to measure 
the economic value of vertical mobility. Throughout Camogli’s maritime labour 
history, wages became the prevalent form of remuneration only from the "*),s 
onwards (still in "*'$, wages were used in &(% of the instances682), when they 
 
679 A. Chin et al., “Technical change and the demand for skills during the second industrial 
revolution: evidence from the merchant marine, &15&–&5&*”, pp. .)*-.1+; S.M. Hynninen et al., 
“Technological change and wage premiums: Historical evidence from linked employer–employee 
data”, pp. &-&&.  
680 S.M. Hynninen et al., “Technological change and wage premiums: Historical evidence from 
linked employer–employee data”, pp. &-&&. 
681 J. Ojala, J. Pehkonen and J. Eloranta, “Deskilling and decline in skill premium during the age 
of sail: Swedish and Finnish seamen, &).&–&5&+”.   
682 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, &1+&-&1$..   
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substituted the previous method to distribute single-voyages profits among crew 
members, in accordance to predetermined proportions (called alla parte). The 
form of payment alla parte was rooted into long-standing traditions dating back to 
Middle Age; from the sixteenth to the late eighteenth century, it represented the 
customary way to provide remunerations for seafarers, in particular concerning 
small communities devoted to coastal cabotage and fishing683. In ")$#, in 
describing all the coeval forms of remuneration, Carlo Targa, a Genoese jurist, 
defined the one alla parte as «the most utilised method in the context of small 
ships, […] which consisted in halving the freight revenues and the profits collected 
by the vessel in its voyages, after having subtracted common expenses»684. In 
general, it consisted in a share-system – which was clearly distinguished from 
share-ownership tools (carati685) – and was tied to single-voyage enterprises, at the 
end of which all the profits were distributed in proportion to previous agreements. 
The purpose underlying this system was to adopt risk-sharing mechanisms to 
cover single enterprises; in this way, shipowners were required fewer investments 
which were limited to hull and equipment supplies and maintenance. Then, at the 
end of the voyage, profits were divided according to roles onboard; during the 
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683 Several references might be found in scholarly literature about Ligurian shipping in early 
modern era. For instance, see: L. Lo Basso, Gente di bordo. La vita quotidiana dei marittimi genovesi 
nel XVIII secolo, Roma: Carocci, *4&$, pp. &41-&&&; P. Calcagno, “A caccia dell’oro rosso. Le comunità 
del Ponente ligure e la pesca del corallo nel XVII secolo”, Rives méditerranéennes, No. .), *4&1, p. 
*5; E. Grendi, Il Cervo e la Repubblica. Il modello ligure di antico regime, Torino: Einaudi, &55+, p. 
&5&.  
684 C. Targa, Ponderazioni sopra la contrattazione marittima, Genova, &14+, pp. *4+-*4/.  





Table ..$. Shares distribution in Camogli’s vessels to the Black Sea. Source: ASGe, Ruoli di 
equipaggio.  
 
Afterwards, beginning with the late "*',s, the allocation of monthly salaries 
gradually replaced the usage of share systems. Such transformation might have 
stemmed from the geographical expansion of the trade routes, which increased 
voyage durations, or from Camogli’s establishment on multi-purposes enterprises, 
as in the case of wheat-coal integrated routes with British ports. Both of these 
factors contributed to the dismissal of shares’ system and the definitive 
establishment of wages. Nevertheless, the traditional forms of payment remained 
long associated with short-range maritime activities, as fishing or coastal-cabotage, 
whereas progressively disappeared along international and oceanic routes. 
According to David Viale, in "**# «share system was limited to coastal cabotage to 
an almost negligible extent, being absent even in a great part of coal transports 
from Sardinia and Maremma»686.  
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Shipmasters ",%,)% ")",', 
Mates *%,*" ",%,"* 
Boatswains %),)$ %*,$, 
Stewards )*,(( %(,'% 
AB seamen '),"# '',,, 
Ordinary seamen &,,'( (&,*) 
Cabin-boys #,,** "*,,( 
Table ..). Average salaries within Camogli’s merchant marine (&1.4-&544). Sources: ASGe, Ruoli di 
equipaggio; ASGe, Giornali nautici.  
 
 
686 Inchiesta Parlamentare sulle condizioni della marina mercantile, Vol. I, p. &.1.  
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The data provided in Table '.% illustrate the evolution of average salaries from 
the Black Sea phase to the edge of the century. Due to the lack of data, we were 
not able to provide reliable information regarding the "*)'-"**' decades within 
which Camogli’s shipping business reached its peak before the international 
freight crisis hampered it. Although, in the proceedings of the Parliamentary 
Inquiry concerning the national merchant marine, the Italian government 
provided some data covering the "*%,-"**, timespan, albeit limitedly to able-
bodied seamen. 
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Table ..1. Average monthly wages of Italian sailors in Genoa (&1)&-&114). Source: Inchiesta 
parlamentare sulle condizioni della marina mercantile, Vol. III, p. &11.  
 
The evidence of Table '.*, if compared with Camogli’s data, confirms the 
occurrence of an upgrading trend until "*%&, followed by a dramatic downturn 
from which Italian shipping recovered only at the beginning of the new century687. 
These figures were corroborated by some oral interventions in which shipowners 
and captains reported the drastic fall of shipmasters’ average salaries which had 
risen to (,, Italian lire «in the age of prosperity»688, before falling again into the 
"',-#,, Italian lire range in "**#689. The fall of freight rates had a vigorous impact 
on market salaries, but, in the long term, its consequences did not hit all the 
professional categories with the same strength. In Table '.$, the lack of evident 
mutations of middle and low-skilled seamen’s wages in comparison with the 
exceptional growth of high-skilled salaries might be crucial to introduce an 




687 See, Chapter +.  
688 Inchiesta parlamentare sulla marina mercantile, Vol. I, p. &$4. 
689 Ibidem.  
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Table ..5. Relative crew wages in relation to AB seamen salary (AB Seamen=&44). Source: ASGe, 
Ruoli di equipaggio; ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare 
 
Table '.$ illustrates the relative salaries of crew members in relation to able-
bodied seamen’s ones. This table was achieved by using AB seamen wages as a 
constant reference to evaluate variations in relative salaries and the relative 
evolution of skill-premia. The divergence between high-skilled professions and AB 
seamen increased remarkably (+",# for shipmasters and +(* for mates); skill-
premia within the same middle-skilled group show a slight growth for boatswains 
and stewards; ordinary seamen (-$) and cabin-boys (-&) relative wages, instead, 
decreased to a limited extent.  
 
9.).". TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE, LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY AND DESKILLING 
 
Since the first approaches of maritime history to nineteenth-century shipping, 
scholars have investigated the correlation existing between technological advance 
and labour productivity690. Despite the reasonable criticism of Lucassen and 
 
690 See: J. Lucassen and R.W. Unger, “Labour productivity in ocean shipping, &/.4-&1).”, 
International Journal of Maritime History, &*, *444, pp. &*)-&/&; Idem, “Shipping, productivity and 
economic growth”, in R.W. Unger (ed.), Shipping and economic growth, $7L2-$>L2, Leiden: Brill, 
*4&&; J. Van Lottum and J.L. Van Zanden, “Labour productivity and human capital in the European 
maritime sector of the eighteenth century”, Explorations in economic history, *4&/. For shipping 
productivity in general, see Chapter +.   
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Unger691, the ratio of tons per man on board has remained the most practical tool 
for measuring labour productivity. As anticipated in Chapter (, where the impact 
of improvements in nautical technology have been correlated to the productivity 
of the maritime business, the enhancement of labour productivity played a decisive 
role to cut the costs and to make shipping more efficient. As said, such discourse 
cannot be limited to steam navigation, since also sailing shipping underwent 
serious transformations, in particular in terms of average tonnage. The fleet of 
Camogli, for instance, passed from "%),( tons average in "*'( to &'),& in "*$)692. 
As a result, the analysis of crew lists and logbooks suggests that ton-man ratios fell, 
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Table ..&&. Estimation of the number of seamen employed by Camogli merchant marine (Ton/man 
ratio per total tonnage). Source: ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, &1$&; CMMC, Assicurazioni varie; ASGe, 
Giornali nautici, &15$; Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile, Roma, &15$; A.N. Kiaer (ed.), 
Statistique internationale. Navigation maritime: II. Les marines marchandes, Christiania: Bureau 
Central de Statistique du Royaume de Norvége, &11+.  
 
 
691 J. Lucassen and R.W. Unger, “Labour productivity in ocean shipping”, p. &*).  
692 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, &1$&; CMMC, Assicurazioni varie; ASGe, Giornali nautici, &15$; 
Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile, Roma, &15$; A.N. Kiaer (ed.), Statistique internationale. 
Navigation maritime: II. Les marines marchandes, Christiania: Bureau Central de Statistique du 
Royaume de Norvége, &11+. 
693 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio; &1+&-&1$.; ASGe, Giornali nautici, &15$.  
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Figure ../. Estimation of the number of seamen employed by Camogli merchant marine (Ton/man 
ratio per total tonnage). Source: ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, &1$&; CMMC, Assicurazioni varie; ASGe, 
Giornali nautici, &15$; Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile, Roma, &15$. 
Within an endogenous labour market, therefore, the increase in labour 
productivity might have affected the equilibrium between demand and supply on 
which Camogli’s shipping system was grounded. As we can see, in Table '."" we 
estimated Camogli’s demands for maritime labour in correlation with the 
comparative evolution of total tonnage and of labour productivity (ton/man ratio): 
the estimated outcomes (Figure '.&) draw a curve which reached the peak at the 
end of the "*%,s, to decline then to the "*',s levels at the end of the century. 
Substantially, these data and estimations allow us to measure the direct 
consequences of the improvements in labour productivity on sea workers. From 
the "**,s onwards, although shipowners showed resilience and were able to resist 
and adapt to the needs of the international freight market, their resilience might 
have led to a severe occupational crisis among Camogli’s sea workers. The effects 
of this crisis included the transition from sail to steam shipping, the abandonment 
of maritime labour and emigration, as we will see in the following pages.  
However, the analysis of labour productivity, notwithstanding the shipowner’s 
perspective to reduce labour costs, can be approached from another point of view, 
which substitutes place of work (the ship, and the ton-man ratio) with time as the 
primary focus. With the adoption of a more social and labour approach, indeed, 
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evaluate the social impact of maritime labour within seafarers’ lives. In this 
direction, for instance, the rapid transition from cabotage to the Black Sea and, 
finally, to oceanic routes had an undeniable social price in terms of more 
qualitative aspects of maritime labourers’ lives, such as the time spent within the 
community and familiar environments. In this regard, a systematic analysis of 
workdays through different cohorts did not show remarkable discrepancies 
between each other (the percentage of months spent in navigation out of the total 
career measures about )#-)(% in the three cohorts694). These results might be 
related to two different issues: first, to the relatively high degree of approximation 
of the data, which take months into account instead of days; secondly, to the fact 
that all the shipping categories (cabotage, great cabotage, oceanic navigation) 
cross the three cohorts, thus diminishing the effects of such distinction.   
Nevertheless, with the purpose to illustrate what we perceive as a fundamental 
trait of seafaring – the ratio between the time at sea and ashore – we opted for 
individual surveys on three different subjects (one from each cohort), which 
possessed various shipping typologies within their careers. 
 
 
Cohort Surname Name Date of birth 
Qualify as AB 
seaman 
  
&* Schiaffino Giuseppe 7+->=-7<@8 >+->+-7<E= 
  
 





& cabotaggio +4-4$-&1/) &$-4)-&1/5 $ &/ .1% 
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Cohort Surname Name Date of birth 
Qualify as AB 
seaman 
  
** Olivari Gio.Batta 7+->=-7<88 7E->+-7<++ 
  
 
694 ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare, cohorts &-+.  
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Cohort Surname Name Date of birth 
Qualify as AB 
seaman 
  
+* Figari Lorenzo 77->7-7<+7 @?->?-7<F> 
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Table ..&*. Individual careers of three Camogli’s seamen. Source: ASGe, Matricole della gente di 
mare, cohorts &-+.  
The findings shown in Table '."# are fundamental to deepen our analysis on able-
bodied seamen work performances and, meanwhile, give us some insights 
concerning the evolution of Camogli’s maritime labour market. The first sample, 
Giuseppe Schiaffino, was born in "*#'695: in his years as cabin-boy and ordinary 
seaman, Giuseppe acquired more practice than needed ()" months), while later, 
albeit qualified for the profession, waited until "*&% to reembark as a sailor. After 
brief service on coastal-cabotage vessels, in "*&$ began to work on longer routes, 
spending more than half of his career in the Black Sea trade. Then, he was 
employed on ocean-going vessels for a decade, before returning to small cabotage 
in sight of retirement. Gio. Batta Olivari696, instead, born in "*'', divided his career 
 
695 ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare, register /, n. /&)/ and register *1, n. &5$.).  
696 Idem, register &/, n. &*1/$ and register +5, n. *1+)/.  
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between great cabotage (Black Sea and North-European routes) and ocean 
navigation in which he collected most of his embarkments (#&) and spent the vast 
majority of his career (#', months). Finally, Lorenzo Figari697 experienced a 
peculiar professional trajectory; until "$,#, at age (", he worked on the latest 
Camogli’s ocean-going vessels. Then, Lorenzo moved to steam navigation and, on 
board of steamers, crossed all the typologies698.  
The working-days in a year of two out of three samples are higher than the 
mentioned averages. Both Gio. Batta Olivari and Lorenzo Figari present several 
and continuative services on ocean-going vessels, which seem to be an upgrading 
factor of working days per years. Oceanic voyages lasted for several months, 
sometimes more than two years; however, in time of occupational crisis and 
downgrading salaries for sea workers, to remain more than a couple of months at 
home might have been an option.  
Finally, in recent literature, deskilling has been included among the most evident 
consequences of technological advancement applied to navigation. The increase of 
labour productivity (measurable through men-tons ratio) have also been 
interrelated to labour efficiency. Within sail shipping, the main transformations 
entailed a simplification of rigging and, therefore, of all the operations underlying 
their handling and management. These changes, which have been poorly studied, 
might have led to middle-skilled seamen gradual substitution with unskilled 
workers. Relative labour shares emerged as one of the primary measures to analyse 
this phenomenon. For instance, evidence from Scandinavian marines suggested an 
increase of unskilled labourers relative shares, which ascended from ##,%% to 
&$,'% in a century ("%$"-"$"()699. Within this vast period, the most substantial 
increase occurred between the "*(,s and "*',s (from (,% to &$%)700, before the 
advent of Camogli’s oceanic cross-trade and the ton-man escalation associated to 
this shipping phase. Indeed, similar surveys of Camogli’s merchant marine led to 
 
697 Idem, register +5, n. *144..  
698 More details about Camogli’s seamen working on steamers are found in the ../.& paragraph.   
699 J. Ojala, J. Pehkonen and J. Eloranta, “Deskilling and decline in skill premium during the age 
of sail: Swedish and Finnish seamen, &).&–&5&+”, Table *, p.).  
700 Ibidem. 
 #$" 







(boatswains, able seamen) 
Low-skilled 
(ordinary seamen, cabin boys) 
<>?E-<>A? >,$#% ##,##% &%,((% 
<>>?-<@E? >,$&% $(,)&% %&,#$% 
Table ..&+. Skill-groups relative labour shares (&1.4-&54.). Source: ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio; ASGe, 
Giornali nautici.  
From Table '."(, we can assume that relative labour shares among different skill-
groups maintained a rather continuous distribution between the "*',s and "*$,s. 
Moreover, despite the adoption of the same categorisation, the absolute values of 
each category seem highly divergent from those of Scandinavian marines701. There 
is, in fact, a slight increase of low-skilled seamen shares at the expense of medium-
skilled workers; nevertheless, the absolute values are nowhere near to almost half 
of the shares as in the Scandinavian benchmark.   
Concerning Camogli, we can assume the role of traditional labour structures into 
mitigating the impact of deskilling on relative distribution onboard. Indeed, within 
the framework of seafaring communities, practical experience was accessible to all 
the members willing to spend their lives at sea. The social composition of the crews 
was substantially different from those merchant marines opened to agricultural 
and industrial workers, attracted into seafaring by economic needs. In Camogli, 
vertical mobility was achievable through expertise, which impacted on able-bodied 
seamen relative weight onboard in comparison with other realities. The presence 
of unskilled labourers onboard of Camogli’s vessels responded to educational 
needs and to promote the intergenerational transmission of practical skills and 
manual know-how rather than stemming from shipowners’ business decisions to 
reduce labour expenses and increase relative cost-effectiveness. Accordingly, we 
may argue the substantial inconsistency of any division between low or medium-
 
701 In coincidence with the same period, Ojala records these relative shares.  
&1.4-&1$.: high-*$,5%; medium-*$,4%; low-/),&%.  
&11&-&15.: high-*1,)%; medium-*+,.%; low-/),1%.  
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skilled seafarers within Camogli’s merchant marine, due to efficient upward 
mobility, as confirmed by the low rate of abandonment in the age of cabin-boys 
(&,#%)702.  
 
9.).). PROFESSIONALISATION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF MASTERS  
 
Within the maritime studies, the role of shipmasters and captains has attracted 
a great deal of attention, both for the relatively high availability of sources 
concerning this figure in comparison with common seafarers and for the ruling 
and representative (of the shipowner) position which captains covered onboard 
and ashore. During the nineteenth century, captains underwent various changes 
which concerned their prerogatives, activities and their relationships with 
shipowners, a wide set of transformations which recent historiography have 
categorised under the label of «professionalisation»703.  
In addition to experience and age requirements, prospective shipmasters’ (and 
mates) necessitated of public licences, granted from local and central institutions 
after completion of a mandatory theory examination. In the Mediterranean 
maritime societies, the historical roots of these state-controlled tests dated back to 
the seventeenth-century, a highly distinguishing feature from the British and 
Dutch environments where public examinations became active only in the 
nineteenth century704.  
 
702 ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare. The fundamental discourse about abandonments will be 
treated in the following sections.  
703 K. Davids, “Technological change and the professionalism of masters and mates in the Dutch 
mercantile marine, &1&.-&5&/”, Colectanea maritima, &55&, ., pp. *1*-+4+; V. Burton, “The Making 
of a Nineteenth-Century Profession: Shipmasters and the British Shipping Industry”, Journal of the 
Canadian Historical Association, &554, &:&, pp. 5)-&&1; Garcia, E., “Losing Professional Identity? Deck 
Officers in the Spanish Merchant Marine, &1$1–&5&/.” International Journal of Maritime History, 
No. *$: +, *4&/, pp. /.&–/)4; R. De Oliveira Torres, “Handling the Ship: rights and duties of masters, 
mates, seamen and owners of ships in nineteenth-century merchant marine”, International Journal 
of Maritime History, No. *$: +, *4&/, pp. .1)-.55.  
704 K. Davids, “Technological change and the professionalism of masters and mates in the Dutch 
mercantile marine, &1&.-&5&/”, Colectanea maritima, &55&, ., pp. *1*-+4+; V. Burton, “The Making 
of a Nineteenth-Century Profession: Shipmasters and the British Shipping Industry”, Journal of the 
Canadian Historical Association, &554, &:&, pp. 5)-&&1.  
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In the Republic of Genoa, the first steps of this public overtaking onto maritime 
education concerned the institution of exams (")$*) which prospective masters 
ought to do in order to be recognised as capable of directing a ship705. This decision 
was inspired by the French Ordonnance de la Marine of ")*", the leading 
international reference, in maritime matters, of the seventeenth and eighteenth-
century Genoese lawmakers. However, the institution of public exams was not 
associated with the implementation of formal education. Still in the last decades 
of the following century, the principal and sufficient requirements to command a 
vessel were ship-ownership or official appointments by shipowners – through a 
notarial deed706. Indeed, the absence of binding educational requirements allowed 
uneducated seamen to the rank of the shipmaster. Ship-ownership, share-
ownership or either mere kinship could be more relevant than specialised know-
how and advanced skills in the art of navigation.  
As said, in the days of the Republic of Genoa, apart from examinations, there 
was no evidence about the existence of formal institutions to impart education to 
prospective shipmasters’; instead, the exams were prepared upon private initiative. 
Something changed after Vienna’s Congress when, due to the imposition of Savoy 
rule onto Liguria, the publication of a new Regolamento per la Marina Mercantile 
in "*"), and its update in "*#%, led to the foundation of state-driven nautical 
schools for prospective masters of all sorts707.  
This decision was in line with the gradual extension of public control over 
shipmasters’ education, which was spreading in several European countries708. In 
this way, the increasing professionalization of these occupations affected long-
standing traditions, which were transformed in favour of a progressive passage 
from private to public control. These schools were intended to impart the 
 
705 L. Lo Basso, Gente di bordo, pp. +)-$+. The author reports that, from &$51 onwards, Genoese 
captains were required to pass an exam in order to be patented.   
706 Ibidem.  
707 Nuovo Regolamento per la Marina Mercantile, &1*), Cap. V, art. +*-+/. In general, see: M.S. 
Rollandi, Istruzione e sviluppo nella Liguria marittima, p. *$1.  
708 See, England: V. Burton, “The Making of a Nineteenth-Century Profession: Shipmasters and 
the British Shipping Industry”, pp. 55-&44; Low Countries: K. Davids, “Technological change and 
the professionalism of masters and mates in the Dutch mercantile marine, &1&.-&5&/”, pp. *1/-*1..  
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theoretical education for shipmasters; their organisation varied through the 
second half of the nineteenth century due to several reforms, which, however, did 
not alter too extensively the general schedule709. In "*)', the diploma for cabotage 
and great cabotage masters took only one year, whereas that for ocean-going 
masters extended up to three years710. Then, in "*%(, great cabotage degree 
widened to two years, while the duration of the second degree remained 
unscathed. Several subjects were common to all the courses, like Italian, 
geography, history, trade law, arithmetic, geometry, hydrography, marine 
equipment and manoeuvring (French and English language courses were 
elective)711. In general, prospective ocean-going captains were taught more 
complicated branches of each subject, as spherical trigonometry, applied 
astronomy and nautical calculations. Nevertheless, the educational programmes 
might be useful to outline the figure and role of shipmasters’ in the Italian 
merchant marine. Masters’ know-how was mainly theoretical: their advanced 
education was aimed at the acquisition of general knowledge and highly 
specialised skills to handle navigation in open seas. Along with technical and 
scientific advancements (for instance, Maury’s contribution to oceanography712), 
masters’ monopoly of navigational skills on board increased accordingly, accruing 
social and professional distances between crews’ top and bottom.  
The coexistence of theoretical education and practical experience represented, 
however, one of the most troublesome matters for the organisation of these 
learning paths. For instance, Edoardo Salviati, professor of mathematics and 
astronomy at the nautical school of Camogli, in "**#, expressed his criticism 
toward the existing system and raised his concerns about the need of finding a 
 
709 See, M.S. Rollandi, Istruzione e sviluppo nella Liguria marittima, pp. */&-*)1.  
710 Ibidem.  
711 Idem, p. *.+.  
712 M.F. Maury, The Physical Geography of the Sea, New York: Harper & Brothers publishers, &1.1. 
His fundamental role in developing the modern oceanography and, as a result, in the optimization 
of oceanic shipping, is recognized by the Italian economist Epicarmo Corbino: E. Corbino, 
Economia dei trasporti marittimi, p. &&&. 
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compromise between theory and practice713. Nautical schools admitted students 
from age nine onwards and, therefore, licensed prospective shipmasters at a 
maximum of age "', almost a decade before they became eligible for these 
positions. As a result, well-educated seamen were forced to enrol as cabin-boys 
until age "* and able-bodied seamen between age "* and #", when they were finally 
entitled to be mates. Among the consequences of such feature, apart from the 
already mentioned issue concerning underaged boatswains, we may also report the 
institution of the so-called «flag captain» (capitano di bandiera). This figure 
responded to the need of the shipowner to appoint licenced captains to handle 
navigation, whereas another person, less experienced, managed most of the 
economic operations. In "**", while arguing with Giuseppe De Rossi, author of an 
inflammatory pamphlet concerning the backwardness of Ligurian shipping, David 
Viale outlined this figure and provided a practical explanation for its institution:  
Mr De Rossi refers to flag captains, who take responsibility for 
navigation, whereas another person, of lower rank, is entrusted 
with economic management. There’s nothing wrong in it, and it 
happens when the shipowner has a relative on board, who, even 
though he has already obtained his licence, does not fulfil the 
necessary age requirements.714  
The diminution of shipmasters’ authorities on board, deriving from the 
introduction of an intermediate figure to handle the managerial business, 
generated however multiple problems and led sailors to file various complaints. 
For instance, the crew members of the barque Adele, in "*)), denounced the 
wrongful food administration which they underwent during a trip between 
Pernambuco and Cardiff (the ship had departed from Marseille on the first haul)715. 
Right in the British port, seamen complained to the Italian consul for having been 
 
713 Inchiesta Parlamentare sulle condizioni della marina mercantile, Vol. III, pp. .+-.1. More 
details on his figure can be found in: M.S. Rollandi, Istruzione e sviluppo nella Liguria marittima, 
pp. /)1-/1/.  
714 Inchiesta Parlamentare sulle condizioni della marina mercantile, Vol. I, p. &.5.  
715 ACS, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea Uffici Diversi, box +$&, folder 
&&1.  
 #$) 
administered poor-quality food and blamed the mate’s unusual interference into 
the affairs of the ship «at the point that the same captain was denied to have a say 
on food administration716». Another interesting case concerned the actions of 
Carlo Dapelo, mate of the barque Cadice and relative to its shipowner717. In "*$%, 
Dapelo, licenced for great cabotage, commanded the ship from Cadiz to Marseille. 
There, while signing the crew agreement, he declared himself as shipowner of the 
barque (presumably, he was just shareholder and legal representative of the 
shipowners). Then, unable to sail across the Atlantic, Dapelo appointed his mate, 
Gio. Batta Caprile (who possessed the required license), as navigating captain. The 
following events shed light on a more complicated scenario. Once in Santos, after 
several sailors complained about Dapelo’s short-tempered behaviour and bad 
administration, captain Caprile denounced its mate (and employer) before the 
consul, specifying that he «had always tried to hide the evil actions of Dapelo in 
respect of his family»718. Finally, following a harsh fight with Caprile, Carlo Dapelo 
left the ship and never returned on board, at the point that the captain was forced 
to denounce him as a deserter.  
Interestingly, although motivated by age requirements and the shipowners’ 
need of trusted representatives on board, the institution of «flag captains» 
anticipated the evolution of captainship into an ultra-specialised navigational 
profession, with little or no involvement in the commercial and economic 
management719. On the contrary, traditionally shipmasters’ role extended well 
beyond the art of navigation; in a society characterised by slow information flows 
and little or no communications, masters were in charge of all the managerial and 
commercial operations, as contracting freights, negotiating loans, handling 
 
716 Ibidem.  
717 ASGe, Giornali nautici, giornale generale, Cadice, +.+/&.  
718 Ibidem.  
719 See, as an element for comparison, the study of Apostolos Delis about the introduction of 
«directors» on board of the Syros fleet: A. Delis, “Le rôle du capitaine et la figure du «directeur» de 
navires dans la marine à voile à Syra au milieu du XIXe siècle”, in G. Buti, L. Lo Basso and O. Raveaux 
(eds.), Entrepreneurs des mers: capitaines et mariniers du XVIe au XIXe siècle, Paris: Riveneuve 
éditions, *4&).  
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incidents in the open sea and ports, administering justice and, in general, 
embracing all the necessary decisions on shipowners’ behalf.   
The evolution of shipmasters inspired extensive and well-reasoned 
historiography, which developed specific research axes involving onboard 
authority720, professionalisation, and the overturn of customary owner-captain 
relationships, by introducing the figures of managing owners721. In ancient regime 
societies, captains were commonly owners or shareholders of the ship: due to the 
impossibility to communicate at long distances, masters carried out managerial 
actions and exerted their control over all the commercial and operational 
decisions. Then, due to nineteenth-century technological advancements in 
logistics and communications722, together with the transition from share-
ownership to the advent of shipping stock-companies, masters progressively 
forfeited some attributions of their traditional «power near to God723» and were 
reduced to high-skilled employees. The primary responsibilities of the latter were 
confined to safe navigation.  
If these developments are taken for granted concerning the significant part of 
the nineteenth-century shipping world, the “sheltered” environment of a seafaring 
community, as Camogli, might represent a remarkable observatory. In analogy 
with other maritime communities, Camogli had several owning-captains, who 
naturally merged economic management and navigation in a single figure. In the 
first half of the century, the relative share of owning-captains was elevated (&&% 
in "*("), whereas, in coincidence with the geographic leap from the Black Sea to 
oceanic navigation, it fell dramatically ("'% in "*)')724. Moreover, by combining 
owning-captains with the figure of direct familiar relationships between 
 
720 J.M. Witt, “«During the Voyage Every Captain is Monarch of the Ship»: The Merchant Captain 
from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century”, International Journal of Maritime History, &+, No. 
*, *44&, pp. &$.-&5/.  
721 H. Doe, “Power, Authority and Communications: The Role of the Master and the Managing 
Owner in Nineteenth-Century British Merchant Shipping”, International Journal of Maritime 
History, *., No. &, *4&+, pp. &4+-&*.; R. Craig, “Printed guides for master mariners as asource of 
productivity change in shipping, &).4-&5&/”, The Journal of Transport History, +, &51*, pp. */-+..  
722 See Chapter +.  
723 J.M. Witt, “«During the Voyage Every Captain is Monarch of the Ship»”, pp. &$$-&1/.  
724 ASGe, Ruoli di equipaggio, &1+&-&1$..  
 #$* 
shipowners and captains (identical surnames), evidence suggests an even neater 
decline from *"% to ('% ("*("-"*)')725. Besides, relationships of acquired kin (as 
in case of sons-in-law commanding fathers-in-law’s vessels) remained out of our 
evaluation, owing to material obstacles to conducting analytical surveys on almost 
a thousand individuals. 
Nevertheless, the extensive recurrence to such feature, drawn from notarial 
sources, might have probably increased the figure. In fact, in a communitarian 
environment, marriage was a fundamental tool for bonding relationships, as in the 
case of Erasmo Schiaffino, who married his four daughters to as many shipmasters 
who served on his vessels726. Finally, when considering the end of the century, 
owning-captains almost disappeared ('%)727. Therefore, in the framework of 
Camogli’s shipping, the progressive demise of owning-captains might be 
reconducted to various factors: among them, we might include the increase of the 
amount of capital needed to start shipping business, which delayed and hindered 
the most sought «transition from employee to employer»728, one of the main life-
objectives of Camogli’s shipmasters.  
Based on the mentioned findings, the trend observed in the case of Camogli may 
allow us to enter the debate about the proletarization of maritime labour729. In this 
regard, the first crucial breakthrough might be recognised in the abandonment of 
the forms of shared remuneration in favour of wages. Whereas pre-industrial 
seafarers actively participated in maritime enterprises, being directly related to 
profits and losses of a single voyage, the introduction of wages set sea workers apart 
from the entrepreneurial section of the shipping business. Thus, seafarers 
renounced to their direct participation to the earnings in favour of more reliable 
 
725 Idem.   
726 See Chapter *.   
727 ASGe, Giornali nautici. The only one is Dapelo Carlo, commanding the barque Cadice: ASGe, 
Giornali nautici, Giornale generale e di contabilità, Cadice, +.+/&.  
728 K. Davids, “Technological change and professionalism”, pp. *55-+44.  
729 E. Sager, “Seafaring Labour in Maritime History and Working-Class History”, International 
Journal of Maritime History, II, No. &, &554, pp. *.5-*)/; B. Beaven, “From Jolly Sailor to Proletarian 
Jack: The Remaking of Sailortown and the Merchant Seafarer in Victorian London”, in B. Beaven et 
al. (eds.), Port towns and urban cultures. International Histories of the Waterfront, c.$122—!222, 
London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, *4&$, pp. &.5-&)1.  
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fixed payments which, at the same time, allowed shipowners to manage their 
business more cost-effectively. Within the balance of single-voyage enterprises, 
maritime labour became a fixed cost, whose relative weight fell gradually in the 
nineteenth century as a result to the decrease of the ton-men ratios and, therefore, 
to the improvements of labour productivity. 
Furthermore, although all the categories of maritime workers underwent 
serious transformations in this period, not all the groups were affected to the same 
extent. Despite shipmasters lost their peer-to-peer relationship with shipowners, 
and their vertical mobility was severely affected by the shrinkage of the shipowning 
ranks, on the other hand, from an economic perspective, professionalization raised 
their average wages, both in relative and absolute terms (see Table '.$). 
On the contrary, technological improvements hit more severely Camogli’s 
middle and low-skilled maritime workers, both socially and economically. 
Although deskilling might not be as effective as in other merchant marines, the 
growth of labour productivity affected sailors’ wage retribution, whose relative 
ratio in comparison with high-skilled seafarers decreased of more than one-third 
(Table '.$). Moreover, as we will see in the next pages, while masters’ highly-
specialised know-how and skills allowed them a smoother transition to more 
advanced labour markets (steam shipping), middle and low-skilled seafarers faced 
more obstacles in reconverting to steam or enduring within the maritime labour 
sector.  
 
E.C. Abandoning Camogli’s fleet 
 
The clash between local and global markets, the evolution of Camogli’s 
maritime activities into oceanic tramp shipping and the broader process of 
transition from sail to steam created the ground for the gradual dismantlement of 
the local communitarian structures upon which Camogli’s shipping system was 
founded. The loss of the occupational consistency between local labour demand 
and supply resulted into various behaviours: some seafarers sought for 
employment at national steam shipping companies, such as NGI (Navigazione 
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Generale Italiana); others quitted navigation or transferred abroad in search for 
maritime or even land-based jobs. Whereas the first two groups (those who moved 
to steam and who abandoned navigation) will be dealt with in the following pages, 
to the latter will be dedicated the sixth and last chapter of the present thesis, due 
to the crucial entanglements between geographical transfer, desertion and 
migration flows which compose a fundamental part of the history of Camogli.     
 
9.$.%. THE TRANSITION FROM SAIL TO STEAM OF CAMOGLI’S SEAMEN 
 
As seen, the extraordinary dimensions of Camogli’s sailing fleet prevented most 
of the local manpower to switch to steam navigation. Camogli’s maritime labour 
market was endogenous and self-sufficient; shipping absorbed local labour 
supplies and even extended to the labour markets of the nearby communities to 
meet its manpower demands. These conditions lasted for decades until the fall in 
freight rates and the progressive marginalisation of sail vessels to peripheral 
markets led to the reduction of Camogli’s fleet. As seen, the impoverishment of 
local shipping business and the increase of labour productivity diminished the 
demands for sea workers dramatically (see Table '."" and Figure '.#) and, for the 
contraction of job opportunities available to seamen, some sought for employment 
into a separate labour market, in the steam merchant marine730.  
 
  "* (")&$-")%$) &* (")'$-")$$) %* (")#$-")($) 
Unskilled (cabin-boys, OS) @ @ "@@%* 
Medium-skilled (AB, boatswains, 
stewards) ",$@% %,(@% &$,($% 
High-skilled (mates, captains)  @ ',"#% #',("% 
Table ..&/. Percentage of sailors and officials with at least &* months of service on board of 
steamships (cohorts &-+). Source: ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare.*There is only one unskilled 
seaman who quitted his career before completing his */-month apprenticeship731.  
 
 
730 See, chapter +.  
731 ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare, register +1, serial number *.51$. The career of Luigi 
Bertolotto (n. *.51$) is exceptional within our sample: enrolled in &11/ at age of fourteen, he 
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The impressive rise of sail-to-steam mobility, which Table '."& describes, among 
the members of the third cohort is clear evidence of the crisis which Camogli’s 
traditional labour system underwent from the late "**,s onwards. Although the 
earliest steamers’ services of Camogli’s seamen dated to "***, most of them took 
place at the turn of the century. From the observation of data, we were able to 
point out some distinguishing traits. First, the extraordinary rise of the passages to 
steam in the third cohort in comparison with the previous two: this trend might 
found a consistent explanation in the influence of the international scenario on the 
communitarian shipping system. Second, the sharp difference shown in the 
percentages of high-skilled seamen ()&,%"%) as opposed to middle-skilled ones 
(#',%'%). Third, no seaman from Camogli engaged to the steam shipping new 
professions (engineer, stokers, coal trimmers), but maintained the same sailing 
shipping roles when employed on steamers. Finally, once transferred to steam, few 
reconverted to sail – and no one definitively.  
First, the timeframe, within which labour transition occurred, has been 
primarily anticipated in the previous paragraphs. The decades between the "**,s 
and "$,,s represent the real breakthrough for Camogli’s maritime history and, 
although shipping survived on marginal routes, the combination of the financial 
crisis and technological improvements stroke a decisive hit on maritime labour. As 
said, the transfer from sailing vessels to steamers was among the decisions 
available to counterbalance the decrease of labour demands on Camogli’s sailing 
ships.  
Then, the discrepancy emerging from the comparison of high and middle-
skilled seamen’s rates of conversion might be fundamental to outline some 
distinguishing features of the Italian maritime labour market. From a technical 
point of view, indeed, shipmasters could engage either to sail or to steam 
 
embarked as cabin-boy on a short-cabotage journey (*+ days) and, then, on a long-cabotage ship 
to Swansea, where got ashore after just .$ days at sea. Three years later, he enrolled as fifth engineer 
on the Italian steamship Robilant, where travelled for more than seven months among long-
cabotage routes. Between &11/ and &11), Luigi must have performed some theoretical studies in 
order to enrol as fifth engineer, which corresponded to engine room operators (fuochista) within 
Italian engine ranks. In the following years, he never embarked again. The uniqueness of his career, 
however, impedes us to adequately evaluate the effects of transition on unskilled seamen. 
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navigation without any distinction. According to the existing legal framework, 
captains were not required to have additional skills or knowledge when 
commanding steamers, since the engine room was under the engineer’s full 
responsibility. This feature, on the one hand, gave engineers immediate 
recognition of their high degree of specialisation, which was often associated with 
highly attractive salaries732. On the other hand, since, for the navigational part, 
shipmasters were still needed, such system facilitated the transition of high-skilled 
and publicly licenced seamen from sail to steam. In describing Camogli’s trend, 
Table '."& witnesses the extraordinary capability of local captains to adapt and 
reconvert to the new market. However, despite the smooth transition suggested 
by the data, this passage from sail to steam had its implications from a more 
qualitative perspective. First of all, the remunerations for captains and deck-
officials on steamers were levelled down in comparison to sailing vessels: for 
instance, the data provided by M.S. Rollandi733 show that, between two equivalent 
class of vessels (in terms of tonnage), masters could lose up to (,% of the salary on 
steamers (from #,% lira average to "($). Secondly, in turning to steam, some 
experienced sailing captains retroceded to ship-officials for a certain period, a 
backstep in their careers, which had obvious repercussions both on the prestige of 
their occupation and from an economic point of view. This tendency, for example, 
is shown in the case of Captain Prospero Schiaffino (n. #)"$&) who, after having 
commanded Camogli’s vessels for more than one hundred months of navigation, 
when engaged to steamers in "*$" was embarked on the Giovanni M. as the first 
mate734. The same happened to Antonio Marini (n. #)#$#) who, immediately after 
his first command on the barque Battistina Madre in "*$(, switched to steam and 
spent almost fifteen years as a second or first official, until he received his second 
command in "$,%, on the steamship Città di Palermo735.  
 
732 See, R.G. Milburn, “The emergence of the engineer in the British merchant shipping industry, 
&1&*–&1$+”, International Journal of Maritime History, *1, No. +, pp. ..5-.).. For the administrative 
framework within the Italian merchant marine, see: Regolamento per la Marina Mercantile, artt. 
*4$-*&+, in M. Vocino (ed.), Codice marittimo, pp. &$&-&$+.  
733 M.S. Rollandi, Lavorare sul mare, Appendice *. Composizione degli equipaggi, pp. /*)-/$).  
734 ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare, register +1, n. *$&5/.  
735 Idem, n. *$*5*.  
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Meanwhile, in the case of middle-skilled seamen, source evidence underlines a 
remarkable continuity between sail and steam about their roles on board. Indeed, 
until the First World War, most of the steamships retained rigging and sails, thus 
giving meaning to the presence of experienced deck-sailors on board. The case of 
Camogli, in this sense, is noteworthy, because all the AB seamen, stewards or even 
boatswains maintained their qualifications on steamers. This feature sheds light 
on some characteristics of the Italian late-nineteenth-century maritime labour 
market. Middle-skilled seamen’s competences and the lack of formal education 
pushed them towards the equivalent jobs in the steam merchant marine, whose 
demands for experienced sailors, however, were progressively contracting. 
Furthermore, the presence of medium-skilled seamen lost centrality: this is 
evident both in terms of numeric presence on board and wages. On steamers, the 
employment share of sailors, in line with the considerations which Chin, Juhn and 
Thompson have outlined on British data736, fell dramatically from ),-%,% 
(depending on the period) to around #'%737. Likewise, middle-skilled seamen wage 
share fell accordingly, from )'% to #,%738. The lack of competences suitable to the 
steam maritime labour market limited the range of job opportunities to which 
Camogli’s seafarers could engage. Apart from engineers, whose extraordinary skills 
and know-how positioned almost at the same level of deck-officials and even 
captains, a significant part of the crew could also be drawn from the agricultural 
and urban unskilled proletariat, due to the low level of specific competencies 
required to work in the engine room. As a result, stokers, coalmen and coal 
trimmers received lower salaries on average739, which experienced middle-skilled 
seafarers seemed not willing to accept. As we will see both in the next paragraph 
and in the following chapter, rather than engaging to steam professions several 
 
736 A. Chin, C. Juhn, and P. Thompson, “Technical change and the demand for skills during the 
second industrial revolution: evidence from the merchant marine, &15&–&5&*”, Table &. Composition 
of the crew: sail voyages versus steam voyages, p. .)..  
737 ASGe, Giornali nautici, &11$-&5&/; M.S. Rollandi, Lavorare sul mare, Appendice *. 
Composizione degli equipaggi, pp. /*)-/$).  
738 Ibidem.  
739 See M.S. Rollandi, Lavorare sul mare, Appendice *. Composizione degli equipaggi, pp. /*)-
/$). 
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seafarers from Camogli, in particular the middle-skilled group, decided either to 
quit the maritime career or to leave the Ligurian community, to sail in foreign 
merchant marines or to settle abroad.  
 
9.$.". QUITTING A MARITIME CAREER 
 
If the passage from sail to steam allowed Camogli’s seafarers to retain their 
occupation within the Italian merchant marine, other solutions could lead to an 
anticipated end of their professional paths. Professional continuity throughout the 
ranks of Italian sea workers was fundamental, for instance, to preserve their rights 
over the public social security fund for the merchant marine, the Cassa degli 
invalidi per la marina mercantile. Founded in Genoa in "*") (under a different 
denomination, as Cassa di risparmio e beneficienza di Genova) as ideal prosecution 
of the Magistrato per il riscatto degli schiavi, this fund was aimed, on the one hand, 
at providing economic aid to invalid seafarers, widows and orphans and, on the 
other hand, supported retired sea workers, from age sixty-five740. Then, in "*'", the 
starting age to benefit from this fund was lowered to sixty years old741. Ten years 
later, willing to uniformise the national social security system for seafarers, Cavour 
created the Cassa degli invalidi della marina mercantile – divided into regional 
independent administrative units – which lasted in its new configuration until "$"(. 
According to law regulations (limitedly to Genoa’s fund, since every local fund 
followed its own rules), every seaman of age sixty with a minimum of twelve years 
of service onboard could enjoy of a yearly pension of a variable entity, depending 





740 La Cassa degli Invalidi della marina mercantile con sede in Genova. Origine e svolgimento: note 
storiche – giuridiche – amministrative, Genova: Stabilimento Fratelli Pagano, &54$, pp. &5-*4.  
741 Idem, pp. *1-+*.  
742 See, Regio Decreto $L novembre $>D>, n. *41&.  
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Table ..&.. Pension subsidies (in Italian lira) in favour of the members of the Cassa degli invalidi 
della marina mercantile di Genova. Source: Regio Decreto &. novembre &1$1, n. *41&, art. /*, Tabella 
I.  
As seen in Table '."', at the maximum level, the yearly value of the subsidies 
accounted for less than a fourth of the average salaries ("',#( lira compared with 
the ''-), lira average in the "*),s-%,s). Furthermore, since the contribution to 
the social fund was charged on shipowners, none or little improvements were 
achieved in this direction until the early twentieth century: conversely, in several 
occasions, its sheer existence was endangered by shipowners’ protests against what 
was perceived as an unnecessary additional expense on labour743.  
The analysis conducted on Camogli seafarers about the length of their careers 
shows an increasing pattern of quitting maritime professions throughout the 
nineteenth century. Indeed, whereas in the first cohort almost half of the sailors 
(&$%) abandoned the navigation in the proximity of their retirement age, or after 
the &,, months of service required for pension subsidies, in the following cohorts 
the share of sea workers who pursued a maritime career until its natural end 
gradually decreased up to the "$% of the third group744. The reasons behind this 
impressive phenomenon might lie into a wide array of factors, including transition 
and the global crisis of freights which, from the "**,s onwards, endangered the 
sustainability of Camogli maritime system. The loss of reliable sources of 
employment provided by locally-owned ships ruled according to the endogenous 
labour market characteristics shown in the previous pages, affected careers 
continuity in the long run.  
 
743 See, for instance, the debate developed during the Parliamentary Inquiry on the merchant 
marine. Inchiesta sulle condizioni per la marina mercantile, vol. II, pp. *.$-*$4. Also, Chapter /.  




% OF SAILORS NAVIGATING UNTIL 
PENSION 
AVERAGE AGE OF 
QUITTING 
6* &$% (%y #''d 
8* #)% #$y (#$d 
:* "$% #%y #%*d 
Table ..&$. Percentage of Camogli’s sailors employed until pension and average age of quitting 
(cohorts &-+). Source: ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare.  
 
Furthermore, the average age of quitting navigation might be another valuable 
parameter to measure this tendency, as it fell from (% years and #'' days for the 
seafarers born between "*#' and "*(' to an average of #% years and #%* days as far 
as the "*)'-"*%' group is concerned745. In general, the overall analysis for 
abandonments underlines the correlation between local demands for maritime 
labour and the contraction of global and local shipping economies occurred in the 
"*%,s-"*$,s period.  
Moreover, apart from the quantitative examination of the retirement –
abandonment ratio among Camogli’s sea workers, the necessary step forward in 
our analysis would be to evaluate the subsequent occupational destinations of the 
latter group, to improve our understanding about their professional trajectories 
outside – and beyond – the working environment of Camogli. However, the 
registration model provided in the Matricole lack further details regarding the 
activities to which sailors dedicated after the abandonment of navigation, with the 
partial exception of those living until "$,$ when the state censuses findings were 
attached to every single record.  
To captains, for instance, quitting life at sea could epitomise the most sought 
accomplishment of this social class, namely the “promotion” to shipowners, as in 
the case of Prospero Schiaffino, son of Gio. Batta, who was born in Camogli in 
"*)*746. Embarked for the first time in "**& on board the brig Schiaffino Padre 
under the command of his father, Prospero was soon transferred on the brig 
 
745 Idem.  
746 ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare, r. +1, n. *$&5/.  
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Draguette (%#* t.) along oceanic routes carrying rice, teak and sugar747. From "*$, 
onward, Prospero sailed to Asian and American destinations at the command of 
Draguette until July "*$*, when he shipwrecked offshore from Tamatave 
(Toamasina, Madagascar)748. Then, after a few years of service as deck official on 
the brig Castello Dragone ())( t.), owned by Adeodato Schiaffino from Camogli749 
and some embarkments on NGI steamers, in "$,# Prospero Schiaffino retired from 
the navigation. Before that, he had collected "*) months of service ("") as ocean-
going master), being at sea for *#% of the time between his first and last 
embarkments. Then, Prospero’s life choices are unknown until "$,$, when he is 
registered in the Italian census as «shipowner settled in Camogli»750. Nevertheless, 
his career as shipowner did not last long – and, probably, was not successful – since, 
in "$"", he began again to sail on Italian steamers for a couple of years751.  
For sailors, instead, the information is more varied and sparse, to the extent that 
it might be impossible to draw veritable statistics about the types of employment 
following their retirement from the navigation. Some of them moved to local 
craftmanship (i.e. Agostino Domenico Mortola, who abandoned fishing for 
shoemaking in "***), but most of the details for these workers could not be 
collected. Although at the end of the nineteenth century Camogli underwent an 
expansive phase under different parameters, its economic and social structure was 
not able to absorb the increasing unemployment originated from the crisis of the 
local shipping sector. The transition from sail to steam within the Italian merchant 
marine, developed in the previous chapter, constituted a reliable alternative for 
Camogli’s high-skilled seafarers, slightly less for the medium and low-skilled 
groups (more than #,% in the last cohort). The rate of abandonments finalised to 
the change of occupation ashore in Camogli, Genoa or different Italian regions 
 
747 ACS, Ministero della marina, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Divisione premi 
compensi e tasse, b. $&, Moulmein (&11)).  
748 ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare, r. +1, n. *$&5/. 
749 RINA, &54*, p. *++, n. +1. Despite Prospero and Adeodato had the same surname, any direct 
kinship is unknown.  
750 ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare, r. +1, n. *$&5/. 
751 Ibidem.  
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accounted for the #"%, #*% and (,% of the respective cohorts. These figures, 
however, were almost evenly matched by the percentage of Camogli sea workers 
who decided to leave their country to settle, either temporarily or permanently, in 











6* &$% #"% "$% )% '% 
8* #)% #*% #(% ""% "#% 
:* "$% (,% ("% *% "#% 
Table ..&). Reasons behind career end among Camogli sea workers (cohorts &-+). Source: ASGe, 
Matricole della gente di mare.  
 
Therefore, in the case of Camogli, the local shipping sector crisis intermingled 
with broader historical processes, such as Italian migration waves to the Americas 
and led to different results depending on a wide array of factors. The outcome 
developed into a multi-faceted phenomenon, in which the shortage of maritime 
employment was critical to intensify underlying trends in general migration, which 
had experienced a preliminary phase before the crisis but, later, increased to 
unprecedented extents.  
Among the seafarers of Camogli who, in the course of the second half of the 
nineteenth century, left their hometown to settle abroad, we can isolate various 
groups depending on different criteria. First, as far as the means of abandonment 
are concerned, we can distinguish between legal and illegal measures, with a 
particular emphasis on desertion. Secondly, the same argument can be approached 
from different angles, aiming to underline the professional fields which sea 
workers engaged in the destination context. The theme of desertion, crucial to 
Camogli seafaring lives as well as to the whole Italian shipping, will be treated to 
contextualise this «social plague» – in the eyes of the national merchant marine – 
within the coeval economic and social context, and in the attempt to individuate 
push factors, at home, and pull factors, abroad. Then, we will adopt the latter 
approach and propose a distinction between those who pursued seafaring careers 
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abroad and those who definitively quitted navigation for a multitude of different 
types of employment.  
 
Conclusions  
From the ancient regime period, and in analogy with several small seafaring 
communities, Camogli’s shipping had inherited an endogenous maritime labour 
system, according to which local labour supply and demand found mutual 
satisfaction. Furthermore, the identarian origins and spirit of Camogli’s crews led 
to a remarkable transposition of the communitarian structures in the onboard life. 
Familiar ties and trust relationships ruled the appointment of crew members, in 
particular as far as the upper ranks were concerned. Although being fundamental 
to the sorts of local shipping, the first historical phase of expansion to the Black 
Sea did not alter labour significantly and enrolment mechanisms which, even more 
interestingly abroad, remained inherently connected with the members of the 
community. From the sailors’ perspective, as far as the maritime activities of the 
community expanded and local shipping business developed, the seafarers of 
Camogli could rely on a growing labour market for their employment. Then, the 
accrued national and international competitiveness owed to the transition from 
sail to steam, the fall of freights and the progressive marginalisation of sailing 
shipping into peripherical markets undermined this system. Whereas, as seen in 
Chapter ( and &, maritime activities per se and shipping business were able to resist 
or, at least, to be resilient to the ongoing global transformations, from the "**,s 
Camogli’s maritime labour fell into a downward spiral. The loss of occupational 
perspectives hit more severely the lower ranks (low and middle-skilled sailors), 
who resisted more to the conversion to steam than their highly-skilled 
counterparts. Shipmasters and officials, on their hand, owing to the higher levels 
of professionalization acquired throughout the century, seemed to be more 
capable of adapting to the new demands of the shipping market. Although most of 
them failed to the long-sought transition from employee to employer (from 
captain to shipowner), several reconverted to the steam shipping sector. 
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On the other hand, among the seamen born in the last generation ("*)'-"*%'), 
few worked until pension, whereas more than sixty per cent of them left either 
navigation or the country. Either way, their abandonments testified the collapse of 
the endogenous locally-based maritime labour system. The direction of their 







C. LEAVING THE COMMUNITY: PROFESSIONAL 




After having treated shipping business and maritime labour and its protagonists, 
the present chapter will deal with the foreign projection of the people of Camogli 
who, for various reasons, decided to leave the community to settle more or less 
definitively abroad. Differently from the first three chapters, where Camogli’s fleet 
and shipping were at the core of the analysis, this chapter focuses on the people 
movements independently from shipping business.  
The turning point is represented by the abandonment of Camogli’s endogenous 
shipping system, by desertion or legal emigration: from that moment onwards, the 
seafarers discarded their affiliation to Camogli’s shipping to embrace different 
roles; maritime labourers within foreign merchant marines or of migrants. This 
distinction draws a basic line to understand the aim of the present chapter.  
Nevertheless, in particular in the case of migrants, the origins and connections 
with the native town are fundamental to shape the outward community abroad, 
its nature and distinguishing features. The reference to Baily’s «village-outward» 
methodology752, classical among migration scholars, is essential to comprehend 
Camogli’s external projection and to analyse the creation of social and labour 
networks in the contexts of destination. Furthermore, the outgoing movement of 
Camogli seafarers will be examined through the existing dialectic between 
migration and maritime professions, which determined unique patterns of 
integration within the hosting societies.  
The first section analyses the distinguishing features of desertion and 
emigration as the primary gateways to flee from the community. In so doing, it 
 
752 S.L. Baily, “The Village-Outward Approach to Italian Migration: A Case Study of Agnonesi 
Migration Abroad, &11.–&515”, Studi Emigrazione *5, No. &4., &55*, pp. /+–$1.  
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aims to provide a methodological framework to consider desertion and emigration 
as parts of distinct but entangled processes.  
The second section analyses Camogli’s maritime labour transfer to the fleets of 
other European countries and calls for major research on the diffusion of Italian 
seafarers into the international merchant marines.  
The third section draws on the dense argument of Camogli’s migration to Latin 
America. It provides an historical and methodological background to contextualise 
the position of Camogli within the broader Ligurian phenomenon. Then, it 
analyses the individual trajectories and careers of some immigrants from Camogli: 
firstly, in continuity with maritime labour; secondly, in the attempt to reconstruct 
a model of migrant entrepreneurship.  
Finally, the fourth and last section will delineate the exceptional case-study of 
the settlement of two sailors from Camogli to the remotest island of Tristan da 
Cunha. Their story constitutes an exemplar case-study for maritime-related 
migrations after shipwrecks, an understudied phenomenon which rarefied with 
the nineteenth-century shipping improvements and globalisation. Nevertheless, it 
still represents a remarkable feature to characterise seafaring, its risks and its 
opportunities.  
 
F.8. Emigration and desertion of Camogli’s global 
seafarers 
The first paragraph will try to sketch out the figure of late nineteenth-century 
Camogli seafarers and, thereafter, illustrate the relationship between pull and push 
factors and the different ways for seamen to emigrate. During the nineteenth 
century, the nature of seafaring put sailors in a unique position among all the 
professions in relation to geographical movement. However, although seamen 
have been long considered as transnational characters par excellence753, not all the 
 
753 See, in particular, the arguments provided by Maria Fusaro in identifying the connections 
between maritime history and global history: M. Fusaro, “Maritime History as Global History? The 
Methodological Challenges and a Future Research Agenda”, in M. Fusaro and A. Polonia (eds.), 
Maritime History as Global History, St. John’s Newfoundland: IMEHA, *4&4, pp. *$)-*1*. For a 
contemporary comparison, see: I. Acejo, “Seafarers and Transnationalism: Ways of Belongingness 
Ashore and Aboard”, Journal of Intercultural Studies, No. ++: &, *4&*, pp. $5-1/; M. Borovnik, “Are 
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seafarers were effectively subjected to long-range voyages and to foreign 
encounters. Having compared the routes of Camogli’s late-eighteenth-century sea 
workers with those of one hundred years afterwards, for instance, we provided 
clear evidence of how nineteenth-century technological advancements and the 
adaptation of Camogli to the evolution of the shipping market had changed 
dramatically seafarers’ relationship with the international scenario. The 
enlargement of the range of shipping produced undeniable effects on the social 
and economic position of Camogli’s seamen. From the mid-nineteenth century 
onwards, they frequented highly internationalised ports and confronted with 
foreign crews on salaries, onboard discipline and further fundamental aspects of 
the life at sea. Together with shipping business, in less than fifty years, Camogli 
seafarers passed from the local to the global dimension754. As outlined in the 
previous chapter, the same characteristics of their professional routines changed 
along with the geographical expansion. These transformations and the maturation 
of transnational identities were, in some instances, channelled into quit behaviours 
from Camogli’s endogenous labour market, such as desertion and migration, in 
response to various pull and push factors.  
For seafarers, among the several ways to abandon a maritime career and flee 
abroad, desertion was one of the most common and, at the same time, 
troublesome. According to the Code of the Italian Merchant Marine (art. #)&), 
«any crew member who, both in national or foreign ports, jumped ship or did not 
embark on the day of departure, with no authorisations of maritime and consular 
authorities, is declared deserter»755. Then, in the following article, the law 
prescribed that, when caught, deserters could end up in prison for a variable period 
of time – up to one year – and must pay a fine from ', to #,, lira756. Therefore, 
Italian nineteenth-century maritime workers were aware of the legal interpretation 
of desertion, which represented a severe crime, punishable with jail reclusion; 
 
Seafarers Migrants? Situating Seafarers in the Framework of Mobility and Transnationalism”, 
Geographer, No. $4: &, *44/, pp. +$-/+.  
754 See, chapter ..  
755 Codice per la marina mercantile del Regno d’Italia, art. *$/.  
756 Idem, art. *$..  
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nevertheless, in particular throughout the second half of the century, countless 
Italian seafarers chose to desert whatsoever. From "*),s to the First World War, 
desertion became an endemic phenomenon for oceanic voyages, in spite of the 
various efforts made by the State to put an end to this continuous drain of sea 
going personnel.  
The post-unitarian administration of the Italian merchant marine tried to control 
desertion since its earliest establishment: in December "*)*, indeed, the King 
Vittorio Emanuele II appointed a special committee to «develop measures to 
remedy the extremely serious inconvenience of many desertions which occur too 
frequently»757. Interestingly, the members of this committee were all from Genoa 
or Liguria, and among them appeared the count Andrea Danovaro, «shipowner»758, 
and Pietro Badaracco, captain. Among the papers delivered from the committee to 
the Minister of the Marine – whose proposals will be discussed further – some 
statistical tables represent, already in the late "*),s, the weight of desertion within 
the Italian maritime framework since, in the "*)*-"*%, period, almost two 
thousands sea labourers deserted. Their analysis also tried to individuate the 
typologies of seafarers who were more likely to desert, both with regard to their 
regional provenience and from a professional point of view.  
Firstly, commissaries highlighted the considerable rate of Ligurian sailors, which 
composed '#,*% of the total, among Italian deserters. In fact, a fundamental share 
of the Italian seafaring personnel came from Liguria, in particular from the 
maritime communities lying on the western and eastern sides of the region. Few 
years after the national unification, Liguria provided (%.#*% seamen out of "&$.')( 
(#&,*%)759. Therefore, the weight of deserters was much more significant in terms 
of proportion than the Ligurian share of sailors. The primary reason for such 
discrepancy lied in the earlier establishment of Ligurian shipping in the oceanic 
 
757 ACS, Ministero della marina, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea Uffici 
Diversi &1$$-&1$5, b. /)/, $th December &1$1.  
758 It is with high certainty the same Andrea Danovaro mentioned in Chapter * as one of the 
main Black Sea grain buyers. Interestingly, in the first draft of the decree, Andrea Danovaro was 
labelled as both merchant and shipowner.  
759 See, Statistica del Regno d’Italia. Movimento della navigazione nei porti del Regno. Anno $>D1, 
pp. LVIII-LIX.  
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freight market: their fleet measured more in terms of both average and total 
tonnage760.  
In addition, the existence of a correlation between desertion and migration, 
which will be discussed further, might associate Ligurian outstanding numbers for 
deserters with the first migration wave to Latin America, of which Ligurian middle-
skilled and educated migrants (often with maritime and commercial backgrounds) 
were essential components, as opposed to the later agricultural low-skilled waves 
in which much more people from Southern Italy participated.   
Secondly, the public inquiry underlined how desertion concerned mainly able-
bodied seamen, who reached the outstanding figure of *$,$'% of the total, 
followed at great distance by ship-boys ($,)#%), whereas shipmasters and mates 
deserted in the rarest occasions (respectively ,,")% and ,,#%%)761. Likewise, the 
sources material on Camogli seafarers illustrate analogous outcomes, since among 
the whole group of deserters ($,))% of the sample), no one was mate or master at 
the time of desertion. Inter alia, the case of Gio. Batta Fravega is worth noting: in 
"*)), he deserted in Genoa (probably he did not present himself at the time of the 
embarkment), one year prior the obtainment of his license as mate762.  
The absolute concentration of cases among low and middle-skilled sea workers is 
in line with most of the historiographical interpretations of such phenomenon. In 
particular, the identification of onboard conflicts with class struggles, between low 
«proletarian» ranks and shipmasters, had stimulated various studies which dealt 
with desertion more or less in conformity with the Marxist theories763. Within this 
 
760 Ibidem.   
761 ACS, Ministero della marina, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea Uffici 
Diversi &1$$-&1$5, b. /)/, Quadro statistico delle diserzioni avvenute nella marina mercantile 
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762 ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare, r. &5, n. &.4.+.  
763 See: A. Cabantous, La Vergue et les fers. Mutins et déserteurs dans la marine de l'ancienne 
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ideological framework, desertion was a mean for seafarers to express their class-
conscious dissensus against masters’ and owners’ (representants of authoritarian 
societies) dominance onboard. Accordingly, deserting was a constructive action 
which sailors took to re-exert their control over their own labour. The correlation 
of desertions with working conditions, in general, and with professional and 
economic subordination, in particular, found fertile ground in the analysis of 
masters’ absolute authority over the crew764.  
Conversely, other scholars tried to contextualise desertion in a broader 
economic and sociological framework, in which class struggle made space to more 
individualistic and market-driven causes765. With regard to Finnish shipping, for 
example, the research of Jari Ojala and Jaakko Pehkonen provided a fundamental 
toolset to analyse the reasons of desertion from a wider perspective, which 
included wage differentials, navigational conditions (mean tonnage, length of 
voyage, destinations) and purely individual characteristics (as marital status or 
age)766. Moreover, this exercise on Finnish sailors was in clear continuity with 
Lewis Fischer’s work on deserting seamen within St. John’s merchant marine, 
where desertion was tested, with contrasting results, in light of wage differentials 
and market-driven opportunities767.  
The Italian case, as it emerges from state inquiries and Camogli’s sample, can be 
compared with the Finnish situation, due to various similarities in the respective 
geographic and shipping conditions. In the second half of the nineteenth century, 
both the Italian and Finnish merchant marines engaged to cross-trading as their 
 
of Capitalism and the Working Class”, International Journal of Maritime History, No. *, &515, pp. 
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764 See, J.M. Witt, “«During the Voyage Every Captain is Monarch of the Ship»: The Merchant 
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765 See, for instance: L.R. Fischer, “A dereliction of duty: the problem of desertion on nineteenth 
century sailing vessels”, in R. Ommer and G. Panting (eds), Working Men Who Got Wet, St. John’s 
Newfoundland: Maritime History Group, pp. .&-)4. 
766 J. Ojala and J. Pehkonen, “Not Only for Money: An Analysis of Seamen's Desertion in 
Nineteenth-Century Finland”, International Journal of Maritime History, No. &1:&, *44$, pp. *.-.+; 
J. Ojala, J. Pehkonen and J. Eloranta, “Desertions in nineteenth-century shipping: modelling quit 
behaviour”, European Review of Economic History, No. &), *4&+, pp. &**-&/4.  
767 L.R. Fischer, “A dereliction of duty: the problem of desertion on nineteenth century sailing 
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dominant form of shipping. Likewise, despite all due differences, their typical 
routes were comparable: both began in peripheral waters, with little or no 
outbound cargoes available, and called to British ports as the real point of 
departure. These analogies affected the working conditions of seafarers in similar 
ways, in particular with regard to the voyage length and the subsequent prolonged 
distance from home. Furthermore, both the seamen populations suffered from 
negative wage differentials in relation to market averages, which implied a 
comparable disposition to desert in favour of foreign employments.   
Ojala and Pehkonen quantitative analyses, for example, revealed that below-
average aged and unmarried seamen were keener to desert than their more mature 
and engaged counterparts; in Camogli, despite lacking serial information 
concerning seafarers’ marital status, the average age of deserters was #( years and 
"," days768. In this regard, the relative youth of deserters might have correlated 
with draft evasion, which the "*)* Commission included among the most critical 
reasons for desertion769. Indeed, in the contemporary perception, military service 
represented an undesirable duty, which wealthier families were able to circumvent 
more easily than the lower ranks: normally, at the moment of the draft, most of 
the seafarers had already selected their substitutes.  Usually, the shipowners 
allotted part of their legacy to exonerate their sons from service in case of a positive 
draw in the draft: this was the case, for example of Prospero Razeto, who, in "*'), 
destined &,,, lire to this specific purpose770. Instead, the absence, for aged sailors, 
of draft evasion among the factors to determine desertion might have favoured 
regular emigration. According to the Italian laws, indeed, seamen under the draft 
age were forbidden to legally settle abroad, whereas elder seafarers were more 
easily authorised.   
Furthermore, a great deal of emphasis was put on the correlation between 
desertion and long-term oceanic routes, measured through the analysis of average 
tonnages, voyage durations and destinations. Whereas the Finnish sample targeted 
 
768 See, ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare, registers &-+5.  
769 ACS, Ministero della marina, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea Uffici 
Diversi &1$&-&1$5, b. /)/, Commissione per la repressione delle diserzioni.   
770 ASGe, Notai II sezione, r. &)/, n. )..  
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seafaring communities and towns devoted to both coastal and trans-oceanic 
shipping, the maritime evolution of Camogli from the mid-nineteenth century 
onwards makes the Ligurian town an excellent case-study to evaluate the impact 
of the enlargement of shipping routes on desertion patterns. The evolution of 
desertion rates followed the progressive abandonment of the Mediterranean and 
increased in the period of oceanic tramp shipping.  
 
Figure $.&. Seafarers leaving the community of Camogli (&1/4-&5&/). Source: ASGe, Matricole della 
gente di mare 
 
Figure )." compares the quantitative evolution of desertion and legal emigration 
among Camogli seafarers from "*&,s to "$",s. Firstly, the curve of desertion shows 
two periods of rising discontinuity, the first during the "*),s and the second in the 
"**,s. Taking into consideration just the economic perspective, these two periods 
present opposite characteristics: between "*), and "*%,, the shipping business of 
Camogli underwent its most rewarding and profitable phase;  in the following 
decades, the global freight crisis, the competition with steam shipping and the 
local financial collapse stroke an heavy blow on Camogli’s maritime system771. 
However, whereas the respective economic factors differed, the two periods have 
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something in common: the geographic escalation of Camogli’s maritime activities, 
from the Mediterranean to the British Isles in the former case ("*),s), and from 
the European waters to the oceanic setting in the latter ("**,s)772.  
Also the "*)* Commission – targeting the whole country – outlined the 
correlation between desertion and the widening of the Italian shipping range to 
the Atlantic environment: in their statistics, the overwhelming majority of Italian 
sea workers deserted in Latin American ports ())%), followed by British territories 
(%%) and the U.S. ()%)773. The extraordinary amount of desertions in Latin 
America is a distinguishing feature differentiating Italian seafarers from those of 
the anglophone and Northern countries. In the literature on St. John’s and 
Scandinavian deserters, the percentage of Latin American destinations never 
exceeded ",%, whereas British and U.S. ports accounted for most of the cases774.  
The case of Camogli, instead, represents a junction point between the two 
worlds: because of Camogli’s outstanding accomplishments in international 
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Table $.&. Destinations of seafarers leaving the community of Camogli (&1/4-&5&/). Source: ASGe, 
Matricole della gente di mare 
 
Indeed, the data provided by Table )." seem to align the case of Camogli to the 
international standards. Differently from the Italian trend, Camogli seafarers 
 
772 See, Chapter * and +.  
773 Data drawn from: ACS, Ministero della marina, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, 
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774 L.R. Fischer, “A dereliction of duty: the problem of desertion on nineteenth century sailing 
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deserted more in the British and Northern European ports than in Latin America, 
thus showing similar characteristics to those of Scandinavians. In broader terms, 
some Camogli seafarers acted more in line with international than national trends 
for deciding the ports where to desert.  
Furthermore, the place of desertion affected the occupational prospects of 
deserters, as we will delineate in the next section. The unique character of 
Camogli’s data within the Italian framework invited us to broaden the analysis to 
compare desertion with the legal emigration flows to America. The widening of the 
perspective is crucial to move forward with the analysis of the exogenous reasons 
for desertion, which require a much wider contextualisation within migration 
movements775.  
Behind the choice to desert either in Cardiff or in Buenos Ayres lied highly 
different individual and environmental reasons: naturally, the desertion led also to 
opposite results. In the first case (British and Northern European destinations), 
deserting was usually aimed at prosecuting the maritime career: seafarers sought 
for more rewarding employments and decided to disembark, even illegally, in ports 
where it was possible to satisfy their expectations. In the second case (Latin 
American ports), desertion usually resulted into stable settlements abroad, 
sometimes connected to the abandonment of a maritime career or, at least, to its 
reconfiguration (e.g. from oceanic routes to cabotage). Although the former 
situation is almost exclusive of desertion, the latter one forced us to inscribe the 
deserting behaviours in a broader framework which comprehended migration 
itself.    
Under a chronological point of view, legal emigration follows a similar pattern 
to desertion: )',""% of the migrations occurred between "**, and "*$$ (see Figure 
)."). The most contrasting results emerge under the geographical perspective: 
migrating seafarers chose the Latin American ports in )&,'*% of the instances (as 
opposed to the (*,%"% of desertion), whereas only "&,'*% opted for British or 
Northern European ports (as opposed to &",$(% of desertion).  
 
775 Ojala and Pehkonen have already attempted to analyse desertion through migration models: 
see, J. Ojala, J. Pehkonen and J. Eloranta, “Desertions in nineteenth-century shipping: modelling 
quit behaviour”, pp. &+4-&+*.  
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These data imply a fundamental element of distinction: for deserters, 
professional continuity played a decisive role in determining the abandonment of 
the community. This feature could also be associated to the sudden nature of 
desertion as opposed to the meticulous planning allowed to migration. 
The next section, therefore, examines the diverging trajectories of those who 
continued a maritime profession according to the nature of their abandonment of 
the community, either by desertion or migration.  
 
F.=. Different flag, same sails: maritime labour 
migration to the European merchant marines 
 
As seen in the previous chapter (Table '."%), notwithstanding the method adopted, 
almost one third (("%) of the sample of Camogli seafarers born between "*)' and 
"*%' decided to leave the community to settle abroad. Although maritime labour 
sources are mostly silent toward foreign employments or activities abroad, the 
utilisation of more qualitative sources might shed some light on them. The present 
analysis will begin by taking into account those who continued into maritime 
professions: in this sense, we will sketch out a sharp contraposition between high-
seas and cabotage foreign careers.  
While the transfer from sail to steam shipping was a late phenomenon which 
impacted severely on Camogli’s shipping crisis from the late "*%,s onwards, the 
abandonment of the «floating communities» in favour of foreign sailing vessels 
anticipated the crisis and the gradual dismantlement of the communitarian 
economic system. Immediately after Camogli’s ships crossed the Mediterranean 
borders and reached out more attractive maritime labour markets (such as the 
British one), the local Italian consuls began to record countless desertions of 
seafarers776. Among the places where Camogli’s seamen chose to jump ship, British 
ports were much likely related to the decision to embark on foreign vessels.  
 
776 See, ACS, Ministero della marina, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea 
Uffici Diversi &1$&-&1$5, b. /)/, Commissione per la repressione delle diserzioni.  
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Interestingly, scholarly literature indicates that serving on foreign merchant 
marines was not as common for Italians as for other nationalities. For example, the 
pivotal studies on the Scandinavian merchant marines have long established how 
switching flag was a common behaviour among Northern European sea workers777, 
whose professional and ethical qualities were of great appreciation in the most 
labour-demanding fleets, such as the British one. For instance, according the data 
retrieved from of a sample database of British crew agreements, the Scandinavians 
provided "$,,$% of the deck personnel and, thus, constituted the second regional 
group (after the Britons, '),')%) within the British merchant marine778. The 
comparative success of Scandinavian sailors reached even Camogli’s fleet: in "*$*, 
when the ship Edinburgh was anchored at Pensacola, in order to replace a couple 
of Southern Italian deserters, the captain embarked a Finnish able-bodied seaman 
and a Danish ordinary seaman779.  
On the other side, despite the relatively low labour costs – which the British 
consuls praised and blamed at the same time – Italian sailors were less demanded 
within foreign merchant marines780. In particular, historiography tends to relate 
this trend to moral prejudices which blamed most of the Southern-European 
countries781. Until now, maritime scholars have completely ignored the presence 
of Italian maritime labourers in the foreign merchant marines. Conversely, a 
thorough research on the vast archival corpuses (particularly in the British case) 
might contribute to the reconsideration of this neglected aspect of the Italian and 
European maritime history and, perhaps, shed light on unexpected entanglements. 
In particular, a systematic research on foreign crew lists might be fundamental to 
 
777 This element arose within the discussion concerning the integration of Northern European 
sailors within the international maritime labour market: L.R. Fischer, “The Efficiency Of Maritime 
Labour Markets In The Age Of Sail: The Post-&1.4 Norwegian Experience”, in Idem (ed.), The 
market for seamen in the age of sail, pp. &&&-&/4. The same phenomenon is repeatedly mentioned in: 
J. Ojala, J. Pehkonen and J. Eloranta, “Desertions in nineteenth-century shipping: modelling quit 
behaviour”, pp. &*+-&*..  
778 The database is outlined and discussed in M.Cooper, “Maritime Labour And Crew Lists 
Analysis: Problems, Prospects And Methodologies”, p. &54.  
779 ASGe, Giornali nautici, Giornale generale, Brigantino a palo Edinburgh, $4*/&.  
780 See, chapter *.   
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evaluate, with more awareness, the effective attractiveness of the foreign maritime 
labour market on Italian seamen and, thus, its correlation with desertion. 
Lacking such data and owing to the fact that, after desertion, the individual 
career records were naturally interrupted, we resorted to a tentative analysis of the 
most frequent places of desertion and to the usage of more qualitative sources, in 
the attempt to discuss the occurrence of Camogli seafarers working on foreign 
vessels.  
As pointed out in the previous paragraph, about &"% of Camogli deserters chose 
to jump ship in British or Northern European ports. This figure is outstandingly 
high in comparison with the Italian average (less than ",% total)782. Therefore, 
Camogli seafarers seem to represent an exceptional case-study within the Italian 
maritime context; whereas most of the Italian deserters aimed at Latin American 
countries to settle there, a remarkable share of Camogli’s seamen deserted in ports 
where embarking on foreign vessels represented the most attractive option. Within 
this framework, the most favourite places for sailors to desert were Cardiff, 
Newcastle and Liverpool, not surprisingly among the leading ports for the Atlantic 
sea borne trade. There, the comparison with British (or American) working 
conditions and salaries might have encouraged displeased, young and unmarried 
seamen to secretly disembark with the purpose to sign new employments aboard 
of foreign ships.  
The absence of a clear legislation and, in particular, of bi-lateral and 
international agreements on desertion – as the "*)* Commission noted – 
facilitated such misconduct783. Furthermore, the relative absence of Camogli’s legal 
migrants to the UK ports, as opposed to the high figure of desertion in the same 
area, suggests a correlation between desertion and the continuation of maritime 
careers in foreign merchant marines. To this group can be added those sailors who 
decided to stop legally in the British ports and never embarked again on Italian 
vessels (#,( % of the total sample, ",,)% of foreign abandonments, see Table '."#).  
 
782 See, ACS, Ministero della marina, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea 
Uffici Diversi &1$&-&1$5, b. /)/, Commissione per la repressione delle diserzioni.  
783 Ibidem. To the same argument refer also Ojala Pehkonen: J. Ojala and J. Pehkonen, “Not Only 
for Money: An Analysis of Seamen's Desertion in Nineteenth-Century Finland”, p. +5.  
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In sums, the reemployment within foreign oceanic merchant marines suggests 
the existence of professional continuity. Camogli’ sailors engaged to foreign 
international shipping to achieve better salaries and ameliorate their working 
conditions. Although these subjects abandoned Camogli’s endogenous labour 
market, they remained within its broader container, the international maritime 
labour market. The high level of mobility associated with high-seas careers 
prevented sailors from permanently settling abroad.  
All these features draw a thick line of distinction between pursuing a maritime 
career in foreign merchant marines and engaging to cabotage. The decision of 
jumping ship to engage to foreign vessels was inherently less durable and one-way 
than a professional readjustment to cabotage in another country. As we will see, 
the latter option was usually pursued in Latin America, in the broader context of 
permanent or semi-permanent migration to this continent. For these reasons, 
before tackling the argument of Camogli’s readjustments to Latin American 
cabotage, we will first proceed with a brief digression about the characteristics of 
Ligurian migration to two specific areas, Peru and the Plata region, where most of 
Camogli’s seafarers directed in the second half of the nineteenth century.  
 
F.?. The Ligurian Migration to Latin America (8P?Ss-
8T8C) 
 
In the reconstruction of the Italian migration flows to Latin America, there is wide 
consensus in representing the Genoese people as a definite group holding some 
distinctive traits. Firstly, in connection with Ligurian chronological primacy within 
the Italian migration flows to Latin America; secondly, because of the unique push 
and pull factors determining their emigration.  
 (#) 
Various scholars noted how cultural factors carved a role within this Ligurian 
primate784. The Genoese people grew in the «mobility culture»785 and possessed a 
natural predisposition to geographical movement, rooted into centuries of 
shipping and commercial practices. These traits lied at the basis of their earlier 
settlement in the Latin American continent and deeply influenced the 
characteristics of their establishment within the social and economic framework 
of the hosting societies. The inclusion of Camogli within this paradigm is however 
a late accomplishment. As seen in the previous chapters, its shipping developed a 
transnational dimension only from the "*(,s onwards: previously, the 
geographical context to which they referred was restrained within the narrow 
borders of the Tyrrhenian sea and rarely Camogli’s vessels sailed outside the 
Mediterranean.  «Mobility culture» did play a role in bringing Latin American 
countries closer to Genoa, but within a more intricated framework where long-
standing interests and durable entanglements intervened.  
The relationships between Liguria and Latin America before the eighteenth 
century had been a neglected field of studies until the recent volume of Catia 
Brilli786 shed light on the Latin American side of the centuries-old business 
entanglements which the Genoese merchants maintained with Spanish monarchs. 
In this context, the greater relationships with this area manifested from the second 
half of the eighteenth century under the direction of the group of Genoese traders 
settled in Cadiz787. The penetration of Genoese entrepreneurs in Latin America can 
 
784 See, for instance the literature concerning the first waves of Italian emigration to Argentina 
and Uruguay: M.C. Crescimbene, “Storia della collettività italiana in Argentina (&1+.-&5$.)”, in La 
popolazione di origine italiana in Argentina, Torino: Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 
&51), pp. *45-*/*; F.J. Devoto, “Un caso di migrazione precoce. Gli Italiani in Uruguay nel secolo 
XIX”, in L’emigrazione italiana e la fondazione dell’Uruguay moderno, Torino: Edizioni della 
Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, &55+, pp. &-+..  
785 The same terms are used in: G. Bonfiglio, Gli Italiani nella società peruviana. Una visione 
storica, Torino: Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, &555, p. +*. See, also: G. Chiaramonti, 
“Italiani in Perú fra otto e novecento: marinai, commercianti, imprenditori di origine ligure”, 
Zibaldone. Estudios italianos, p. .).  
786 C. Brilli, Genoese Trade and Migration in the Spanish Atlantic, $122-$>72, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, *4&$.  
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be contextualised within the Spanish designs to enhance and develop the colonial 
trade, in particular with the surroundings of Buenos Ayres. Thus, various 
individuals settled there and opened trade activities, in particular in the retail 
sector (pulperias); some of them became successful and survived to the dramatic 
transformations observed at the turn of the century788.  
After the commercial and shipping crisis determined by Napoleonic Wars, the 
Genoese recovered their communications with Plata, which assumed continuous 
characters from the "*(,s onwards. Meanwhile, since the early "*#,s, several 
members of the Ligurian community settled around the Plata basin engaged to 
maritime-related professions, in particular river navigation and shipbuilding789, to 
which were gradually added the newcomers establishing in the same area from the 
"*(,s onwards. For this group of immigrants – among which it is possible to 
include those from Camogli – shipping business represented the gateway to 
migration. First, it provided the means and the occasion to migrate; wether 
deserting or regularly leaving the ship, many of these migrants presented a 
maritime background which concurred to their arrival to the American continent. 
Secondly, shipping business and its affiliated industries were underdeveloped 
sectors in the area: thus, countless Ligurians were able to fill the void and engaged 
to river navigation, coastal cabotage and shipbuilding790.   
The same pattern is observed on the opposite shore of the Latin American 
subcontinent, in Peru and Chili where, for being less numerous, the Italian 
communities were even more evidently related to maritime emigration791. There, 
Ligurian immigrants started to arrive with continuity from the early nineteenth 
century, in the wake of their independence.  
 
788 Idem, pp. 15-&+/.  
789 Idem, pp. &$/-*4*.  
790 See: F.J. Devoto, “Un caso di migrazione precoce. Gli Italiani in Uruguay nel secolo XIX”, pp. 
&-&..  
791 G. Bonfiglio, Gli Italiani nella società peruviana, pp. *5-+.; G. Chiaramonti, “Italiani in Perú 
fra otto e novecento: marinai, commercianti, imprenditori di origine ligure”, p. $&; J. Worral, “Italian 
Immigrants in the Peruvian Economy, &1$4-&5&/”, Italian Americana, No. *:&, &5)., pp. .4-$+; V. 
Maino, “I marinai italiani in Cile a metà del secolo XIX”, in Il contributo italiano allo sviluppo del 
Cile, Torino: Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, &55+, pp. &.)-&5.. 
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In general, the Ligurian emigration to Latin America has been interpreted as an 
early chain migration. Early, because it took place before the effective development 
of the Italian mass migration flows to the same area. Still in "*%", the immigrants 
of Ligurian origins represented the '(% of the Italian population settled in the 
American continent792. Therefore, migration historians have naturally decided to 
label the pre-"*%, migration wave as the Ligurian phase793. Then, with the growth 
of the emigration flows from other areas of the country, the Genoese component 
lost its dominant role in terms of relative participation; nevertheless, Ligurian 
people continued to transfer to Latin America in the following decades. Indeed, 
despite the characteristics of Ligurian migration were tailored on the mid-
nineteenth century context, the same features can be seen throughout the 
subsequent period.  
Within this framework, the history of Camogli’s emigration to Latin America 
can be explicated through a three-step process. First: the immigrants arrived there 
as seafarers and decided to abandon the ship – either by deserting or under 
permission of the captain/shipowner. Second: they found employment within local 
cabotage and prosecuted with their maritime careers. Third: at the top, shipping 
business was gradually associated with investments in trade, agricultural 
production and industry; at the bottom, it was abandoned for the retail and 
wholesale sectors. Indeed, this pattern underwent an intergenerational 
differentiation: usually, first-comers (arrived between "*(,s and "*),s) reached 
the third step at the top; instead, late-comers ("*%,s-"$",s) – arrived as a result of 
mechanisms of chain migration – were employed in already-established activities 





792 Statistica generale del Regno d'Italia - Censimento degli italiani all'estero (7$ dicembre $>1$)                             
Roma: Stamperia Reale, &1)/.  
793 M.C. Crescimbene, “Storia della collettività italiana in Argentina (&1+.-&5$.)”, pp. *45-*/*.  
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=.).%. CAMOGLI’S MARITIME LABOUR MIGRATION TO LATIN 
AMERICA  
 
When arrived to Latin America, the main tools at disposal of the people of 
Camogli were the maritime background and the related professional expertise. 
Despite many specificities, the same characteristics were shared by most of the 
immigrants of Ligurian origins. As a result, they successfully integrated within all 
the shipping-related industries, in particular cabotage and shipbuilding. Within 
the wide range of opportunities offered by the fluid Latin American societies, the 
places of origin of the “Genoese” influenced their choices. Camogli’s people, like 
many from the Eastern Ligurian Riviera, founded shipping companies and engaged 
to local cabotage. On the other side, immigrants from places with deeply-rooted 
traditions in the shipbuilding industry were more likely to open shipyards. Several 
shipwrights and carpenters from Varazze, one of the leading shipbuilding centres 
of Liguria, arrived in Buenos Ayres and Montevideo and founded shipyards 
there794. Instances like these are emblematic to highlight the professional 
continuity tying the hometown with the migrant environment.  
In the aftermath of the Latin American independence process, the extant 
political and social climate was favourable for Europeans to make great profits 
within societies under construction. In Peru, since the mid-nineteenth century, 
«the Italians owned almost all of the cabotage under the Peruvian flag»795. 
According to the Italian consul in Lima, «in order to practice fishing and cabotage, 
and to be equalised to locals» many Ligurian emigrants «had inscribed themselves 
in the Peruvian rolls»796. In "*'(, the only data available to analyse the mid-
 
794 See the case of the brothers Franco, Giuseppe and Luigi Fazio and Giuseppe, Vincenzo and 
Gio. Batta Cerruti reported in: F.J. Devoto, “Un caso di migrazione precoce. Gli Italiani in Uruguay 
nel secolo XIX”, pp. .-$. See also, the case of Matteo Amico, from Loano to Peru: G. Bonfiglio, Gli 
Italiani nella società peruviana, pp. 1.-11. For Buenos Ayres, see: M.C. Crescimbene, “Storia della 
collettività italiana in Argentina (&1+.-&5$.)”, p. */$.  
795 ACS, Ministero della marina, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea Uffici 
Diversi, b. *)&, Lettera di Pietro Castelli al Ministro della Marina (&1$$).  
796 AMAE, Ministero degli affari esteri, b. 1&), Lima, &1$..  
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nineteenth century Peruvian merchant marine, record at least eighteen vessels – 
out of one hundred twenty (),))%) – belonging to Ligurian shipowners797.  
Scholarly reconstructions underline how, at the beginning of its independent 
history, the Peruvian society lacked both the means and the know-how to create 
its own merchant marine and, accordingly, favoured foreign investments in this 
sector798. The Ligurian shipowners engaged mainly to the Latin American 
cabotage, where they imposed their rule, and more rarely adventured to 
international trade: in that sector, for the outstanding success of guano trade, 
British, American and French were powerful and resourceful competitors.  
Thus, Peru turned into an attractive maritime labour market for Ligurian 
seamen. However, the enrolment of Italian citizens within the Peruvian rolls and 
the transfer to the foreign flag was perceived as a problematic drain of resources 
by the Italian authorities. From the consular correspondence, for instance, it is 
possible to observe the efforts to achieve bi-lateral agreements with the Peruvian 
state aimed at obtaining the fiscal equalisation between the Italian and Peruvian 
merchant marines799. This type of agreement would have diminished the drain of 
resources and, perhaps, would have pushed the resident shipowners to return to 
the Italian flag. In addition, consular correspondence shed light on another factor 
of attractiveness of Peru in the eyes of Italian seafarers: to contrast desertion, the 
consul proposed the introduction of a minimum salary within the Italian merchant 
marine – equal to the local market level. Such proposal underlines the existence of 
considerable salary differentials between the two maritime labour markets and 
their role to determine desertions and labour migration to Latin America.    
 
797 R. Melo, Historia de la Marina del Perù, Lima: Carlos F. Southwell, &54), p. *&)-**4. The figure 
might indicate an overestimation of the Ligurian penetration within Peruvian shipping business: 
however, later sources and historiography identified many more Italian-owned ships in Peru, in 
particular of Giuseppe Canevaro and Gio. Bono Figari. See, M. C. de Mendoza, El transporte 
maritimo en la Inmigracion China, Lima, &515, p. $1, mentioned in G. Bonfiglio, Gli Italiani nella 
società peruviana, p. )4.  
798 G. Bonfiglio, Gli Italiani nella società peruviana, pp. $/-$$.  
799 AMAE, Affari Esteri, b. 1&). In the proposed treaty, the consul aimed at obtaining free fishing 
and free cabotage for the Italian flag. However, he was not optimistic about the fact that this action 
on itself could prevent Italian citizens from enlisting into the Peruvian rolls.   
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Moreover, another advantage of the Peruvian labour market in comparison with 
the Italian one involved the mechanisms of upward professional mobility. Several 
low and middle-skilled seamen deserted in the Pacific Latin American country to 
obtain, in short time, remarkable and profitable commands within the local 
merchant marine800. Interestingly, the consul pleaded their case, inviting the 
Italian public authorities to acknowledge a de facto situation and regularise their 
positions, in order to let them serve for the national fleet as well801.  
In Peru, as well as in the Plata region, Camogli’s migration inscribes into the 
chain migration model. By means of «diffusion» and «feedback»802, the 
mechanisms of chain migration led to the creation of communitarian-based 
clusters, in which kinship and shared origins played a fundamental role.  
Bartolomeo Figari is an example of this migrating pattern803. Born in "*(" from 
Gio. Batta and Rosa Ottone, he began his maritime career in Tyrrhenian cabotage 
routes at age twelve. From "*', to "*'&, Bartolomeo served in the Peruvian 
merchant marine for more than forty months. In Peru, he sailed on the ship 
Santiago, captain Giacomo Gotuzzo, and on the ship Carmen, under the command 
of captain Giuseppe Garibaldi. Interestingly, the latter embarkment, on board of 
Carmen, is related to one of the most famous voyages of Garibaldi as shipmaster, 
because of the long-standing debate about Garibaldi’s alleged participation to the 
coolie trade804. Nevertheless, both the Carmen (owned by Pietro Denegri805) and 
the Santiago surely employed a lot of Italian-born maritime personnel. In Latin 
America the integration of newly-arrived immigrants within the already-existing 
 
800 Ibidem.  
801 Ibidem.   
802 J.D. Gould, “European Inter-continental Emigration: The Role of «Diffusion» and 
«Feedback»”, The Journal of the European Economic History, *, &514, pp. *$)-+&..  
803 ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare, r. +, n. +&$$.  
804 The main elements of this debate can be followed in: F. Capece Galeota, “Il «secondo esilio» 
di Giuseppe Garibaldi, Mediterranea Ricerche Storiche, No. &/, *441, pp. $.&-$$$. The main voice 
raised against the idea that the “Hero of Two Worlds” had engaged the coolie trade can be found 
in: P.K. Cowie, “Nuova luce su Garibaldi in Perù (&1.&-&1.+)”, Rassegna storica del Risorgimento, 
&51&, pp. +*.-++&.  
805 AST, Consolati nazionali, Lima, &. According to the consul Giuseppe Canevaro, his brother-
in-law, Pietro Denegri was born in Casella (Liguria).  He was arrived in the Peruvian port in the 
early &1+4s and had accumulated substantial fortunes with trade and shipping.  
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Italian activities responded to a common pattern for Ligurian emigration. The 
individual trajectory of Bartolomeo Figari was in line with this model: in Lima, he 
had relatives orbiting around the business of Giovanni Figari, one of the foremost 
members of the Italian community in Peru806.  
From the sources, it is also possible to reconstruct some unfortunate cases, 
which, nevertheless, can say something about the characteristics of Camogli’s 
chain migration to Peru. For example, this was the case of the shipmaster Carlo 
Cichero who, for «his extremely miserable conditions»807, repeatedly demanded to 
the Italian consul in Callao to be repatriated at state expense. In this circumstance, 
the existence of a “supporting network” based on communitarian ties was even 
more important since it allowed the consul to find at least temporary employment 
to the captain, as a second pilot on the Italian ship Dominga808.  
Similar conditions facilitated the integration of Camogli’ seafarers in the area 
surrounding the Plata basin. There, the characteristics of Camogli’s migration are 
hardly distinguishable from the Ligurian microcosm crowding the alleys of Buenos 
Ayres and Montevideo. Indeed, the conditions predisposed by the dictatorship of 
Juan Manuel de Rosas ("*('-"*'#) in Argentina attracted several Ligurian seafarers 
to Buenos Ayres809. Rapidly, a great part of the cabotage fleet and the navigation 
along the river Plata came into the hands of Ligurian shipowners810. In analogy to 
what it has been observed in the Peruvian case, the cabotage fleet hoisted the 
Argentinian and Uruguayan flags. The adoption of local flags was particularly 
effective for engaging to the navigation of the internal rivers (Paranà, Uruguay and 
 
806 See, infra.   
807 AMAE, Affari Esteri, 11&.   
808 Ibidem.  
809 See, N. Cuneo, Storia dell'emigrazione italiana in Argentina, $>$2-$>12, Milano: Garzanti, 
&5/4, pp. +.&-+.*; M.C. Crescimbene, “Storia della collettività italiana in Argentina (&1+.-&5$.)”, 
pp. *45-*&+; F.J. Devoto, “Un caso di migrazione precoce. Gli Italiani in Uruguay nel secolo XIX”, 
pp. /-..   
810 Official data are not available for this period: as Crescimbene reports, the Ligurian dominance 
in cabotage fluvial navigation is widely recognized by specialists. For instance, between &1/. and 
&1/1, /+% of the vessels leaving the port of Buenos Ayres to cabotage destinations hoisted the 
Sardinian flag. See, M.C. Crescimbene, “Storia della collettività italiana in Argentina (&1+.-&5$.)”, 
p. ***.  
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even Paraguay), accessible to national vessels only811. Indeed, as a general feature, 
the Plata region was a transnational space for Ligurian immigrants: through fluvial 
navigation, they moved incessantly between different national states back and 
forth812. This trait is fundamental to understand the unique characteristics of the 
Ligurian presence in the area as opposed to the later Italian migration flows which 
need to be forcibly contextualised in the consideration of the receiving societies.  
After the turbulent last years of Rosas, the Ligurian dominance within cabotage 
and fluvial navigation regained its momentum at the point that, in "*)', the Italian 
consul described the current situation with these words:  
From high-seas vessels to port rafts, from shipowners, importers 
and exporters to captains, sailors and ship-boys, to shipbuilders, 
caulkers and sailmakers, almost all of them belong to one Ligurian 
riviera or to the other.813    
In this phase, however, it is not common to find people from Camogli in this 
area. As seen, the first sizable waves of immigrants from the Ligurian town date 
from the second half of the nineteenth century onward and were deeply 
interrelated with the worsening conditions of the local shipping business. It is in 
that moment that the mechanisms of chain migration gradually increased the 
number of immigrants. Nevertheless, the earliest news of Camogli’s people in the 
Plata basin fit the characteristics of Ligurian immigration and, by witnessing the 
continuity to maritime labour and shipping, coincide with the above-mentioned 
second step of Camogli’s immigration pattern. For example, it is possible to 
mention the cabotage captain B. Schiaffino, who, in "*'(, left the port of 
Montevideo to Gualeguaychu at the command of the ship Sole814.   
Indeed, the most noteworthy period to analyse Camogli’s immigration to 
Buenos Ayres and the nearby cities took place from the late "*%,s onwards. In 
 
811 F.J. Devoto, “Un caso di migrazione precoce. Gli Italiani in Uruguay nel secolo XIX”, p. ..  
812 Idem, p. 1.  
813 L. Chapperon, “La Repubblica Orientale dell’Uruguay. Cenni geografici, statistici e 
commerciali”, in Bollettino Consolare Italiano, &1$., p. ./4.  
814 AST, Consolati nazionali, Buenos Ayres, b. *.  
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these years, both desertions and legal migrations reached the zenith in Latin 
American countries, with Buenos Ayres ((&,*%) and Montevideo (%%) being the 
foremost destinations for Camogli seafarers either deserting or settling abroad815. 
There, the seamen from Camogli, both deserters and regular immigrants, found 
regular employment in the maritime sector. In "**', more than '&% of the tonnage 
of the Plata, despite covered by Latin American flags, belonged to Italian 
shipowners816. Such considerable amount of vessels, albeit of limited dimensions 
(most of them weighted below "', tons), could obviously provide a vast source of 
maritime labour for several Italian migrants settled abroad. These are the cases, for 
instance, of Carlo Oneto, sailor, found in Buenos Ayres in "**": part of a numerous 
family composed of six male brothers, Carlo was emigrated to Argentina in the 
previous years, whereas three brothers of him were still employed on board of 
Camogli’s vessels and two were farmers817. Another one was Benedetto Figari, 
captain, who appeared as witness in a notarial deed from Buenos Ayres together 
with Fortunato Cichero, owner of a pulperia818. A decade later, Camogli’s notarial 
sources witness the presence in Buenos Ayres of Cesare Gotuzzo and Fortunato 
Maggiolo, captains819. Most interesting is the case of Giuseppe Caprile, who, in 
"**', had found employment as a coalman820.  
More rare, but still present, is Camogli’s maritime labour migration to Chile. 
There, with different dimensions, the gradual integration of Ligurian captains and 
seafarers within the Chilean merchant marine can be observed from the "*#,s821. 
Already in "*(', the English consul in Valparaiso recorded six Italian captains 
(Schiattino, Viale, Ferrari, Garassino, Allao and Capurro) as opposed to only eight 
 
815 ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare, registers &-+5.  
816 AMAE, Serie Politica A, b. +, Buenos Ayres.  
817 ASGe, Notai III Sezione, b. .4&, n. *...  
818 Idem, b. .4+, n. $+&.  
819 Idem, b. &$&$, n. .// and $.1.  
820 Idem, b. $11, n. *1.*.  
821 V. Maino, “I marinai italiani in Cile a metà del secolo XIX”, in Il contributo italiano allo 
sviluppo del Cile, Torino: Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, &55+, pp. &.)-&5..  
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Chilean captains822. Others could be added to this list and even more followed 
afterwards823. Between "*'" and "*)', "%% of the captains and "$% of the vessels of 
the Chilean fleet were Italian824. Among them, it is not easy to distinct those from 
Camogli from those who arrived from the nearby communities, such as Santa 
Margherita and Recco. Surnames like Bozzo, Capurro, Chiesa, Cichero, Ferrari and 
Viacava can be equally reconducted either to Camogli or to those places. Thus, 
widening the perspective adopted to embrace this broader trans-communitarian 
area seems to be a necessary operation to shed light on the characteristics of 
Camogli’s maritime immigration to Chile. Within this group, Gio. Batta Cichero 
owned the major numbers of ships, five825. Similarly to Emanuele Bozzo, Benedetto 
Capurro, Antonio Chiesa, Niccolò Ognio, B. Repetto and Gio. Batta Viacava, he was 
also shipmaster, employed despite his several ownerships826. These captains and 
ships mostly engaged to cabotage along the Pacific coast of the Latin American 
subcontinent and seldomly went beyond this borders827.  
Although being employed in the maritime sector represented a common fate for 
most of the seafarers who, from Camogli, arrived in Latin America, the duration of 
their maritime careers was usually limited within the first years spent in the 
hosting societies. Afterwards, on the one hand, the most successful collected 
enough resources to found shipping firm and, in a certain perspective, followed a 
parallel evolution to their counterparts in Camogli. They relinquished the role of 
owning-captains and sought for social and economic recognition in 
shipownership. On the other hand, many abandoned shipping to engage to other 
activities. Within this framework, the case history is multifaceted. In general, most 
 
822 Idem, p. &$5.  
823 Ibidem. The author reports the names of Giuseppe Ferro, Niccolò Revello and Geronimo 
Costa.  
824 Idem, p. &1*.  
825 Idem, p. &1/, Tabella & – Armatori Italiani della flotta cilena, $>L2-DL.  
826 Idem, p. &1), Tabella * – Capitani Italiani della flotta cilena, $>L2-DL. The same Gio. Batta 
Cichero can be found in L. Pandolfini, “Emigrazione italiana al Chili”, Bollettino consolare italiano, 
&1$1, p. &/&.  
827 The author mentions extraordinary exceptions to this general rule, such as in the case of 
Pietro Alessandri, but it seems that none of the captains reported above actually engaged to 
international trade. V. Maino, “I marinai italiani in Cile a metà del secolo XIX”, pp. &)&-&)).  
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of them went upstream the supply chain, from transport to distribution up to 
production: firstly, they opened retail shops (pulperias), then passed to wholesale 
commerce (almacen) and, finally, acquired land for cultivation or engaged to 
industrial production.  
 
=.).". CAMOGLI’S SHIPPING BUSINESS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN 
LATIN AMERICA 
 
As said, from a chronological perspective, the bulk of Camogli’s migration to 
Latin America is not in line with the analogous broader Ligurian movement. This 
factor covered a role in determining the integration of the people of Camogli 
within the Italian and receiving societies. The practice of maritime occupations 
represented a common trait to delineate the first steps of Camogli’s people into the 
new world; instead, the subsequent entrepreneurial success was largely dependent 
on environmental factors and on the opportunities available. For example, in the 
age of guano ("*&,s-"*%,s), Peru was flourished and highly attractive to 
prospective emigrants; later, in particular after the War of the Pacific ("*%$-"**&), 
which deprived the country of most of its nitrate deposits, it entered in a 
downward economic spiral. Thus, when taking into account long-term 
entrepreneurial trajectories, a crucial differentiation between the few first-comers 
("*(,s-"*),s) and the more extensive group of late-comers ("*%,s-"$",s) is 
needed. 
Indeed, at the mid-nineteenth century, the opening of the Black Sea trade and 
the overall evolution of local shipping represented a source of attractiveness from 
which few people of Camogli refrained. One of them was Giovanni Figari ("*",-
"*%(), who emigrated to Callao (Peru) in "*(#828.  
Although several references will be made to other characters from different 
places, the unusual abundance of sources about the life and business of Giovanni 
Figari allow us to reconstruct his activities and discuss his model of successful 
entrepreneurship in comparison with other cases.  
 
828 See, AST, Consolati nazionali, Lima, Lettera del console Luigi Baratta, &1/*; G. Bonfiglio, Gli 
Italiani nella società peruviana, pp. /+-//.  
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Arrived in "*(#, Giovanni Figari was able to collect a discrete fortune in less than 
ten years, as he was included in a short list of the thirteen most wealthy persons of 
Italian origins in Peru829. The Sardinian consul in Lima, Luigi Baratta, described 
him as a «merchant settled in Lima, married and with family for more than twelve 
years, who is not willing to return to his native country, and who holds a fortune 
of more than thirty thousand pezzi»830. Within this ranking, the position of 
Giovanni Figari followed those of Giuseppe Canevaro ("',.,,, pezzi), the Mazzino 
bros. (*,.,,, pezzi) and Pietro Parodi (',.,,, pezzi). Then, at the same level of 
Giovanni Figari, appeared also Antonio Boggiano (from Chiavari), Pietro Denegri 
(from Casella), Giuseppe Saccone and Angelo Macera831. These people were at the 
top of the Ligurian community of Peru: in particular, Giuseppe Canevaro and 
Pietro Denegri, merchants and shipowners, became the most influential of them, 
along with Figari832. 
Apparently, Giovanni Figari did not settle abroad on his own: he was probably 
accompanied by his brother, Angelo, who owned a pulperia (retail shop) in Lima833. 
Probably, other members of the family Figari moved to Peru: for example, within 
a list of the Peruvian fleet in "*'( a certain Hilario (Ilario) Figari is reported to be 
the owner of the schooner Diana ("() t.)834.  
In "*&#, Giovanni Figari was defined as a «merchant» and still in "*'( he does 
not figure among the Peruvian shipowners: arguably, soon after his arrival, Figari 
had collected his fortune through trade, as owner of a pulperia or even an almacén 
(wholesale shop). Afterwards, he surely returned to shipping and became one of 
the leading shipowners involved in the transport of coolies from China. Indeed, as 
seen in Chapter (, Giovanni Figari was reported as the owner of the full-rigged ship 
(Provvidenza, ')& t.) and a barque (Lima, #'' t.) which from January "*)' to June 
 
829 AST, Consolati nazionali, Lima, Lettera del console Luigi Baratta, &1/*.  
830 Ibidem.  
831 Ibidem.  
832 Giuseppe Canevaro was the Sardinian and later Italian consul between &1/) and &1$/. See, G. 
Bonfiglio, Gli Italiani nella società peruviana, p. *5..   
833 Idem, p. $5.  
834 R. Melo, Historia de la Marina del Perù, Lima: Carlos F. Southwell, &54), p. *&5.  
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"*)) sailed three times along the Macao-Callao route with a total of $,* coolies835. 
In "*%#, to the company Figari & Hijos belonged five out of twenty-six ships which 
arrived to Callao loaded with coolies between January and October "*%#836. Finally, 
according to a calculation of Mario Castro de Mendoza – reported by Giovanni 
Bonfiglio – Giovanni Figari had deployed twenty-two ships to the coolie trade 
throughout the whole period, second to Giuseppe Canevaro only (&( ships)837.  
The considerable revenues collected through this activity strengthened even 
more Figari’s position within the Italian community of Lima. His commitment to 
the communitarian social institutions found recognition in "*)#, when Giovanni 
Figari was elected president of the Società Italiana di Beneficienza of Lima (Italian 
Mutual Aid Society)838. The next year, Rocco Pratolongo succeeded to him in the 
same position and Figari was appointed treasurer, still a prestigious role839. The 
foundation of mutual aid societies and hospitals was a cornerstone for the 
consolidation of the Italian immigrant communities in Latin America840. These 
societies were intended to provide social and economic services to the associates: 
the membership fees and the incomes deriving from collateral activities were 
gathered into a social fund destined to support infirmed or indigent members. 
Furthermore, after they gathered sufficient capitals and assets, these societies 
performed additional services, tied with the construction of «schools, medical 
clinics, hospital care, pharmacies, restaurants»841. They also provided job 
 
835 See, Chapter + and: ACS, Ministero della Marina, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, 
Miscellanea Uffici Diversi &1$&-&1$5, b. *)+.  
836 W. Stewart, Chinese bondage in Peru, p. 1+; G. Chiaramonti, “Italiani in Perù fra Otto e 
Novecento”, p. )*.  
837 M. C. de Mendoza, El transporte maritimo en la Inmigracion China, Lima, &515, p. $1, 
mentioned in G. Bonfiglio, Gli Italiani nella società peruviana, p. )4.  
838 G. Bonfiglio, Gli Italiani nella società peruviana, p. &4/.  
839 AMAE, Affari Esteri, b. 11&, Lima, Società Italiana di Beneficenza – Commissione 
amministrativa pel corrente anno $>D7, Elenco dei soci. 
840 See, for instance: S.L. Baily and A. Scarli, “Las sociedades de ayuda mutua y el desarrollo de 
una comunidad italiana en Buenos Aires, &1.1-&5&1”, Desarollo Economico, No. 1/, &51*, pp. /1.-
.&/; S.L. Baily, “The Adjustment of Italian Immigrants in Buenos Aires and New York, &1)4-&5&/”, 
The American Historical Review, No. 11, &51+, pp. *1&-+4.; F.J. Devoto, “Las sociedades italianas de 
ayuda mutual en Buenos Ayres y Santa Fe. Ideas y problemas”, Studi Emigrazione XXI, No. )., &51/, 
pp. +*4-+/*.  
841 S.L. Baily, “The Adjustment of Italian Immigrants in Buenos Aires and New York”, p. *5+.  
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placement services, working as the operational arm of the Italian immigrant 
societies and the basic element of its social networking.  
From "*)# to "**", the number of associates to the Italian mutual aid society of 
Lima increased from "#" to ""#'842. Among the subscribers of "*)(, it is possible to 
single out the components of Camogli’s community within the broader Italian 
group: besides Giovanni Figari, the list records three more members of the same 
family, Luigi, Bartolomeo and Andrea, to which must be added Giovanni’s sons, 
Bartolomeo and Giovanni Figari-Rosas843. In addition, other associates might 
originate from Camogli, such as Gio. Batta Bozzo, Bartolomeo Schiaffino, Giuseppe 
Olivari and Michele Razeto844.  
Then, in "**", the mutual aid society gathered the funds to construct the Italian 
Hospital of Lima, founded on #,th September845. Less than a decade later, the 
company Giovanni Figari & Hijos hold ten shares of this institution846.  
Although his active participation to mutual aid societies and, more generally, to 
the social networks of the community, the figure of Giovanni Figari cannot be 
easily restricted to the mainstream endogenous character of Ligurian immigrant 
communities in Latin America. Indeed, the networking role of these institutions 
compensated for the troublesome integration of foreign elements within the 
hosting societies. The emergence of this factor is evident in Peru, where several 
Italians were subjected to vexations by the authorities and suffered from 
complicated relationships with the natives. Illegal imprisonments, beatings and 
murders were commonplace: in "*)&, for instance, a thirteen years old boy, 
Giacomo Figari (whose kinship with Giovanni is not clear) was strangled847. In the 
same period, an old man Schiaffino was assassinated in Lima. In Callao, two 
pulperos were murdered: one, named Garibaldi, was shot and the other had his 
 
842 G. Bonfiglio, Gli Italiani nella società peruviana, p. &4/-&4..  
843 AMAE, Affari Esteri, b. 11&, Lima, Società Italiana di Beneficenza – Commissione 
amministrativa pel corrente anno $>D7, Elenco dei soci.  
844 Ibidem.  
845 AMAE, Serie Politica A, b. 14, Lima, Società Italiana di Beneficienza in Lima – Relazione del 
presidente sulla gestione dell’anno $>>> all’assemblea generale.  
846 Ibidem.  
847 AMAE, Affari Esteri, b. 1&), Lima.  
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throat cut848. The climate of hostility was even fostered by clergymen, who 
contributed to flare the tempers of the Peruvians against the Italian community, 
whose members were labelled as «thieves and bandits»849.  
Therefore, having in mind long term projects, it was natural to feel the need to 
integrate as much as possible within the Peruvian society or, at least, to expand 
outside the borders of the Italian community. Thus, it was natural that, in "*(*, 
Giovanni Figari married Eulalia Rosas Barragan, daughter of Nicolas Rosas 
(probably of Italian origins, but in Peru since "*,% at least) and of a local woman850. 
Between "*&, and "*'&, the couple had nine sons, five boys and four girls. Then, 
Giovanni Figari carried out a careful marriage policy aimed at spreading the 
familiar connections in various directions. Bartolomeo ("*&,-"$"'), Pedro (b. "*'") 
and Manuel (b. "*&%) married women of local descents; Juan Jacinto (Giovanni, 
"*&(-"$"#) and Luis Lucas (Luigi, "*'&-"$(&) married women of Italian origins, 
descendants of Luigi Figari and Pietro Denegri respectively; Maria Dolores ("*&)-
"$"$) and Clorinda (d. "$"$) were given to Emile and Jules Fort, French merchants 
living in Lima851; finally, Carmen ("*&&-"$")) married Adolphe Harismendi, 
merchant of Basque origins. Then, these unions resulted into thirty-one grandsons 
from the original household of Giovanni Figari.  
Besides the unique case-study of Giovanni Figari, although with fewer details, it 
is possible to reconstruct alternative trajectories of Camogli’s immigrants in Peru. 
According to scholarly reconstructions, a great deal of the Italian business in Peru 
was severely damaged by the outbreak of the Pacific War and the subsequent 
Chilean invasion of the country ("**,-"**() which turned into a widespread 
lawlessness targeting foreigners in particular. For example, G.B. Ferrari reports 
about the considerable damages suffered by Giovanni Diego Schiaffino, Gaetano 
 
848 Ibidem.  
849 AMAE, Affari Esteri, b. &+1/, Lima.  
850 The genealogy of Giovanni Figari was made available online by Francisco Javier Carbone 
Montes, a distant descendant. It can be seen at: 
 https://gw.geneanet.org/fracarbo?lang=es&n=figari+olivari&oc=4&p=giovanni  
851 This information is corroborated by Teodoro Hampe Martinez: see, T.H. Martinez, “Una 
dinámica de integración social: Inmigrantes europeos y norteamericanos en Lima (siglo XIX)”, 
Ibero-amerikanisches Archiv, No. &):/, p. +.1.  
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Figari and Emanuele Cevasco, seemingly all proprietors of retail shops852. In the 
same period, it was in the valley of Chincha that the Italian residents lamented the 
greatest damages853.  There, some other business activities belonging to individuals 
from Camogli were founded and, then, flourished in the following decades. The 
settlement of members of the families Mortola and Oneto provides an emblematic 
example.  
The first penetration to this vast agricultural region took place between "*', 
and "*%,: first, it regarded the port area (Tambo de Mora), where several Ligurians 
founded cabotage shipping companies. Afterwards, in compliance with the 
mentioned pattern from transport to production, many opened retail and 
wholesale shops to handle the distribution of the most commercialized local 
commodity, wine. After that, some moved to the countryside and purchased lands 
cultivated with vineyards. The relative backwardness – in terms of agricultural 
exploitation and production – of the area delayed of a couple of decades the closure 
of the access to new immigrants within this business. It is in this context, for 
example, that, before "*%$, Niccolò Oneto managed to acquire a piece of land and 
founded a wine-producing enterprise in Chincha Alta: then it was improved by his 
wife Elisa Mortola until a Genoese collateral acquired it in "$")854. To the name 
Mortola, but probably a different branch of the family, was tied another wine-
making firm: it is reconducted to the entrepreneurship of Anna Massa, widow of a 
 
852 G.B. Ferrari, La città dei mille bianchi velieri, p. +4$. The author reports confusing data 
concerning both locations and time. First, he locates the shop of Gaetano Figari, son of Niccolò, in 
«Barranquerra Alta», which is not a Peruvian toponym, but most likely corresponds to an 
Argentinian town. Secondly, he dates the attacks to the Italian properties to an alleged «Peruvian 
Revolution» occurred on &*th March &1)., an event which is never reported by the historiography. 
Some elements might suggest that he referred to the &15. Revolution – which took place during 
the Cacéres’ overthrowing by Piérola – when riots and attacks to the Italian community were 
repeated in the same fashion of the Chilean occupation (&114-&11+). See, G. Bonfiglio, Gli Italiani 
nella società peruviana, p. &5&. However, some data about age (Gaetano Figari arrived at Callao in 
&1.5 at age +1, so he was )/ in &15.) and other internal textual references make us not incline 
toward this option. Most likely, G.B. Ferrari made confusion and wanted to refer to the years of the 
Chilean occupation (&114-&11+).  
853 G. Bonfiglio, Gli Italiani nella società peruviana, pp. *&+-*&..  
854 The Italian entrepreneurship in the valley of Chincha is deeply analysed in: G. Bonfiglio, Gli 
Italiani nella società peruviana, pp. *&4-*+5. 
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Mortola, whose success allowed her to expand to other sectors, including a banking 
institute and a constructions company855.   
Conversely, the width and variety of the Italian community on the other side of 
the Latin American subcontinent (the Plata basin) complicated the identification 
of Camogli’s entrepreneurs. To this specific regard, the news provided by local 
historians and the scattered references found in academic literature delineate a 
pattern of business in line with the dominant model of Ligurian immigration, given 
the chronological delay of Camogli’s emigration and its results. Since maritime 
labour was the gateway to migration, the earliest immigrants invested mainly in 
shipping. Apart from several single-ship enterprises engaging to fluvial cabotage, 
which are hardly identifiable from the sources, the people of Camogli invested also 
in collateral activities connected with port service. For example, Gio. Batta 
Lavarello (d. "*)$) founded a tug boats company operating in the port of Buenos 
Ayres856. Already in "*)#, Lavarello met Nicolas Mihanovic (born nearby 
Dubrovnik, in the Austrian Empire), destined to become one of the most important 
shipowners of the Argentinian capital857: after the death of Gio. Batta, his wife 
Caterina Balestra offered to Mihanovic the direction of the company together with 
her elder sons, Francesco and Elia Lavarello. A few years later, in "*%#, Nicolas 
married Caterina858. Since Gio. Batta’s death, it is possible to follow the 
participation of his six sons throughout the business evolution of Nicolas 
Mihanovic, culminated in the foundation of the Sociedad de Navegación a Vapor 
 
855 Idem, p. *&1.  
856 He is mentioned with no further details in: M.C. Crescimbene, “Storia della collettività 
italiana in Argentina (&1+.-&5$.)”, p. */$. Then, see: L.I. Zanotti de Medrano, “De imigrante a 
empresário: formação e atuação da empresa de navegação fluvial de Nicolás Mihanovich (&1).-
&5&5)”, Historia Unisinos, No. 5:+, *44., pp. &51-*&4.  
857 On this figure: L.I. Zanotti de Medrano, “De imigrante a empresário: formação e atuação da 
empresa de navegação fluvial de Nicolás Mihanovich (&1).-&5&5)”, pp. &51-*&4; L.G. Caruso, “La 
Mihanovich: trabajo marítimo, condiciones laborales y estrategia patronal en las primeras décadas 
del siglo XX”, Trabajadores, No. *, *4&&, pp. &*1-&.$; B. Kadic, “Los hermanos Mihanovich, 
fundadores de la Flota Mercante Argentina”, Studia Croatica, Revista de Estudios Políticos y 
Culturales, No. *, &5$&.  
858 L.I. Zanotti de Medrano, “De imigrante a empresário: formação e atuação da empresa de 
navegação fluvial de Nicolás Mihanovich (&1).-&5&5)”, p. *4&.  
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Nicolás Mihanovich in "***859. The structure of the firm, indeed, reflected the co-
participation of the family Lavarello to Mihanovic’s business, despite it hold the 
name of its founder. Elia was vice-president and managing director, whereas 
Giovanni and Luigi were directors860. The Mihanovic company engaged also to 
shipbuilding: Carlo Lavarello was the director of this branch and Giovanni and 
Luigi were council members861.  
Apart from the specific case of the Mihanovic-Lavarello, the Ligurian fluvial 
entrepreneurship in the area rarely led to the creation of big shipping companies. 
Limitedly to Camogli’s case, for example, it is possible to observe a line of 
continuity in terms of shipping business practices between the hometown and the 
migrant communities. Chain migration was primarily on familiar basis and then 
expanded to the town; occasional partnerships with exogenous members were 
possible (e.g. G.B. Ferrari speaks about the Mortola & Canevaro, in Buenos Ayres 
or the Risso & Schiaffino at Montevideo)862, but they rarely acquired permanent 
character. Thus, the shipping activities of Camogli’s expatriates in this area lacked 
capital concentration and, therefore, the means to sustain foreign competition on 
the long run.  
Finally, several seafarers from Camogli, settled in Argentina and Uruguay, 
having retired from a maritime career, sought for new opportunities in different 
markets: some remained in the shipping sector and opened ship-chandler shops, 
many hold pulperias at the Boca, others went to the inner regions of these 
countries. Unfortunately, the research conducted in the sources kept in the 
archives of the Sardinian and Italian Foreign Affairs was rather unsuccessful863. 
Five members of the family Schiaffino were registered within the Sardinian 
population in Rosario ("*''): Antonio, Gaetano and Francesco were defined as 
 
859 L.G. Caruso, “La Mihanovich: trabajo marítimo, condiciones laborales y estrategia patronal”, 
p. &+&.  
860 L.I. Zanotti de Medrano, “De imigrante a empresário: formação e atuação da empresa de 
navegação fluvial de Nicolás Mihanovich (&1).-&5&5)”, p. *4*.  
861 Ibidem.  
862 G.B. Ferrari, Capitani di mare e bastimenti di Liguria, p. /*1.  
863 The papers related to the Sardinian period can be found in Turin: AST, Consolati nazionali, 
Buenos Ayres,  
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traders, Prospero was a painter and Rocco was labelled as merchant and owner864. 
Another Schiaffino, Niccolò, is mentioned among the subscribers of the 
construction company to construct the Italian Hospital in Buenos Ayres, in "*)(865. 
Then, Antonio Capurro, Giovanni Cichero and Eugenio Ferrari appear in the list of 
the Italian citizens who were damaged during the siege of Paysandù, an Uruguayan 
city attacked by the Brazilian troops in "*)&866.  
Nevertheless, these scattered data are incomplete and unsystematic. Therefore, 
in this case, a brief reference to the sparce news provided by local historians is 
needed, at least to delineate a general framework of Camogli’s entrepreneurship in 
Argentina and Uruguay.  
In "*$&, at age "#, Gio. Bono Ferrari, the major local historian of Camogli, 
migrated to Buenos Ayres personally to reach his father, Giuseppe Ferrari ("*'$-
"$((), son of Gio. Bono. Giuseppe had spent his first years embarked on the brig 
Geronima Ferrari, owned by his father, but he never obtained the captain’s license. 
He married young, in "**", and, in the following year, left Camogli to make fortune 
in Argentina: after a short period in Bahia Blanca, Giuseppe was employed on 
board of the steamer Carhué, commanded by his uncle Francesco Bisso and, then, 
was embarked on sailing vessels engaging to fluvial navigation in the Paranà. 
Afterwards, he founded a trade company with an acquired cousin from Recco 
(Gaetano Cavalli): this business earned good profits, as during the "*$,s it 
consisted of three shops and employed various people. Finally, in "$,&, Giuseppe 
Ferrari decided to return to Camogli867.  
As said, his son Gio. Bono reached him to Buenos Ayres in "*$&: until "$,&, the 
future founder of Camogli’s maritime museum worked in the familiar business. 
Afterwards, not willing to continue in retailing, Gio. Bono moved to the interior, 
 
864 AST, Consolati nazionali, Buenos Ayres, b. *, Primi elementi pel censo italiano a Rosario, 
Paranà, Santa Fé e Diamante, nella Confederazione Argentina.  
865 AMAE, Affari Esteri, b. 1$), Buenos Ayres, Commissione edilizia dell’Ospedale Italiano. On 
this argument, see: D. Sacchi, “I consoli e l’ospedale: le prime collette per la fondazione 
dell’ospedale italiano di Buenos Ayres (&1.+-&1.1)”, Quaderni storici, No. /&:+, *44$, pp. $+5-$$5.  
866 AMAE, Serie Politica A, b. +, Elenco dei reclami presentati alla Regia Delegazione Consolare 
d’Italia a Paysandù dai sudditi italiani ivi stabiliti.  
867 Part of these information come from: Gio. Bono Ferrari, Fasti e nefasti della famiglia Ferrari. 
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to work as accountant in a grain trade company settled in the region northward 
than Santa Fé. On these bases, there is a deep methodological difference between 
the representativity of Gio. Bono Ferrari’s accounts on Camogli’s history, based on 
the collection of oral witnesses, and the sections about the late nineteenth-century 
Buenos Ayres, grounded on first-person knowledge.  
According to G.B. Ferrari, the number of the owners of pulperias (retail shops) 
and almacen (wholesale shop) from Camogli was almost uncountable: surnames as 
Antola, Olivari, Mortola, Repetto, Maggiolo, Massa, Schiaffino, Valle and Simonetti 
are all reported in his account868. Then, for their limited numbers, the author is 
more detailed when describing the activities of those who engaged to the 
productive sectors. There were small-scale industrials, such as Aurelio and Eugenio 
Ferrari: the former founded a factory of textiles, the latter one engaged to wooden 
and iron manufactures. Lorenzo Schiaffino, instead, opened a lumbermill. Samuele 
Ansaldo explored the mines of Catamarca, in the Andin region, at the north-
western borders of Argentina. Salvatore Ferro embarked on a colonization process 
in Patagonia; Federico Valle became a wheat merchant in Santa Fé; a Mortola tried 
to set up a mulberry plantation in an island along the Paranà river869.  
 
F.C. A case of migration by accident: the foundation of 
the Camogli’s community in Tristan da Cunha 
(8PT=) 
 
This last and short section deviates from the systematic analysis of Camogli’s 
migration flows and aims at reconstructing the unique case-study of the 
permanent settlement of two sailors from Camogli, Andrea Repetto and Gaetano 
Lavarello, in the island of Tristan da Cunha, in the Atlantic Ocean. For its 
exceptionality, the event is well-known in Camogli and local historians 
reconstructed it in details. Most of the information arises from the personal 
 
868 G.B. Ferrari, Capitani di mare e bastimenti di Liguria, p. /*).  
869 Idem, p. /*1.  
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memory of the sailor Agostino Lavarello, cousin to Gaetano, who, in "*$#, 
shipwrecked together with him on the Atlantic island870.  
Indeed, the origins of Camogli’s community in Tristan da Cunha were rooted on 
a specific event, the shipwreck of the barque Italia (",%& t.), built in "**# by B. 
Cerruti in the shipyards of Varazze871. The barque belonged to the Michele and 
Andrea Dall’Orso, shipowners of the Ligurian city of Chiavari, ca. #, kilometres 
distant from Camogli. As seen in Chapter #, during the first half of the nineteenth 
century, several members of the Dall’Orso family had engaged into the Black Sea 
grain trade, both as merchants and carriers. In the following years, some of them 
continued to practice shipping (in "*$,, Michele and Andrea owned seven 
barques)872. It was not uncommon for Camogli’s seafarers to be employed on board 
of ships belonging to the nearby communities, especially because of the crisis 
which Camogli’s shipping was experiencing in the last decades of the century. 
Indeed, at the moment of the departure, in May "*$", the crew of the barque Italia 
was composed of seventeen people: the captain Orlando Perasso (from Chiavari), 
a Genoese mate, five seaman from Camogli (including the boatswain), seven 
seamen from Grottamare, on the Adriatic side of Central Italy (including the 
steward, two ordinary seamen and a ship-boy), another ordinary seaman from 
Lavagna, and two cabin-boys, one from Genoa and the other from Milan.  
The group from Camogli included: Fortunato Schiappacasse (boatswain),  
Agostino Lavarello (able seaman), Gaetano Lavarello (able seaman), Antonio 
Gardella (able seaman) and Andrea Repetto (able seaman).  
The research throughout the Matricole allowed us to reconstruct the careers of 
Gaetano Lavarello and Andrea Repetto, the founders of Camogli’s community to 
Tristan da Cunha. Gaetano Lavarello, son of Gio. Batta and Cecilia Oneto, was born 
on the $th December "*)%; Andrea Antonio (his second name) Repetto, son of 
Agostino and Maria Lagno, was born on the "(th January of the same year.  
 
870 CMMC, Il naufragio del Brigantino a Palo “Italia”. The memory was then published into the 
second publication of Camogli’s maritime museum: A. Bertolotto (ed.), Agostino Lavarello. Ultimo 
viaggio del brigantino a palo Italia nel $>M!, Camogli: Quaderni del Museo *, &5)+.   
871 Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro $>M2.  
872 Ibidem.  
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Gaetano’s first embarkment took place in "*%$, as ship-boy on board of the 
barque Paola Revello, where he remained for almost one year engaging to the Black 
Sea and British trades. After four services along these routes, Gaetano’s first 
transoceanic voyage occurred in "**( (as ordinary seaman), on the barque Paola 
R. to Montevideo. Then, he continued his maritime career along the oceanic 
routes; finally, on the 'th May "*$", Gaetano embarked on the barque Italia, from 
where he disembarked in Tristan da Cunha on the (rd October "*$#, as a result of 
the shipwreck873.  
Andrea began his maritime career in September "**,; throughout the first two 
years, Andrea collected less than four months at sea, as ship-boy in voyages of 
Tyrrhenian cabotage. Then, between "**( and "**%, he engaged to transoceanic 
routes, in particular to North American destinations. Finally, in "*$", he resumed 
navigation and got on board of the barque Italia874.  
The written memory left by Agostino Lavarello offers many details useful to 
describe the routes and the traffics of the barque Italia. Departed from Genoa with 
a mineral cargo, the barque arrived thirty-five days later to Swansea. There, it 
loaded coal and embarked upon a long voyage – it lasted one-hundred and six days 
– to Penang. After a brief passage on ballast to Rangoon, the barque Italia was 
chartered with a teak cargo to Greenoch, in Scotland. The passage lasted one-
hundred and forty-seven days. Finally, on the (rd August "*$#, it received a coal 
cargo to be consigned at Cape Town875.  
On the #*th September, the crew noticed that the coal cargo had caught fire. 
After several unsuccessful attempts to extinguish the fire, the captain opted for 
controlling it in order to endure as much as possible and to sail toward Tristan da 
Cunha. During the night of the #nd October, then, the hold exploded without 
destroying completely the barque, which was still ', miles far from Tristan da 
Cunha. On the following day, they were able to disembark on the desert and rocky 
side of the island and, therefore, spent there the next eight days before being able 
 
873 ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare, r. *), n. &5)1&.  
874 Idem, r. +4, n. *&5&). 
875 A. Lavarello, Ultimo viaggio del brigantino a palo Italia nel $>M!, pp. *-+.  
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to find help from the local community. Finally, on the "&th October, the crew 
arrived to Edinburgh of the Seven Seas, the only inhabited site of the island876.  
At the time of the arrival of the Italian shipwrecked, Tristan da Cunha was 
populated by forty-seven people. The earliest permanent settlements to this 
remote island date to "*")-"*"%, when the English navy sent a garrison to prevent 
any possible attempt to free Napoleon from Saint Helena. After "*#", most of the 
garrison left, apart from a small number of people, among which was William 
Glass, who became the first governor of the island. In the following years, groups 
of black women from Saint Helena and South Africa were sent to Tristan da Cunha 
to integrate with the dominant male population. In "*(), an American schooner 
shipwrecked, and three of the people on board decided to stop. Among them, there 
was the Dutch Peter William Groen (later Green), governor in "*$#. The 
population was mainly composed by women: in "**', male inhabitants 
represented only "&,)%% of the total.  
The economy of the island was obviously based on subsistence: farming, fishing 
and potato crops provided to the population the means for survival. Since Tristan 
da Cunha was located outside the average routes, it was rarely reached by vessels. 
The only exception was represented by American whalers, which anchored there 
for provisions in exchange of clothes and textiles877. Thus, before being completely 
rescued (apart from Gaetano and Andrea, who decided to remain there), the Italian 
crew was hosted for four months by the residing community. Actually, the first 
group (the mate and some sailors) embarked, after fifteen days, on an American 
barque directed to Adelaide (Australia): the lack of sufficient provisions impeded 
to the whole crew to do the same878. In the following weeks, various whalers arrived 
to the island but refused to take the Italian sailors to Cape Town in order to not 
waste the hunting season. Meanwhile, the remaining sailors gradually integrated 
with the local community: since the island was prevalently populated by women, 
the presence of strong young males was naturally more than welcomed. 
 
876 Idem, pp. /-&$.  
877 Idem, p. *4.  
878 Idem, pp. **-*+.  
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Furthermore, their manual skills were highly appreciated: according to Agostino, 
«the people of the island regarded us as people fell from the sky, due to the fact 
that we were able to do anything and we were hard workers»879.  For instance, they 
made potato sacks with the remaining sails and the boatswain, being a decent 
carpenter, was able to repair the chariots880.  
Seemingly, it was during these months spent as members of the community that 
Gaetano Lavarello fell in love with a local, «Gini Glass»881 and decided to marry her 
and settle in the island for his future days. The same decision was then taken by 
Andrea Repetto. Finally, the rest of the group, including Agostino Lavarello was 




The present chapter aimed at reconstructing the actions of those who abandoned 
the community of Camogli to establish abroad.  
The analysis of desertion rates outlined how occupational continuity was crucial 
in determining the choices of Camogli seafarers. The remarkable rates of desertion 
observed in a positive period for the local shipping business and the pattern of 
deserting ports make Camogli an exceptional case-study within the Italian 
framework. In the "*),s, the seafarers of Camogli implemented a market-driven 
professional choice at the moment of desertion: they disembarked in the British 
ports, where it was easier to found more profitable employments in the same 
sector. Thus, they demonstrated market awareness and to be able to move within 
an international maritime labour market, pointing out an approach more similar 
to that of Northern Europeans than to those of their fellows Italians.  
The examination of Camogli’s migration patterns to Latin America, instead, 
inscribed our case-study within the broader Ligurian model. The predominance of 
 
879 Idem, p. *&.  
880 Ibidem.  
881 Idem, p. *+.  
882 Idem, pp. *+-*..  
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maritime-related occupations in the countries of destination is as fundamental for 
Camogli’s outward migration as for several nearby communities (e.g. Recco, Santa 
Margherita, Chiavari, Sori etc.). Moreover, apart from few exceptions, Camogli’s 
immigrants arrived in already-existing Ligurian communities, which favoured 
their integration. Thus, from a general perspective, the pattern of  Camogli’s 
migration was consistent with the Ligurian model, albeit some peculiarities. 
Firstly, Camogli’s immigration started at least with a gap of one generation in 
comparison with the Ligurian average ("*#,-"*(,), due to Camogli’s exceptional 
success in shipping which deprived its inhabitants from most of the push factors 
until the "*%,s. Secondly, the correlation with maritime activities was even stricter 
than in the case of Ligurians, at the point that it is hardly possible to find newly-
arrived immigrants employed in different occupations than shipping.  
These characteristics led the way to propose a positive business model for 
Camogli’s immigrants in Latin America: after their arrival as seafarers, they were 
firstly employed in the shipping business, mostly in cabotage (Peru) and fluvial 
navigation (the Plata basin). Then, the most successful among them became 
shipowners and integrated with the upper ranks of the Italian migrant societies 
(Giovanni Figari and the Lavarello Bros.): these people covered important 
positions within the social and economic networks of the Italian community (e.g. 
mutual aid societies and hospitals). Others decided to definitively abandon 
shipping and devoted themselves to alternative businesses: in general, the sources 
delineate an upstream movement through the supply chain, from transport 
(shipping) to retail (pulperias), from wholesale (almacén) to production (wine 
factories, wood and iron manufactures, cultivation etc.).  
Finally, we provided an account on an extraordinary case-study for the 
underdeveloped theme of migrations determined by shipwrecks. This kind of 
events became progressively rarer, because the development of world shipping 
enhanced the sea borne connections with the remotest places of the globe. 
Nevertheless, the settlement of two sailors from Camogli to Tristan da Cunha, 
occurred at the end of nineteenth century, might represent one of the most 
emblematic results of the globalisation process to which the Ligurian community 









From charcoal cabotage to oceanic tramp shipping, the trajectory of Camogli 
throughout the nineteenth-century is emblematic for the history of Mediterranean 
sailing shipping communities. The passage from the first phase (late eighteenth 
century – "*(,) to the second one ("*(,-"*%,) is related to the improvement of 
market integration and the enlargement of the geographic range. The causes of 
such step-forward can be identified in the inner potential belonging to the 
community and in the capability of the shipping elites to concentrate the 
investments in a profitable venture, the Black Sea grain trade.  
There, before the Crimean War, Camogli’s specialisation into shipping provided 
the Genoese merchants with a strong and trustworthy fleet, manned by 
experienced seafarers who visited the Black Sea ports with unbroken continuity. In 
the "*),s, the opening to foreign merchants and the access to Greek networks 
determined the transition from the Mediterranean to the British markets. The 
arrival of Camogli ships to the ports of the United Kingdom represented a decisive 
breakthrough in the history of the Ligurian community: from the creation of an 
integrated wheat-coal route in and out the Mediterranean, the captain-shipowners 
of Camogli established initial contacts with the British freight market. Afterwards, 
when steam competitiveness rose and steamships seized the Black Sea grain trade, 
the people of Camogli were ready to expand to oceanic shipping. Each step-forward 
of Camogli was determined by previously established relationships: similarly to a 
chain, every phase was preliminary to the next one. The transport of grain for 
Ligurian merchants was needed to mature expertise of the Black Sea market; the 
integration with the Greek networks was pivotal to access the British freight 
market; the establishment of a wheat-coal route opened to Camogli the coal trade; 
later, the international demands for coal unlocked other trades, particularly South-
Eastern Asian rice and North-American timber. Until the late "*%,s, the spatial 
enlargement corresponded to the rise of the community shipping business; 
afterwards, the direct correlation between geographic expansion and economic 
growth ceased. From the "**,s, the fleet of Camogli was gradually marginalised 
into low-profitable transports, whose scarce viability inverted the curve and 
 ('& 
exacerbated the decline of the community. In the last decades of the nineteenth 
century, Camogli lost its position within the international shipping world. At the 
turn of the century, the attempts to realise the transition from sail to steam 
represented the last backlash. Since the previous period, the shipowners of 
Camogli had replenished their fleets by operating on the second-hand market: the 
same pattern was followed for the construction of the steam fleet, whose outdated 
structural characteristics and tonnage prevented these shipowners from retrieving 
remarkable profits.  
Throughout these processes, the community itself changed dramatically. 
Firstly, it underwent a demographic boom, as a result of the generally improved 
economic conditions and of the new position which the old fishing village had 
acquired within its sub-regional area. Secondly, the shipping revenues favoured 
the promotion of a modern shipping elite, which invested in the amelioration of 
the local infrastructures, and founded educational and cultural institutions which 
survived to their fortunes. Thirdly, Camogli became a point of reference for the 
Italian maritime sector: in "**,, the city hosted the First Congress of the Italian 
Shipowners and, on the following year, the local shipowners partook to the 
National Inquiry over the conditions of the merchant marine. In these occasions, 
from Camogli emerged economic policies of national interest which shaped the 
Italian maritime world for the next decades. Fourthly, Camogli’s maritime labour 
underwent dramatic transformations. The old-fashioned mutualistic structure 
based on «share» payments was substituted by modern salaries and, to a certain 
extent, to the proletarization of seafarers. The ranks of shipownership were 
gradually closed to newcomers from below: the professionalisation of masters and 
the increased business volume required to engage to shipping curbed vertical 
mobility. The optimisation of labour productivity and the contraction of the fleet 
concurred to disrupt the pre-existent endogenous labour market by curtailing the 
demands for maritime labour. In force of this, several seafarers abandoned either 
navigation or, physically, the community itself. The most qualified made the 
transition to steam: based on the local nautical school, Camogli produced deck and 
engine officials for the Italian merchant marine long after its demise as a shipping 
centre. Others abandoned the community and the Italian shipping to found more 
 ('' 
profitable employments abroad: among them, a first group embarked on foreign 
European fleets, following career paths comparable to those of the Northern 
European seafarers. A second group, instead, transferred to Latin America. There, 
they found reception among the pre-existent Ligurian communities, to which also 
belonged a restricted list of early-comers from Camogli. At first, they were 
employed in maritime-related businesses, such as cabotage or fluvial shipping; 
afterwards, several quitted navigation to dedicate to commerce and production.  
Throughout this century-old history, the effects of global-scale processes, such 
as the transition from sail to steam and the globalisation, played a crucial role in 
the configuration of the community. From the desertion of the Black Sea trade 
onwards, the trajectory of Camogli’s shipping was determined by the global 
competition of sail against steam. Momentous events occurring on the broader 
scale, such as the construction of the Suez Canal, exerted their impact on Camogli 
and his seafarers. Besides, other technological innovations, such as the invention 
of cable telegraph, transformed the nature of maritime professions and disrupted 
the previously established social and power relationships.  
The present thesis aimed to provide a contribution to the analysis of the global 
transformations which invested the nineteenth-century maritime world. The 
representation of the case-study of Camogli glanced at an understudied area for 
the nineteenth-century maritime studies, the Mediterranean Sea. Under this light, 
the Ligurian community served as a privileged observatory to the world. However, 
the accent on the global scale must not obliterate the local dimension. The 
community of Camogli was integrated within the global transformations but, at 
the same time, was responsible for its unique responses, reactions and 
readjustments. The establishment in the Black Sea trade, the "*),s-"*%,s massive 
campaign of constructions and the financial bubble of "*%* – only to mention some 
of the most distinguishing events – compose a unique picture, which cannot be 
found elsewhere with identical characteristics. Camogli is not a paradigm; it is a 
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